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
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON ARISTOTLE AND ELITISM

RALPH MCINERNEY

IT IS OFTEN SAID THAT ARISTOTLE, since he locates human happiness preeminently in the exercise of speculative intellect,—and not when it is in quest of truth about the divine, but when it can exercise that activity on truths already known in contemplation,—effectively rules out the mass of mankind from human happiness. That this is a misunderstanding of what is going on when Aristotle identifies happiness preeminently with the exercise of our highest faculty is easily shown. But since the showing of it brings into play other aspects of Aristotle's alleged elitism, the showing of it is not without interest.

I.

What does Aristotle mean by 'man'? A preliminary question that must be raised is what the range of 'man' or 'human' is when Aristotle says things like "All men by nature desire to know" or that "Man is by nature a political animal" or speaks of 'human happiness.' Aristotle restricts what he has to say about politics to citizens and not all members of a community are citizens. Slaves are notably excluded, and so too are women. Thus, quite apart from the alleged elitism within Aristotle's moral and political discussions, there seems to be an elitism of exclusion before the discussion even begins.

There are several ways in which this difficulty can be discussed. First, historically, and then there is unquestionably a restricted range to Aristotle's teaching. Second, theoretically, where the undeniable restraints of Aristotle's historic setting may be overcome by suggesting that there is no intrinsic reason in what he teaches for such restrictions. For centuries, at least, women have read—and interpreted—Aristotle's moral and political writings without fear that they do not fall within the range of what he has to say. This could only be the case if

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they are convinced, rightly, that the *de facto* restrictions are not *de iure*.

One could raise similar questions about the Declaration of Independence and other constitutive documents of our republic. Many of the founders approved of slavery, and women were not initially accorded the franchise and thus full admission to the body politic. If we reject these views, this is not because we wish to impose latter day opinions on earlier opinions, but rather because we think that the founders wrote better than they knew. When, over time, former slaves and women were admitted to full citizenship, it was not necessary to amend the statements of the founders so much as to set aside contingent and mistaken restrictions that attached to their recognition of the truths they set down. When Jefferson wrote that all men are created equal and are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, among them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, it is doubtless historically true that he was not thinking of all men *tout court*. Nonetheless, what he said is true of all persons and it was only the range of his remark that had to be corrected.

So too, I suggest, with Aristotle. That he personally did not acknowledge the full range of the moral and political doctrine he proposed is unfortunately true; but it is equally true that what he had to say, when true, is true of all human persons.¹

¹ It will be said that Aristotle himself from time to time recognizes the expandability of what he is saying beyond citizens. "And any chance person—even a slave—can enjoy the bodily pleasures no less than the best man; but no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness—*unless he assigns to him also a share in human life*." Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.6.1177a6–10, trans. W.D. Ross, rev. J.O. Wilson, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 1860 (hereafter, *NE*). Perhaps as well the remark in *NE*, 1.9 where, after noting that happiness is the result of virtue, Aristotle goes on, "It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue, may win it by a certain kind of study and care." *Ibid.*, 1.10.1099b18–20, p. 1737. Such maiming would seem to be incidental to our shared nature which as such is perfected by actions appropriate to it. Aristotle is here arguing against the view that happiness is a result of chance, of good luck; but the maiming that might prevent a given person from acquiring the virtue that will make him happy, provided this is not due to previous bad actions of his own, would seem to be a matter of bad luck.

II.

Can all humans be happy? But even when such liminal restraints on the possible range of Aristotle's moral doctrine are lifted, there remains the issue of how applicable his final identification of happiness is to all those he would have considered to be his addressees. If only the philosophical life, the life of contemplation of the divine, counts as happiness, this seems restrictive indeed. We may know of even professional philosophers who seem incapable of human happiness in this sense. We might in moments of candor wonder about ourselves. In quest of a proper understanding of contemplative happiness, let us put before us, in its broad outlines, the order of the discussion in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

a) *That there is an Ultimate End.* Beginning with a list of human activities—which list, perceptive commentators have seen, covers the range of possible human pursuits—Aristotle observes that they all aim at some good. This suggests the primary sense of 'good,' viz. that at which all things aim, the end. If the activities with which the chapter begins, exhaust the kinds of human activity, and if they all aim at the good, it follows that every human act is undertaken with an eye to some end. All this can mean at this point is that "aiming at the end or good" is predicably common to all human activities, not that there is some one end of our every activity. But that there is such an end Aristotle intends to show.

First, a distinction among ends. Some lie beyond the activities that seek them, as the work lies beyond artistic activity, while others are to be found in the activities themselves. Then, indicating that he is as aware of this as those who have presumed to inform him of it, Aristotle notes that as there are many kinds of activity having ends appropriate to them, there are many different ends. But it is because the end of an activity can be ordered to the end of another activity, that there can be a linking of ends. Indeed, in the case of the orchestration of the arts and skills that go into the construction of a building, the master-builder directs their ends to the over-all end of a new building. Something similar is seen in the cluster of subordinated and subordinating arts that make up the military whose ultimate end is victory. Wouldn't it be a marvelous thing if there were some end which related to all we do as victory relates to all military activities and the construction of a new building gathers together the ends of all the build-

ing trades at the site? Aristotle next goes on to show that it would be incoherent to deny that there is such an ultimate end.

The purpose of the opening of 1.2 is not often seen. But the force of the passage lies in the parenthetical remarks which support the premisses. And they support the premisses by reducing to absurdity their denial. Anyone who denies that there is an ultimate end of all that we do, specific ends terminating finally in it, renders human action empty and vain. So, human action not being otiose and absurd, there must be an ultimate end of human life. Such a reductive argument is used when the truth in question is not in need of proof, it being clear in itself. The reduction to absurdity of counterclaims is the appropriate defense of such first principles.

Knowledge of this end must be assigned to an authoritative and master art. "And politics appears to be of this nature."² We are then reminded that all overt human acts can fall under law and the law is meant to order them, not simply to their proper effects—for example, operating a motor vehicle—but to do so in a way that contributes to the overall good of the community. Thus, Aristotle, having defended the fact that there must be an ultimate end of all we do, goes on to show that such an end is presupposed by legislation. Moreover, there is a word for the good at which all our activities ultimately aim, and it is happiness.

To be happy is to live well, but as to what this consists of there is wide disagreement, some saying pleasure, others wealth, honor, health, money or a Separate Good. A methodological aside indicates that Aristotle does not regard all views on the matter to be equal: "... anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science, must have been brought up in good habits."³ But the distinction here between the word "happiness" and its applicants, opens the way to the crucial task of Book I, and that is to get clear on what the ultimate end or human happiness consists of. What are the conditions of happiness? How do we know which of the rival views is the right one? Only after Aristotle has established the conditions of happiness, can he ask what candidate or candidates fulfill these conditions.⁴ But ini-

² Ibid., 1.2.1094b, p. 1729.

³ Ibid., 1.4.1095b4-6, p. 1731. What might be called Aristotle's "methodological elitism" is summed up in the repeated maxim that in moral matters the good man is the measure.

tially he notes that three kinds of life have been recognized, each bearing on something taken to be ultimate and good, the life of pleasure, the political life and the contemplative life. And, beginning with the suggestion that honor might be the end of the political, Aristotle ends with linking it with virtue.⁵

b) *The conditions of happiness.* It is in Chapter 7 of Book 1 that Aristotle sets down five conditions an end will have to meet in order to be ultimate and worthy to be called happiness. Of happiness it can be said that:

1. It is always sought for itself and not for the sake of something else.
2. It is self-sufficient.
3. It is virtuous activity.
4. It is an activity of that which is best in us.
- 5 It is pleasant.

It is in establishing the third condition that Aristotle introduces the justly famous function- or *ergon*-argument.

c) *'Rational activity' as equivocal pro se.* The distinctive activity or *ergon* that sets man off from everything else is rational activity. But such a characteristic activity provides a basis for talking about 'well' and 'good.' Once we know what a carpenter's function is we can assess his performance and dub it well or poorly done. This is true of golfers, tanners, bankers, on and on. Thus, the isolation of man's function qua man enables us to say that to perform this function well makes for a good man. The 'well' of the function is its perfection or virtue. For a thing to do well the characteristic work of its kind is to make it a good instance of that kind.

But at the very point where he identifies the peculiarly human work, Aristotle makes clear that man's *ergon* has a range of meanings.

⁴ Similarly, Thomas Aquinas at the beginning of the moral part of his *Summa* will first establish the *ratio felicitatis* and then go on to ask what best fulfills or instantiates that formality. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* IaIIae, q. 1, a. 6 (Rome: Leonine Ed., 1891), Vol. 6, pp. 14–15. Thus, Aristotle can be said to be establishing the formal notion of happiness first, preparing the way for the eventual judgment as to what human activity best saves or embodies this formal notion.

⁵ *NE*, 1.5.

There remains, then, an active life of the element which has a rational principle; of this one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing or exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is meant, for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.⁶

We are not surprised, then, when he states this condition of happiness thus: "human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete."⁷

If 'activity of soul in accordance with virtue' is a phrase that is applied unequally, the same is true of 'virtue', something that is spelled out at the end of the book, thus setting the stage for the development of the subsequent books. In Chapter 13 of Book I, Aristotle introduces a rough account of the soul on which he can ground the various virtues. There is an irrational part of the soul as well as a rational part, and the former is also divisible into vegetative activity, which is not amenable to rational direction, and a part that shares in the rational principle, when it responds to the guidance of reason. But this latter part also wars against reason and it is no easy matter to bring it under the sway of reason. This is the primary moral task.⁸

But the rational principle also is twofold and thus its perfection or virtue cannot be spoken of univocally. The final words of Book I are of enormous importance.

Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference; for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral, philosophic wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man's character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues.⁹

The array of virtues is based on the complexity of the human agent who sometimes uses his mind theoretically and sometimes practi-

⁶Ibid., 1.7.1098a2-7, p. 1735.

⁷Ibid., 1.7.1098a17-18, p. 1735.

⁸"Now even this seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational principle—and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle." Ibid., 1.13.1102b26-28, p. 1742.

⁹Ibid., 1.13.1103a4-10, p. 1742.

cally, the latter use capable of swaying the irrational part that consists in desires consequent on perception. Of themselves, these appetitive activities of the irrational part seem at war with reason, but this need not be so—in the virtuous person they ‘speak with the same voice as the rational principle.’ The final sentence in the quotation above makes it clear that moral virtues have a greater claim on the term ‘virtue’ than do the intellectual virtues. Just as the secondary senses of healthy point to the primary meaning and have only that claim on the common term, so it is with ‘virtue.’ The primary sense of ‘virtue’ will shortly be explained in book 2 and it becomes clear that given that definition intellectual virtues are virtues only in a secondary and derived sense. So it is that when we speak of a life lived according to virtue we doubtless have in mind moral virtues. If not, we would, like Aristotle in the final lines of book 1, have to make a case for calling intellectual habits virtues. To say that intellectual virtues are such only in a derived and secondary sense does not mean that they are not really virtues—they are really the kind of virtues they are. But of course they are not virtues in the full sense that moral virtues are.

Many of the difficulties that are raised about the *Nicomachean Ethics* would perhaps not be raised if we were more attentive to the recognition in this work—as indeed throughout—of the way in which non-univocal shared names behave. It is one of his key contributions, as G. E. L. Owen has said,¹⁰ and if Aristotle does not quite bring it into play in his discussion of Plato’s separate good in chapter 6, it can be seen to define the very order of the work. These suggestions about the controlled equivocity of the term ‘virtue’ must be kept in mind when we follow Aristotle’s search for the virtuous activity which best saves the conditions of happiness laid out in book 1.

III.

Happiness and the philosophical life. a) *What fulfils the conditions of happiness?* When he has enumerated the conditions of happiness in book 2, Aristotle, true to the methodological remarks he has made earlier, tests what he has said by reference to common opinion.

¹⁰ Cf. G.E.L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” *Logic, Science, and Dialectic*, ed. Martha Nussbaum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), 180–99.

This decent respect for the opinions of mankind occupies chapters 8 through 11, and is anything but perfunctory. Moreover, it foreshadows the task that begins in chapter 7 of book 10, the identification of happiness by identifying the activity that best exemplifies the conditions of happiness.

This culminating task of the work reposes on everything that has intervened between it and book 1.

If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural guide and to take thoughts of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.¹¹

Aristotle now makes clear that contemplation is the activity that best saves the conditions of happiness. First, it is the best of the best, since reason bears on the best objects. Secondly, it is continuous. Third, it is most pleasant. Fourth, it is self-sufficient and, fifth, loved for its own sake. For good measure, he adds a sixth feature, since happiness is thought to depend on leisure. A good commentary will note that the conditions are ordered differently here than in book 1 and seek the reason why. But it suffices for our purposes to see the basis for the identification of contemplation and happiness.

Now this seems an odd upshot in a work that was billed at the outset as a political one. The political life has its own characteristic end and we might have expected the work to point to the aims and virtues and activities of the practical life. The introduction of the sixth condition, leisure, leads to a comparison and contrast of the contemplative and practical lives. But the activity of the virtues appropriate to the political life are not leisurely, and:

the action of the statesman is also unleisurely, and—apart from the political action itself—aims at despotic power and honors, or at all events happiness, for him and his fellow citizens—a happiness different from political action, and evidently sought as being different.¹²

This important passage does two things. First, it makes clear that political action does not save the conditions of happiness in the way that

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10.7.1177a12-18, p. 1860.

¹² *Ibid.*, 10.7.1177b12-16, p. 1861.

contemplation does. Second, political action is ordered to the happiness that is contemplation.

This is Thomas's understanding of the passage in the middle of chapter 7 of book 1 just after Aristotle has shown that the *ratio ultimi finis*, as Thomas calls it in the *Summa Theologiae*,¹³ the conditions of happiness, are best saved in contemplative activity, and has gone on to add that, over and above the five conditions or constituents of the notion of happiness, there is another, leisure. We are busy that we might have leisure. That is the crux. Earlier in speaking of games he had said that rest is a restorative and is ordered to work, but the leisure he has in mind now is that which rests in the possession of the end. That which aims at no end beyond itself can rest in that end, enjoy leisure, whereas the pursuit of an end ordered to another does not afford leisure or at least not in the same degree. Allow me to repeat the passage:

But the action of the statesmen is also unleisurely, and—apart from the political action itself—aims at despotic power and honors, or at all events happiness, for him and his fellow citizens—a happiness different from political action, and evidently sought as being different.¹⁴

Political life is ordered to an end beyond itself. The power and honor that seem to be its commensurate ends have already been dismissed as constituting happiness in book I, so the happiness to which political life is ordered cannot be reduced to those. The peace and tranquility afforded by the attainment of the end of the political life as such provides men with the opportunity of contemplating truth.¹⁵

The fact that contemplative activity best fulfils the conditions of happiness, does not mean that political life does not do so in a

¹³ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 1, a. 5, and 7.

¹⁴ Ibid., 10.7.1177b12–16, p. 1861.

¹⁵ "Secundo etiam hoc manifestum est in actionibus politicis quod non est in eis vacatio, sed praeter ipsam conversationem civilem vult homo acquirere aliquid aliud, puta potentatus et honores; vel, quia in his non est ultimus finis ut in I ostensum est, magis est decens quod per civilem conversationem aliquis velit acquirere felicitatem sibi ipsi et civibus, ita quod huiusmodi felicitas quam intendit aliquis acquirere per politicam vitam sit altera ab ipsa politica vita; sic enim per vitam politicam quaerimus eam quasi alteram existentem ab ipsa, haec est enim felicitas speculativa, ad quam tota vita politica videtur ordinata, dum per pacem, quae per ordinationem vitae politicae statuitur et conservatur, datur hominibus facultas contemplandi veritatem." Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* (Leonine, 1969), vol. 47.2, bk. 10, lectio 11, p. 587, ll. 36–51.

secondary way. Furthermore, as just seen, political life is ordered to the activity that does best fulfill those conditions. Like 'virtue', 'happiness' is a *pros hen* equivocal and there is no more reason for saying that political life does not provide real happiness, though in a secondary sense, than there would be to say that a diet is not really healthy because it is not healthy in the primary sense of the term.

b) *That contemplation is not exclusive.* Once it is appreciated that Aristotle's characteristic use of controlled equivocation does not allow the interpretation that only contemplation can be called happiness, and that political life, which provides happiness in a secondary sense, is ordered to that which is happiness in the fullest sense, it should be noted that Aristotle is speaking of the way in which we men can be happy. "If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled—but happy men."¹⁶ Even contemplation is, taking the conditions of happiness seriously, an imperfect happiness. Still, it is the happiness that men can achieve by action.¹⁷ Indeed, in his discussion of contemplation as preeminently happiness, Aristotle draws attention to those imperfections.

When Aristotle makes clear that the human *ergon*, life according to a rational principle, is a *pros hen* equivocal, with the activity of theoretical reason exemplifying the *ergon* most perfectly, practical reason less so, and the passions as they come under the sway of reason even less, we do not say that he is confining the term to that which saves its meaning best. So too with the concept of virtue developed modally from the analysis of the *ergon*. It is the 'well' or excellence of the characteristic activity, its virtue, that makes both the activity and the agent good. But virtue too is a *pros hen* equivocal. Is virtue in the primary sense the perfection of rational activity in the primary sense? No. Moral virtue, the bringing of the passions under rational control, is the primary sense of virtue. Does that lead to the denial that intellectual virtues are virtue? Of course not. Similarly, the fact that contemplation best saves the conditions of happiness and thus is happiness, should not lead us to think that the political life is not real

¹⁶ *NE*, 1.11.1101a19–20, p. 1740.

¹⁷ It is well known that it is this passage that leads Thomas Aquinas to say that Aristotle himself realized that we can only imperfectly realize the ideal of happiness. Given that, it can be said to relate as imperfect to the perfect happiness to which the Christian aspires.

happiness. That it fulfills the conditions of happiness less perfectly than contemplation is of course true, but as in the two cases just recalled, this ought not lead to the rejection of the practical life as not really productive of happiness. This is to impose a narrow and univocal outlook which is far from Aristotle's own ordered but expansive conception of human life.

Nor should it be overlooked that Aristotle has difficulty with the notion that contemplation is a human life. In order to satisfy himself on this point he makes the startling remark, "for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man."¹⁸ More than anything else. Not, to the exclusion of everything else. He goes on immediately to say that "in a secondary sense the life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this befit our human estate."¹⁹ It is practical wisdom, not theoretical, *phronesis* rather than *sophia*, which is typically human. Thomas Aquinas called prudence *sapientia viro*—the wisdom befitting a man. "The excellence of the reason is a thing apart . . ." ²⁰ Contemplation is the activity that is most divine—it is the activity that can be appropriately assigned to God, and our contemplation has God as its object—but we can never forget the complex nature of the human who engages in it. He will need the necessities of life like anyone else; he will need the society of friends like anyone else; and he must be morally virtuous, though his exercise of the virtues will differ from that of the person whose life is characterized by happiness in the secondary degree. Contemplation is the distinguishing mark of the philosophical life, but no human life could consist of it alone. It is, in fact, episodic. Even Homer nods and philosophers need their sleep, and this need stands for all the other factors of daily life that they continue to share with those whose happiness does not consist in contemplation.

But to show that the philosopher continues to share in activities more human than contemplation, that his life encompasses as well the virtues that define a lesser life, still leaves open the question whether the political life does not share in some way in contemplation. An analysis of the *Poetics* from this point of view is suggestive.

¹⁸ *NE*, 10.11.1178a6–7, p. 1862.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.8.1178a8–10, p. 1862.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.8.1178a21, p. 1862.

IV.

Tragedy and Contemplation. The most important thing about the *Poetics*, for our purposes, is that it was written by a philosopher.²¹ For Plato there is an ancient quarrel between the philosopher and poet, but the *Poetics* reveals a philosopher who spent a good deal of time at the theater where he rubbed elbows with fellow citizens who would have been, most of them, engaged in the practical life. But while watching the play, the practical man is not engaged in those activities thanks to which we dub him practical. Is he engaged in an activity similar to games, which had to be justified as refreshing us for future action?²² That aim would explain the presence neither of the philosopher nor the statesmen—or indeed the other citizens—at the theater. Aristotle gives several reasons why we delight in the imitation that characterizes poetry, the second of which is this:

to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it.²³

If that is generally true of poetry, we may ask what the philosopher and the rest of mankind learn from the tragedy. Whatever it is, they will learn it primarily through the plot.

Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is by our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse . . . So that it is the action in it, i.e., its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of tragedy; and the end is everywhere the chief thing.²⁴

²¹ One could make a similar point about the author of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. If he is engaged in the philosophical life, what is he doing teaching and writing, which are clearly practical activities? Remembering that we are reading a book by a presumed contemplative is perhaps the quickest corrective against understanding Aristotle's happiest man as a kind of Anthony in the desert.

²² *NE*, 10.6.1176b8–10, p. 1859.

²³ Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Ingram Bywater, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 4.1448b12–16, p. 2318.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.1450a15 ff, p. 2320.

Nor is the famous comparison of historian, poet, and philosopher unimportant for our purposes. Poetry is said to be more philosophical and of graver import than history,

since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters.”²⁵

It is human moral activity that provides the subject matter of tragedy, but the tragedy is not a moral treatise. What is its proper effect on the audience?

Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another; there is more of the marvelous in them than if they happened of themselves or by pure chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvelous if there is an appearance of design as it were in them.²⁶

The pity and fear have to do with the degree of involvement the spectator can feel with the actions depicted, but the wonderful or marvelous is the meaning which the plot conveys, not about moral action, but through it, of the ultimate ambience in which we act. The spectator is induced to ask “What does it all mean? What sense does life have if the tragic hero and/or heroine can be so cruelly visited with the effects of their actions?” It could be me. The tragic hero moves from happiness to misery, not because he is depraved, but because of a great error of judgment.²⁷

In feeling pity and fear, the spectator understands how prone the human agent is to effect what he does not intend. Yet the outcome of such things on the stage is meaningful, it makes a kind of sense. The audience, the philosopher and the rest of mankind, gets an intimation of the context within which human actions take place, the hint of an explanation. Call it a contemplative moment. There are many ways to get an intimation of the divine, and poetry, tragedy, is a way open to both philosopher and other citizens—and necessary to both.

The political man has been described as one who orders practical life beyond its own practical ends. The presence of a theater in a pol-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1451a6–10, p. 2322.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1452a1–8, p. 2323.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1453a15, p. 2325.

ity can, if I am right, be understood as providing a species of contemplation to the masses. Nor is this condescending when we realize that huddled with those masses is the contemplative as well. It is important to think of the contemplative as a habitue of the theater.

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THE FATE OF ANCIENT GREEK NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES: ISLAM AND WESTERN CHRISTIANITY

EDWARD GRANT

THE ENDURING IMPACT of ancient Greek science and natural philosophy on the civilizations of Islam and Latin Christianity is one of the great success stories in the history of the world. The successful transmission of Greek science into Arabic and then of Greek and Arabic science into Latin compels us to speak of “Greco-Islamic-Latin” science in the Middle Ages. It was Greco-Islamic-Latin science and natural philosophy that unquestionably set the stage for the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, which would otherwise have been impossible. The transmittal of science and natural philosophy from Greek to Arabic and from Greek and Arabic to Latin was largely a one way process, a one-way belt of transmission. There was little, if any, backward movement—that is, there were no meaningful translations from Arabic to Greek and from Latin to Arabic and Greek—and therefore no significant interactions between Western Christianity and Islam.

But if there were no mutual interactions in science and natural philosophy between Latin Christianity and Islam, the two religions on which I shall focus, there were important contrasts in the way each religious tradition responded to, and utilized, the scientific heritage it received. Perhaps the differences in their long-term responses to secular pagan philosophical and scientific learning were shaped to a lesser or greater extent by the culture and civilization in which each was born and the manner in which each came into being.

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I

Major Differences that Transcend Science and Natural Philosophy. Christianity was born inside the Roman Empire and was spread slowly and quietly, but persistently. By comparison with Islam, Christianity was disseminated at a snail's pace. Not until 300 years after the birth of Christ was Christianity effectively represented throughout the Roman Empire. Only in 313, by the Edict of Milan, or Edict of Toleration, was Christianity given full equality with other religions in the Empire. And it was not until 392—almost four centuries after the birth of Christ—that Christianity became the state religion, when the Emperor Theodosius ordered the closing of pagan temples and forbade pagan worship.

In striking contrast, Islam was spread over an enormous geographical area in a remarkably short time. In less than one hundred years after the death of Muhammad in 632, Islam became the dominant religion in a vast area stretching from the Straits of Gibraltar in the West to India in the East. Such a rapid spread could only have occurred by conquest. Where Christianity spread slowly, by proselytizing, Islam came from outside the Roman world as an alien intruder, and although its converts were pagans and often former Christians, the mind set of the invaders was one which viewed Greek learning as alien, as is illustrated by the fact that Muslims distinguished two kinds of sciences: the Islamic sciences, based on the Koran and Islamic law and traditions, and the foreign sciences, or "pre-Islamic" sciences, which encompassed Greek science and natural philosophy. We might say that the slow spread of Christianity provided Christians an opportunity to adjust to Greek secular learning, whereas Islam's rapid dissemination made its relations with Greek learning much more problematic.

Another dramatic difference concerns the relationship between church and state. From the outset, Christianity recognized the state as distinct from the church. The separation is encapsulated in these momentous words of Jesus: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Matt. 22:21). Thus did Jesus acknowledge the state and implicitly urge his followers to be good citizens. Although Church and state were contending powers throughout the Middle Ages, each acknowledged the independence of the other. They regarded themselves as two swords,

although, all too often, they were pointed at each other. Even when the church asserted supremacy over the state, however, it never attempted to establish a theocracy by appointing bishops and priests who were also to function as secular rulers. The tradition of the Roman state within which Christianity developed and the absence of explicit biblical support for a theocratic state were powerful constraints on unbridled and grandiose papal ambitions and, above all, made the imposition of a theocratic state implausible.

In Islam church and state are one. Religion cannot be understood apart from politics, and vice versa.¹ "The function of the state was to guarantee the well-being of the Muslim religion, so that all who lived within the state could be good, practicing Muslims."² Where religion is strong, as it was in medieval Islam, it is likely to dominate secular activities, such as natural philosophy. To avoid this consequence, at least one of the following conditions would be essential: (1) regard natural philosophy as a discipline that is distinct and independent from theology; or (2) a secular state protects natural philosophy; or (3) religious authorities regard natural philosophy favorably. While we shall see that the first and third conditions were met in the Latin West, none of the three conditions was met in medieval Islam.

A third significant difference between Islam and the medieval Christian West is organizational and structural. Islam has no overriding, central authority to determine its orthodoxy, whereas the Latin West had the papacy to insure adherence to the faith and to combat heresy. In brief, Islam is a kind of democratic religion that relies on consensus, whereas medieval Christendom was a centralized religion, headed by a single individual, the Pope, who, in principle, had supreme authority to determine and shape religious opinion and belief. From such a major structural difference, one might suppose that papal-dominated, centralized Christianity would have been far more restrictive and oppressive toward secular Greek learning than consensus-seeking Islam. The record shows, however, that the Church was favorably disposed toward secular learning, especially Aristotelian natural philosophy. In Islam, however, Aristotelian natural philosophy and the philosophers who studied it were often treated with

¹ See Reynold A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 182.

² Edward Grant, *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 183.

hostility. As we shall see, it was in Islam, rather than in the Latin West, that secular learning, philosophy, and, the "foreign sciences" in general, were subject to significant constraints and confronted considerable obstacles and prejudice.

Although there are *hadiths*, or traditions, in Islam that praise the unending quest for knowledge, "implying the endlessness of knowledge itself,"³ there are others that see a world that is steadily deteriorating. At least two *hadiths* express this attitude. In the first, the Prophet proclaims that "time has come full circle back to where it was on the day when first the heavens and the earth were created," and in the second he declares that "The best generation is my generation, then the ones who follow and then those who follow them."⁴ Both *hadiths* were often cited and commentaries were made upon them. "They suggest a universe running down, an imminent end to man and all his works."⁵ Such *hadiths* may have served as powerful elements in Islamic thought and custom. They may have encouraged those who sought to preserve the status quo, or who wished to turn the clock back as far as possible to create a society as close as possible to that which existed in the days of the Prophet Muhammad. It is plausible to suppose that such *hadiths* exerted an influence on attitudes toward Greek science and natural philosophy, the foreign sciences, which did not exist within Islam when it began.

Indeed, the influence of such *hadiths* may have affected the way Islam responded to the invention of the printing press. Although it takes us beyond the Middle Ages, it is relevant to mention the time and manner in which printing was introduced into Islam. Although the printing press had been in use in the West since around 1460, and its virtues were obvious, it was not introduced into Islam until 1727,⁶ when Ibrahim Müteferrika, described as "a renegade from the Hungar-

³ See Tarif Khalidi, "The Idea of Progress in Classical Islam," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 40 (Oct. 1981), 280.

⁴ A.J. Wensinck, *Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane* (Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill, 1936-1988), s.v. 'Zaman,' 'Umma.'" Cited in: Khalidi, "The Idea of Progress in Classical Islam," 279.

⁵ A.J. Wensinck, *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition, Alphabetically Arranged* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), s.v. 'Hour,' where *hadiths* about knowledge disappearing in the last days are cited. Cited in: Khalidi, "The Idea of Progress," 279.

⁶ See Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977), 381.

ian nobility,"⁷ established the first press. Even when introduced, the forces that had always opposed it exacted a price: only secular works could be printed, not sacred texts, including the Koran. In *The Ottoman Centuries*, Lord Kinross declares that

With the aid of a committee of twenty-five translators, he [Müteferrika] published a flow of works revealing to his adopted compatriots the mysteries of such objects of study as geography and cartography, in which he himself specialized; physics and astronomy, including a translation of Aristotle with information for the first time on the telescope and microscope, on magnetism and the compass, on the theories of Galileo; on mathematics in its various branches, with the discussion of the ideas of Descartes; and finally on medicine.⁸

As an indication that the Ottoman government still did not realize the power of the printing press, Müteferrika's death in 1745 resulted in the cessation of printing until 1783, a hiatus of nearly 40 years.⁹

There are undoubtedly other significant differences between Islam and Christianity, but we must now narrow our focus. Although Greek science and natural philosophy may have been regarded as foreign sciences in Islam, most of Greek science and natural philosophy were translated into Arabic and studied over the centuries. Scholars in the Islamic world made significant contributions to science and natural philosophy. Indeed, from around 1100 to 1500, sciences such as optics, astronomy, mechanics, mathematics, and medicine reached a higher state in Islam than in the medieval West. In what follows, however, I shall ignore the exact sciences, which posed no significant doctrinal problems for Islam or Christianity, and focus rather on natural philosophy, almost exclusively Aristotle's natural philosophy, which did indeed pose major problems for Islam and Christianity.

During the Middle Ages, Aristotelian natural philosophy was inherently more important than any single identifiable exact science. In the broadest sense, natural philosophy was the study of change and motion in the physical world. It was one of Aristotle's three subdivisions of theoretical knowledge, or knowledge for its own sake. As the very name suggests, the domain of natural philosophy was the whole of nature. It did not represent any single science, but could, and did, embrace bits and pieces of all sciences. In this sense, natural philoso-

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 382.

⁹ Ibid.

phy was "The Mother of All Sciences." But medieval natural philosophy was far more significant than is indicated by the mere fact that embedded within it were bits and pieces of different modern sciences. In a culture such as that of the Middle Ages, in which the tools for scientific research and inquiry were largely absent, how could nature be interpreted and analyzed in order to arrive at some understanding of a world that would otherwise be unknowable and inexplicable? The most powerful weapon available was human reason, employed in the manner that Aristotle had used it. The idea was to come to know what things seemed to be—and this could be done by empirical means—and then to determine what made them that way, a process that was largely guided by metaphysical and apriori considerations. In the ancient and medieval worlds, Aristotle's works represented the apotheosis of reason. Without reason, science cannot exist. It is the first indispensable element in the development of science and it was the characteristic feature of medieval natural philosophy. For these reasons, a comparison of the status of natural philosophy in medieval Islam and in the Latin West should tell us much about the potentiality for science within each civilization, and therefore provide some insight into a perennially perplexing question: why did Islam, which reached a higher state of scientific development in the Middle Ages than the Latin West, fail to continue its development, while the West, which started much later, surpassed Islam by 1600. One major result of any comparison between the relations of these two religions to Aristotelian natural philosophy will reveal that, in contrast with the West, Aristotelian natural philosophy in Islam had an uneasy and uneven existence. Let us see why.

II

Islam. Throughout the history of medieval Islam, the role of Greek philosophy was problematic. At any particular time, there were those who viewed it favorably, while others, undoubtedly a considerable majority, viewed it, at best, with indifference, and perhaps even with some degree of hostility. Occasionally the attitude of this or that caliph was instrumental in altering attitudes toward natural philosophy, but more often attitudes toward natural philosophy and Greek thought were governed by Muslim religious leaders, who exercised great influence in particular regions or cities. Not only was Greek phi-

losophy regarded as a foreign science, but the term *philosopher* (*faylasufs*) was often employed pejoratively.

In the intellectual hierarchy of medieval Islamic society, scholars distinguish three levels.¹⁰ Because Islam was a nomocracy, the first level was comprised of legal scholars. The religious law and traditions were valued above all else, and, therefore, valued even more than theology. Next in order came the *mutakallimun*, scholars who used Greek philosophy to interpret and defend the Muslim religion. The *mutakallimun* emphasized rational discourse, to which they added the authority of revelation. And, finally, at the bottom, were the *falasifa*, the Islamic philosophers, who followed rational Greek thought, especially the thought of Aristotle. Not surprisingly, the philosophers placed greatest reliance on reasoned argument while downplaying revelation. The philosophers sought to develop natural philosophy in an Islamic environment, and, as Abdelhamid I. Sabra has put it, did so, "often in the face of suspicion and opposition from certain quarters in Islamic society."¹¹

Of the three Islamic groups just distinguished, namely legal scholars, who were almost always traditionalists, the *mutakallimun*, and philosophers, the traditionalists made no real use of Greek philosophy, largely because they found it a threat to revealed truth and the Islamic faith. In their bitter struggle with each other and with the traditionalists, the *mutakallimun* and the philosophers made much use of Greek philosophy. The *mutakallimun* were primarily concerned with the *Kalam*, which, according to Sabra, is "an inquiry into God, and into the world as God's creation, and into man as the special creature placed by God in the world under obligation to his creator."¹² Thus *Kalam* is a theology that used Greek philosophical ideas to explicate and defend the Islamic faith.

Two groups of *mutakallimun* have been identified: the *Mu'tazilites*, who were the more extreme, and the *Ash'arites*.¹³ Both groups shared an attitude "against the passive acceptance of authority in matters of faith." It was their intention to replace the "passive acceptance

¹⁰ Toby Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 69.

¹¹ Abdelhamid I. Sabra, "Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology," in *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, vol. 9 (1994), 3.

¹² Sabra, "Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology," 5.

¹³ See *Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions*, ed. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1973), 205.

of authority" with "a state of knowledge (*'ilm*) rooted in reason."¹⁴ The Mu'tazilites were regarded as Islamic rationalists who equated the power of reason with that of revelation.¹⁵ They are said to have "made an outstanding contribution to Islamic thought by the assimilation of a large number of Greek ideas and methods of argument."¹⁶ These arguments and methods were not adopted for their own sake but rather for their utility in understanding the Islamic religion. In the ninth century, the Mu'tazilites gained the support of caliphs like al-Mamun and Mutassim, as well as influential intellectuals. The supportive caliphs persecuted those who opposed the Mu'tazilite belief that the Koran was created. They implemented a virtual inquisition. Because many thought their rationalism was extreme, the Mu'tazilites were regarded as heretics by many Sunni Muslims.¹⁷ Their ascendancy ended with the rule of the Sunni caliph al-Mutawakkil, who destroyed their movement.¹⁸

The Asharites, who followed the teaching of al-Ash'ari (d. 935), are the second group of mutakallimun. They broke with Mu'tazilism and replaced it as the main representatives of kalam. Ash'arism, however, was a complicated movement, with some of its followers emphasizing rationalism, while others argued in the traditionalist mode.¹⁹ Although the mutakallimun, both Mutazilites and Asharites, were severe critics of the philosophers, they were, in turn, themselves regarded as too rational and were bitterly opposed by more conservative Muslims, both from the Sunni and Shiite sides.

In treating of attitudes toward natural philosophy and science in medieval Islam, it is essential to have a good sense of the relationships between Muslim traditionalism and Muslim rationalism, which were engaged in an ongoing, and bitter, struggle about the role of Is-

¹⁴ Sabra, "Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology," 9.

¹⁵ Toby Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science*, 111.

¹⁶ William Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1985), 54.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁸ See Pervez Hoodbhoy, *Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1991), 99–100.

¹⁹ For a good account, see George Makdisi, "Ash'ari and the Ash'arites in Islamic Religious History," Parts I and II, in *Studia Islamica*, vol. 17 (1962), 37–80; and vol. 18 (1963), 19–39. Reprinted in George Makdisi, *Religion, Law and Learning in Classical Islam* (Hampshire, Great Britain: Variorum Collected Studies Series; Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing Co., 1991), I.

lam in intellectual life. George Makdisi provides a useful way to distinguish between Muslim traditionalism and Muslim rationalism by explaining that:

The traditionalists made use of reason in order to understand what they considered as the legitimate sources of theology: scripture and tradition. What they could not understand they left as it stood in the sources; they did not make use of reason to interpret the sources metaphorically. On the other hand, the rationalists advocated the use of reason on scripture and tradition; and all that they deemed to contradict the dictates of reason they interpreted metaphorically in order to bring it into harmony with reason.²⁰

The antithetical approaches of the Muslim traditionalists and the Muslim rationalists can be illustrated directly from the mutakallimun themselves, namely from the Mutazilites and Asharites. What was one to make of anthropomorphic statements in the Koran that speak of "the face of Allah, His eyes and hands, His sitting on His throne, and His being seen by the Faithful in Paradise."²¹ The strong tendency in Islam was to take such statements literally. Thus al-Ash'ari himself, for whom reason in theology was still important, declared that:

We confess that God is firmly seated on His throne. . . . We confess that God has two hands, without asking how. . . . We confess that God has two eyes, without asking how. . . . We confess that God has a face. . . .²²

Mutazilites, however, viewed these same statements metaphorically. God has no bodily parts; He has no parts or divisions; He is not finite. They also say that "He cannot be described by any description which can be applied to creatures, in so far as they are created . . . The senses do not reach Him, nor can man describe Him by analogy. . . . Eyes do not see Him, sight does not reach Him, phantasy cannot conceive Him nor can He be heard by ears."²³ I am unaware of any analogous discussion in the Christian West during the Middle Ages. Medieval Latin theologians regarded anthropomorphic descriptions of God as metaphorical pronouncements.

²⁰ George Makdisi, "Ash'ari and the Ash'arites in Islamic Religious History," Part II, in *Studia Islamica*, vol. 18 (1963), 22. Reprinted in Makdisi, *Religion, Law and Learning in Classical Islam*, I, 22.

²¹ See Arthur John Arberry, *Revelation and Reason in Islam: The Forwood Lectures for 1956, Delivered in the University of Liverpool* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), 22.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 23.

III

The Philosophers. Of the three groups distinguished earlier, the least popular were the philosophers, whom the mutakallimun and conservative Muslims attacked because they used natural philosophy and logic to acquire truth for its own sake, which usually signified that they were ignoring religion. One of the most significant Ash'arite thinkers, the famous al-Ghazali (1058–1111), leveled a devastating attack against philosophy. He was fearful of the detrimental effects on the Islamic religion of subjects like natural philosophy, theology (actually metaphysics), logic, and mathematics. In his famous quasi-autobiographical treatise, *Deliverance from Error*, he explained that religion does not require the rejection of natural philosophy, but that there are serious objections to it because nature is completely subject to God, and no part of it can act from its own essence. The implication is obvious: Aristotelian natural philosophy is unacceptable because it assumes that natural objects can act by virtue of their own essences and natures. That is, Aristotle believed in secondary causation—that physical objects are capable of causing effects in other physical objects. Al-Ghazali found mathematics dangerous because it uses clear demonstrations, thus leading the innocent to think that all the philosophical sciences are equally lucid. A man will say to himself, al-Ghazali related, “if religion were true, it would not have escaped the notice of these men [that is, the mathematicians] since they are so precise in this science.”²⁴ Ghazali explains further that such a man will be so impressed with what he hears about the techniques and demonstrations of the mathematicians that “he draws the conclusion that the truth is the denial and rejection of religion. How many have I seen,” al-Ghazali continues, “who err from the truth because of this high opinion of the philosophers and without any other basis.”²⁵ Although al-Ghazali allowed that the subject matter of mathematics is not directly relevant to religion, he included the mathematical sciences within the class of philosophical sciences (these are: mathematics, logic, natural science, theology or metaphysics, politics, and ethics) and concluded that a student who studied these sciences would be “infected with the evil and corruption of the philosophers. Few

²⁴ Translated in William Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1953), 33.

²⁵ Ibid.

there are who devote themselves to this study without being stripped of religion and having the bridle of godly fear removed from their heads."²⁶

In his great philosophical work, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, al-Ghazali attacked ancient philosophy, especially the views of Aristotle. He did this by describing and criticizing the ideas of al-Farabi and Avicenna, two of the most important Islamic philosophical commentators on Aristotle. After criticizing their opinions on twenty philosophical problems, including the eternality of the world, that God knows only universals and not particulars, and that bodies will not be resurrected after death, al-Ghazali declares:

All these three theories are in violent opposition to Islam. To believe in them is to accuse the prophets of falsehood, and to consider their teachings as a hypocritical misrepresentation designed to appeal to the masses. And this is blatant blasphemy to which no Muslim sect would subscribe.²⁷

Al-Ghazali regarded theology and natural philosophy as dangerous to the faith. He had an abiding distrust of philosophers and praised the "unsophisticated masses of men," who "have an instinctive aversion to following the example of misguided genius." Indeed, "their simplicity is nearer to salvation than sterile genius can be."²⁸ As one of the greatest and most respected thinkers in the history of Islam, al-Ghazali's opinions were not taken lightly.

In light of al-Ghazali's attack on the philosophers, it is not surprising to learn that philosophers were often subject to persecution by religious leaders. Many religious scholars regarded philosophy, logic and the foreign Greek sciences generally, as useless, and even ungodly, because they were not directly useful to religion. Indeed, they might even make one disrespectful of religion.²⁹ In the thirteenth century, Ibn as-Salah ash-Shahrazuri (d. 1245), a religious leader in the field of tradition (*hadith*), declared in a *fatwa* that "He who studies or teaches philosophy will be abandoned by God's favor, and Satan will overpower him. What field of learning could be more despicable than

²⁶ Ibid., 34.

²⁷ Cf. *Al-Ghazali's Tahafut al-Falasifah [Incoherence of the Philosophers]*, trans. Sabih Ahmad Kamali (Pakistan Philosophical Congress Publication, No. 3, 1963), 249.

²⁸ Ibid., 3.

²⁹ Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science*, 68.

one that blinds those who cultivate it and darkens their hearts against the prophetic teaching of Muhammad."³⁰ Logic was also targeted, because, as Ibn as-Salah, put it, "it is a means of access to philosophy. Now the means of access to something bad is also bad."³¹ Ibn as-Salah was not content to confine his hostility to words alone. In a rather chilling passage, he urges vigorous action against students and teachers of philosophy and logic, because:

Those who think they can occupy themselves with philosophy and logic merely out of personal interest or through belief in its usefulness are betrayed and duped by Satan. It is the duty of the civil authorities to protect Muslims against the evil that such people can cause. Persons of this sort must be removed from the schools and punished for their cultivation of these fields. All those who give evidence of pursuing the teachings of philosophy must be confronted with the following alternatives: either (execution) by the sword or (conversion to) Islam, so that the land may be protected and the traces of those people and their sciences may be eradicated. May God support and expedite it. However, the most important concern at the moment is to identify all of those who pursue philosophy, those who have written about it, have taught it, and to remove them from their positions insofar as they are employed as teachers in schools.³²

Although numerous others shared the attitude of Ibn as-Salah, logic continued to be used as an ancillary subject in scholastic theology (*Kalam*) and in many orthodox religious schools. But there was enough hostility toward philosophy and logic in Islam to prompt philosophers to keep a low profile. Those who taught did so privately to students who might have sought them out. Following the translations in the early centuries of Islam, Greek philosophy, primarily Aristotle's, received its strongest support from a number of individuals scattered about the Islamic world. Numbered among the greatest of Islamic natural philosophers are al-Kindi (801–873); Al-Razi (ca. 854–925 or 935); Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980–1037); and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126–1198). All were persecuted to some extent.

Al-Kindi's case reveals important aspects of intellectual life in Islam. The first of the Islamic commentators on Aristotle, al-Kindi was at first favorably received by two caliphs (al-Mamun and al-Mu-

³⁰ Ignaz Goldziher, "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the 'Ancient Sciences,'" *Studies on Islam*, ed. and trans. Merlin L. Swartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 205.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, 206.

tassim), but his luck ran out with al-Mutawakkil, the Sunni caliph mentioned earlier. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy,

It was not hard for the ulema to convince the ruler that the philosopher had very dangerous beliefs. Mutawakkil soon ordered the confiscation of the scholar's personal library. . . . But that was not enough. The sixty year old Muslim philosopher also received fifty lashes before a large crowd which had assembled. Observers who recorded the event say the crowd roared approval with each stroke.³³

The other four scholars were also subjected to some degree of persecution and a number of them had to flee for their safety.

Persecutions and harassment of those who advocated the use of reason to explicate revelation are unknown in the medieval Latin West after the mid-twelfth century, when Bernard of Clairvaux and other traditional theologians opposed the application of reason to theology. Bernard undoubtedly had much in common with Islamic traditionalist theologians. In his relentless assault on Peter Abelard, Bernard was convinced that Abelard's heresies, as he saw them, were the result of an excessive reliance on reason, as he makes clear in a letter to a Cardinal of the Church. "He has defiled the Church," Bernard declares,

[H]e has infected with his own blight the minds of simple people. He tries to explore with his reason what the devout mind grasps at once with a vigorous faith. Faith believes, it does not dispute. But this man, apparently holding God suspect, will not believe anything until he has first examined it with his reason.³⁴

Bernard's hostile attitude lingered on into the first forty years of the thirteenth century, but only at the University of Paris (though not at Oxford), where Church authorities first banned the books of Aristotle from public or private use, then sought unsuccessfully to censor them. By the 1240's, however, Aristotle's books of natural philosophy were taught and read at the University of Paris. Indeed, they had become the core of the curriculum in the arts faculty of that great medieval university.³⁵ After the 1240's, and for the rest of the Middle Ages, attacks on reason would have been regarded as bizarre and

³³ See Pervez Hoodbhoy, *Islam and Science*, 111.

³⁴ Bernard of Clairvaux, *The Life and Letters of St. Bernard of Clairvaux*, trans. Bruno Scott James (London: Burns Oates, 1953), letter 249, p. 328.

³⁵ For a brief account of the reaction to Aristotle's works at the University of Paris, see Grant, *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages*, 70–80.

unacceptable. Some theologians were opposed to certain of Aristotle's ideas, but, like St. Bonaventure, they used Aristotelian natural philosophy, and fully recognized that they could not do theology without it. Scholars were sometimes accused of heresy, and occasionally the Church tried to curb the excessive use of logic and natural philosophy in theological treatises, but I know of no instance where religious authorities sought to prevent the study of natural philosophy because it threatened religion. Indeed, as time passed, Aristotelian natural philosophy only became more entrenched in the medieval universities. By the time of the Galileo affair in the seventeenth century, the Church went to great lengths to defend and protect Aristotle's natural philosophy.

How different it was in Islam, if we judge by a question that Averroes posed in the twelfth century in his treatise *On The Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*. In this treatise, Averroes seeks to determine "whether the study of philosophy and logic is allowed by the [Islamic] Law, or prohibited, or commanded—either by way of recommendation or as obligatory."³⁶ In the thirteenth century, Ibn as-Salah ash-Shahrazuri, an expert on the tradition of Islam and whom we have already met, issued a written reply (*fatwa*) to a question which asked, in Ignaz Goldziher's words,

whether, from the point of view of religious law, it was permissible to study or teach philosophy and logic and further, whether it was permissible to employ the terminology of logic in the elaboration of religious law, and whether political authorities ought to move against a public teacher who used his position to discourse on philosophy and write about it.³⁷

What is remarkable in all this is the fact that in the twelfth century, Averroes, and in the thirteenth century, Ibn as-Salah, were grappling with the question whether, from the standpoint of the religious law, it was legitimate to study science, logic, and natural philosophy, even though these disciplines had been readily available in Islam since the ninth century. Averroes felt compelled to justify their study,

³⁶ Averroes, *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, A translation with introduction and notes, of Ibn Rushd's *Kitab fasl al-maqal*, with its appendix (*Damima*) and an extract from *Kitab al-kashf 'an manahij al-adilla*, trans. George F. Hourani (London: Luzac, 1976), 44.

³⁷ Ignaz Goldziher, "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the 'Ancient Sciences,'" 205.


while Ibn as-Salah, astonishingly, denied their legitimacy. I know of no analogous discussions in the Late Latin Middle Ages in which any natural philosopher or theologian felt compelled to determine whether the Bible permitted the study of secular subjects. It was simply assumed that it did.

IV

The Madrassas and the Universities. Despite the enormous obstacles faced by Islamic natural philosophers and scientists, either in the form of active harassment and even persecution, or simply as indifference, the remarkable feature about medieval Islamic science and natural philosophy was the high level they attained. As I have already mentioned the level of achievement in the sciences between 1100 and 1500 was higher in Islam than in the Christian West. It is more difficult to compare natural philosophy, partly because the Latin West derived some of its ideas from Islamic treatises. In the exploration of Aristotle's works and in the departures they made from Aristotle's thought, the West may have advanced beyond Muslim scholars. But in other ways, certain Muslim scholars went beyond anything contemplated in the West. This is especially true in the attitudes of some Islamic natural philosophers toward theologians and religion.

For example, al-Razi (ca. 854–925 or 935), known as Rhazes in the West, was a famous physician whose major medical work was translated into Latin. He actually attacked religion, denying miracles attributed to the prophets of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity (he is said to have written a treatise titled *The Tricks of the Prophets*). He refused to accept authority in either religion or science and believed that the sciences continually progressed because scientists build upon the knowledge they inherit from their predecessors. He accepted an atomic theory of matter akin to that of Democritus. Because of his independent views, al-Razi was severely criticized by his successors and many of his works have disappeared.³⁸ Avicenna thought, in the words of Shlomo Pines, that al-Razi "should have confined himself to

³⁸ My information about al-Razi is drawn from the article "Al-Razi, Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Zakariya" by Shlomo Pines in the *Dictionary of Scientific Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970–90), vol. 11, 523–6.



dealing with boils, urine, and excrement and should not have dabbled in matters beyond the range of his capacity."³⁹

Averroes (Ibn Rushd) wrote famous commentaries on Aristotle, which are known only in Latin or Hebrew translations. He is unusual because in his treatise *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, he insisted that only the philosophers are competent to judge Scripture, because they use demonstrative arguments. By contrast, the *mutakallimun* are incompetent to do so because they use dialectical reasoning based on popularly accepted premises.⁴⁰ The kind of hostility that al-Razi and Averroes showed to the theologians, as well as al-Razi's attacks on religion, have no counterparts in the medieval West.

By contrast, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) was more like al-Ghazali and defended religion against philosophy and logic. But his great fame does not derive from any defense of religion against the foreign sciences. Rather, it derives from his extraordinary treatise, known as the *Muqaddima* ("The Introduction"), which consisted of the introduction and first book of a lengthy world history. According to Franz Rosenthal, "The *Muqaddima* was indeed the first large-scale attempt to analyze the group relationships that govern human political and social organization on the basis of environmental and psychological factors."⁴¹ Arnold Toynbee spoke in superlative terms about Ibn Khaldun, declaring that in his *Muqaddima* "he has conceived and formulated a philosophy of history which is undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place."⁴² George Sarton's assessment is more critical, but nonetheless highly laudatory. Sarton did not rate Ibn Khaldun as a great historian, but regarded him as:

the greatest theorician of history, the greatest philosopher of man's experience, not only of the Middle Ages, but of the whole period extending

³⁹ Ibid., 326.

⁴⁰ Averroes, *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, 24.

⁴¹ Franz Rosenthal, "Ibn Khaldun," in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, vol. 7 (1973), 321.

⁴² Toynbee's assessment of Ibn Khaldun is cited in *An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332–1406)*, trans. and ed. Charles Issawi (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1987), ix. Toynbee's remarks were taken from his *A Study of History*, vol. 3.

from the time of the great classical historians down to that of Machiavelli (1532), Bodin (1576), and even Vico (1725). Badly composed as the *Muqaddama* is, with many repetitions, and poorly written sometimes to the point of obscurity, it remains one of the noblest and most impressive monuments of medieval thought. A comparison between Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli is not to the disadvantage of the earlier writer.⁴³

Although comparisons are difficult, there is no reason to believe that Islamic natural philosophers were inferior to those in the Latin West in the late Middle Ages. But the fate of natural philosophy in Islam differed radically from that in the West. To gain a proper sense of the difference, we must compare the *madrasas* in Islam with the universities in the West. A *madrasa* was a charitable trust, which was established freely by an individual Muslim, known as a *waqif*, who endowed the trust with substantial funds to be used for a public purpose. The founder had great latitude in determining the conditions for the operation of the *madrasa* he had founded with his own property. "The legal status of the *madrasa* allowed the founder to retain complete control over the administrative and instructional staff of the institution."⁴⁴ But the founder of a *madrasa* had to accept one condition: the terms of the foundation could not violate the tenets of Islam.⁴⁵

The *madrasa* was essentially a school for the study of the religious sciences and subordinate and related subjects. Excluded from its curriculum were the "foreign sciences," that is the philosophical and natural sciences.⁴⁶ Those who wished to study natural philosophy or the sciences for their own sakes had to either teach themselves, or make arrangements for private instruction with someone knowledgeable in such matters.⁴⁷ Occasionally nonreligious courses were taught in the *madrasas* on an optional basis. In his splendid book, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, Roy Mottahedeh explains that

⁴³ George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Company, 1927-1948), vol. 3, 1775.

⁴⁴ Article "Madrasa" in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 5, 1128, col. 2.

⁴⁵ See George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 36.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 78.

Madreseh learning had formerly been a conspectus of higher learning, with its optional courses in Ptolemaic astronomy, Avicennian medicine, and the algebra of Omar Khayyam. But . . . even the mullahs recognized that their learning really was 'religious' learning, and only a few enthusiasts studied the traditional nonreligious sciences such as the old astronomy in private.⁴⁸

However, those subjects were only taught which illuminated the Koran or the religious law. One such subject was logic, which was found useful in semantics and in avoiding "simple errors of inference," although philosophical logic, popular in the West, was usually avoided.⁴⁹ The primary function of the *madrasa*, however, was "to preserve learning and defend orthodoxy."⁵⁰ In Iran, the *madrasas* existed into the twentieth century, limping on until the end of World War II.

V

The Medieval University in the Latin West. Apart from a few works of Aristotle's logic, the Christian West had virtually no knowledge of Aristotle's natural philosophy for approximately 1100 years after the birth of Christianity. It was not until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that it made the bulk of Greek natural philosophy and science a part of its intellectual heritage. Islam began its serious appropriation of Greek science in less than two centuries after its founding and by 1000 had translated into Arabic virtually all that it would receive.

But if the West took approximately 1100 years to receive Aristotle's natural philosophy, where Islam acquired it in only two to three hundred years, the West wasted no time in making the most of what it received. By 1200, the new translations facilitated the transition from the Cathedral school system to the university system, represented ini-

⁴⁸ Cf. Roy Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 237.

⁴⁹ On the subject of logic in Islam, see John Walbridge's excellent article, "Logic in the Islamic Intellectual Tradition: The Recent Centuries," in *Islamic Studies*, 39, No. 1 (Spring 2000), 55-75. On attitudes toward philosophical logic, see p. 68.

⁵⁰ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 91.

tially by the universities of Paris, Oxford and Bologna. Despite some difficulties at the University of Paris, the new universities, and numerous others that would follow in the course of the next three centuries—approximately 75 existed by 1500—unhesitatingly chose Aristotle's logic and natural philosophy to form the curriculum of their arts faculties. In a complete university, we find four faculties: arts, theology, medicine, and law. All students were required to obtain a bachelor's degree in arts. If they wished to enter one of the three higher faculties of theology, medicine, and law, they were expected to obtain the Master of Arts degree. This meant that virtually all, if not all, theologians, physicians, and lawyers had been thoroughly trained in logic and natural philosophy, as were those who were content to acquire only a master of arts degree and therefore did not enter one of the three higher faculties. A university education in the Middle Ages was in no way intended to teach religion or theology. Theology was only taught in theology faculties to theology students. It was a jealously guarded intellectual preserve.⁵¹

Because all theologians were thoroughly trained in logic and Aristotle's natural philosophy, they used these subjects extensively in their theological commentaries, which all theological students were expected to produce. They posed questions that were answerable only by the application of logic and natural philosophy. One of the most powerful logical tools theologians used was the law of noncontradiction where it was assumed that not even God could perform a contradiction. Richard of Middleton, for example, asks "whether God could do contradictory things simultaneously,"⁵² and concludes that He cannot. Theologians incessantly inquired whether God could perform this or that act. Their object was to determine whether God could or could not do something by applying the law of noncontradic-

⁵¹ For a brief description of the medieval university and its faculties and curriculum, see Grant, *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages*, ch. 3 ("The Medieval University"), 33–53. For a lengthy, detailed account, see H. de Ridder-Symoens, ed. *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 1: *Universities in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁵² "Quarto quaeritur utrum Deus possit simul contradictoria facere." Richard of Middleton, *Clarissimi theologie magistri Ricardi de Media Villa, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi questiones subtilissimae*, vol. 1, bk. 1, dist. 42, qu. 4, pp. 374 (col. 1)–375 (col. 2); cited from Facsimile Reprint: Frankfurt: Minerva, 1963.

tion. If no contradiction was involved, God could perform the act; if there was a contradiction He could not. For example, Hugolin of Orvieto, in the fourteenth century, applied the law of noncontradiction to determine "Whether God could make the future not to be?"⁵³ and "Whether God could make a creature exist for only an instant?"⁵⁴ and Gregory of Rimini applied it to a question in which he inquired whether God could make someone sin.⁵⁵

During the Latin Middle Ages theology became an analytical discipline with a heavy emphasis on logic and natural philosophy. Indeed, to the extent that medieval theologians increased the analytic content of their theological treatises, they seem simultaneously to have diminished their spiritual content. Medieval theological commentaries became exercises in natural philosophy and logic. From time to time Church authorities sought to stem the tide by edicts that were intended to curtail, if not prevent, excessive reliance of theology on natural philosophy and logic.⁵⁶ Their efforts were in vain. Theology had become too dependent on logic and natural philosophy.

During the history of medieval Islam, a continual struggle raged among theologians, philosophers, and religious teachers. Only religious subjects constituted the curriculum of the *madrasas*, while the foreign sciences—logic, natural philosophy, and the exact sciences—were either ignored or taught only as ancillary subjects to shed light on religion. The university system in the Christian West was radically different. Universities taught a nonreligious analytic curriculum based on logic, science, and natural philosophy. So great was the surge toward analyticity, that theology was transformed into a large collection of problems that could only be resolved by the use of logic

⁵³ *Hugolini de Urbe Veteri OESA Commentarius in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum*, edited by Willigis Eckermann O. S. A., 4 vols. (Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, 1980–1988), Vol. 2: Book 1, Distinction 40, Question 3, art. 3, 341.

⁵⁴ Hugolin of Orvieto, *ibid.*, Vol. 3: Book 2, Distinction 2, Unique question, art. 3, 97–9.

⁵⁵ *Gregorii Arimensis OESA Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum*, 7 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979–1987), vol. 3, bk. 1, distinctions 42–4, qu. 1, 359.

⁵⁶ For a summary account of the reaction of churchmen to the invasion of theology by natural philosophy and logic, see Monika Asztalos, "The Faculty of Theology," in H. de Ridder-Symoens, ed. *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 1: *Universities in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 420–33.

and natural philosophy. This practice continued routinely for four centuries and laid the basis for a rationalistic society.

Islam and the West differed not because one civilization taught, studied, and wrote about analytic subjects that the other ignored. Both civilizations taught, studied, and wrote about logic, natural philosophy, and the sciences. But in contrast with Islam, the West taught, studied, and wrote about these disciplines in universities that fully supported them. This was possible because the university curriculum was enthusiastically approved by church and state. Anyone with a university education had studied, and perhaps even commented on, Aristotle's natural philosophy and done so for its own sake, not for the sake of better understanding or explicating Scripture. In Islam, the foreign sciences, which comprised the analytic subjects derived ultimately from the Greeks, were rarely taught in religious schools such as the *madrasas*, which formed the core of Islamic higher education. The analytic subjects were there, though they were marginal. But why were they marginal? Why did they not have equal status with religious and theological subjects? Why did they have to be taught as ancillary subjects, or taught privately and unobtrusively? We have now come full circle, since the answer to these questions requires reiteration of all the arguments and quotations that I have already presented. In light of the obstacles faced by natural philosophy in Islam, the high level of achievement that it attained is quite remarkable. But as long as religious traditionalists opposed or ignored analytic studies, they could not attain the required degree of acceptance to be a potent intellectual force in Islamic society.

I should like to conclude with a hypotheticalal scenario. Let us assume that a reassessment of the traditional interpretation of the *madrasas* should reveal that Islamic society did embrace analytic studies. What if it were shown that the *madrasas* laid heavy emphasis on rational subjects such as Aristotelian logic, natural philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy. And let us suppose that this rationalistic curriculum has been extremely stable since 1300, a period of seven hundred years! And like the West these rationalistic subjects had as one of their functions the explication of Islamic revelation. In effect, let us assume that Islam's educational system in the *madrasas* was as rationalistic as that which prevailed in the medieval Latin West.

If this should prove to be an accurate characterization of Islamic education since 1300, certain fundamental questions arise. Why did Islamic education remain so static for seven centuries, while in the

West, the analogous curriculum, based on medieval Aristotelian learning, was largely abandoned in the seventeenth century, after approximately four centuries, to be replaced by a new approach to science that is associated with the Scientific Revolution? With the implementation of the new science in the West, why did Islamic scholars not appropriate what they could from the new science? Why did they continue on for centuries with an outmoded curriculum that had been abandoned in the West? Why did Islam not borrow the new science and learning from the West during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, just as the West had borrowed much of their science and natural philosophy from Islam in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries? Were Muslims too proud to borrow from the West? Were they fearful that Western ideas would endanger the faith? Were they simply uninterested? Or did they regard it as unimportant and perhaps even irrelevant? Did they regard the new science as adding little or nothing to the science they already had in the *madrasas* and beyond, and perhaps even viewed Western science as a step backward from that standard?

This last possibility would make the hypothesis of a rationalistic curriculum in the *madrasas* seem far-fetched and implausible. And yet Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr is convinced that Islamic science is so radically different from Western science that it could not have profited from it. As Professor Nasr sees it, Islamic science was as important for religious and spiritual life, as it was for the acquisition of knowledge about the physical world. Islamic cosmological sciences not only provided "the necessary background and knowledge for particular disciplines of practical import such as medicine and agriculture," but they had "a direct practical effect upon the inner life of man," because

they are directly related to man's real existential problem which is to traverse the perilous caves and valleys of the 'mountains' of the physical and psychic worlds to reach safely the sky of the world of the Spirit.⁵⁷

Continuing in the same vein, Professor Nasr explains that:

The traditional cosmological sciences . . . concern man in an ultimate sense and on a level not to be compared with the modern sciences. The traditional cosmologies are related to man's inner perfection and to his ultimate end. They are inseparable from angelology and eschatology. They provide the background for that process of spiritual maturing

⁵⁷ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study* (Westeham, Kent, England: World of Islam Festival Publishing Co. Ltd., 1976), 236.

which enables man to become God's vice-regent in actuality rather than only potentially . . .⁵⁸

For Seyyed Hossein Nasr science and religion merge, and even fuse, to form a vast spiritual enterprise. If his characterization of Islamic science is reasonably accurate, we might conclude that Muslims, satisfied with their own science, would have had no desire, and indeed, no need, to import Western science. Professor Nasr seems to regard Islamic science as the product of a more holistic approach, in contrast to the narrower, more focused science produced in the West.

A recent investigation into cultural differences may offer some support to those who would distinguish between Western and Islamic science along cultural lines. Dr. Richard Nesbitt, a social psychologist at the University of Michigan, and his colleagues challenge the widely held view among Western philosophers and psychologists that "the same basic processes underlie all human thought, whether in the mountains of Tibet or the grasslands of the Serengeti."⁵⁹ The basic processes that all humans followed were alleged to embrace

a devotion to logical reasoning, a penchant for categorization and an urge to understand situations and events in linear terms of cause and effect.

However, in comparing East Asians and European Americans, Dr. Nesbitt and his colleagues arrived at a radically different assessment. They "found that people who grow up in different cultures do not just think about different things: they think differently." Easterners, they discovered,

appear to think more "holistically," paying greater attention to context and relationship, relying more on experience-based knowledge than abstract logic and showing more tolerance for contradiction. Westerners

⁵⁸ Ibid., 237. Professor Nasr also believes that modern science, that is Western science, has led to the destruction of nature. By contrast, ". . . Islamic metaphysics and cosmology were able to create an extensive science of the physical and of the psychic worlds which far from destroying nature only accented the equilibrium that exists in the cosmic order and emphasized the harmony between man and his environment. While the Islamic sciences taught man a great deal about the world about him and enabled man to rule over this world, they also set limits to his power to destroy the earth and pointed in a thousand ways to the fact that man's end is to journey to a world beyond and not to be satisfied through pride or ignorance with imprisonment within the cosmic crypt which man's forgetfulness has made to appear as his natural state" (Ibid., 239).

⁵⁹ Erica Goode, "How Culture Molds Habits of Thought," *Science Times*, *New York Times*, August 8, 2000. All the quotations in this paragraph are from Ms Goode's article.

are more "analytic" in their thinking, tending to detach objects from their context, to avoid contradictions and to rely more heavily on formal logic.

This is an intriguing analysis and is compatible with Professor Nasr's understanding of Islamic science and certainly fits what we know about Western analyticity. But it would require a great deal more investigation and discussion of medieval Islamic and Western natural philosophy and theology before we can assert with any confidence that the differences between them derive from cultural differences between East and West of the kind described by Dr. Nesbitt and his colleagues.

In light of all these uncertainties, it seems proper to conclude that we are as yet unable to answer the most vital questions about the course of science in Islam. Was it the kind of science Professor Nasr has described: as much concerned with the spiritual world as with the physical world; or was it more akin to medieval Western science and natural philosophy, and therefore incorporating a strong current of rationalistic thought? If the latter, why did Islam ignore Western science for so long? Answers to such questions would contribute mightily toward a proper understanding of Islamic attitudes toward science and natural philosophy from the Middle Ages to the present.

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HEGEL ON DESIRE'S KNOWLEDGE

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I

HEGEL'S *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT* IS FOUNDED on the methodological commitment to treat experience itself as the final court of appeal for all questions concerning the ultimate nature of knowledge and of reality.¹ In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel suspends in advance all epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions concerning what knowledge and its object really are, and instead seeks to describe what we can call the "experience of knowing" solely on its own terms.² The goal is to capture how the actual experience of knowing, as it is concretely lived by us, generates solely from within itself the standards for determining both what counts as knowledge in the first place, and what counts as the true object of this knowledge.³

In the course of his exposition, Hegel brings into focus the radically different forms that the actual experience of knowing can take, as well as the radically different and irreconcilable epistemological and metaphysical commitments that experience generates from out of itself. Many of the distinct forms of experience considered in the *Phe-*

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¹Georg W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988). See also Georg W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Arnold V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). All direct quotations will be given in English and will be drawn from Miller's translation unless otherwise noted. All references to the *Phenomenology* will be given as *PhS* followed by "M" and the paragraph numbers of Miller's translation, and then by "W/C" and the page numbers of the Wessels and Clairmont edition.

²Hegel considers the *Phenomenology* to be an "exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance [*die Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens*]" (*PhS* M76, W/C 60). I take this to mean that it is an exposition, not simply of knowledge in itself, but of how consciousness "takes itself to be real knowledge" (*PhS* M78, W/C 60). Insofar as this process of taking itself to be real knowledge is not explicitly articulated by consciousness, but is, rather, implicit in its actual way of relating to itself and to its object, we can construe it as part of its experience of knowing.

³See *PhS* M 84, W/C 64–5, for Hegel's argument that consciousness, in claiming to be conscious of something—that is, in taking itself to know it—at the same time generates from itself the criteria for determining both its own knowledge, and the nature of the object it would claim to know.

nomenology correspond to familiar theories of knowledge that have been developed in the history of the Western philosophical tradition. For instance, along the way Hegel engages with versions of empiricism, rationalism, and Kantian idealism, and each of these is treated, not first and foremost as a conceptually articulated philosophical position, but as rooted in a distinctive way of experiencing what it is like to have knowledge, as well as in a distinctive stance on what it is to be a true object of knowledge.⁴

But in addition to these more familiar positions, Hegel also considers various forms of practical experience as though each form constituted a distinctive and comprehensive experience of knowing in its own right. In the course of the *Phenomenology* we consider, for instance, the experience of being immediately compelled to actualize one's own desires,⁵ the experience of producing objects through one's own labor,⁶ and the experience of needing to honor the customs of one's nation,⁷ and each of these experiences is treated as though it operated in terms of its own, autonomously generated standards for determining both what counts as a genuine way of knowing the real and what counts as the real in relation to which it is taking a practical stance. For Hegel, our knowledge of ourselves *qua* agents, along with our corresponding knowledge of the world in its basic capacity to motivate, demand, and receive our actions, is qualitatively distinct from, and irreducible to, other forms of knowledge we claim to possess, and so we cannot conceive of this essentially practical knowledge on the model of those more familiar, theoretical forms of knowing we associate with straightforward sense perception, the rational understanding of natural laws, or self-reflective thought. It is an experience of knowing to which only actively engaged agents, specifically in their capacity as engaged agents, have access.

⁴ For an account of a primitive version of empiricism, we can turn to chapter 1 of the *Phenomenology*, on Sense-Certainty. For an account of rationalism—the form of knowing that takes explanation, or the identification of the rational laws underlying the sensible world, as the ultimate truth—we can look to chapter 3, on Understanding. And for Hegel's account of a transcendental idealist epistemology—the form of experience that takes the unconditioned unity of apperception to be the absolute ground of knowledge—we can look to chapter 5, on Reason.

⁵ *PhS* M 167–75, W/C 120–6.

⁶ *PhS* M 195–6, W/C 134–5.

⁷ *PhS* M 446–63, W/C 292–304.

My goal in this paper is to make clear the sense in which, for Hegel, our distinctive experience of ourselves as agents can be said to generate from within itself its own autonomous claim to possess the ultimate truth about the nature of knowledge and of reality. I will be focusing primarily on what is for Hegel the most primitive experience of agency—the immediate compulsion to actualize one's desires—and I will show that at the heart of Hegel's phenomenology of desire is the thesis that we as desiring agents necessarily lay claim to knowing the world, not simply as a set of fully determined, independent objects that stand against us and that determine our experience from the outside; rather, the world necessarily appears to us as something that gets its determinacy and truth precisely in and through our autonomous, self-relating subjectivity, precisely in and through the self's unconditioned affirmation of itself as a self-determining subject embroiled in the project of actualizing itself in the world. Since it is one of the general goals of Hegel's philosophical idealism to demonstrate the fundamental unity between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the self-affirming self and its world, we shall see that this original, practical perspective on the world can thus be understood as constituting for Hegel a kind of performative demonstration of our lived commitment to an idealist schema of knowledge.⁸

The perspective of the desiring agent is not conceived as one perspective alongside other, more theoretical perspectives—as though the agent first built up an independent, disinterested knowledge of the given, objective world through her empirical perceptions and her understanding of objective laws, and then simply sought to impose her practical ends onto what is taken to be objectively given. Rather, the world, as it is originally given to the desiring agent's experience, is al-

⁸ Compare Hegel's claim that "while so-called 'external' things have a show of self-subsistence for consciousness, intuition, and representative thinking, the free will idealizes that type of actuality and so is its truth" (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970], section 44R; translated into English as *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. Thomas M. Knox [London: Oxford University Press, 1967], and hereafter cited as *PhR* followed by the section number. All direct quotations will be given in English and will be drawn from Knox's translation). In *PhR* 44A, Hegel argues that "the free will . . . is the idealism which does not take things as they are to be absolute." While the perspective of desire is not as developed as that of the free will (on this point, see *PhR* 11–2), I shall be suggesting that the idealistic logic of the will is already anticipated in the account of desire given in the *Phenomenology*.

ready determined in the light of her practical self-affirmation, and so the practical perspective must be understood as an autonomous and original perspective on the world as a whole.⁹ Indeed, I will be suggesting that, for Hegel, even the apparent immediacy of sense experience must ultimately be reconceived so as to render intelligible the fact that, experientially speaking, what most immediately appears to us in our sensuous encounter with the world is not merely a multiplicity of discrete, sensible presences, but rather a porous, practical terrain, a phenomenal field whose immediate, sensible forms are themselves ordered in light of the potential actualizations of desire they afford.

II

I will begin by discussing some of the general features of Hegel's phenomenology of immediate sense experience.¹⁰ We shall see that, for Hegel, that form of experience in which we immediately take ourselves to be in a direct contact with the sensible here and now is, in fact, the simplest and most basic experiential embodiment of a primitive form of metaphysical realism. It is not that we need to presuppose such a metaphysical view in order to explain how sense experience could exist; rather, sense experience itself generates this metaphysical view from within itself, simply in its being alive to the compelling character of its own sensing.¹¹ In the sections that follow, I will be suggesting that the agent's immediate experience of being mobilized to act by its own desires, in contrast, is for Hegel the simplest and most basic embodiment of a primitive metaphysical idealism. It will, therefore, be useful to compare Hegel's phenomenology

⁹ The irreducibility of the practical stance to the theoretical would suggest that, if there is ultimately a unity of theory and practice operative in Hegel's thought, it must develop just as much out of the exigencies and problems internal to practical life itself as it does from purely theoretical considerations. For a helpful account of how Hegel conceives of this unity as evolving out of the inner dialectic of the practical will, see Stephen Houlgate's "The Unity of Theoretical and Practical Spirit in Hegel's Concept of Freedom," *The Review of Metaphysics* 48 (1995): 859–81.

¹⁰ As presented in *PhS* M 90–110, W/C 69–78.

¹¹ See *PhS* M 93, W/C 70.

of the experience of desire with his account of sense experience so as to clarify the sense in which, for Hegel, our experience of our own agency puts us at odds with our otherwise common sense view that objects possess a reality and truth that is independent of our actual engagements with them.

The phenomenological force of the sort of experience Hegel calls "sense-certainty" can be brought to light by contrasting it with our experience of imagining an object. If we consider the difference between merely imagining the sound of a fire alarm, and the lively, vivid experience of hearing it here and now as it suddenly surrounds us and interrupts what we are doing, we can see that this difference is first and foremost an experiential difference, a difference in the very form or quality of our experiencing. We do not need to reflect on these experiences, after the fact, in order to appreciate the difference between the two. Rather, the difference is immediately apparent precisely in the character of the experiencing involved.

In sensing this alarm sounding, my consciousness is immediately and wholly immersed in the sound, and I have no reflective distance from it. It takes over my consciousness without the mediation of my will or my power to associate images, for instance. My image of the sound—for instance, as I remember it the next day, or as I contemplate it as a possible event in the future—seems like one of many possible reproductions, one that packs no real punch in its own right; whereas, in sensing the sound, and in being startled by it, I experience it as actually happening here and now and thus as original, as a discrete, singular event that is complete in its sensible presence.¹² It is precisely this positive immediacy and singularity that counts as the mark of truth for sense-certainty. Thus, just by having sense experience, just by being compelled by it, I am experientially committed to the epistemological primacy of sense experience as the source of truth, and other kinds of experience—imagining, remembering, thinking, reasoning (including any reasoning that would lead me to formu-

¹² Hegel identifies the object of sense-certainty as having the form of a singular [*das Einzelne*] or of "a pure this" (*PhS* M 91, W/C 70). The "here and now" character of sense-certainty's object constitutes its singularity or its incomparable "thisness"; see *PhS* M 95, W/C 71.

late skeptical doubts as to the veracity of my sense experience)—must, from this point of view, seem merely derivative in comparison.¹³

We can see, too, that this experience of sensible presence necessarily and immediately involves a positing of the reality of what is being sensed,¹⁴ and that this feature of the experience implicates sense-certainty in a definite metaphysical stance concerning what constitutes the true nature of reality generally. Sense-certainty is inherently object-directed, in the sense that what I am actually conscious of, in having a sense experience, is precisely the lively, sensible presence of what is presenting itself. In the sheer immediacy of the event of experiencing, I am not expressly or primarily conscious of myself as having the experience, but rather find myself absorbed in the presence of the object, in its being here and now. I can afterwards reflect on my having had this experience, but the immediate form of the experience itself necessarily involves a turning away from oneself, and a being-thrown into something other. When I am imagining an alarm sounding, I am still object-directed, for what I am conscious of therein is precisely the sound of an alarm, not the qualities of my image *qua* image. But in thus making contact with the sound “through” the image, the whole time I am nevertheless alive to the fact that I, in my spontaneity, am responsible for the experience I am having, and this self-awareness—this self-directedness—is precisely what prevents me from becoming fully absorbed in the sound itself.¹⁵ In the case of sense certainty, however, I am directly alive to the fact that I am not directly responsible for what I am experiencing, to the fact that there is something that is right now in the process of giving itself to me, a being that does not have my own consciousness as its source. Hegel describes this complete immersion of the self in the present object as an experience of simple being or, we can say, of the pure “that

¹³ See Henry S. Harris's discussion of the sense in which sense experience is for itself the absolute truth; Henry S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 209–12.

¹⁴ See *PhS* M 90, W/C 69, where Hegel calls sense-certainty the knowledge “of what simply is.”

¹⁵ Compare Sartre's account of how the qualitative differences between perception and the various forms of imaginative experience (for instance, daydreaming, hallucination, discerning the appearance of faces or other objects in an obviously nonrepresentational pattern) rely, in part, on differences in the degree of the subject's awareness of his or her own spontaneity; Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Psychology of the Imagination* (New York: Citadel Press, 1991), 22–77.

it is" of the sensible presence, for to have such an experience is to be immediately committed to the full-fledged reality of that which is being sensed.¹⁶

From this basic phenomenological description, then, we can conclude that in the lived experience of sense-certainty we are implicitly engaged in affirming a primitive form of common sense, realist metaphysics, according to which the ultimate nature of reality—what reality is in truth—consists of the sheer, concrete immediacy of beings which, insofar as they are immediately experienced as "not-me," are taken to be ontologically independent of consciousness: there really is a shrill, ringing sound happening right now, and my hearing of it—and, more generally, my capacities as a sensing being in general—are in no way experienced as a condition for its existence.¹⁷ I call this a primitive form of realism, because it has not developed to the point of being plagued by those sorts of questions that realist philosophers are compelled to address, such as whether the red we see corresponds to some sort of objective redness in the thing itself, or whether there is some supersensible property in the object that causes us to have the experience of red. Since we are drawing our standard of truth solely from the immediate, lived experience of what it is like to sense, those sorts of questions—questions which seek after an explanation of our sense experience, and which thus implicitly posit the rational understanding and its laws as a more developed source of truth than sense experience by itself—have no place here.¹⁸ For sense-certainty there is no question of seeking after an underlying explanation of its experience, for its experienced object simply "*is*, and it *is*, merely because it *is*";¹⁹ the object's positive, sensible immediacy counts for sense-certainty as the original and self-sufficient standard of truth.

¹⁶ *PhS* M 91, W/C 69–70.

¹⁷ Sense-certainty is, Hegel argues, "a *knowing* which knows the object only because the *object* is, while the knowing may either be or not be" (*PhS* M 93, W/C 70).

¹⁸ For Hegel, our experience of understanding, or of finding the "why" behind something, is to be viewed as a distinctive experience of knowing in its own right, and his own study of this experience is presented in chapter 3 of the *Phenomenology*. For Hegel, the metaphysical stance indigenous to the understanding can be considered a form of scientific realism, in that the understanding's true object—namely, the system of laws and their manifestation in the sensible world—is treated by it as an inherently intelligible objective totality, but one that is independent of the mind; see *PhS* M 132, W/C 93.

¹⁹ *PhS* M 91, W/C 69, Hegel's emphases.

As the *Phenomenology* moves on to consider further, more developed experiences of knowing—namely, those Hegel calls “perceiving” and then “understanding”²⁰—more developed forms of realism emerge. Thus, a fuller account of Hegel’s treatment of the experiential underpinnings of realism in the *Phenomenology* would need to involve an account of these later forms of experience as well. However, my only goal in focusing on sense-certainty has been to show how it is that a basic experiential phenomenon—that irreducible, lived experience, familiar to us all, of sensing something, and of finding this experience to be intrinsically compelling and self-evidently truth-revealing—can be said to generate, solely from within itself, the basic schema of a realist metaphysics. I showed how the inherently immediate and object-directed nature of our sense experience—the fact that sense consciousness is immediately absorbed in what is appearing to it, in the vivid presence of what is showing itself, rather than in the movement of its own being conscious of it—generates a commitment to the independent being and truth of this self-showing object, as well as to the inessentiality of consciousness itself for determining the truth of its object.

III

It is precisely this realist schema that comes under question once Hegel comes to consider those forms of experience that fall under the heading of Self-Consciousness, beginning in chapter 4 of the *Phenomenology*. In contrast to the essentially object-directed forms of experience considered in the first three chapters—forms which, collectively, come under the name of Consciousness²¹—the forms of Self-Consciousness are essentially characterized by a form of self-direct-

²⁰ As taken up in chapters two and three, respectively.

²¹ For Hegel’s construal of each of the three forms of Consciousness as essentially object-directed see *PhS* M 93, W/C 70; M 111, W/C 70; and M 132, W/C 93. I cannot here reconstruct the complicated argument that leads Hegel to make the transition from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. Suffice it to note, however, that Hegel claims to have shown that all consciousness is essentially self-consciousness, which is to say that he takes Self-Consciousness to be a logically more basic form of knowledge upon which the forms of Consciousness are in fact derivative; *PhS* M164, W/C 118.

edness, in the sense that they each involve an experiencing being experiencing itself as what is primarily at issue in its experience.²² To be more precise: each of the distinct experiences of knowing that are considered under the heading of Self-Consciousness are such as to involve experiencing the truth of reality as consisting, not in an independent, objective world, but first and foremost in the relationship of the world to one's own experiencing subjectivity. The self-conscious subject thus experiences itself, and not some external object, as ultimately responsible for what it is experiencing, and it thus experiences itself, not as conditioned by independently existing objects, but rather as an unconditioned center in relation to which alone objects obtain their experienced character and, indeed, their actuality and truth.²³

To give some perspective on what is at stake in Hegel's move to Self-Consciousness, it would be fruitful to compare the basic logic of self-directedness at work in Hegel's account to Kant's conception of the self-reflective subject in its function as the condition for the possibility of all experiential objects.²⁴ For Kant, the conscious subject cannot help experiencing its own consciousness as the ultimate locus of truth. The Kantian transcendental unity of apperception offers us the basic model here: in realizing that all consciousness is essentially my consciousness, and in thereby realizing that whatever has meaning for me is necessarily conditioned in its very meaning and structure by my

²² Hegel at one point describes the various shapes of Self-Consciousness as the exposition of "*what consciousness knows in knowing itself*" (*PhS* M 165, W/C 119, Hegel's emphasis).

²³ As Hegel says, "the *necessary advance* from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth was a thing, an 'other' than themselves, expresses just this, that not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes" (*PhS* M 164, W/C 118, Hegel's emphasis).

²⁴ In truth, it is not until the end of Hegel's account of Self-Consciousness, at which point Hegel makes the move to the general stance he calls Reason, that we arrive at a shape of selfhood that is comparable to the one that Kant articulates; see *PhS* M 233–9, W/C 158–63. For a helpful reading of the Self-Consciousness chapter as a developmental account that leads eventually toward a Kantian conception of the transcendental subject as the condition of objectivity, see John Russon, *The Self and its Body in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit"* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 15–29. For an extended discussion of Hegel's conception of self-consciousness in the light of Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of apperception, see Robert Pippin's *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially part 2.

own capacity to make sense—by my “I think”—I necessarily come to experience my own capacity to be conscious as the unconditioned and universal element through which all things get their meaning. As Kant writes,

It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.²⁵

Though my experience is necessarily informed by a receptivity to the world—by my sensibility, or my capacity “for receiving representations through the mode in which [I am] affected by objects”²⁶—this receptivity itself is but a moment in my spontaneous and ultimately autonomous activity of making sense, for without this activity my received representations “would be nothing to me.” This activity in which I recognize myself as the source—we can call it the activity of “being conscious of,” insofar as this activity involves an ongoing process of synthesis whereby otherwise disparate manifolds are organized into meaningful, internally connected experiential unities²⁷—is ultimately propelled by its own steam, and, in its formal essence, it does not owe anything to its object; it is essentially unconditioned.²⁸

Indeed, for Kant the very form or structure of the object—the fact that it is experienced, for instance, as an independent being with properties and causal ties to other beings, the fact that it is the kind of thing that I can conceive of as exerting a causal force on my objective,

²⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1992), 152–53, B131–32. Originally published as *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, as found in vol. 3 of *Kants Werke: Akademie Textausgabe* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1968), 108. Hereafter, all direct quotations will be drawn from Smith’s translation, and all references will be given as “CPR” followed by the standard page numbers of the A and/or B editions.

²⁶ CPR A19.

²⁷ See Kant’s claim, that “the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations” (CPR A105).

²⁸ Kant calls this capacity to generate the representation of the “I think” that underlies all our representations a spontaneous and original act of apperception, in that it cannot be given to us simply through our inner sensibility (that is, through our sensing of our own mental states), and in that it does not depend on the existence of any further representations; CPR B132.

perceptual apparatus, for instance—has its ground, not in the object itself (or in its sensible givenness), but in the inner structure of self-consciousness, in the fact that I cannot possibly be conscious of a world that did not have this sort of objective structure.²⁹ In contrast to the experience of immediate sense-certainty discussed above, in which the sensuous object is itself taken to be the independent and self-sufficient source of my experience and thus the essential locus of truth, here the subject itself recognizes that it itself is the essential condition of even the object-directed character of its own sense experience. For, indeed, the unity of apperception is taken to be the very condition of the self's ability to refer its experiences to a unified, self-standing object in the first place.³⁰ I claimed that, for Hegel, Self-Consciousness is characterized essentially by the self experiencing itself as the unconditioned center in relation to which alone the objects of experience obtain their experienced character and truth, and so, in this respect, I am taking there to be an important similarity between the Hegelian conception of Self-Consciousness and the Kantian subject.

Another crucial similarity lies in the fact that, for both Kant and Hegel, the subject's knowledge of itself is of a different order than the subject's knowledge of objects. The subject relates to itself, not merely as one object among others in the experiential world, but rather as the fundamental condition for the possibility of any and every object. Therefore, the fact that the subject is essentially characterized by self-consciousness cannot mean that the subject is conscious of itself in the same way that it is conscious of objects. This foundational self-reflexivity cannot consist, for instance, in a form of empirical introspection, which would involve the subject's inner relation to its own passing mental states—such as its fears, desires, feelings of pain, as well as its thoughts and images—in distinction to its sensuously and spatially mediated encounter with external objects. For, such phenomena can themselves be conceived on the model of determinate, temporally situated, empirical objects of which I am con-

²⁹ See, for instance, *CPR* A111–14.

³⁰ See Kant's claim that "the conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are likewise conditions of the *possibility of the objects of experience*" (*CPR* B197, A158, Kant's emphases).

scious—indeed, Kant called them objects of “inner sense,” apprehended through “empirical apperception”—and so knowing them can still be conceived according to the object-directed schema of a subject observing or intuiting a given content.³¹ Though the contents of its introspection are inner and are available only to itself, as empirical givens they are still taken as distinct from the self’s activity of being conscious of them, and so the subject can distinguish and distance itself from them.

The form of self-reflexivity that resides at the heart of the Kantian subject—that which constitutes the transcendental unity of apperception—is the subject’s constitutive aliveness to its own activity of being conscious of objects, and it becomes alive to this activity of being conscious precisely in and through actually engaging in this activity, precisely in and through its actual synthesizing of the manifold of its representation into a unity.³² In being conscious of an object (whether an external object, or, for instance, my own pain), I am at the same time implicitly alive to the fact that I am conscious of it; I am not, within this act of consciousness, straightforwardly the object of my own consciousness—for what I am conscious of is the object itself—but am nevertheless reflectively related to myself in my activity of being-conscious of it.³³ This distinctive form of self-reflexivity and self-knowledge is, in the end, peculiar to the self as an agent, or as the spontaneous and original source of the activity of being-conscious; it is a knowledge that can be had only by the self who is itself actively engaged in the sort of experiential synthesizing Kant discusses.³⁴ So, what makes this sort of self-knowledge distinct from the knowledge of objects—and so, what makes the schema of self-directedness dis-

³¹ See *CPR* B68–9.

³² Kant argues that the relation of each of my multiple representations to my “I think”—which is the condition of their being unified into a single, object-directed experience in the first place—“comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only insofar as I *conjoin* one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them” (*CPR* B133). Kant is here drawing attention to the fact that I become aware of each of my various representations as mine precisely through my own activity of conjoining or synthesizing them.

³³ Robert Pippin helpfully describes transcendental apperception as the subject’s spontaneous act of “taking itself” to be apprehending an object; Robert Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 32–5.

tinct from the schema of object-directedness—has to do precisely with the fact that it is a knowledge that pertains only to agents, or with the fact that it is a representation of their own agency that agents spontaneously give themselves, precisely through the very activity that they engage in *qua* agents.³⁵

It would be misleading to call this self-reflexive knowledge “practical” thereby, for it has little to do with what we would normally recognize as action. The activity of being conscious is not exactly an activity that I choose to engage in, or that I could do differently. Most importantly, though, it is a purely cognitive activity, one that takes place in the sphere of ideality, and one that thus does not lead directly to any actual changes in the world. The self’s immediate access to its activity *qua* self takes the form of an “I think,” an activity that can in principle be performed independently of the self’s practical engagement with the world. But this is precisely where Hegel’s account of Self-Consciousness, and of the special relationship that selves have to themselves as agents, can be seen to diverge from Kant’s.

IV

Hegel likewise recognizes that the distinctive character of Self-Consciousness lies precisely in the way that the self, from within the perspective of the activity it itself generates, relates to itself as the spontaneous source and enactor of that activity. As Charles Taylor has pointed out, Hegel’s own understanding of agency, and of the distinctive knowledge that agents possess of themselves *qua* agents, certainly has part of its lineage in the Kantian notion of the self’s nonempirical knowledge of its own activity *qua* consciousness.³⁶ But, if we

³⁴ For a good discussion of the performative character of the awareness of spontaneity that underlies Kant’s conception of transcendental unity of apperception, see William H. Bossart, *Apperception, Knowledge, and Experience* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1994), 23–6.

³⁶ “We cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined, and . . . of all representations *combination* is the only one which cannot be given through objects. Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself” (*CPR* B130, Kant’s emphasis).

view the Self-Consciousness chapter as an extended, developmental account of the nature of this distinctively agential self-knowledge, we can see that one of the things that makes Hegel's account different from Kant's is that it begins precisely with a form of self-relation that we would clearly recognize as essentially practical in nature, namely the experience of oneself both as desiring and as acting on one's desires: it turns out that, for Hegel, the most basic form of Self-Consciousness, and so the most basic experience I have of being the unconditioned center on the basis of which the truth of all else is determined, involves relating to myself, not primarily as thinking, but as an active process of bringing my own desire to fruition. As we shall see, it is clear that, for Hegel, desire names not just some internal, subjective state that can occur independently of the world, but an internal state together with the subject's self-acknowledged practical capacity to transform the world so as to actualize or externalize its own desire.³⁷ Indeed, we shall see that, for Hegel, what the desiring being desires first and foremost is not merely some particular, objective state of affairs—for instance, to not get rained on, or to have more money, states of affairs that can come into existence without any effort on its part. Rather, what it ultimately seeks, in each of its particular desires, is to experience itself as the truth and determining ground for what otherwise has the appearance of being other to it (namely, the given sensuous world).³⁸ And it attains this experience of itself precisely by overcoming, through its own practical efforts, this appearance of otherness, precisely by actually transforming the sensible world so as to reveal it to be something that is in fact determined by it itself. The desiring self's own practical exertion, then, is not simply a means to satisfy a preexisting desire, but is rather an es-

³⁶ Charles Taylor, "Hegel and the Philosophy of Action," in *Hegel's Philosophy of Action*, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich and David Lamb (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), 1–18, especially 5, 6.

³⁷ See, for instance, *PhS* 174, W/C 125–26, where Hegel construes the desiring self's very self-certainty as being conditional upon its capacity to actually destroy what is other to it (for instance, in consuming it).

³⁸ For Hegel's initial definition of desire as the practical movement whereby the sensuous world—as the self's otherness—is shown by the self to have its truth in the self, and thus to no longer be other, see *PhS* M 167, W/C 120–22.

sential facet of its affirmation of itself as the unconditioned center on the basis of which the truth of all else is determined.

For a preliminary understanding of Hegel's conception of desire, it would be fruitful to situate it, as Hegel does, in the light of an account of the phenomenon of life.³⁹ Insofar as the living organism is completely absorbed in its constitutive and self-founded project of living or of just continuing to be itself, we can say that it exists as constantly affirming itself as the ultimate object or underlying essence of all that it recognizes: its various life-activities—for instance, its endeavor to obtain food, or its ongoing attempts to maintain a comfortable living condition—are just so many affirmations that it itself is the being that ultimately matters in the real, and that everything it comes into contact with ultimately matters only insofar as it figures into its project of affirming itself.⁴⁰ As thus constitutively self-directed in this way, external objects must appear to it as having no claim to exist on their own account; they make a difference within its experience only insofar as the living self is able to affirm itself in and through them. For the living being, then, the truth of these external objects—what they are in themselves—is immediately experienced as residing in the significance they have for it, a living significance they acquire in and through its own living project of self-affirmation.⁴¹ It is as though, from the living being's perspective, the external world is ultimately continuous with its own living body. For, just as its own body is an external thing whose actuality and truth lies in the inner soul that animates it—for, its hands are what they are precisely insofar as they

³⁹ *PhS* M 168–74, W/C 120–6.

⁴⁰ When Hegel says that “the object of immediate desire is a *living thing* [*ein Lebendiges*],” I am taking him to be referring fundamentally to the desiring organism's relation to itself as situated in the context of the total environment defined by its living projects; *PhS* M 168, W/C 122, Hegel's emphasis. Its object is, ultimately, its own living. For a similar account of Hegel's understanding of the object of desire, see Henry S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, vol. 1, 320–21. For a helpful account of the different senses of “life” at work here, see Joseph Flay's *Hegel's Quest for Certainty* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 81–84.

⁴¹ Compare how Hegel introduces the concept of Self-Consciousness: “If we call Notion what the object is *in itself*, but call the object what *it is qua* object or *for an other*, then it is clear that being-*in-itself* and being-*for-an-other* are one and the same” (*PhS* M 166, W/C 120, Hegel's emphases).

function as the concrete medium through which the living self actively affirms and actualizes itself, and if cut off would be, as Aristotle argued, hands only homonymously called⁴²—so too is the external world experienced as having its truth and actuality precisely insofar as it is concretely plugged into, and thus animated by, a living process of the self-affirming organism.⁴³ Just as the blind man's walking stick exists, not so much as an external thing that he holds in his hand, but is, rather, more an extension of his hand's living function of touch, so too does the living being's environment as a whole function for it most basically, not as an independent, external object which it observes or contemplates, but rather as an extension incorporated into its living activity of being itself.⁴⁴

The logic of desire is at the core of the structure of life, for desire, on Hegel's account, names precisely that movement whereby a self as-

⁴² *Generation of Animals*, trans. Arthur Platt, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 726b 21–23. Aristotle's definition of the soul as the "first actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it" implies that what it is to be a living body cannot be defined without reference to the soul that gives it life and that gives its parts their specific function within the living whole; see *On the Soul*, trans. J. A. Smith, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, 412a 18–412b 24. Hegel himself makes reference to Aristotle's hand example in his own account of the logic of life; Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. Theodore F. Geraets, Wallis A. Suchting, and Henry S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), sec. 216 *Zusatz*. Hegel's own account of the soul in his *Anthropology* clearly draws upon Aristotelian themes throughout; see *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 2 Anthropology*, ed. and trans. Michael J. Petry (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1978). For a discussion of the Aristotelian lineage of Hegel's antidualist conception of the body, see Charles Taylor's *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 81–90; see also John Russon's *The Self and its Body*.

⁴³ This is one implication of Hegel's construal of life as the element of "fluidity" [*Flüssigkeit*] and "continuity" in and through which all beings get their enduring being; *PhS* M 171, W/C 124. On the issue of the living organism's relation to what is external to it, see *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 2 Anthropology*, sec. 402 *Zusatz*; Hegel here characterizes the individual's soul as the "actual vivacity [*Lebendigkeit*] and subjectivity of [its] universe" (my translation).

⁴⁴ This analysis of the walking stick is Merleau-Ponty's: "The blind man's stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), 143. Russon also draws on this example in his discussion of the importance of habit in Hegel's account of the body. John Russon, *The Self and its Body*, 6–7.

serts itself as the unconditioned center and determining ground of its world as a whole, precisely in and through its ongoing transformation of that world into the medium of its self-actualization.⁴⁵ It asserts itself as unconditioned, in that the self recognizes that its own power of self-assertion has its origin only within itself, that there is nothing other that could make it take up one cause over another, not even its own given nature as an embodied being. It is answering only to itself, only to its own desire as such, and in attempting to actualize its desire the self is, in effect, affirming itself as that being that answers only to itself.⁴⁶ It asserts itself as the center and determining ground of the world it encounters in its experience, in the sense that, through its constitutive awareness of itself as self-assertive and efficacious, it does not experience the immediate givenness of things—including the immediate, natural givenness of its own body—as having the final word on what these things truly are: rather, as I shall discuss more fully below, it perceives the world already in light of its own desire and its own efficaciousness and thus experiences the given world essentially in terms of the world's receptiveness to the self-affirming projects that it itself generates.⁴⁷ Even its own natural body is, for it, not a self-contained, fully determined substance unto itself. Rather, it is essentially a malleable vehicle for its own self-affirmation and self-actualization in the world, a plastic medium that ultimately gets its actuality, not merely from its positive, natural determinations, but from what the self does with it.⁴⁸

The desiring agent's self-affirmation does not take the form of a cognitively formulated judgment or proposition; it is not something I think or say. Rather, it has the form of my being affectively invested in a given situation and practically oriented toward the activity it seems

⁴⁵ See Harris's claim that, with the move to desire, "what truly is' manifests itself as an urge or appetite, through the active transformation of the not-self" (Henry S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, vol. 1, 320).

⁴⁶ Hegel says of self-consciousness that "there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin" (*PhS* M182, W/C 128). This ontological independence is not something given once and for all, but must be constantly reaffirmed and reestablished in practice.

⁴⁷ See *PhS* M 167, W/C 120–2, where Hegel argues that the sensible world is, for the self-asserting self, a merely negative object, whose true essence show itself only in becoming a manifestation of the self.

⁴⁸ Compare Hegel's discussion of the self's manner of taking possession of its own body, in *PhR* 47–8 and 57; on this issue, see my "Hegel on Owning One's Own Body," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 43, no. 1 (2005): 1–23.

to solicit from me. It has the form, for instance, of being taken with a feeling of hunger and, at once, of experiencing the world most immediately as a situation laden with the potentiality of answering to or frustrating my hunger. In such a case, that to which I am most immediately directed experientially is, for instance, the alluring apple hanging from the tree, and my desire exists at once as the experience of its allure and as the mobilizing of my practical energies toward the getting and eating of this apple. Though I, in my capacity for conscious self-reflection, might step back from my desire so as to become explicitly conscious of it (and though I might, by thus making my own desire an object of my consciousness, choose to refrain from actualizing it), from within the immediate, prereflective experience of having this desire I relate to myself, not by way of an internal, reflective process of thought, but precisely by way of the world as it presents itself to me immediately in its being-for-me—that is, in its manifest potential to answer to my desiring, in the way it is charged with an alluring, practical significance.⁴⁹

To be hungry, then, is not simply to have a subjective state that is located in one's self-contained body. It is, at once, to be immediately awake to the world in terms of what is edible in it, and in terms of the edible thing's alluring call for me to ingest it; it is thus to find oneself invested in and reflected by such an alluring, practically charged world. (Conversely, it can involve being awake to the lack of edible things around, and thus take the form of a frustrating experience of things as absent of a practical significance.) To be absorbed in the alluring promise of some satisfying objective state of affairs is itself the desiring self's manner of being directed toward itself, its way of affirming itself as that which provides the ultimate defining context of that which appears to it. Though desire itself is what constitutes the objective situation as essentially defined by its desire—for it itself is what constitutes the apple as an alluring presence within its reach in the first place—and though it is, in this sense, seeing itself in this situation, the form that this self-directed experience takes is an affective absorption in the desirable object itself, not an introspective withdrawal into itself.

⁴⁹ For Hegel, it is not until we reach the stance of Self-Consciousness he calls "Stoicism" that the self is characterized by a capacity to regard its own reflective abilities, its own thinking, as a self-sufficient source of truth; see *PhS* M 197, W/C 137. Desire is, therefore, essentially prereflective.

The fact that things immediately appear to me as desirable or alluring constitutes what we can consider to be the initial, subjective certainty that things are, in essence, for my sake, and that I am their determining center. However, by itself this certainty is inherently unsatisfying, for it must be accompanied by an actual, practical exertion on the part of the desiring agent, whereby the agent's unconditioned efficacy is actually made manifest to it in and through these things. As Hegel says, the self's initial certainty of itself as the true essence of things needs to "become explicit for self-consciousness *in an objective manner*," and in transforming its object the self thereby "gives itself the certainty of itself as a *true* certainty."⁵⁰ The hungry agent completes its act of self-affirmation by actually eating the apple, thereby demonstrating in an objective manner that it was right all along: namely, that the truth of the apparently external apple consisted not in its discrete, sensible presence, but rather in its potential to be transformed (in this case, in its potential to be negated in its very existence) by the agent itself. On this account, then, the desire for the apple has as its end, not simply that objective state in which the apple has actually been incorporated into the agent's body, but the agent's own putting into action of its powers to nourish itself, powers that can only be put into action in and through a concrete transformation of what is other. By actually grasping and ingesting the apple, the desiring being in effect demonstrates to itself that the apple cannot even stand on its own unless the desiring being allows it to. Through exerting its power, the desiring being thus gives itself the experience of being what ultimately determines the things in its environment, and so its own exertions are, in truth, the real objects or ends of its experiential life.

Desire thus enacts a sort of practical proof of the ultimate incapacity of objects to stand on their own, and so challenges precisely that feature of sense-certainty that involves positing the independent being of the object as the highest truth to which knowledge can attain. From the perspective of the desiring agent, then, to know the truth of objects involves knowing them precisely in terms of their ultimate incapacity to be independent of one's agency. That is, to be a desiring agent is to affirm the truth of an idealist schema. Of course, this is not to say that the desiring being is expressly out to make metaphysical

⁵⁰ *PhS* M 174, W/C 125–6, Hegel's emphases.

declarations about itself and the world. On the contrary, as I have said, what the desiring being is most directly absorbed in is, for instance, the mouth-watering apple's alluring presence, not in the conceptual articulation of its stance. Hegel is suggesting, however, that to experience the apple in this way is implicitly to be engaged in refuting—in a lived, performative manner—the realist standards that were shown to be at work in the bare experience of sense-certainty. It is illuminating to note here that Hegel characterizes even animals as operating with a more sophisticated metaphysical position than sense-certainty, for

they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being [*als an sich seienden*], but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up. And all nature, like the animals, celebrates these open mysteries [the mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus] which teach the truth about sensuous things.⁵¹

V

This inherently practical starting point of Hegel's account of Self-Consciousness reveals something important about how Hegel understands the logic of self-directedness that lies at the heart of this account. For although desire is characterized as the most basic and immediate form of self-directedness—as the most basic way in which selves experience themselves as the essential truth behind all things—the desiring self's experiential relationship to itself is inherently mediated by its ongoing relationship to objects. As Hegel says, "self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from *otherness*."⁵² As we have seen, this return to itself is grounded in the desiring self's ongoing practical success in transforming given objects into reflections of its own living power of self-assertion. In contrast to the Kantian conception of self-reflexivity, according to which the subject has an unmediated and complete knowledge of itself in its cognitive activity—an access that is independent of, and logically prior to, its empir-

⁵¹ *PhS* M109, W/C 77. Compare also Hegel's remark in *PhR* 44A: "Even an animal has gone beyond this realist philosophy since it devours things and so proves that they are not absolutely self-subsistent."

⁵² *PhS* M167, W/C 121, Hegel's emphasis.

ical encounters with objects—on Hegel's account the self-conscious agent, *qua* desiring, cannot satisfactorily know itself except by way of its living engagement with the sensible world that comes to be transformed through its own exertions.⁵³

The world as experienced by the desiring agent while in the midst of an action is not, however, made up of self-contained, independent things of the sort that a disinterested, objective observer might posit. Rather, the very character of this world as a whole is to be defined essentially in terms of the concrete projects of self-affirmation initiated by the agent itself, and so, though the agent is object-directed in the sense I have described, what the agent sees in this world is something that can only appear to its eyes, something whose very meaning and determinacy depends ultimately on its place within the concrete drama that the agent's launch into action inaugurates. To get a more developed sense for how the world appears to the desiring agent in the midst of action, consider the simple example of a child who takes pleasure in rolling pennies down the street to see how far they will go before they meet with some obstruction. The child watches with excitement as the penny skirts by a crack in the sidewalk, he himself veers his body to the right as the penny just barely misses the grate of the sewer, and, indeed, he feels somewhat squashed himself when an unwitting pedestrian steps on the penny that seemed destined for a great run. From the point of view of his experience, it is as though he is literally in the penny, as though the penny is not a thing in its own right but rather a direct manifestation of his own efficacy, a symbol of his own power to be the underlying ground of what actually occurs in the world outside him. Indeed, once he sets himself to act, everything in his whole phenomenal field comes to exist as his practical terrain, with the sidewalk suddenly starting to be articulated experientially in terms of obstacles, treacherous stretches, paths of smooth sailing, and with pedestrians becoming annoying impediments. In actually staking himself through this action, then, the child in effect transforms the whole objective horizon into a stage for the realization of his own power of self-assertion, and all that appears to him must necessarily appear in terms of its contribution to, or its frustration of, this con-

⁵³ Compare here Charles Taylor's argument that, for Hegel, "what passes in modern philosophy for the 'mental' is the inward reflection of what was originally external activity." Charles Taylor, "Hegel's Philosophy of Action," 8–11.

crete project.⁵⁴ No doubt, an external, objective observer well acquainted with the laws of physics could in principle show how every single event in the penny's journey is fully determined by the laws of nature as soon as it leaves his hand. However, from the perspective of the child what is essentially at stake in the penny's journey is not merely a set of objective causal events determined in advance, but his own capacity for practical self-affirmation showing itself in and through the open-ended drama, the twists and turns, close calls and lucky misses, that constitute the peculiar character of each run. It is precisely this drama—a practical terrain in which agency, not merely impersonal, objective events, is the central issue—that the desiring agent seeks to bring into being, and this drama infects and gives meaning to all things.

As disinterested observers of reality, we can certainly conceive of things in terms of their practical values, and these values can be treated as objective, observable properties alongside others. For instance, upon observation we can describe something in objective terms as "light enough to be lifted" or "hard enough to use in breaking a window." But not only is it unclear whether such properties could ultimately be meaningful to subjects who were not themselves embodied, self-actualizing agents—that is, desiring beings who can project themselves into those objects in the first place, thus transforming them into the stage sets of their own practical self-realization—it is also the case that an objective account of one's circumstances in terms of the use-values that it possesses would still be insufficient to account for how it is that I myself could ever come to experience this situation here and now as a site for the sake of manifesting my own efficacy as a desiring being. This experience involves, not an express consciousness of the object in its character as an independent thing with certain kinds of properties, but rather a sort of practical assumption of the object into one's actual projects—a prereflective act of taking it in hand, as it were—whereby this object's con-

⁵⁴ The idea that what appears to an agent as empirically given reality is, in truth, already determined in light of the agent's own projects, is taken up most explicitly in Hegel's discussion of what he calls the "spiritual animal kingdom" (see *PhS* M 398–401, W/C 261–5). On the manner in which the spiritual animal expects all otherness to exist in a preestablished harmony with its own individual projects, see Ardis Collins, "Hegel on Language, Citizenship, and the Educational Function of the Workplace: The Marxist Challenge," *The Owl of Minerva* 32 (Fall, 2000): 21–43.

crete actuality comes to be animated first and foremost by its capacity to contribute to the agent's own self-affirmation. One must first be a desiring agent, concretely invested and at work in the world here and now, in order to claim to know these practical values that are disclosed by one's agency. Or, rather, this concrete process of being at work in the world is itself the knowing, and so this agential knowledge cannot ultimately be detached from it.⁵⁵

Similarly, my knowledge of my own capacities as an agent might be conceived of on the model of an observational knowledge of certain objective facts about myself. For instance, I either do or do not have the ability to swim competently, and it is important that I come to settle that question objectively before I take on the project of making my way out into the deep end of the lake. I might, for instance, run some experiments in shallower water, so as to observe what my limits are. But knowing one's own ability in such an external, observational manner is different than knowing what it is like actually to possess and put this ability into action, and to experience the world as a practical terrain that is immediately and concretely oriented in terms of this ability's actualization—experiencing, for instance, what it is like actually to see a body of water as welcoming me into it, or as enticing me with a challenging swim.⁵⁶ That first-person perspective of myself as a desiring agent actually at stake in the objects I experience is irreducible to anything that could be merely given to me as an independently existing, empirical property of objects, for it involves precisely my original and unconditioned capacity to animate these objects as actual or potential expressions of my desire in the first place.

Of course, many of the specific things in our environment do not reveal their specific practical significance to us without a great deal of

⁵⁵ If I am right to claim that there is a notion of irreducible, agent-specific knowledge at work in Hegel's account of desire, then we can see that there is a close affinity between this account and Heidegger's account of the agent's circumspective seeing (*Umsicht*) in relation to the world characterized by "readiness-to-hand" (*Zuhandenheit*); Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1941), 5 Auflage, section 15; translated into English as *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

⁵⁶ On this account, Anscombe's notion of non-observational knowledge can be extended so as to include, not only the agent's knowledge of its own actions, but also its knowledge of its practical terrain; see Gertrude E. M. Anscombe, *Intention*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 13–15.

work and effort on our part. For instance, I need to develop a complex, practical relationship to paint, brushes, and canvas before I am able to realize the sorts of paintings I would like to be able to paint. As a beginner, I do not appreciate all the nuances of brushstrokes and of the different visual effects they create, and it is not until I actually take the brushes in hand to paint that these nuances gradually come to life for me and thus enter into my practical terrain. However, that the world is opened to me, from the start, as generally composed of objects that I can do things with, as containing objects that my body can transform and that can thus manifest my desire in an objective manner, seems to be an original and irreducible feature of my very access to the real.

In this sense, we can understand the desiring agent's basic relation to itself as playing a role similar to the one played by Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, the role, namely, of being the original, *a priori* condition for the possibility of there being such things as objects of consciousness in the first place. For in the case of the desiring agent there is an original and spontaneous form of self-relation—the self's relation to itself as an effectual agent—that acts as a condition for the possibility of experiencing the world in general as its practical terrain. However, though the desiring agent is what is ultimately responsible for allowing its objective situation to appear as the dramatic stage for its own practical self-affirmation in the first place—and, in this respect, the desiring agent's original relation to itself as a self-affirming agent is the *a priori* condition of what appears—it is not until the agent actually transforms the world on its own account that it genuinely establishes itself as the original truth behind this appearance. It is thus as though the self can only establish itself as the *a priori* condition of objects in retrospect, after it has already acted in the world, for it must first succeed in transforming the world to its satisfaction, thus showing that the world was in truth for its sake all along.

VI

Rather than treating the sort of immediate sense experience discussed earlier as a self-sufficient form of knowledge that exists simply

side-by-side with desire's practical experience of the world, Hegel would have us see that sense experience itself must be understood as a limited and abstract form of knowing that gets its fuller truth only when it is reconceived as a function of desire's experience of the world.⁵⁷ Sense experience, in other words, is always the sense experience of a living, desiring being, and so the very character of the sensible world must be reconceived so as to make clear how this world appears, not merely to a neutral, passive recipient of sense information, but rather to a desiring being that is always already in the process of affirming itself in and through the world that presents itself to it.

I have described how the desiring agent, in its living awareness of itself as an agent in the midst of actualizing itself, in effect transforms the sensible world as a whole into what I have called a practical terrain: in the midst of action, things in the world appear to us immediately, in reference to our practically engaged bodies, as "things we can grasp with our hands," or as "things we can swim in." These practical meanings do not straightforwardly correspond to positive, sensibly present properties of objects, but are rather more like negative gaps or openings in the sensible world that call for my action to bring positive actuality to them. I immediately experience the world, in other words, not simply in terms of what is actually there in the present, but in terms of what is as yet absent, in terms of its potential to make manifest, in an objective and sensible manner, my actual power to transform it.

In the midst of a walk through a dense forest, for instance, what I am experientially engaged with most immediately is not the trees as independent, self-contained, sensible beings laid out before me as an objective spectacle. Rather than looking at the trees as positive beings in their own right, what I am actually conscious of—what I am immediately awake to in my practical body—are the potential paths through them, the ways some groups of trees clear a space for me to walk, whereas others cluster together and present themselves as repelling or inaccessible to me. Now although the space between the

⁵⁷ Hegel claims that "consciousness of an 'other', of an object in general, is itself necessarily *self-consciousness*" (*PhS* M 164, W/C 118). He thus implies that all of the forms of Consciousness investigated in the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology* (sense-certainty included) must now be reconceived in the light of primacy of Self-Consciousness.

trees is not a positive, sensible presence in its own right—indeed, it is precisely the absence of any such presence—it does not seem inappropriate to say that I see this space, or that the quality of this space appears to me in some sense. For, I do not need consciously to measure up the distance between the sensibly present trees as if with a ruler (itself another positive, sensible presence) in order to determine whether my body frame will pass comfortably through them. Rather, I immediately see the situation in terms of a concrete, practical vision of how my moving body stands in spatial relation to the things around it, and for the most part the environment around me is already sized up, not in terms of precise units of magnitude, but most immediately in terms of a qualitative feel for what bodily movements are enabled or hindered by it.⁵⁸ In this way I am alive to the space between the trees, not as a positive, sensible entity in its own right, but precisely as a negative opening or an emptiness through which I can pass.⁵⁹ What orients the sensible world as I immediately experience it, what brings together the sensible multiplicity into a unified, meaningful phenomenon for me—such that I immediately recognize some area as a “clearing”—is really something that itself does not yet have a sensible presence in the world, but that only exists in potentiality: namely, my actual act of walking through the trees, the act I desire. We can see that this sort of seeing, though it appears to be as immediate as the bare sense experience that we discussed earlier under the name of sense-certainty, could not be accounted for in the same terms as sense-certainty, precisely because the true object that it is reckoning

⁵⁸ I am drawing here from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analyses of spatiality as determined in relation to the lived body's motility; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Part 1, Ch. 3.

⁵⁹ Note Hegel's claim that “the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception . . . for self-consciousness [*qua* desire] has the character of a negative.” *PhS* M167, W/C 121–2. Compare here Sartre's argument that our perception of negativity in the world (for instance, our experiential realization that something we are looking for is not present) is not reducible to a judgment we make on the basis of our experience of what is positively present, but is, rather, an original and immediate experience of a lack of being, an absence that is actually manifest to us; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), 36–44 and 56–87. On Sartre's argument, it is precisely we, as free selves, that bring such negativity into the world, and I am suggesting that Hegel's account of desire involves a similar claim.

with is not simply the sensible presence of things, but, on the contrary, an absence that is not yet present.⁶⁰

It might seem as though immediate sensible properties like color and sound ought to be apparent to our senses regardless of whether or not we are practically engaged in the world. However, except in certain artificial conditions—for instance, those that a cognitive psychologist might set up so as to isolate certain faculties of perceptual discrimination—sensation is never merely a passive reception of practically neutral, sensuous qualities, but is always already a way in which a desiring being positions itself in terms of its ongoing project of self-actualization. For instance, phenomenologically speaking it seems impossible to separate our hearing the distinctive quality of the sound of a fire alarm from our being immediately mobilized to drop what we are doing and to flee. The very sensible immediacy of this distinct sound seems to engage us precisely in terms of our ability to experience our immediate situation as undesirable and as repelling us from it. Even if we choose not to flee, we as agents nevertheless hear this sound as a determinate call to action, we hear it immediately, with our practically engaged bodies, in terms of the determinate practical project it solicits—in terms, for instance, of the way it immediately makes salient to us the exit doors of the room we are in. That is, we do not first hear some neutral sound data to which we then ascribe a practical significance; rather, the world we sense is through and through a practical world, and so even the bare, sensible appearing of things is not, for me as a concrete, embodied agent, detachable from the various desires and practical commitments I am constantly carrying around with me as I live my life. We can imagine that a being with absolutely no desires or bodily agency of its own—a purely disinterested, theoretical consciousness—would actually hear the fire alarm differently than we do, would not hear its teeth-grating shrillness, its repelling volume, and thus its patently alarming character.⁶¹

It thus seems that we must conceive of the practical, bodily stance of fleeing that I assume in hearing the alarm as an integral part of what it is to actually hear the alarm in the first place: to be hearing this sound is, at once, to be repelled by it, and thus to be positioned

⁶⁰ In Hegel's term's, the sensible world has ceased to be a self-sufficient presentation of truth in its own right, and has become appearance (*Erscheinung*) of an essence (self-consciousness itself) that does not show itself, or rather that shows itself only as the negation of this appearance; *PhS* M167, W/C 121.

practically in such a manner as to do (or fail to do) something about it. While we can abstract the experience of hearing from the concrete, practical life of the desiring agent who hears—this is what we did in our account of sense-certainty, and it was solely on this condition that we were able to conceive of it as generating realist metaphysical commitments—it seems that this approach ultimately fails to do justice to the actual, living context within which sensing for the most part takes place. For Hegel, this approach would be comparable to that approach which, in an attempt to understand the phenomenon of life, studies only the corpses of living things. For the sensible world is, for the concrete, desiring agent, alive on all sides with the potentialities of its own practical self-affirmation, and to reduce the experiential field merely to what is sensibly present would be tantamount to cutting off the lifeblood that animates it and gives it meaning and truth. It is true, desire is not the final experience of knowing considered in the *Phenomenology*, and it too eventually proves to be an abstract moment of more comprehensive forms of experience. However, desire's practical refutation of sense-certainty's realist schema is, for Hegel, the first step in his eventual demonstration that the world we experience is not made up of independent, self-contained, objects that stand over against us, but is rather to be understood ultimately as the historical setting for the drama of spirit, as the practical terrain upon which spirit's self-actualization takes place.

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⁶¹ Compare Hegel's discussion of how even the sensible immediacy of colors can manifest, for the sensing self, an affective (and therefore practical) significance; *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 2 Anthropology*, sec. 401 *Zusatz*. Compare also Merleau-Ponty's account of how even the simplest of sense experiences necessarily involves the sensing subject's "enactment" of a certain bodily attitude; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 211–5.

DIMENSIONS OF ABSOLUTE KNOWING

MARTIN J. DE NYS

The phenomenologically necessary concept of receptivity is in no way exclusively opposed to that of the *activity of the ego*, under which all acts proceeding in a specific way from the ego-pole are to be included. On the contrary, receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity.¹

HEGEL DEVOTES THE CONCLUDING chapter of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* to a discussion of “absolute knowing.” This is not simply the final topic that Hegel considers in the *Phenomenology*. It is the telos that makes sense of the dialectic and argument of that work. To arrive at the position that Hegel entitles “absolute knowing” is to attain an express and warranted understanding of the nature of knowledge that justifies the claim that the activity of knowing has as its most essential outcome “actual cognition of what truly is.”² This understanding determines the standpoint from which fully authentic philosophical thinking proceeds. Achieving that standpoint is the fundamental aim of the inquiry that both introduces and is the first part of the system of philosophical science.

My purpose in these pages is to present a discussion that represents the complexity and comprehensiveness of the core of the position on absolute knowing that concludes the *Phenomenology* and that,

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¹Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979), 79.

²Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 46. (Hereafter: *Phenomenology*). G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, herausg. Eva Moldenhauer u. Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 68. (Hereafter: *Phänomenologie*).

for this reason, contributes to a defense of that position. My interpretation of that position is not uncontroversial. The position that is at the core of the doctrine of absolute knowing presents, I maintain, the idea of knowing as a single process that is essentially self-determining and that integrates into its autonomy dimensions of receptivity and historicity. There may well be aspects of the larger doctrine of absolute knowing that need criticism and reversal. But the position that is at the core of that doctrine and that both defines cognitive activity in terms of the autonomy of reason, and integrates into this idea of autonomy concepts of receptivity and historicity, invites development rather than reversal in virtue of its essential contribution to philosophical truth. I am chiefly interested in bringing that contribution into focus.

Hegel characterizes absolute knowing in three ways. He says that it involves a "reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness,"³ that it exhibits a coincidence of certainty with truth,⁴ and that it entails a transformation "of Substance into Subject."⁵ In commenting on each of these characterizations, Hegel refers back from the concluding chapter of the *Phenomenology* to the work as a whole. My discussion of these characterizations of absolute knowing must also examine both the final chapter of the *Phenomenology* and some key portions of the larger work.

I

The characterization of absolute knowing as a coincidence of certainty and truth appears, in the eighth chapter of the *Phenomenology*, between the discussions in the same chapter of the other ways of understanding the standpoint to which that work concludes. It does not receive extended, independent consideration in that chapter. Nonetheless it is important, because it represents one way of naming the issue that is of fundamental concern to the whole work and that every stage of Hegel's phenomenological argument addresses. The introductory pages of the *Phenomenology* define its task, procedures, and goal in relation to this issue. The conception of that goal entails

³*Phenomenology*, 482. *Phänomenologie*, 579.

⁴*Ibid.*, 485/582.

⁵*Ibid.*, 488/585.

an abstract concept of absolute knowing that frames the additional understandings of that standpoint that the final chapter presents.

It is natural on his contemporary scene, Hegel observes, for philosophers to assume that before one starts to develop philosophical knowledge of reality, "one must first of all come to an understanding of cognition, which is regarded either as an instrument to get hold of" what truly is, "or as the medium through which one discovers it."⁶ After all, there are different ways of understanding cognition. One needs the right understanding in order to properly use this instrument or medium in the service of philosophical purposes. But caution quickly turns to skepticism regarding the very possibility of cognition of what truly is. If cognition is like an instrument or a medium, then of course it does not leave the item to which it is applied or the thing which it filters unaffected. If so, then anything that we know is known in virtue of its being modified by the instrument or medium that cognition is. Supposing that one could correct for the modification, the object in question would then revert to its unmodified state and would be unknown. To regard cognition as an instrument or a medium, then, suggests the impossibility of coming to know what is in and of itself actual.

Of course there is a good deal taken for granted in the view of knowledge just mentioned. It may be that the fear of error that disposes one to begin philosophy with a critique of cognition is in fact a fear that blocks access to truth. Perhaps one should just abandon the view of cognition in question and the assumption about the beginning of philosophy that it supports. Then the supposition that leads to skepticism about the possibility of actual cognition of what truly is no longer prevails. One can suppose instead that such cognition is possible, and begin straightaway to pursue that possibility. But of course this will not do either. We all know that "*One* bare assurance is worth just as much as another."⁷ We require a genuine account of knowing that shows the evident truth of its conclusion. This coincides with an exposition of "the path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge," and which finally achieves, "through a completed experience of itself, the awareness of what it really is in itself."⁸

⁶ Ibid., 46/68.

⁷ Ibid., 49/71.

⁸ Ibid., 49/72.

Natural consciousness consists in principle of all forms consciousness that assume or present an account of knowing but that do not show the validity of that account. It comes in an array of shapes. Any shape of natural consciousness presents some understanding of the nature of the object of consciousness, the relation between consciousness and its object, and the nature of consciousness itself. Any shape of natural consciousness also presents the claim that the terms and relations that define its structure make possible genuine cognition of the object. On its own terms, a shape of natural consciousness holds within itself both the ability to test this claim and the criterion needed to make that test. One makes the test by endeavoring to know that which, given any particular shape of natural consciousness, is supposed to be there to be known, in the way in which it is supposed to be knowable. Suppose that, in the course of this attempt, a contradiction arises. Then it becomes evident that one's concept of the nature of the object of knowledge does not conceptualize that object in its integrity, but rather presents an understanding of the object that natural consciousness entertains, and that stands in contrast with the integrity of the object itself.

Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to be the *in-itself* is not an *in-itself*, or that it was only an *in-itself for consciousness*.⁹

One's experience of the object is a process in which one forms a new concept of the nature of the object, which at once presents a new designation of the object in its own integrity, along with a new understanding of the relation between consciousness and the object, the nature of consciousness, and the manner in which what is available to be known is supposed to be knowable.

Phenomenology is, for Hegel, the "Science of the *experience of consciousness*."¹⁰ In doing phenomenology one observes the process through which diverse forms of natural consciousness give rise to tests of and revisions of specific claims regarding the conditions of genuine cognition, bringing order and necessity into that process through the analyses that are part of these observations. Since any of its shapes present some claim regarding the conditions of genuine knowing, natural consciousness on its own terms exhibits at least the

⁹ Ibid., 54/78.

¹⁰ Ibid., 56/80.

abstract concept of such knowing. But that is exactly what it exhibits. "Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the concept of knowledge, or in other words, not to be real knowledge."¹¹ The science of the experience of consciousness will demonstrate that the terms and relations supposed from the standpoint of natural consciousness to allow for genuine cognition fail as conditions of that possibility. In this sense, the course of experience that natural consciousness traverses can "be regarded as the pathway of *doubt*, or more precisely as the highway of despair."¹² But since a warranted account of genuine knowing does emerge as a consequence of the experience of natural consciousness, the presentation of that experience is "the detailed history of the *education* of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science."¹³ Moreover, these comments on procedure in phenomenology enable one to delineate, in advance and in an abstract way, the nature of that standpoint.

Recall that the experience of consciousness presses forward as one moves from the definitions of the object, of consciousness, and of the relations between them that determine any specific structure of consciousness, to an effort at gaining cognition of what is supposed to be knowable in view of that structure. Such an effort fails insofar as one learns that what is knowable on its own terms stands in opposition to the concept of the same, which is the base of operations for cognitive consciousness. The base of operations is supposed to secure for consciousness the possibility of genuine cognition. But the concept that seems to provide security or certitude regarding that possibility fails to coincide with the truth about the object. Then consciousness must reconceive its object, and in doing so must go beyond the structure that has determined its most recent activities. Cognitive consciousness must go beyond itself in that sense. If so, then "the *goal* is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where concept corresponds to object and object to concept."¹⁴ In this situation cognitive self-understanding, the source of certainty, coincides with the truth about what is knowable and the manner in which it is to be known. This coincidence of

¹¹ Ibid., 49/72.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 50/73.

¹⁴ Ibid., 51/74.

certainty and truth gives a most basic and most general characterization of the standpoint of absolute knowing.

II

The explicit discussion of absolute knowing that concludes the *Phenomenology* begins with comments on the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness. These comments presuppose the earlier presentation of the terms ingredient in this reconciliation, and they explicitly refer to two culminating moments in the experience of consciousness, namely, the dialectics of the community of conscientious selves and of the revelatory religion. These comments give an argument for a position concerning the self-relatedness and autonomy of rational self-consciousness that specifies the more general concept of the coincidence of certainty and truth. That argument, I maintain, also requires an affirmation of the being-in-itself of what is known, and thus of receptivity as a dimension of the autonomy of reason.

The various shapes that belong to the experience of consciousness fall into more general structures which are themselves ordered and linked in the light of phenomenological observation. The first phases of the experience of consciousness belong to a structure for which Hegel simply uses the word "Consciousness" itself as the title. Consciousness in this sense sees its object as independent of and external to itself, and as that which makes the essential contribution to cognition. Knowledge comes about insofar as one allows the object to present itself to consciousness in the manner in which it does, in virtue of its nature. One learns through the course of the development of this structure that one must do more and more in order to allow this to happen. Still, as long as consciousness in this sense is in place, the object is defined in terms of its otherness from consciousness, and the relation of consciousness to its object is the relation of consciousness to something other. But it finally becomes manifest that it is the very activity of cognitive consciousness itself that realizes the intelligibility of the object that one grasps in understanding. The intelligibility of the object that one grasps in understanding is a potentiality that is made actual through the activity of the understanding itself. If so, then an understanding of that object is as such, if only implicitly, an understanding of one's own explanatory activities. The

relation of consciousness to its object is not only a relation to something other. It is even more essentially a relation to its own self.

With this a new general structure, "Self-Consciousness" emerges in phenomenological inquiry. Self-Consciousness is defined by the attitude that the relation of consciousness to the object is in truth a self-relation. The object is most essentially defined as the vehicle, as it were, through which consciousness achieves self-relatedness, and thus in terms of its being-for-another, for consciousness, as contrasted with its independent being. Of course "the whole expanse of the sensuous world" continues to stand before consciousness. But this is so only insofar as this appearance "is connected with the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself;"¹⁵ Self-consciousness needs its object to exhibit this connectedness in the manner in which that object presents itself. Self-consciousness is essentially determined by the "Desire" (*Begierde*) that its object present itself in this manner.¹⁶

According to Hegel, with the emergence of self-consciousness we have "entered the native realm of truth."¹⁷ Self-consciousness needs to develop if it is to inhabit this realm, and the requirements of that development become manifest in the dialectic of the experience of desire. The desire that belongs to self-consciousness, as already noted, demands that the object present itself in a manner that exhibits the essential connectedness of the object with the self. This is possible only if another self defines itself in terms of its recognition of oneself. Thus the desire that belongs to self-consciousness defines the situation that determines the self as one of relations between selves. The self by its very nature subsists in a context that is essentially intersubjective. Its desire is the desire for the desire of another.¹⁸ Both the confirmation and the occurrence of the identity of the self follow from recognition by the other. Recognition, in turn, can occur in an adequate way only if the other offers recognition on the basis of its own initiative. This means that the self must acknowledge the other self, as well as its object in a more general sense, as possessing intrinsic being. Even though desire seems to relate the object essentially to the self, self-consciousness must "learn through experience that the object is

¹⁵ Ibid., 105/138.

¹⁶ Ibid., 105/139.

¹⁷ Ibid., 104/138.

¹⁸ Ibid., 109–10/143–44.

independent,"¹⁹ Thus even if self-consciousness presents us with "the native realm of truth," the standpoint that defines consciousness must receive its due, and the two standpoints must come together in a position that reconciles each with the other.

The discussion of this reconciliation in the chapter on absolute knowing begins by referring again to self-consciousness as a structure that overcomes the standpoint of consciousness. This entails a "surmounting of the object of consciousness"²⁰ taken as external and independent. One must understand this to mean "not only that the object as such presented itself to the Self as vanishing, but rather that it is the externalization of self-consciousness that posits the thinghood [of the object];"²¹ for self-consciousness this has a negative and a positive meaning. The "vanishing" of the object comes about because self-consciousness

externalizes its own self—for in this externalization it posits *itself* as object, or the object as itself, for the sake of the indivisible unity of *being-for-self*.²²

Self-consciousness attains self-relatedness by directing itself towards and identifying with something that is independent and external, and establishes the object as such a thing for consciousness by doing just this. Since this aspect of externalization requires that self-consciousness direct itself towards and identify with something that is not itself, its significance for self-consciousness is negative. But this at once means that through externalization self-consciousness relates the thing to itself. Self-consciousness

has equally superseded this externalization and objectivity too, and taken it back into itself so that it is in communion with itself in *its* otherness as such.²³

Insofar as externalization brings about self-relatedness its significance for self-consciousness is positive.

As the preceding remarks indicate, one can also understand the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness by saying that the "surmounting of the object" that externalization brings about inte-

¹⁹ Ibid., 106/140.

²⁰ Ibid., 479/575.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

grates the intrinsic being and the being-for-other (that is, for-consciousness) of the object. For this to occur,

consciousness must have related itself to the object in accordance with the totality of the latter's determinations and thus have grasped it from the standpoint of each of them.²⁴

These determinations are the immediate being of the object, the determinateness through which the object is something for-another, and the essential intelligibility of the object that discloses itself in terms that are universal.²⁵ These determinations appear severally in various specific ways throughout the experience of consciousness. Absolute knowing, understood as the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness, comes about through a gathering-together (*Versammlung*)²⁶ of these determinations that brings them into a unity. Insofar as self-consciousness grasps the object from the standpoint of each of the determinations that belongs to the object, its relation to the object is a relation to itself, just as it is an integration of the intrinsic being of the object and the being of the object for-consciousness. However, the unification of these determinations itself appears in the experience of consciousness. In fact it appears twice therein. Those appearances are critical for the account of absolute knowing. They occur in the discussion of the community of conscientious selves that concludes the discussion of morality, and in the conclusion of the consideration of the religion of revelation.²⁷

The definition of the self in terms of conscience comes about in virtue of the collapse of the separations and connections between duty and outer nature, between duty and inner nature, and between the voice of the individual moral subject and the voice of the holy law-giver, that the postulates of practical reason, as Hegel formulates these, require. As a consequence, the argument maintains, the moral subject comes to define itself wholly in terms of conscience. One knows one's duty in the light of conscientious conviction; the opposi-

²⁴ Ibid., 479/575–76.

²⁵ Ibid., 480/576.

²⁶ Ibid., 485/582.

²⁷ Hegel's expression, *Die offenbare Religion* (*Phänomenologie*, 545), is quite difficult to translate. I follow Quentin Lauer in using the expression "the religion of revelation." See Lauer, *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), 244. (Hereafter: *Reading*).

tion of duty and inner nature is overcome. One does one's duty through the actions that one performs and in the world, and this one declares to be the expression of one's conscientious conviction; insofar as one's action belongs to the world the opposition of duty and external nature is overcome. Conscience is inviolable and sacred; the voice of the holy lawgiver coincides with the inner voice of the self. Of course it is always possible to understand any action to be one that follows from particular inclination rather than from a sense of duty and to judge that its performer is subordinating duty to inclination. Nonetheless, the conscientious agent declares the action to follow from genuine conviction and expects that declaration to be acknowledged.

The conscientious self defines external nature, its own internal nature, and God in terms of its own self-knowledge. That is to say, its self-knowledge is the source of its definition of everything. For this reason, with the conscientious self "we see self-consciousness withdrawn into its innermost being, for which all externality as such has vanished;" whether this self directs its attention to external reality or to its own identity, "its consciousness is only this knowledge of itself."²⁸ This condition entails two possibilities. The self may endeavor to preserve its self-relatedness at all costs. Then the self "flees from contact with the actual world" and determines itself as a "beautiful soul" who shuns action.²⁹ Or one may remember that self-knowledge is knowledge of the self as one whose conscientious conviction determines duty, and that duty requires action. Then one will act. To do this, of course, is to present one's deed and one's declaration about that deed to the self who shuns action but is still capable of judging the deeds of others.

This judge knows that any action supposed to express duty may be assessed as following from personal inclination rather than duty.³⁰ This is the chief reason why the judge shuns action in the first place. In the light of this understanding the judge assesses the self who acts to be base, insofar as the act follows from inclination rather than duty, and hypocritical, because the actor declares that the deed expresses duty as determined by conviction. In doing this the judge becomes

²⁸ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 398–9. *Phänomenologie*, 482–3.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 400/484.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 404/488.

base by insisting that the act be assessed in relation to personal inclination rather than conscientious conviction, and hypocritical by substituting judging for acting, thus making duty a matter of words. The judge puts himself on the very same level that he assigns to the actor. The self who acts then sees itself in the self of the judge, and confesses as much. This of course is not what the judge wanted at all. The judge defines himself in opposition to the other and "rejects any continuity with the other."³¹ But in doing this, the judge becomes a self who:

refuses to put itself into communication with the other which, in its confession had *ipso facto* renounced its *separate being-for-self*, and thereby expressly superseded its particularity, and in so doing posited itself in continuity with the other as a universal.³²

Now the judge, who claims identification with universal duty and condemns the other for of identifying with particularity, locks himself in particularity by insisting on his judgment. For this reason the judge comes to see himself in the other. There follows forgiveness and the "word of reconciliation"³³ that interrelates and reinstitutes community among these otherwise opposed selves.

It is essential to understand the complexities of the dialectic just outlined in terms of the different determinations of the object—immediacy, being-for-another, and universality—to which self-consciousness must relate itself and from whose standpoint self-consciousness must grasp the object. As a consequence of the dialectic just outlined, each self possesses knowledge (a) of its connection with the other in a community that interrelates particulars and is therefore universal, (b) of the manner in which it is in a determinate way for-the-other, and (c) of its own immediate individuality. Each self sees itself in the other. The actor determines the presence of itself to the other through acting and making a declaration about that action and through confessing that the judge is one in whom the actor sees himself. The judge determines the presence of itself to the other by judging, and then by speaking words of forgiveness and reconciliation as a consequence of seeing itself in the actor. In virtue of these differences, each self stands over against the other as a separate individual posed in its own imme-

³¹ Ibid., 405/490.

³² Ibid., 406/490–1.

³³ Ibid., 408/493.

diacy. The consciousness that each self has of the situation just described coincides with the self-consciousness of each. The dialectic of the experience of consciousness thus presents at this point a reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness. Moreover, the intelligibility known in and through this reconciliation is an intelligibility that is determined, one might say produced, by the action of each self. Each is integrated into a community with the other, each presents itself in a determinate way to the other, and each stands in a condition of immediate separation from the other, on account of what it does. And what it does, most fundamentally, is to know the other and itself in a specific way. In this way, that which the self knows is now "the *Self's* own *act*,"³⁴ and is understood to be precisely that. The concept of the object of consciousness corresponds precisely to that object as such, and there is nothing that requires consciousness to revise that concept in order to comprehend the object in its integrity. This gives us a reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness that produces and specifies the coincidence of certainty and truth.

The unification of the determinations from whose standpoint self-consciousness must grasp its object, and the reconciliation of self-consciousness with consciousness that this unification defines, makes another determinate appearance in the experience of consciousness in the discussion of revealed religion. Briefly, religion emerges in the experience of consciousness insofar as the community that results from the experience of the conscientious self is a community of selves who gain self-knowledge by transcending themselves in virtue of identifying with the overarching principle that integrates them together. This combination of self-transcendence and self-knowledge is the basis of religion. The consideration of religion leads to the religion of revelation. The model that Hegel uses for understanding this is Christianity. Thus, revelation discloses God in terms of the immanent relations supposed to comprise divinity, as well as in terms of the economic precessions through which God creates the natural and human world, enters into that world to heal the estrangement that human beings cause between themselves and God, and brings about the gathered community as the domain of divine indwelling.

³⁴ Ibid., 485/582.

The representations that convey the community's consciousness of divine being and action signify divine activity by referring to the moments of that activity as discrete occurrences: creation, incarnation and redemption, indwelling.³⁵ Representational thinking also presents divine action as a set of occurrences that happen in a manner external to the life of the community. But the activity of the community itself, worship, integrates awareness of the occurrences of divine activity into the consciousness of a comprehensive, unifying action. This allows the community to experience its own active response to divine action as that which allows divine being and action to live and to be manifest in the life of the community.³⁶ Then the devotee can understand the situation of the community of believers before God as one in which God relates creatures to Godself and interrelates particular creatures with each other as the ultimate ground and universal principle of intelligibility, and consequently as a situation in which both God and creatures are in a determinate way for-the-other, which determinacies, because they contrast, define God as well as creatures through their respective immediacies. This understanding is possible insofar as the community realizes in its experience, as Quentin Lauer points out, that divine and human action are not discrete processes that simply stand over-against each other, but are ingredient in "one and the same process."³⁷ Since the cultic acts of the community allow divine being and action to manifest itself in the community, the representations that convey an understanding of the divine to the community express the community's own self-understanding. A reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness occurs in the experience of the religious community that finds a consciousness of its own action in its awareness of the being and action of the divine.

There is a common factor in each of these determinate appearances of the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness in the experience of consciousness. In each, the activity of knowing provides the intelligible content that is realized in cognition, either by being that content, or by forming and integrating the moments of representational thinking that present that content. One attains the idea of absolute knowing if one releases this factor from the determinate

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 466/560.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Reading*, 254.

shapes of consciousness in which it appears and considers the pure conception of knowing that it defines. According to that conception, cognitive activity itself is the single, essential ground of all knowledge. Knowledge has its ground in the action that brings that which is known into presence as an intelligible content in and for cognitive consciousness, as the first moment of the activity through which that intelligibility is realized, that is, grasped in thought. In Hegel's words, the content that is known in actual cognition "is here the *Self's* own act," just as the concept of cognition that has emerged with necessity in the science of the experience of consciousness "requires the *content* to be the *Self's* own act."³⁸

These remarks about "the self's own act" state the defining feature of absolute knowing. Such knowing proceeds from the warranted understanding that rational, cognitive activity is the single principle from which knowledge follows, and is therefore a self-determining or autonomous principle. Knowledge comes about not because one is related to an object that is determinate in this or that way, but because of self-directing rational activity with regard to whatever is actual, whatever its specific mode of determinacy might be. For this reason the doctrine of absolute knowing has as its correlate an affirmation of the essential intelligibility of being, or more precisely, of what is actual in a genuine sense. These observations surely support comments like those by Stephen Houlgate, who maintains that Hegel's account of thought is an account of the conditions that allow "thought to determine itself *freely*," and that at the conclusion of that account, "thought has become explicitly what it has always been implicitly, namely the determination of thought by *itself*."³⁹ Especially in the light of comments like these, I believe that it is essential to recognize that the understanding that grounds knowledge in the freedom and autonomy of cognitive activity does not on that account exclude receptivity. Towards the beginning of this section I reported on a part of Hegel's understanding of the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness by saying that self-consciousness, through externalization, establishes something as an object and as a thing that is independent and external. Something is an object and an

³⁸ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 485. *Phänomenologie*, 582.

³⁹ Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth, and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 45, 57.

independent and external thing due to the activity of rational self-consciousness.

Given the context in which Hegel expresses this view, what does it mean? It means that it is just by directing itself towards and relating itself to something that such a thing gets established as an item that can and does present itself in terms of an intelligibility that can be realized in knowledge as rational activity develops. Since the item in question is defined through that intelligibility it is, as such, a vehicle for the self-relatedness that determines self-consciousness. Since the intelligibility in question belongs to the item itself, that item stands over against rational consciousness as something that presents itself thereto. The positive meaning that externalization has for self-consciousness does not annul the negative meaning that externalization has for self-consciousness. Rather, the former preserves the latter. Recall that self-consciousness, through its relation to its object, relates to itself insofar as it grasps the object from the standpoint of the different determinations that belong to the object. One of those determinations is and must be immediacy, the being-in-itself of the thing as such. Immediacy here does not stand over against the intelligibility of the object, but is integrated into that intelligibility as one of its necessary dimensions.

These remarks require the position that rational self-consciousness, through its own activity, establishes its object as something that presents itself to rational consciousness in virtue of an intelligibility that it realized insofar as it is grasped in thought. If rational self-consciousness establishes or determines its object as something that presents itself, then it simultaneously determines itself as being receptive to those presentations. Hegel realizes, as does Husserl in the citation that opens this paper, that self-determining activity and receptivity do not exclude each other, just because being receptive is in its own way a kind of activity. Doing what one must do in order to allow that which is actual and therefore intelligible to present itself in and to rational thought is, as these very words suggest, a kind of action in its own right. Heidegger offers a deeply helpful gloss on the Hegelian conception of absolute knowing in just this regard. He notes that,

The term *absolute* means initially 'not relative.' . . . For knowledge to be qualitatively other than relative knowledge . . . it must not remain bound but must liberate and ab-solve itself from what it knows and yet as so absolved, as absolute, still be a knowledge. To be ab-solved from what

is known does not mean 'abandoning' it but 'preserving it by elevating it.'⁴⁰

Later he says,

What is known absolutely can only be that which knowledge knowingly lets emerge and which, only as emerging thus, stands in knowing: it is not an object but an emergence. . . . The correlate of absolvent knowing is this emergence.⁴¹

Knowing that is absolute has attained a warranted identification of the activity of knowing itself as that which lets the intelligibility of whatever is actual to appear in the cognitive process that then goes on to secure its evident comprehension. Given this identification, what is known does not stand over against knowing as an other to which cognition relates at the cost of its self-relation, or as an other that stands over against cognitive activities as a criterion against which the nature and outcomes of those activities are measured. But still, the intelligibility of what is known appears with an integrity of its own in the evident comprehension of the intelligibility that the activity of knowing both attains and grounds. In this sense, the otherness of the other is both overcome and preserved in the cognition that is attained by knowing that is absolute, and the conception of absolute knowing assigns to cognitive activity an intrinsic dimension of receptivity. I believe that this is the case even when knowledge is of the self-determining reality of cognition itself.⁴²

III

The claims about preserving as well as overcoming the otherness of the other in cognition, and about the emergence in cognition of an integral intelligibility, find strong support, I maintain, in Hegel's re-

⁴⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 14 and 15.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁴² To say this is to suggest that there is a dimension of receptivity even in what Hegel calls Logic. See Martin J. De Nys, "Self-Consciousness and the Concept in Hegel's Appropriation of Kant," *Hegel On The Modern World*, ed. Ardis B. Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 143–158. See also John Burbidge, *Hegel on Logic and Religion* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 7.

marks about the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness.⁴³ However, in the concluding chapter of the *Phenomenology* the discussion of absolute knowing as the transformation of subject into substance also has a bearing on these comments. That discussion takes up the ideas of an integral intelligibility and of the occurrence of a receptive dimension in absolute knowing and makes them specific in connection with the issues of time and history in their relation to thought.

Given Hegel's terminology, "substance" is the social domain that situates the lives of its members, is the context of possibilities for self-realizing action, and is the work of each and all who belong to it. Knowing aims at actual cognition of the truth about thinking and about the world that discloses its intelligible actuality in and to thought. Such cognition calls upon the self neither to withdraw abstractly into its self-conscious identity nor to lose itself in the actuality of the world. Rather, cognition comes about insofar as the self

empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its substance, and also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and content.⁴⁴

Cognition as understood here begins with the autonomous determination in thought of those categorial necessities that at once and most radically belong to the activity of thinking and to the intelligible actuality of things. This is possible in virtue of the warranted realization that actual knowledge of what truly is has its sole and essential ground in the activity of knowing itself.

That realization, of course, comes about in the science of the experience of consciousness, in which specific shapes of consciousness exhibit, separately and together, the determinations that account for the genuine self-relatedness of rational self-consciousness. Absolute knowing, understood with reference to the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness that defines this self-relatedness, occurs through a release of those determinations from the determinate shapes of consciousness in which they appear, and an integration

⁴³ Recall that he holds that self-consciousness must "learn through experience that the object is independent," and that in the context of its reconciliation with consciousness self-consciousness must still grasp the object with respect of each of the object's own determinations.

⁴⁴ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 490. *Phänomenologie*, 587–88.

of them in a pure conception of knowing. But the development of the science of the experience of consciousness requires that the shapes of consciousness that are immanently ordered and identified within that science appear in life so that they can come forward again in phenomenological thought. Those appearances happen in the acts that bring about the social world that is the work of each and all, and that at the same time stands on its own as the substance of the lives of those whose work it is. It is in this world that people sense, perceive, and understand, attain self-awareness, struggle for recognition, observe nature, act for the sake of self-actualization, bring about communities, act on conflicting convictions, build reconciled communities that preserve conflicting differences, and gather in devotion. The action that has the social world as its work also has as its work the production of thought in the multitude of its forms. Or, the social self-production of human beings and of humanity is definable as the process of the self-production of thought.

This process takes time. The process has as its ultimate end radical cognitive self-understanding, a condition in which rational self-consciousness has made evident to itself the truth about its most essential possibilities, and has thus come into a condition of perfected self-relatedness. But as it always the case, self-relatedness entails difference. In this case, cognitive self-understanding is attained in connection with the different shapes of consciousness whose systematic examination has as its outcome absolute knowing. That self-related understanding

stands over against this pure difference which, as pure and at the same time objective to the self-knowing Self, has to be expressed as Time. So that, just as previously essence was declared to be the unity of Thought and Extension, it would now have to be grasped as the unity of Thought and Time.⁴⁵

The temporal process that is a necessary condition for the appearance of radical cognitive self-understanding takes, in the first instance, the form of a contingent and nonsystematic appearance of the shapes of consciousness. Spirit, Hegel says, performs the process of producing the appearance of those shapes in its journey towards self-knowledge. "The movement of carrying forward the form of its self-knowledge is the labour which it accomplishes as actual history."⁴⁶ Actual history stands over against phenomenology as its other. It is the domain in

⁴⁵ Ibid., 489/587.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 488/586.

which the diverse possibilities that belong to knowing develop in a contingent and nonsystematic way. These possibilities include developments in philosophy. The philosophy of an era, when it is at its best, represents the cognitive standpoint that the era has attained. This is, for Hegel, the fundamental sense in which, to use words from the *Philosophy of Right*, a philosophy is "its own time apprehended in thoughts."⁴⁷

It would not be correct to say that phenomenology "presupposes" actual history. The identity and order of the shapes of consciousness as they appear in phenomenology is, Hegel claims at least, determined with necessity by the immanent process of phenomenology itself. At no point does the science of the experience of consciousness appeal to actual history for the intelligibility or justification of claims that are presented. Nor does the science of the experience of consciousness even refer to actual history, as contrasted with the shapes of consciousness whose definitions and order are immanent to that science. But the shapes of consciousness whose ordered dialectic has as its outcome absolute knowing must have appeared in actual history in order for that same history to have attained the standpoint that makes possible both the cognitive self-understanding that absolute knowing is, and the science of the experience of consciousness that is the demonstration of the sense and truth of that self-understanding. In this way, phenomenology is on its own terms a reenactment of what has already occurred in history, and thus receptive in its relation to actual history. According to Hegel, actual history and phenomenology taken together form "comprehended history;"⁴⁸ comprehended history is not actual history all by itself, and also not phenomenology all by itself. It is both together. Since phenomenology requires actual history as it other, even though phenomenology does not presuppose actual history, it is fair to say that it is from comprehended history that absolute knowing proceeds.

But what is the relation of the process of determining radical cognitive self-understanding to actual history once the position on absolute knowing has emerged? I think it is very easy to misread the posi-

⁴⁷ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: The University Press, 1952), 11; G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, herausg. Moldenhauer u. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 26.

⁴⁸ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 493. *Phänomenologie*, 591.

tion on this question that Hegel presents in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. He does say that time “appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself,” and that “Spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time just so long as it has not *grasped* its pure concept, i.e. has not annulled time.”⁴⁹ This would suggest that once the standpoint of radical cognitive self-understanding has been achieved, philosophical knowing stands above and apart from the actual history.

But Hegel also says, although not in the chapter on absolute knowing, that

only the totality of Spirit is in time, and the ‘shapes’, which are ‘shapes’ of the totality of Spirit, display themselves in a temporal succession; for only the whole has true actuality and therefore the form of pure freedom in the face of an ‘other’, a form which expresses itself as time.⁵⁰

He also says, in the chapter on absolute knowing,

The self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit: to know one’s limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the externalization in which Spirit displays the process of its becoming Spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*, intuiting its pure self as Time outside of it, and equally its Being as Space.⁵¹

The context defined in terms of the self-production of thought is as such characterized, with respect to its telos, by self-determination, freedom in the fullest sense. This context is a whole whose freedom allows, and whose self-relatedness requires, that it stand in the face of something other, in this case the contingently occurring moments of its own self-becoming. The freedom of that context has “a form which expresses itself as time.” Spirit, cognitive self-comprehension that recognizes its own action in its self and in its world, sacrifices itself in relation to this other, is itself only inasmuch as it comes to self-relatedness through its relation to this other. In other words, to the extent that we as knowers operate with a truthful and evident self-understanding, that self-understanding is always and necessarily one that we gain or regain in the historical context that situates our activities, and is in that sense receptive in relation to that context.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 487/584–85.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 413/498.

⁵¹ Ibid., 492/590.

There can be, then, no thought of anything like the end of philosophy or the end of history in the doctrine of absolute knowing that concludes the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Even the text cited above that speaks of annulling time suggests this in its way. The verb that Hegel uses is *tilgen*. *Tilgen* means to annul in the sense of erasing. It also means to repay, as in repaying or paying back a debt that one owes, thus erasing the debt. Spirit repays time because it owes time and actual history a debt. The debt follows from the contingent appearance in actual history of shapes of consciousness that bring human thinking to the standpoint from which, ultimately, radical cognitive self-understanding can come about, through a demonstration that shows what it means to say, and why it is true to say, that knowing attains actual cognition of what truly is. In one sense, this self-understanding stands above time and history, since its adequate expression restates and integrates in pure concepts determinations that otherwise appear in particular ways in specific shapes of consciousness. In another sense, this self-understanding is inextricably bound to history, since it can occur only insofar as thought appropriates its self-understanding in its connection with actual history. Since the context in which thought does and must appropriate its self-understanding is temporal, the appropriation itself is temporal to that extent. The loan from history to thinking is always being made; the debt is always in need of repayment. In Hegelian terms, in reaching its completion Spirit returns to a condition of immediacy that as such requires mediation.

Absolute knowing occurs as the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness. Since it is the activity of knowing that allows the intelligibility of what is known to be present in and to be realized or grasped in thought, the relation of rational self-consciousness to this object is a self-relation. The understanding of the object in terms of the activity of knowing entails that the activity of knowing is the essential and sole ground of knowledge. Knowledge determines itself and at the same time allows the integral intelligibility of what truly is to become evident in its truth. The autonomy of knowing incorporates a dimension of receptivity within itself. Since the self-relatedness of rational self-consciousness follows from an integration of the being-for-consciousness and the intrinsic being of the object, the doctrine of absolute knowing presents a concept of the object of knowledge that corresponds to the object in-itself, so that there is no need and no possibility of going beyond this concept for the sake of comprehending the object in its integrity. In this sense, the standpoint of absolute knowing reconciles certainty and truth. Because the science

THE CONVERSATION THAT NEVER HAPPENED (GADAMER/DERRIDA)

RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN

“IT WAS AN ‘IMPROBABLE’ ENCOUNTER, but improbable though it was, it took place.”¹ This is how Diane Michelfelder and Richard Palmer initially described “The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter.” Let me remind you of what happened (or did not happen). In April 1981, Philippe Forget organized a conference at the Goethe Institute in Paris that brought together Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida, as well as a number of other French and German scholars interested in hermeneutics and poststructuralism. At the time, these were two of the most significant continental philosophical orientations of the twentieth century: hermeneutics, deeply rooted in German nineteenth-century philosophy; and poststructuralism, a movement that burst upon the French scene after the Second World War. Gadamer, already in his eighties, and the much younger Derrida were respectively acknowledged to be the leading spokespersons of hermeneutics and deconstruction. Gadamer hoped that the occasion would provide an opportunity to begin a serious conversation with Derrida. In his lecture, “Text and Interpretation,” Gadamer sketched his own understanding of hermeneutics against the background of their conflicting interpretations of Heidegger and Nietzsche. He indicated that “the encounter with the French scene represents a genuine challenge for me. In particular, Derrida has argued against the later Heidegger that Heidegger himself has not really broken with the logocentrism of metaphysics.”² By sketching the different German and French read-

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¹This is the opening sentence of an early unpublished draft of the introduction to *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter*, ed. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).

²Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” trans. Dennis J. Schmidt and Richard Palmer, in *Dialogue and Deconstruction*, 24.

ings of Heidegger and Nietzsche, Gadamer sought to provide a basis for a conversation. (Derrida's paper at the conference deconstructs Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche). But the conversation never really took place. The morning after Gadamer's lecture, Derrida began his brief reply by declaring: "During the lecture and the ensuing discussion yesterday evening, I began to ask myself if anything was taking place here other than the improbable debates, counter-questioning, and inquiries into unfindable objects of thought—to recall some of the formulations we heard. I am still asking myself this question."³ He then went on to ask three questions, "taking off" from a brief remark that Gadamer made about "good will."⁴ Gadamer was clearly perplexed and began his response to Derrida by saying: "Mr. Derrida's questions prove irrefutably that my remarks on text and interpretation, to the extent they had Derrida's well-known position in mind, did not accomplish their objective. I am finding it difficult to understand these questions that have been addressed to me."⁵

I think that anyone, regardless of their sympathies with hermeneutics or deconstruction would not find in these exchanges any real encounter—any meeting of minds. And this is a great pity because there are important and consequential differences and points of contact between hermeneutics and deconstruction. The so-called encounter of Gadamer and Derrida strikes one as a classic instance of non-communication, of two philosophers speaking past each other; neither really making substantial contact. As we shall see, by the criteria that Gadamer takes to be a genuine conversation or dialogue, this is an example of what happens when a conversation or dialogue does not happen. Michelfelder and Palmer tell the story of how the papers from the 1981 conference were subsequently published in French and German, and how they decided to publish translations of the key texts from the 1981 conference together with other texts and commentaries.⁶ Gadamer and Derrida met on several occasions after

³ Jacques Derrida, "Three Questions to Hans-Georg Gadamer," trans. Diane Michelfelder and Richard Palmer, in *Dialogue and Deconstruction*, 52.

⁴ Gadamer remarks: "Thus, for a written conversation basically the same fundamental condition obtains as for an oral exchange. *Both partners must have the good will to try to understand one another*"; Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation," 33 [emphasis added].

⁵ Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Reply to Jacques Derrida," trans. Diane Michelfelder and Richard Palmer, in *Dialogue and Deconstruction*, 55.

⁶ See especially Fred Dallmayr, "Hermeneutics and Deconstruction: Gadamer and Derrida in Dialogue," in *Dialogue and Deconstruction*, 75–92; and Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Letter to Dallmayr," trans. Richard Palmer and Diane Michelfelder, in *Dialogue and Deconstruction*, 93–101.

1981, but there is no evidence that they ever really had a real dialogue.⁷

I want to imagine the conversation that might have taken place. Or more accurately, I want to explore some of the key differences and points of contact between Gadamer and Derrida. I hope to show that they stand in a productive tension with each other; they “supplement” each other. To characterize their complex relationship, I employ a metaphor from Benjamin and Adorno that I have used before, that of a *constellation*: “a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resists reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle.”⁸ I accept the Gadamerian principle that we never fully escape from our own prejudgments or prejudices when seeking to understand and interpret.⁹ Although Derrida doesn’t phrase the issue this way, I believe he would affirm this Gadamerian thesis for very different reasons. We risk these prejudgments in the event of understanding, and of course, even with our best efforts we may misunderstand and misinterpret. This is an unavoidable risk.

Before turning directly to the encounter that I want to stage, I would like to cite one more text to set *mise-en-scène*. In September 2001, Derrida was awarded the distinguished Adorno Prize given by the city of Frankfurt. Derrida delivered an extraordinarily insightful and moving speech that not only dealt with Derrida’s affinity and indebtedness to Adorno, but also addressed the larger issue of the

⁷ Jean Grondin describes the subsequent meetings between Gadamer and Derrida in his *Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 324–8. When Gadamer died on March 13, 2002, Derrida published an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (March 28, 2002) entitled, “Wie recht er hatte! Mein Cicerone Hans-Georg Gadamer.” Grondin comments: “Breaking a public silence of over twenty years since their first encounter back in 1981, Jacques Derrida, who had recently received the honor of being named a guest professor (for the year 2003) in the newly endowed Gadamer Chair in the University of Heidelberg, also let himself be heard”; Grondin, *Gadamer*, 338. After the 1981 encounter, Gadamer was frequently asked about Derrida and deconstruction. See his interviews in Richard Kearney, ed., *Debates in Continental Philosophy: Conversations with Contemporary Thinkers* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004); and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and Commentary*, trans. and ed. Richard E. Palmer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

⁸ I have used the metaphor of constellation in my book, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 8–9.

⁹ Although I speak of understanding and interpretation, I agree with Gadamer that all understanding involves interpretation. All understanding demands highlighting, and to highlight is to interpret.

complex relation between twentieth-century German and French philosophy. In his imaginative style Derrida tells us: "If one day I were to write the book I dream of to interpret the history, the possibility, and the honor of this prize, it would include at least seven chapters," and he suggests that each of these chapters would consist of about ten thousand pages.¹⁰ His "imagined" fifth chapter is relevant to Gadamer. Here is his sketch.

5. A differential history of the resistances and misunderstandings between on the one hand those German thinkers who are also my respected friends. I mean Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas, and on the other the French philosophers of my generation; for a little while this history has been largely over, but perhaps not yet over with. In this chapter, I would try to show that despite the differences between these two great debates (direct or indirect, explicit or implicit), the *misunderstandings* always occur around interpretation and the very possibility of *misunderstanding*—they turn around the *concept of misunderstanding*, of dissensus as well, of the other and the singularity of the event; but then, as a result, they turn around the essence of idiom, the essence of language, beyond its undeniable and necessary *functioning*, beyond its communicative intelligibility. . . . If these misunderstandings about misunderstanding seem to be calming down these days, if not totally melting away, in an atmosphere of amicable reconciliation, we should not only pay tribute to the work, the reading, the good faith, and the friendship of various people, often the youngest philosophers in this country.¹¹

I have already touched on some of the major themes I want to explore: conversation, understanding, misunderstanding, interpretation and misinterpretation. Exploring these will widen the circle of issues that separate and unite hermeneutics and deconstruction. I begin with a brief statement of Gadamer's hermeneutics and then proceed to the questions that Derrida should have asked (that is, what I would have liked him to ask).

Let me begin with conversation and dialogue, concepts that are central to Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics, but are barely mentioned by Derrida.¹² "To conduct a dialogue requires first of all that the partners do not talk at cross purposes. Hence it necessarily has

¹⁰ Jacques Derrida, "*Fichus*: Frankfurt Address," in *Paper Machine*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 178.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Gadamer frequently speaks of "dialogue" and "conversation" interchangeably, although he occasionally acknowledges differences between them.

the structure of question and answer. The first condition of the art of conversation is ensuring that the other person is with us."¹³ Actually the phrase "to conduct a dialogue" is misleading; it is more accurate to say that we—the partners—participate in, or fall into, a dialogue or conversation.¹⁴ Gadamer consistently seeks to undermine the legacy of a Cartesianism that assigns ontological and epistemological primacy to individual subjects. This is already evident in his phenomenological description of the concept of play where he tells us that there is the primacy of play over the subjectivity or consciousness of the players. "Play clearly represents an order in which the to-and-fro motion of play follows of itself."¹⁵ In the play of dialogue, the dialogue itself has its own rhythm, its own to-and-fro movement that carries along the partners. This means that in a conversation one must "allow oneself to be conducted by the subject matter [*Sache*] to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented."¹⁶ This subject matter guides the dynamics of question and answer. Drawing on his interpretation of the Platonic dialogues where dialectic is closely related to dialogue, Gadamer tells us: "Dialectic consists not in trying to discover the weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real strength. It is not the art of arguing (which can make a strong case out of a weak one) but the art of thinking (which can strengthen objections by referring to the subject matter)."¹⁷ This is the feature of dialectic that Gadamer seeks to integrate into his understanding of dialogue. But how are these reflections on conversation and dialogue related to hermeneutics?

¹³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd revised edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1997), 367.

¹⁴ Gadamer emphasizes this sense of participation when he writes: "We say that we 'conduct' a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. The way one word follows another, with the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. . . . All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it—i.e., that it allows something to 'emerge' which henceforth exists"; *ibid.*, 383.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 367.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

What characterizes a dialogue, in contrast with the rigid form of statements that demand to be set down in writing, is precisely this: that in dialogue spoken language—in the process of question and answer, giving and taking, talking at cross purposes and seeing each other's point—performs the communication of meaning that, with respect to the written tradition, is the task of hermeneutics. Hence it is more than a metaphor; it is a memory of what originally was the case, to describe the task of hermeneutics as entering into dialogue with the text. . . . When it is interpreted, written tradition is brought back out of alienation in which it finds itself and into the living present of conversation, which is always fundamentally realized in question and answer.¹⁸

There are two points that I want to emphasize about Gadamer's reflections on conversation, dialogue, and hermeneutics. First, Gadamer insists that his project is a philosophical one (not methodological). He wants to answer the question—to put it into Kantian terms—how is understanding possible? And following Heidegger he declares:

Heidegger's temporal analytics of *Dasein* has, I think, shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but the mode of being of *Dasein* itself. It is in this sense that the term "hermeneutics" has been used here. It denotes the basic being-in-motion of *Dasein* that constitutes its finitude and historicity, and hence embraces the whole experience of its experience of the world.¹⁹

But there is a tension between this claim about the primacy and universality of understanding and the idealized (normative) description of conversation and dialogue. If understanding presupposes the kind of dialogue that Gadamer describes then it certainly is *not* universal, but rare indeed—and perhaps, as Derrida might suggest, impossible. No such conversation or dialogue took place between Gadamer and Derrida. One might even question whether we find examples of such dialogues in Gadamer's beloved Platonic dialogues. Are the partners in these dialogues really open to each other and are they guided by the subject matter developed in the conversation? Is there really a reciprocal relation between Socrates and his interlocutors? More often than not the Platonic dialogues seem to be studies where the participants misunderstand and misinterpret each other.

Second, when Gadamer tells us that it is more than a metaphor to describe the task of hermeneutics as entering into a dialogue with a text, we cannot gloss over the fact there is a fundamental difference

¹⁸ Ibid., 368.

¹⁹ Ibid., xxx.

between engaging in conversation with a living person who has the capacity to respond to us and a conversation with a written text. Gadamer acknowledges this but he doesn't think that this difference alters the description of understanding as a conversation with a text.

It is true that a text does not speak to us in the same way as does a Thou. We who are attempting to understand must ourselves make it speak. But we found that this kind of understanding, "making the text speak," is not an arbitrary procedure that we undertake on our own initiative but that, as a question, it is related to the answer that is expected in the text. Anticipating an answer itself presupposes that the questioner is part of the tradition and regards himself as addressed by it.²⁰

Here we touch the heart of Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics. Understanding is a conversation or dialogue with texts—texts that speak to us, texts that pose questions to us and to which we pose questions. In the to-and-fro movement of our dialogue with texts, a text answers the questions that we pose. This is why the meaning of a text is not something that is somehow intrinsic to a text and merely has to be discovered. Understanding is a happening in which meaning emerges in and through our dialogical encounter with texts. The task of the interpreter as a partner in the conversation with texts is to "re-awaken" the text's meaning. "Thus it is perfectly legitimate to speak of a hermeneutical conversation. . . . The text brings a subject matter [*Sache*] into language, but that it does so is ultimately the achievement of the interpreter. Both have a share in it."²¹ What takes place in understanding is a fusion of horizons of the partners (whether this is another person or a text).

²⁰ Ibid., 377. Note how Gadamer both acknowledges and downplays the significance of the difference between a living dialogue between persons and the dialogue with a written text. When he compares the conversation between persons with the hermeneutical task of understanding texts, he writes: "This is not to say, of course, that the hermeneutic situation in regard to texts is exactly the same as that between two people in conversation. Texts are 'enduringly fixed expressions of life' that are to be understood; and that means that one partner in the hermeneutical conversation, the text, speaks only through the other partner, the interpreter. Only through him are the written marks changed back into meaning. Nevertheless, in being changed back by understanding, the subject matter of which the text speaks itself finds expression. It is like a real conversation in that the common subject matter is what binds the two partners, the text and the interpreter, to each other," *ibid.*, 387–8.

²¹ Ibid., 388.

The notion of a horizon, which Gadamer appropriates from Nietzsche and Husserl, deepens our understanding of hermeneutics. A horizon is "the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. . . . Since Nietzsche and Husserl, the word has been used in philosophy to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one's range of vision is gradually expanded."²² We always have a finite historical horizon that is continuously being shaped by the traditions to which we belong; our horizon is informed by the prejudgments or prejudices that we inherit from tradition. But horizons are not closed; they are open.

[T]he closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction. The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion.²³

It is precisely because of the openness of horizons that we can enlarge our horizon in and through the happening of understanding. This is what happens in a "genuine" dialogue or conversation with texts. Because the horizons of those who seek to understand and interpret, although finite, are themselves always changing, it makes no sense to speak about a final or complete understanding of any text. A text is always open to new and different understandings and interpretations.

Ever since Thomas Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*,²⁴ philosophers in both the Continental tradition and the Anglo-American tradition have been fascinated (even obsessed) with the idea of the incommensurability of paradigms, languages, frameworks, and horizons. The picture that has held many thinkers captive is that we are somehow prisoners within these paradigms and horizons. Consequently, we cannot really understand what is incommensurable with them. Or if we are to understand what is genuinely incommensurable and alien, then we must somehow learn how to leap out of our own horizon and identify ourselves with the radically other

²² Ibid., 302.

²³ Ibid., 304.

²⁴ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

horizon or paradigm. Kuhn likened this to a "conversion"²⁵ experience. But Gadamer categorically rejects this picture of incommensurable horizons. He is in basic agreement with Donald Davidson who has forcefully challenged the very idea of the incommensurability of conceptual schemes.²⁶ Our finite historical horizons are not barriers to understanding; they are the very condition for the possibility of understanding. The hermeneutical task is to enlarge and expand our finite horizons through the encounter with the texts and traditions that we seek to understand.²⁷ "In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new are always combining into something of living value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the other."²⁸ Although there are no barriers to understanding, nevertheless understanding is always limited; the meaning of a text can never be exhausted. Gadamer, in a famous sentence, tells us that "Being which can be understood is language," and he says this implies "that which is can never be completely understood. . . . This is the hermeneutical dimension in which Being 'manifests itself'."²⁹

²⁵ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 159.

²⁶ See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 183–98. See also my discussions of incommensurability in "Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited," in *The New Constellation*, 57–78; and in *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 79–108.

²⁷ It might seem that the very idea of the fusion of horizons presupposes that there are distinct horizons to be fused. But Gadamer denies that there are distinct fixed horizons. He raises the question: "If, however there is no such thing as these distinct horizons, why do we speak of the fusion of horizons and not simply of the formation of one horizon, whose bounds are set in the depths of tradition?" Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 306. Gadamer's answer to his own question is subtle. In seeking to understand a tradition, we "project a historical horizon." "Projecting a historical horizon, then, is only one phase in the process of understanding; it does not become solidified into the self-alienation of a past consciousness, but is overtaken by our own present horizon of understanding. In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs—which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously superseded," *ibid.*, 306–7. Consequently, in understanding a text, we interpreters, as partners in the hermeneutical conversation, must also "project a horizon" for the text—we speak for the text. This projected horizon is, however, superseded in the fusion that takes place.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 306.

²⁹ Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation," 25.

Gadamer accepts the Heideggerian claim that "Being' does not unfold totally in its self-manifestation, but rather withholds itself and withdraws with the same primordially with which it manifests itself."³⁰

We are now in a position to understand the two questions that Gadamer poses in "Text and Interpretation."

First, How do the communality of meaning [*Gemeinsamkeit des Sinnes*], which is built up in conversation, and the impenetrability of the otherness of the other mediate each other? Second, What, in the final analysis, is linguisticity [*Sprachlichkeit*]? Is it a bridge or a barrier? Is it a bridge built of things that are the same for each self over which one communicates with the other the flowing stream of otherness? Or is it a barrier that limits our self-abandonment and that cuts us off from the possibility of ever completely expressing ourselves and communicating with others?³¹

One may think that Gadamer's answer to the question: "Is it a bridge or a barrier?" is clearly that it is bridge and not a barrier. All the paths that he pursues in his discussions of play, dialogue, and the fusions of horizons lead us to the realization that we have the capacity from our limited finite historical horizons to reach out and understand what initially strikes us as different, alien, and other. This is the dominant theme in Gadamer's hermeneutics. But if we fully appreciate what it means to be a finite historical creature shaped by living traditions, then we must also realize that it is impossible—ontologically impossible—to speak about a complete and final understanding. Positively stated, there can be no finality to the conversation that we are. But if by a "barrier" we mean a "limit," then there are limits to all understanding. Furthermore, it is through the encounter with the other that we enlarge our own horizon and come to a deeper self-understanding. We never completely penetrate the otherness of the other. To think that we can do this is to be guilty of logocentrism—and Gadamer categorically rejects this.³² But neither do we stand mute or dumb before

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 27.

³² Gadamer emphatically says: "A limitation of the Greek models of thought can be detected here, one that was persuasively pointed out by the Old Testament, Saint Paul, Luther, and their modern reinterpreters. It is a dimension of dialogue that still does not come into conceptual consciousness even with the celebrated discovery of Socratic dialogue as the basic form of thought. . . . [T]he true depth of the dialogical principle first enters philosophical consciousness in the twilight of metaphysics, in the epoch of German romanticism, and then is rehabilitated in our century in opposition to the subjective bias that characterized idealism." Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation," 27. Gadamer is summarizing his argument about the limitations of Greek *logos* that he develops in detail in Part Three of *Truth and Method*.

the otherness of the other. It is through dialogue or conversation that we can mediate between the communality of meaning and the otherness of the other.

I have attempted to present a fair characterization of some of the main points Gadamer's hermeneutics—one that brings forth its strengths. What is so impressive about Gadamer is the way in which he textures his understanding of hermeneutics and integrates themes reaching back to the Greeks. Although Heidegger was decisive in making the ontological turn of hermeneutics, a careful reading of Gadamer reveals how much he has appropriated from Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel (as well as from the long and varied tradition of hermeneutics) to articulate and defend his distinctive understanding of understanding. Nevertheless, there are tensions and internal conflicts, and Derrida's deconstructive practices highlight these. Before turning explicitly to questions that Derrida might have raised, I want to mention something that Gadamer and Derrida have in common, but which is also a source of their greatest divergence. They both share an extraordinary sensitivity to the nuances of language. Typically, whatever topic they consider, they begin by reflecting on multiple linguistic expressions. Think, for example, of the way in which Gadamer introduces the concept of play (*Spiel*) in *Truth and Method* by speaking of children's play, the play of waves, the play of gears, the play of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, and the play of words. He does this in order to show how play is "the clue to ontological explanation." Language itself "has something speculative about it"; an "event of speech" is speculative in the sense "that finite possibilities of the word are oriented toward the sense intended as toward the infinite."³³ But then think of the very different way in which Derrida appeals to play in his famous article, "Structure, Sign and Play," where he tells us:

Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitute reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is always a play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence. Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around.³⁴

³³ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 469.

³⁴ Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 292. See my discussion of Derrida's concept of play in "Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Derrida," in *The New Constellation*, 171–98.

We detect here a difference between Gadamer and Derrida that runs deep. When Gadamer reflects on the uses of the word "play" in order to elaborate his concept of play, it is the to-and-fro movement of play, the primacy, continuity and the communal aspect of play that he emphasizes. But Derrida focuses on play as unstable disruption and discontinuity. He begins his article by speaking of an "event" in the history of "structure" that he names "rupture." And throughout, Derrida is most concerned with play as decentering, as *différance*. Gadamer's "conversation," "dialogue," "understanding," and "fusion of horizons" are shaped by a metaphors of overcoming barriers, achieving agreement, commonality, and reconciliation. But Derrida constantly speaks of rupture, of abysses, of "possible impossibles" and "impossible possibles." Derrida, in his deconstructive practices, seems to delight in locating discontinuities, breaks, obstacles, "contradictory logics" and unstable undecidables.³⁵ So let's see how he might have questioned Gadamer. Remember that in his Adorno lecture, Derrida noted that the misunderstandings between Gadamer and himself "always occur around interpretation and the very possibility of *misunderstanding*—they turn around the *concept of misunderstanding*."³⁶ It is striking how infrequently Gadamer speaks about *misunderstanding* and *misinterpretation*. He tends to be dismissive of Schleiermacher's claim that hermeneutics is "the art of avoiding misunderstandings" and that "misunderstanding follows automatically and understanding must be desired and sought at every point."³⁷ Gadamer privileges understanding and prefers to speak about the "failures of understanding," the failure to do what needs to be done to achieve understanding. But Derrida might well object that there is an implicit hierarchical valorization here that must to be challenged. After all, despite Gadamer's claim that understanding constitutes our being-in-the-world, if we take seriously his rigorous requirements for what constitutes "genuine" understanding and conversation, then it appears to be a very rare phenomenon, if it ever really occurs. Misunderstanding is not just a failure to understand, but rather is intrinsic to under-

³⁵ For Derrida's reflections on the practical implications for his "preference" of discontinuity over continuity for *différance* over reconciliation, see his interview "Terror, Religion, and the New Politics," in *Debates in Continental Philosophy*.

³⁶ Derrida, "*Fichus*," 178.

³⁷ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 185.

standing. Why? Because understanding doesn't happen without prejudices. Some prejudices are enabling and are the "conditions of understanding," but there are always prejudices that can block or distort understanding.³⁸ But integral to Gadamer's critique of the Enlightenment "prejudice against prejudice" and his critique of Cartesian claims about bracketing all prejudices by an act of self-reflection, is the claim that we are never in a position, once and for all, to isolate those prejudices that result in misunderstanding. The Derridean way of making this point is not to reverse Gadamer's hierarchy, not to say with Schleiermacher that "misunderstanding follows automatically and understanding must be desired and sought at every point," but rather to affirm that understanding and misunderstanding are equiprimordial. There is no understanding without misunderstanding and no misunderstanding without understanding. Furthermore, because there can be no fixed decision procedure for distinguishing whether we are understanding or misunderstanding, it is in this respect undecidable.

This instability highlights another tension in hermeneutics (Derrida would call it an *aporia*). One of the most insistent themes in Gadamer's hermeneutics is the critique of the subject-object dichotomy, whether it is interpreted ontologically or epistemologically. This is why play as the clue for ontological explanation is so important for Gadamer, and why he insists upon the primacy of play over the individual players. When Gadamer applies this concept of play to the hermeneutical conversation, he emphasizes that there is a to-and-fro movement between the partners in the dialogue; between the person who seeks to understand and the text that she attempts to understand. Following Heidegger, Gadamer is relentless in his critique of subjectivity, so much so that he rejects Schleiermacher's claim that hermeneutics involves "divining" the intentional meaning of the author of a text.³⁹ Hermeneutics is not concerned with the "psychological" states of the creators of texts. The text itself has meaning, although the meaning of the text comes alive only when it is understood by the interpreter. The interpreter must not only learn the art of asking the right questions, she must learn how to listen to the way that the text answers her; understanding requires submitting oneself to the

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 277.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 184.

authority of tradition. But what is paradoxical, indeed aporetic, is that the more Gadamer critiques subjectivity, the more he affirms subjectivity. Think of the demands that Gadamer places on the interpreter-partner (subject?) who seeks to understand a text. She must learn the art of asking the right questions; she must risk her prejudices; she must listen to what the text says; she must open herself to the claim of truth of the text. Furthermore, she must be the ventriloquist for the text because, as Gadamer tells us, "the text speaks only through the other partner, the interpreter"; and she has the responsibility of changing the written marks "back into meaning."⁴⁰ Gadamer may not want to call this a "subject," but like the Cartesian ego, this is a subject that doubts, imagines, thinks, hears, and speaks for herself and for the text. In short, the more Gadamer denies that the interpreter is a subject, the more he affirms that she has all the characteristics of the "classical" philosophic subject.

But there are further problems. Despite Gadamer's suggestion that the partners in the hermeneutical conversation stand in a reciprocal relation to each other, the above remarks bring out the asymmetry between the text and the interpreter-partner. There are a host of difficulties concerning the written and the spoken word. Gadamer says that the written text "speaks" only through the other partner, the interpreter, but he also insists that "it is perfectly legitimate to speak of a *hermeneutical conversation*" between the text and the interpreter.⁴¹ But how do I, as interpreter, know that I am speaking "correctly" for the text? Presumably if I misspeak, if, for example, I am imposing false prejudices, the text will answer me. But there is something very strange here because it is I—the interpreter-partner—who answers "No" for the text. So we find ourselves facing another aporia: I must at once affirm that the text speaks and that it doesn't speak (I speak for it). The difficulties are compounded because, although Gadamer says "that all the meaning of what is handed down to us finds its concretion (that is, is understood) in its relation to the understanding I," he also says:

⁴⁰ Ibid., 387.

⁴¹ Ibid., 388.

The intimate unity of understanding and interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the interpretation that reveals the implications of the text's meaning and brings it into language seems, when compared with the given text, to be a new creation, but yet does not maintain any proper existence apart from the understanding process. . . . *[T]he interpretive concepts are superseded in the fullness of understanding because they are meant to disappear.*⁴²

So it appears that there is no understanding or interpretation without the "understanding I" and yet this I is superseded (disappears) in the happening of understanding. In the concluding sentence of "Text and Interpretation," Gadamer declares: "The interpreter who gives his reasons disappears—and the text speaks."⁴³

Gadamer seems to think we can dissolve this aporia once we recognize that the hermeneutical conversation between the text and the interpreter-partner "is like a real conversation in that the common subject matter [*Sache*] is what binds the two partners, the text and the interpreter, to each other."⁴⁴ "To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the subject matter [*Sache*] to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented."⁴⁵ The text is not a cipher; it constrains us. Unless we are responsive to its subject matter (*Sache*), unless we share it, then there is no conversation and no understanding. But suppose we probe this idea of a common *Sache*. How do I, as interpreter, know that there really is a common subject matter that binds me to the text? Perhaps I am deluding myself by projecting false prejudices upon the text. But if this is what I have done then the text will check me; it will say, "No!" But, even according to Gadamer, this is not quite accurate. The text does not literally say no to me; it is I as interpreter who says no on behalf of the text. This begins to look like a very strange conversation. Unlike a "real" conversation with another person who has the capacity to say yes or no, this is a one-sided conversation where the burden of answering for the text always falls on me (the interpreter-partner). Derrida might even highlight this aporia by noting that this is a conversation or dialogue that begins to look more and more like a soliloquy or an internal monologue where I play

⁴² Ibid., 473; emphasis added.

⁴³ Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation," 51.

⁴⁴ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 388.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 367.

different roles: interpreter and spokesperson for the text that I am interpreting.⁴⁶

The aporiae located above are also relevant to the way in which Gadamer characterizes the fusion of horizons. The very idea of a fusion of horizons seems to suggest there are at least two horizons that need to be fused—the horizon of the person seeking to understand and the horizon of the text, the work of art or the historical tradition that we seek to understand. But Gadamer tells us that this is not quite accurate when he asserts that there are no distinct horizons. What then am I talking about when I speak of the fusion of horizons? Once again, we detect an asymmetry and not a reciprocal relation. When Gadamer discusses the “historicity of understanding” he tells us that I project a “historical horizon.” It is I, the interpreter, who does this; it is I who project. So how do I know that the horizon that I project is in fact the horizon of the text? Can’t I be mistaken? According to Gadamer, I certainly can be mistaken. Otherwise there would be no dialogue with the text from which I learn about my mistaken interpretations. How do I find out if I am mistaken when it is I who speak for the text? Gadamer tells us: “In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs—which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously superseded.”⁴⁷ It begins to look as if the text itself drops out of this fusion. Why? Because I, the interpreter, from within my own limited horizon, project the horizon for the text that I am seeking to understand, and this projected horizon is “simultaneously superseded.” The fusion here is not between my horizon and the horizon of the text, but between my horizon and the horizon that I project on behalf of the text.

⁴⁶ The difficulty here can be generalized. Gadamer’s understanding of hermeneutics requires that we acknowledge two fundamental principles. Texts exercise constraints. They bind and guide us. The constraints of texts are compatible with the openness of understanding and interpretation in the sense that a text is always potentially open to new and different interpretations. Unless the text exercised some constraint it would not even make sense to speak of understanding or interpreting the text. But Gadamer does not really explain how the text itself constrains the interpreter when it is the interpreter who must speak for the text. Once this is acknowledged then the possibility arises that the interpreter may misspeak for the text. It is not then the text that constrains, but the text as understood and interpreted that constrains. The aporia here, according to Derrida, is that Gadamer affirms that the text does and does not constrain us.

⁴⁷ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 307–8.

But this is not the only difficulty with the fusion of horizons. One of the main functions of the fusion of horizons is to show how we can understand what is other and alien without reifying this otherness or denying the otherness of the other. According to Gadamer, it is only in and through the encounter with the other that I can enlarge my horizon and come to a greater self-understanding. But Derrida, in a Levinasian spirit, might question whether this really does justice to the alterity of the other. Despite Gadamer's insistence that the text and the interpreter are partners, we have seen that it is really the interpreter that is privileged insofar as she speaks for herself and speaks for the text she is seeking to understand.⁴⁸ Gadamer does, of course, claim that all understanding is limited; we can never exhaust the meaning of the text. But the otherness of the other may still be violated. Phrasing the point in a different way, Derrida might suggest that Gadamer is guilty of that tendency that lies so deep in the tradition of Western philosophy: reducing the other to the same because understanding necessary involves my horizon and the horizon that I project on behalf of the other. So now we have a new aporia. Gadamer at once affirms but denies (undermines) the otherness of the other. Derrida tells us, there are always "traces of an alterity which refuse to be totally domesticated."⁴⁹ At least, with another person, she can respond: "You have not really understood me, you are projecting your own concepts and categories on to me." But with a text, it requires the interpreter-partner to respond for it.

Derrida might also object that there is something ethically and politically misleading about the primacy that Gadamer gives to dia-

⁴⁸ To speak only of the interpreter and the text is to oversimplify the situation. We are always being shaped by other interpretations—even conflicting interpretations. This is constitutive of Gadamer's concept of *wirkungsgechichtliches Bewusstsein* (historically effected consciousness), a consciousness that is doubly related to tradition because it is "affected" by history; open to the effects of history and also brought into being—"effected" by history. Ibid., 298–304.

⁴⁹ See Derrida's interview with Richard Kearney, "Deconstruction and the Other," in *Debates in Continental Philosophy: Conversations with Contemporary Thinkers*, 148–9. Derrida adds: "Moreover the rapport of self-identity is itself always a rapport of violence with the other, so that the notions of property, appropriation, and self-presence, so central to logocentric metaphysics, are essentially dependent on an oppositional relation with otherness. In this sense, identity presupposes alterity." Derrida, "Deconstruction and the Other," 149.

logue and conversation. We do not have to deny that sometimes there are dialogues and conversations that are oriented to a common subject matter (*Sache*) that guides the to-and-fro movement of the dialogue. (Deconstructive practices do not primarily deny; they bring forth complexities by revealing inner tensions and contradictory logics.) Gadamer stresses the demanding conditions for a "genuine" dialogue; but he seems to think dialogue and conversation are always possible. Derrida might even appeal to his sometime adversary, Habermas, in questioning this. We should be alert to the many ways that dialogue and conversation are impossible, when in Habermas's phrase there is "distorted communication." Put in another way, the material conditions, the verbal ability, the level of education (the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions) required for persons to engage in a genuine dialogue do not always exist. They rarely exist even in the best of circumstances. Too frequently the call for dialogue is a power play, a screen for doing violence to the otherness of the other.⁶⁰

This last point brings up one of the most important differences between Gadamer and Derrida. Gadamer has always been concerned with the ethical-political horizon of hermeneutics. Understanding, interpretation, and application are three moments of a single happening. Application is constitutive of understanding. To clarify what he means Gadamer draws on Aristotle's *Ethics*, particularly Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle distinguishes *phronesis* from *techné* and *epistémé*.

[I]f we relate Aristotle's description of the ethical phenomenon and especially the virtue of moral knowledge [*phronesis*] to our investigation, we find that his analysis in fact offers a kind of *model of the problem of hermeneutics*. We too determined that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but co-determines it as a whole from the beginning. Here too application did not consist in relating some pregiven universal to the particular situation. The interpreter dealing with a traditionary text

⁶⁰ This motif has been especially dominant in Derrida's writings during the last decades of life where he examines the complex political issues concerning asylum, immigration, homelessness, and the treatment of those who are "*sans-papiers*." See Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); and Jacques Derrida, "On Cosmopolitanism," trans. Mark Dooley, in *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, ed. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001), 1–24. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), vol. 2.

tries to apply it to himself. But this does not mean that the text is given for him as something universal, that he first understands it per se, and then afterwards uses it for particular applications. Rather, the interpreter seeks no more than to understand this universal, the text—i.e., to understand what it says, what constitutes the text's meaning and significance. In order to understand that, he must not try to disregard himself and his particular hermeneutical situation. He must relate the text to this situation if he wants to understand at all.⁵¹

The type of reasoning characteristic of *phronesis* with its mediation (play) between the universal and the particular is the type of reasoning that hermeneutical understanding requires. *Phronesis* is important for Gadamer because it enables him to distinguish hermeneutical understanding from the objectifying methods of modern science. But Gadamer also wants us to move in the other direction—to recover the importance of *phronesis* for practical philosophy today (and to show how hermeneutics is the heir to the tradition of practical philosophy). He tells us: "When Aristotle, in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, distinguishes the manner of 'practical knowledge' [*phronesis*] . . . from theoretical and technical knowledge he expresses, in my opinion, one of the greatest truths by which the Greeks throw light upon 'scientific' mystification of modern society of specialization."⁵² Or again he writes:

In my own eyes, the great merit of Aristotle was that he anticipated the impasse of our scientific culture by his description of the structure of practical reason as distinct from theoretical knowledge and technical skill. . . . [T]he problem of our society is that the longing of the citizenry for orientation and normative patterns invests the expert with an exaggerated authority. Modern society expects him to provide a substitute for past moral and political orientations. Consequently, the concept of 'praxis' which was developed in the last two centuries is an awful deformation of what practice really is. In all the debates of the last century practice was understood as application of science to technical tasks. . . . It degrades practical reason to technical control.⁵³

⁵¹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 324.

⁵² Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," trans. Jeff L. Close, in *Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look*, ed. Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 107.

⁵³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Social Science," *Cultural Hermeneutics* 2 (1975), 312. For a more detailed discussion of Gadamer's understanding of *phronesis* and the way in which it differs from *techné* and *epistémé*, see my *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

Derrida would agree with Gadamer's remarks about the degrading of practical reason to technical control. His writings about the mentality and effects of what he calls "technoscience" support Gadamer's claims. But unlike Gadamer, Derrida does not appeal to *phronesis*. (I am almost inclined to say that he is tone deaf to the significance of *phronesis* and of the Aristotelian tradition of practical reason). He stresses the *aporiae*—the contradictory logics that we confront whenever we make practical decisions. This becomes especially dominant in his writings during the last decades of his life. In his discussions of cosmopolitanism, hospitality, and forgiveness, he seeks to show how we are confronted with incompatible imperatives. We must negotiate between these injunctions in making responsible decisions. But if we are really confronted with contradictory logics, then it would seem that this paralyzes decision and action. This is an objection that has frequently been raised against Derrida. But Derrida emphatically claims that, on the contrary, this facing up to the contradictory logics of the unconditional and the conditional is precisely what enables responsible decision and action. When a variation of this objection was pressed against Derrida's claim that the only thing to forgive is the unforgivable, he responded:

The *aporia* is the experience of responsibility. It is only by going through a set of contradictory injunctions, impossible choices, that we make a choice. If I know what I have to do, if I know in advance what has to be done, then there is no responsibility. For the responsible decision envisaged or taken, we have to go through pain and *aporia*, a situation in which I do not know what to do. I have to do this and this, and they do not go together. I have to face two incompatible injunctions, and that is what I have to do every day in every situation, ethical, political, or not. . . . An *aporia* is an experience, enduring an experience, in which nothing—such as forgiveness—presents itself as such. That is because absolute forgiveness never presents itself as such and is irreducible to conditional forgiveness.⁵⁴

But one may ask, and if my imagined conversation between Gadamer and Derrida had taken place, Gadamer might well have asked: "What

⁵⁴ Jacques Derrida, "Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida," in *Questioning God*, ed. John Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 62. For my discussion and critique of Derrida's reflections on forgiveness, see my article, "Derrida: The *Aporia* of Forgiveness?" in *Constellations* 13, no. 3 (September 2006): 394–406.

is this experience of the aporia? How do I decide if I have to face 'incompatible injunctions'?" Derrida writes:

[I]f we want to embody an unconditional forgiveness in history and society, we have to go through these conditions. We have to *negotiate* between the unconditional and the conditional. They cannot be dissociated, although we know they are absolutely heterogeneous and incommensurable. It is because these incommensurable poles are indissociable that we have to take responsibility, a difficult responsibility, to *negotiate* the best response in an impossible situation.⁶⁶

Even if Gadamer accepted Derrida's claims about "incompatible injunctions" and "contradictory logics" he might still ask: "What precisely do you mean by 'negotiation'? Is this a reasoning process? What are its characteristics?" Gadamer and Derrida both reject the idea that such negotiation can be understood as calculation, as a means-end technical rationality. Neither Gadamer nor Derrida thinks that responsible decisions follow from universal rules. Gadamer might say Derrida's negotiation looks suspiciously like *phronesis*. (And even if Gadamer would not say this, I would say it in his name). To put the issue in a slightly different way, Derrida does not think that negotiating between the unconditional and the conditional is a completely arbitrary process. It is a deliberative process where I weigh and evaluate alternatives in order to decide responsibly what to do in this particular situation. Now even after such deliberation, there is still a gap between my deliberation and my decision. But this is always true of *phronesis* as a form of practical thinking. The considerations to which I appeal in deliberating do not dictate or completely determine the decision. Insofar as we negotiate between incompatible imperatives in order to decide what to do in this particular situation we are engaged in a deliberative activity that is neither *techné* nor *epistémè*. There are always risks involved in making such a practical decision; but uncertainty is intrinsic to *phronesis*.

How then might we understand the tension that still exists between Gadamer and Derrida? I see it as a productive tension. On the one hand, Gadamer helps us to see that the kind of negotiation that Derrida takes to be so fundamental for responsible decisions and actions is a form of *phronesis*. But on the other hand, Derrida brings out complexities and risks of *phronesis*; he warns against reducing it to

⁶⁶ Ibid., 58; emphasis added.

technical calculation or simply following a universal rule. In his language, there is always a gap—an abyss—which we have to face in making responsible decisions, whether they are ethical or political decisions.

I have attempted to show how such a conversation between Gadamer and Derrida might have begun. I stress this, because I have not pursued how Gadamer and Derrida might have responded to the type of objections that each raises about the other. And there are topics that I have not even explicitly raised, such as their different understandings of truth. But I want to conclude by a brief look at their different readings of the *Phaedrus*—the Platonic dialogue that is so fundamental for both of them and for their respective conceptions of hermeneutics and deconstruction.

Much of what Gadamer has to say about conversation, dialogue, understanding, interpretation, and text can be read as a commentary on Plato's reflections about writing and speech—especially as it is discussed in the famous passage from the *Phaedrus* (274c–279c). One might initially think that Gadamer simply accepts the standard traditional reading where Plato presumably introduces the myth Theuth in order to argue for the superiority of the spoken word over the written word. After all, Gadamer seems to favor living dialogue and conversation. He conceives of the hermeneutical task as one of making written texts speak. Not only interpreters, but texts themselves pose and answer questions; they are partners in the hermeneutical conversation. Consequently, Gadamer seems to be guilty of the phonocentrism that Derrida takes to be at the heart of the logocentrism of the Western metaphysical tradition. But a careful reading of Gadamer shows that this is not quite accurate—and it isn't the way in which he interprets the *Phaedrus*. The first and foremost task of hermeneutics is the understanding of written texts, not oral utterances. “[W]riting is central to the hermeneutical phenomenon insofar as its detachment both from the writer or author and from a specifically addressed recipient or reader gives it a life of its own.”⁵⁶ When Plato criticizes writing (in the Theuth myth), Gadamer notes:

[T]his is obviously an ironic exaggeration with which to conceal his own writing and his own art. In fact, writing and speech are in the same plight. Just as in speech there is an art of appearances and a

⁵⁶ Ibid., 392.

corresponding art of true thought—sophistry and dialectic—so in writing there are two arts, one serving sophistic, the other dialectic. There is, then, an art of writing that comes to the aid of thought, and it is to this that the art of understanding—which affords the same help to what is written—is allied.⁵⁷

Both the written word and the spoken word have their distinctive weaknesses and strengths. “Writing is no mere accident or mere supplement that qualitatively changes nothing in the course of oral tradition. . . . [O]nly a written tradition can detach itself from the mere continuance of the vestiges of past life, remnants from which one human being can by inference piece out another’s existence.”⁵⁸ With the written word, then, it is the reader that is the arbiter of its claim to truth. The lesson to be learned from Plato is that there is a subtle complex relation between the spoken and the written word. They do not stand in a simple binary opposition. Writing is a kind of alienated speech and the hermeneutical task is to transform written signs back into speech and meaning. The written word is not a secondary or a degenerate form of speech. Written texts are the vehicles for meaning and truth; it is the task of hermeneutical understanding to renew this meaning and truth. It is the written text that overcomes the ephemeral character of the spoken word.

[T]he meaning of something written is fundamentally identifiable and repeatable. What is identical in the repetition is only what was actually deposited in the written record. This indicates that “repetition” cannot be meant here in a strict sense. It does not mean referring back to the original source where something is said or written. The understanding of something written is not a repetition of something past but the sharing of a present meaning.⁵⁹

Derrida’s famous essay, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” is a tour de force—a hundred-page close reading and deconstruction of the *Phaedrus*. We can even use the distinctive Gadamerian concepts to analyze what Derrida is doing. Derrida, like Gadamer, is not concerned with reconstructing Plato’s intentions or probing the psychological states of Plato’s mind. He focuses on what the written text, *Phaedrus*, says. And in a fine Gadamerian manner he focuses closely on the language of the *Phaedrus* to draw out what it reveals and conceals. We might

⁵⁷ Ibid., 393.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 391.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 392.

even say that his discussion exemplifies the movement of the hermeneutical circle insofar as there is a constant playing back and forth between the part and the whole. Contrary to many traditional interpretations of the *Phaedrus* that complain about its apparent disjointedness, Derrida shows how carefully it is constructed and how unified it is. The question of the relation of the spoken and the written word is not simply the subject of the Theuth myth; it is apparent at every stage of the dialogue, from the moment that Socrates discovers that the speech Phaedrus wants to try out on him is actually a recitation of a written text that he has hidden under his cloak. Derrida is engaged in a dialogical encounter with the written text, a classic that still speaks to us. He questions the text and responds to the way in which the text questions him. By bringing forth fresh and unexpected meaning(s) of the text, Derrida shows how new meanings emerge from the to-and-fro play of interpretation between the interpreter-partner and the text-partner. Historically effected consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*) is at work in Derrida's playful reading of the text.

And yet, Derrida's reading of the *Phaedrus* is strikingly different from Gadamer's, and radically challenges Gadamer's understanding of the relation of the spoken word and the written word. Derrida does precisely what Gadamer is always recommending that the interpreter must do—pay close attention to the language of the written text. Specifically, Derrida's close reading follows the thread of the multiple conflicting meanings of *pharmakon* as poison, remedy, and cure. Frequently, translation from a foreign language requires using different words to convey a word's meaning in a given context. The translator has to figure out what is the appropriate word to use. (Think, for example, of how translators struggle to convey the precise meaning of Hegel's *Aufhebung*). This truism about translation is not Derrida's point. He makes a much more radical point by showing that the conflicting and even contradictory meanings of *pharmakon* have their own uncontrollable semantic logic. In a Gadamerian spirit, he shows Plato's language has a logic and spirit of its own that has little to do with Plato's intentions. So the issue is not what Plato intended each time he used the word *pharmakon*, or even whether he was fully aware of its uncontrollable and undecidable multiple meanings. Conceding that Plato might well have seen some of the links within the word *pharmakon*, Derrida comments: "Then again in other cases,

Plato can *not* see the links, can leave them in the shadow or break them up. And yet these links go on working of themselves. In spite of him? Thanks to him? In *his* text? *Outside* his text? But then where? Between his text and the language? For what reader? At what moment?"⁶⁰ Gadamer himself has affirmed that language has something speculative about it "in that the finite possibilities of the word are oriented toward the sense intended as toward the infinite."⁶¹

But how are the multiple contradictory and uncontrollable semantic links of *pharmakon* related to the issue of speech and writing? Before answering this question I want to reiterate something that I said at the beginning of this paper. As I interpret the constellation of hermeneutics and deconstruction, I do not see it as an Either/Or, but rather as a Both/And. I do not see that Derrida is really denying Gadamer's characterization of understanding and all that it entails. Rather I see him as complicating our understanding of understanding—of bringing out its instabilities, difficulties, risks, conflicts, uncertainties, and undecidables. I have indicated that Gadamer notes the strengths and weakness of the spoken and the written, but he nevertheless presupposes that we have a relatively clear understanding of the differences between speech and writing. And this is what Derrida's deconstruction is calling into question. For Derrida the speech/writing opposition is closely related to a whole series of oppositions that have been inherent in the Western logocentric metaphysical tradition: inside/outside; good/evil; soul/body; memory/forgetfulness—all of which have to be deconstructed. But let us return to the speech/writing opposition in the *Phaedrus*.

When Theuth offers the gift of writing to King Thamus, he categorically rejects the gift and gives a host of reasons to show that writing is not really a remedy or cure (*pharmakon*) but is actually a poison (*pharmakon*) that will encourage forgetfulness and fill men with the false conceit of wisdom (*doxosophia*). Writing is thoroughly condemned; it is an illegitimate bastard, a dangerous poison. But at a crucial and culminating point in the *Phaedrus* we have this revealing exchange between Socrates and Phaedrus, which Derrida quotes.⁶²

⁶⁰ Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 96.

⁶¹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 469.

⁶² See Derrida's quotation and discussion of this exchange between Phaedrus and Socrates in "Plato's Pharmacy," 148–55.

Socrates: But now tell me, is there another sort of discourse that is brother to the written speech, but of unquestioned legitimacy? Can we see how it originates, and how much better and more effective it is than the other?

Phaedrus: What sort of discourse have you in mind, and what is its origin?

Socrates: The sort that goes together with knowledge and is written in the soul of the learner, that can defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak and to whom it should say nothing.

Phaedrus: Do you mean the discourse of a man who really knows, which is living and animate? Would it be fair to call the written discourse only a kind of ghost of it?

Socrates: Precisely.

And Derrida comments:

While presenting writing as a false brother—traitor, infidel, and simulacrum—Socrates is for the first time led to envision a brother of this brother, the legitimate one, as another sort of writing: not merely as a knowing, living, animate discourse, but as an inscription of truth in the soul. It is no doubt usually assumed that what we are dealing with here is a “metaphor.” . . . But it is not any less remarkable here that the so-called living discourse should suddenly be described by a “metaphor” borrowed from the order of the very thing one is trying to exclude from it, the order of the simulacrum.⁶³

Derrida's deconstructive moves suggest a much more radical complexity of speech and writing. He is not only challenging this binary opposition that dominates so much of the logocentric and phonocentric traditions. He wants to show that, instead of an opposition between speech and writing, speech (the really good kind of speech) presupposes at its very core a type of writing—the inscription engraved in the soul. The more that one tries to exclude writing from living speech and to expose its derivative character—that writing is

⁶³ “Plato's Pharmacy,” 149. Derrida claims that this metaphoric appeal to writing in order to clarify the “living discourse” is not just an accidental slip, but rather reveals a deep pattern that dominates Western philosophy. “According to a pattern that will dominate all of Western philosophy, good writing (natural, living, knowledgeable, intelligible, internal, speaking) is opposed to bad writing (a moribund, ignorant, external, mute artifice for the senses). And the good one can be designated only through the metaphor of the bad one. Metaphoricity is the logic of contamination and the contamination of logic,” *ibid.*

"traitor, infidel, and simulacrum," the more one affirms that "another sort of writing" is "an *inscription* of truth in the soul."⁶⁴ Gadamer declares that writing is alienated speech, but it is just as true to say that speech is alienated writing.

I have barely scratched the surface of Derrida's playful and brilliant deconstruction of the *Phaedrus*, but I hope I have said enough to begin to reveal how much he shares with Gadamer and yet how radically he differs from Gadamer. But who is really right? Who presents a better interpretation of the *Phaedrus*? Who is more illuminating about the relation of speech and writing, understanding and misunderstanding, interpretation and misinterpretation? I think these are misguided questions. There is no Either/Or, but rather a Both/And. To parody Derrida: "Gadamer/Derrida: Hermeneutics/Deconstruction. Extremes meet." Together they present us with a "juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle."

New School for Social Research

⁶⁴ Ibid.

BOOK REVIEWS

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

JEREME HUDSON AND STAFF

ADAMS, Robert Merrihew. *A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. ix + 249 pp. Hardcover, £25.00—This is an excellent study in *substantive* as distinct from *meta* ethics, *moral life* as distinct from *moral decision-making*, the *ethics of virtue* as distinct from *virtue ethics*, *what lies behind our actions*, as distinct from the mere *actions themselves*, *goodness* as distinct from *rightness*. These are the kinds of helpful distinctions Adams proposes and fleshes out as he attempts to pin down the elusive moral phenomena of human virtue masterfully explained by his theory of virtue.

Building upon the distinctly meta-ethical thought of his 1999 work, *Finite and Infinite Goods*, and a plethora of interdisciplinary scholarship, Adams aspires in this work to provide a more substantive theory of ethics by fleshing out the philosophical distinctions, presuppositions, qualifications, implications, and ramifications of his eponymous definition of moral virtue: “excellence in being for the good.” His methodology is unique in its utilization of various modes of philosophical analysis and argumentation: it is at once analytic and synthetic, empirical and logical, phenomenological and abstract, dialogic and pedagogic, scholarly and commonsensical. To explain and defend his definition of virtue, which he does explicitly and directly in the first two chapters of the book, and implicitly and indirectly in the other chapters, he carefully explains what he means by each term, juxtaposing apposite and opposed definitions, characterizations, and ideas of virtue to his own, and offering very helpful, because not theory-laden, descriptions of various virtue-pertinent moral phenomena. Throughout the book, he places these descriptions in elenctic dialectic with his and various other theoretical accounts to see which best explain them.

The book is divided into three parts. In “What is Virtue,” Adams explains in detail what *excellence* and *to be for* something means, and what precisely constitutes the Good and the goods one should be for. He covers such topics as satanic wickedness, human flourishing, and trait consequentialism; distinguishes vices of weakness from vices of excess, and virtue from its benefits; and discusses the relationship between virtues and Virtue. In the second part, “Self and Other,” Adams tries to answer

*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

Nietzsche's repudiation of altruism. Altruism, although obviously a virtue in some sense, does not easily fit under Adams' definition. Is altruism truly an intrinsic excellence, or is it just instrumentally so? Cannot selfish people be *excellently for goods*, but only for themselves? The sensibleness and balance of Adams' thinking is exemplified here:

Those who care for the good of others live in a larger and richer universe of relations. In giving oneself unreservedly to other persons or to larger goods one escapes from isolation. One moves with freedom, and probably with richer perceptiveness, in a space of values in which one's life can have significance in relation to those other persons and goods and not merely in relation to oneself. This is excellent (77).

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book occurs in the seventh chapter, where Adams discusses self-love, distinguishing it from selfishness, self-centeredness, and "cognitive self-preference." He characterizes self-love as not necessarily selfish, selfishness as an *absence* of self-love, and self-centeredness as distinct from both, being a kind of idolatry of the self, though not excluding a genuine desire to be virtuous. In the third part of the book, Adams sympathetically responds to the suspicion that genuine virtues do not and cannot exist in the "morally inconsistent, fragmented, and frail creatures" that human beings evidently are. This is the most philosophically sophisticated part of the book, and the one that draws most deeply and comprehensively upon recent scholarship, both philosophical and scientific. Some of the thinking in this section, specifically regarding the dependent relationship of the individual to his communal and historical context, with his limited and historically conditioned capacity effectively to develop and accurately to evaluate virtues, is redolent of Alasdair MacIntyre's thought: "Virtue is real, and one of the most excellent things in human life. But it is a dependent and conditioned virtue. We are dependent creatures and dependent also in matters of virtue and vice" (161).

What is not MacIntyrean, however, is Adams' insistent denial of the "unity of the virtues." Although quite Aristotelian in his dialectic, *eudaimonic*, and common-sense methodology, and especially in his defense of a universal human *telos*; and although quite Platonic in his repeated references to a real, transcendent good to which we approach but never possess in our pursuit of virtue; Adams is firmly against the classical theory of the virtues, arguing that the virtues do not at all imply each other, and that a firm possession of *most* of the virtues, let alone all of them, is humanly impossible. Nevertheless, Adams, like MacIntyre, criticizes the moral compartmentalization of contemporary western society as an obstacle to the necessary, though intrinsically limited, *moral integration* that the possession of Virtue (with a capital V) requires.

Yet, unlike McIntyre—and this, I think, is the weakest part of his theory—Adams, far from criticizing liberal political order and pluralistic civil society as an obstacle to the development of robust and integrated virtues, praises the ideological and cultural "diversity" ostensibly inherent to such societies for being helpful for such development. I, for one, do not think the moral phenomena support this conclusion.—Thaddeus J. Kozinski, *Our Lady Seat of Wisdom Academy*.

AMBROSIO, Francis J. *Dante and Derrida: Face to Face*. SUNY Series in Theology and Continental Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. xv + 240 pp. Cloth, \$75.00—Francis J. Ambrosio begins with a sentence that is either self-effacing or alarming: "Truly, I do not know why I must write this book, so I must begin by asking for your forgiveness for having done so without knowing why and therefore, necessarily, without knowing how." An Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, Ambrosio believes "the difference the book makes is this: it traces and remarks in the texts of Dante and Derrida two episodes in the history of forgiveness" (p. ix).

Opining that "Conclusions, like so much else, are impossible," he ends with "Less a conclusion than a reconfiguration of the question with an unmasking of Dante as no more 'Christian' than Derrida; Derrida as no less religious than Dante" (p. 213). Though "the literature on Dante and Derrida is regrettably limited," Ambrosio asserts that "the significance of their relationship has been recognized and explored" (p. 229). He acknowledges his debt to John D. Caputo who has articulated the religious concern and character of Derrida's work. Caputo points out that the important French thinker was not a theologian but understood that "faith and its theology grow like desert flowers in a desert place, blooming when all the elements conspire against it" (*The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 61]). He saw faith not as content but as conversion, saying "yes" to the stranger whose shores we see but without landing or seeking to conquer (p. 62). Derrida himself writes that "The essence of faith *par excellence* can only ever believe in the unbelievable" (*Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, translated by Peggy Kamuf [New York: Routledge, 1994], p. 143).

Ambrosio's four chapters are each introduced by a careful statement of goal. Chapter 1, "*Vita Nuova*: The Promise of Writing," interprets "Dante's *Vita nuova* occasioned by the difference that appears in the text when it is read alongside the first essay of Derrida's *The Gift of Death*" (p. 15). Chapter 2, "*Inferno*: The Aporia of Forgiveness," "continues the reading of *Circumfession* as a confession of Derrida's conversion in writing, now read alongside the text of Dante's *Commedia*, beginning with an interpretation of *Inferno* as another conversion story" (p. 51).

Chapter 3, "*Purgatorio*: Re-turning to the Scene of Forgiveness," "takes up the aporia of forgiveness as the precise 'turning point' through which the process of constant conversion must always pass so as to begin again. Dante locates this turning point in the Resurrection of Jesus, the secret encrypted in the sign of the Cross. For Derrida, this figure of constant conversion traces the movement of life passing over into a new beginning by passing through the *Gift of Death*" (p. 117). Chapter 4, "*Paradiso*: Turning Tears into Smiles," "examines the difference that emerges when Derrida's *Memoirs of the Blind* is read alongside Dante's *Paradiso* in an attempt to respond to the question, 'What is the difference between Dante and Derrida, and what difference does it make for the concerns that they share and the style of writing that marks their relationship?'" (p. 159).

Many see the *Commedia*, Ambrosio reports, as "the greatest poem of western literature" while "contemporary poets of widely diverse and religious persuasions and nonpersuasions" revere Dante "as both towering visionary and master craftsman" (p. 3). Ambrosio's "guiding concern—less rigid and more flexible than a contention" is "to ask whether the style of writing with which Jacques Derrida has identified himself, generally labeled 'deconstructionism,' might prove to be singularly effective in aiding contemporary readers to understand the power and beauty of Dante's writing, and most particularly, to understand how today that power and beauty might be read as expressing a revelation of the Spirit of resurrection differently" (p. 4).

Ambrosio suggests that "Derrida's style of piety allows Dante's poem to resonate differently in the ears of contemporary readers for whom the late medieval synthesis of faith and reason can no longer ring altogether true" (p. 6). He judges that Derrida's style of writing "can be read, like Dante's *Commedia*, as a 'scriptural revelation,' a testimony in writing to a 'new truth' about the human relationship to the divine and about history" (p. 7). He sees Dante as exemplary of the Christian religious imagination and Derrida of the Jewish religious imagination, and "the relationship between them challenges our understanding of the relation between Christianity and Judaism, both as styles of religious imagination and as revealing the religious dimension of as a constitutive element of all human personal identity" (p. 9).—William C. Graham, *The College of St. Scholastica*.

ANDERSON, Thomas C. *A Commentary on Gabriel Marcel's The Mystery of Being*, 2 vols. Marquette Series in Philosophy, No. 46. Wisconsin, Marquette University Press, 2006. 200 pp. Paper, \$25.00—Thomas C. Anderson's *Commentary on Gabriel Marcel's The Mystery of Being*, stands out as a unique and remarkable achievement in the realm of Marcel studies. He comments on a central and important work, the text of Marcel's Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen University in Scotland, 1949, 1950, which Marcel acknowledged as his effort to communicate what he was attempting to accomplish in and through his philosophic reflections. Anderson's work provides us with a comprehensive overview of Gabriel Marcel's thought based on close examination of many of Marcel's principal ideas. Anderson's commentary clarifies the main themes Marcel explores in response to his fundamental and overarching question: "Who am I?" and "Is Being empty or full?" Anderson's choice of *The Mystery of Being* is inspired for it allows readers to clarify their understanding of familiar Marcel themes, and to grasp their significant illumination of the meaning and value of human existence and its call to fulfillment through creative fidelity as growing participation in "Being".

Anderson's consummate scholarship and engaging focus on the development of Marcel's thought makes this book an excellent companion and guide for cultivating readers' understanding and deeper appreciation of Marcel's thought communicated in the two volumes of *The Mystery of Being*.

The Commentator's Preface notes that he wants to "offer a more complete explanation of many of the ideas and arguments, than even Marcel does in *The Mystery*," and present, in an explicit and orderly fashion, the often unexpressed logical connections between Marcel's successive themes and reflections. Anderson also offers, at the end of each chapter, references to "Marcel's treatment of the same topics in other published works, those written both before and after *The Mystery*." This is an admirable "tour de force" on the part of a mature and conscientious scholar. It also facilitates readers' tasks of deepening their understanding of Marcel's thought and developing familiarity with some of his other published works.

Anderson's thirty-five years of graduate and undergraduate teaching have enabled him to present in clear graceful prose a mature and masterful clarification to what Marcel announced as his goal in *The Mystery*: "an attempt to set forth the 'general direction' of his thought and to articulate the connections among its various components." On several occasions Anderson reminds readers that phenomenology is the approach and method which guides and also justifies Marcel's procedure in developing descriptions, argumentation and critical interpretation of themes constituting his thought. Anderson's descriptions are intriguing and attractive as he charts Marcel's journeys through a given territory he's explored, and which others might wish to visit on their own.

As Anderson's Commentary on Volume I: Reflections and Mystery, the table of contents and the general introduction announce, Marcel reflects in the first volume on the quest to reflectively clarify "Who am I?", or "What is the intelligibility and value of human existence?" He does this successively through chapters examining: (1) Introduction, (2) A Broken World, (3) The Need for Transcendence, (4) Truth as a Value: The Intelligible Milieu, (5) Primary and Secondary Reflection: The Existential Reference Point, (6) Feeling as a Mode of Participation, (7) Being in a Situation, (8) 'My Life', (9) Togetherness: Identity and Depth, and (10) Presence as a Mystery.

In each of the chapters listed Anderson ably presents Marcel's line of questioning, his analyses, and argumentation; and at each chapter's end Anderson summarizes Marcel's findings and relates these to previous and subsequent chapter themes. "Commentator's Summary of Volume I" connects and highlights the significance of the various insights brought to light.

In Volume II Marcel explores, and reflectively clarifies, the meaning and value of faith. Commentary on Volume II: Faith and Reality advises readers that the human subject's need for transcendence and fullness still requires critical reflective clarification. It also emphasizes that faith can be experienced and clarified in a philosophy of religion that does not require adherence to any institutional church or any denominational creed; it can be part of the life experience even among those who are un-

aware of, or who explicitly deny their belief in God. The first three chapters deal with clarification of "Being": (1) The Question of Being; (2) Existence and Being, (3) Ontological Exigency; and the focus shifts in the following chapters: (4) The Legitimacy of Ontology, (5) Opinion and Faith, (6) Prayer and Humility, (7) Freedom and Grace, (8) Testimony, (9) Death and Hope, and Marcel's Conclusion. There follows Commentator's Summary of Volume II, which is clear and dramatic. A Bibliography and an Index complete the book. Marcel's *The Mystery of Being* and Anderson's *A Commentary* make excellent companion texts.—Katharine Rose Hanley, *Le Moyne College, Professor Emeritus*.

BLACKWELL, Richard J., *Behind the Scenes at Galileo's Trial*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. xiii + 245 pp.—Without doubt "l'affaire Galileo," as Descartes called it, is one of the most studied events in the history of Western culture. The past four centuries have produced vast amounts of commentaries as well as countless interpretations and evaluations by physicists, astronomers, theologians, philosophers, churchmen, historians, and even playwrights. Almost 60 books were written about the trial from 1633–1651 alone, and one has yet to learn how many have been published since. Given the vast amount of literature produced just within the past 50 years, Richard Blackwell is almost apologetic for bringing out yet another volume. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including *Galileo, Bellarmine and the Bible* (1991), and is the translator of *A Defense of Galileo the Mathematician from Florence* (1994). This adds to his already impressive stature as a chronicler of the famous event.

Behind the Scenes is divided into two parts. The first part provides an informative overview of the elements that led to the trial of 1632. The second part consists of three appendices, that is, Blackwell's translations of three behind-the-scenes documents that shed some light on the episode. It is difficult to say precisely when l'affaire Galileo actually began. Copernicus promulgated his heliocentric view of the universe as early as 1510, although publication of his complete work, *On the Revolution of the Celestial Spheres*, had to await 1543, the year of his death. For the greater part of a century ecclesiastical authorities made no official condemnation of a doctrine that seemingly contradicted Sacred Scripture. From Patristic times it was acknowledged that Sacred Scripture had to be interpreted at several levels, the literal meaning being only one. In fact, Antonio Fosearini, a Carmelite priest, in 1615 argued that the Copernican doctrine is both in agreement with the truth and not contrary to Sacred Scripture. Yet in 1616, shortly before Galileo published his *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*, the Copernican teaching was condemned. It is to be remembered that the heliocentric theory not only challenged a literal interpretation of the Bible but also the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian conception of the universe that supported the traditional Biblical interpretation. On February 26, 1616, in the presence of Cardinal Bellarmine, Galileo was served an injunction

issued by the Holy Office demanding that he abandon his defense of Copernicanism, "nor henceforth to hold, teach or defend in any way, either verbally or in writing" the heliocentric view of the universe. Given Aristotelian standards regarding the nature of demonstration, Galileo could not prove that the earth revolved around the sun. Bellarmine clearly understood the difference between a hypothetical explanation and a demonstration and evidently had no trouble with Galileo's defense of the heliocentric view as an hypothesis. Apparently a *modus vivendi* was worked out that to that effect. In fact, proof awaited the first part of the 19th century when astronomers for the first time were able to measure the parallax of the stars. Galileo was aware of the proscription and in an effort to garner support for his theory without directly promulgating a prohibited view produced his *Dialogue*. The discussion takes place among three parties, with Salviati defending the heliocentric view, Simplicio the Ptolemaic view, and Sagredo open-mindedly commenting on each point made by Salviati. The literary device was a transparent defense of Galileo's own view and was seen as a violation of the injunction prohibiting the espousal of the Copernican view.

In the years after his trial and condemnation, Galileo remained convinced that his downfall had been caused by a plot against him by his enemies. Evidence of a plot may be lacking, but he certainly had enemies. His sharpest opponent was Christopher Schneiner, an astronomer, who fell out with Galileo 20 years before his trial over the issues of priority of observation and interpretation in regard to sun spots. Schneiner wrote personal attacks before and during the trial. Blackwell provides a translation of Schneiner's "Prodromus pro sole mobile" as an appendix to the present volume. Galileo's foremost critic was Melchior Inchofer, S. J., a theologian with no background in astronomy or science, who was in a position to do him harm as advisor to the Holy Office. Blackwell devotes forty percent of the volume to Inchofer's, *A Summary Treatise Concerning the Motion or Rest of the Earth and the Sun, in which it is briefly shown what is and what is not to be held as certain according to the teachings of Sacred Scriptures and the Holy Fathers*. If the evidence does not support a plot in Galileo's sense, Blackwell's account provides a scenario for a spellbinding novel. English-speaking readers can be grateful for the author's translation of Inchofer's behind-the-scenes document. The story leaves enough latitude for the reader to draw his own conclusions. Although scholars both acquit and condemn the Church, the underlying issue remains: what constitutes a demonstration?—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*

BRANN, Eva. *The Music of the Republic*. Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2004. xiv + 378 pp. Cloth, \$24.95.—*The Music of the Republic* consists of a series of essays on several of the dialogues of Plato—*Phaedo*, *Charmides*, *Timaeus*, the *Apology*, the *Sophist* and the *Republic*. Brann's examination of Plato's work is undertaken in the light of two

deep influences—one institutional, the other personal. She refers several times to her role as a “tutor” at St. John’s College and endorses the attitudes and approaches to learning and scholarship prevailing there. She also acknowledges on at least five occasions within the text and countless times within the footnotes her great debt to her mentor Jacob Klein. Since Klein was not only the author of the book *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra*, but the architect of the St. John’s curriculum in its current form, these two influences can perhaps be reduced to one.

In an effort to follow in the footsteps of her mentor, Eva Brann reads Plato’s dialogues in the light of two chief concerns—one is moral, the other one might call mathematico-metaphysical. In the light of the former concern Plato appears as a moral psychologist who reveals the character of Socrates’ interlocutors through Socrates’ “trick-laden dialectic” (344). We gain acquaintance with, on the one hand, a variety of “notorious evil-doers” (142)—the “flagrant” Alcibiades, the “violent” Thrasymachus, the “iniquitous” Meno, and the tyrant Critias (69, 80–81, 69–71, 226, 346)—and, on the other hand, “decent-minded,” if nonetheless “unthinking” men, “clueless about the meaning of the terms they live by” (86). By contrast, her Socrates appears as the one man who combines perfect moral virtue with self-knowledge: he knows the virtue he lives by (348, 331; however cf. 47, 53, 56, 64–65). As such Socrates is “trustworthy beyond all others” both personally and insofar as the “presuppositions” or even “beliefs” that Socrates himself trusts in (29, 35, 342, cf. 160, 175, 350) are “trustworthy beyond all others.” In this sense, Socrates’ philosophy, as the author construes it, is grounded first and foremost not in doubt, perplexity and knowledge of ignorance, but faith (350, 175, cf. 226).

If, by Brann’s account, Socrates’ philosophy begins in faith, it finds its culmination in a complex of “definite” “doctrines” (348) that together articulate a metaphysics that is also a higher-order arithmetic (203, 157). The title essay of the book, by far the longest and most involved of the studies presented here, is devoted to articulating the character of this metaphysics. Brann strains to take sight of its lineaments in the central arguments of the *Republic* in which Socrates presents his three images of the good—sun, divided line and cave. Her account of these arguments proves to be informed as much by the neo-Platonic tradition and certain doctrines that—primarily through Aristotle—have come to be associated with Plato’s supposed “unwritten teaching” (86–7) as by the details of the arguments of the *Republic*.

According to Brann’s understanding, the divided line is the real key to Socratic metaphysics, insofar as it maps out both an ontological and cosmological hierarchy and a schema of the means by which the human soul may ascend from the shadow world of non-being into the noontide light of being and its highest principles (186–202). In its former aspect it articulates the whole of things as divided between the visible and intelligible realms and ruled over by a principle transcending both—beyond the being of the whole stands the Good Itself as the first cause of that whole. The Good relates the various parts of the whole to one another via “an image-making power” that it possesses and “passes down to the *eide* and that they pass on in turn . . . [thus] making our world a cascad-

ing progression of likenesses" (193). Being is then bound together through "that peculiar case of Otherness called 'being an image of'" (201). The otherness of the image, however, points to the presence of a second principle of the whole in addition to the Good (which the author identifies with the Same), namely, the Other. Brann finally interprets the Good of the *Republic* in relation to the genus of the Other of the *Sophist* in terms of Aristotle's account in the *Metaphysics* of Plato's "arithmological teaching" (198), even while recognizing certain difficulties standing in the way of such an interpretation (357–58, note 35): the Good is the One and the Other the Indefinite Dyad. Together these engender "the first begotten true number (*arithmos*) . . . the eidetic Two . . . that is, being": the togetherness in difference of Motion and Rest (199, 202–03).

In its second aspect, however, the divided line articulates an analysis of soul in terms of its perceptual and cognitive powers of which *eikasia* (the capacity to recognize an image as an image) is the most crucial: *eikasia* alone allows for the ascent from the visible realm to the intelligible and beyond by allowing one to perceive the relations of likenesses between the beings of the whole in an ascending (or descending) order (192–93, 201–02, 207; but cf. 266–68). The Good then provides both for the knowability of the known and the power to know of the knower.

Brann mentions but dismisses the problems raised for such an account in Plato's own *Parmenides* (201–02, 340). She is silent regarding both the apparently irresolvable perplexities that Socrates lays out in the *Phaedo* (96a–99d) for any account of things in terms of teleological cause and the difficulty that the argument of the *Statesman*, as establishing the opposition between the arithmetic measure and the measure of the mean, poses for her analysis (*Statesman*, 283b–287b). Be that as it may, having studied her account of the central arguments of the *Republic* and read her claim that only in Socrates' initiation of Glaucon into the "study of 'the one and the two and the three'" (*Republic*, 522c–526c) "and nowhere else in the *Republic* is undisguised direct philosophical work done" (181), one is left to wonder why, in her view, Plato chose to embed his imagistic intimation of his unwritten teaching within an analysis of the city in both its perfection and decline. After all, Brann's Socrates is hardly Cicero's Socrates who called philosophy down from the heavens to establish it in the cities and the homes of men.

The author does, however, present an explanation for the political character of the argument of the *Republic*. Indeed, the title of both her book and her essay refer to this explanation. The "music of the Republic" proves to be a species of Socratic rhetoric designed to effect the conversion of the young (for example, Glaucon) from a concern with this-worldly and particularly political matters, to the practice of philosophy and the ascent to the transcendent realms of being and the Good beyond being (217). This rhetoric proves to be necessary despite the perspicuous intelligible structure of the whole of things, because the Other or Indefinite Dyad as the second principle of that whole has a duplicitous aspect—it is, on the one hand, a principle of being and intelligibility; on the other hand, it appears "in the context of the human good . . .

not as a second source of being but as something opposed to that good, as a source of evil." This "bad version of the second *arche* . . . is matter" (200).

The cave image, in her view, thus represents the realm of the material world in which "the human soul struggling with body" is forced to confront the "dark realm of non-being" (213). The realm of non-being, however, is also the realm of human ignorance, the evil that is its consequence, and the "management" of human ignorance and evil "which is called politics" (212; but cf. 64–5, 350). Socrates' description and analysis of the political world—Socratic dirty work—proves, by this account, to be an act of altruism. It is undertaken for the benefit of Glaucon whom Socrates thus leads out of the dark underworld of non-being as Heracles led Theseus out of Hades (244). Socratic-Platonic philosophy, in Brann's view then is political only rhetorically and propaedeutically. Indeed the account of the human and political things is in fact merely propaedeutic to the genuine propaedeutic to philosophy—the practice of mathematics (217, 236–37). Though Brann embraces the teaching of the *Sophist* according to which the figure of the sophist is the object of inquiry that reveals to the philosopher both his own nature and that of being (282), she seems to reject the suggestion of both the *Republic* and the *Statesman* that the city is "the sophist of sophists" (*Republic*, 492a–b, *Statesman*, 303c) and, therefore, the primary clue to the nature of things and the necessary object of philosophic inquiry.

In taking Socrates' description of the philosopher's education from Book Seven as her model for the ascent to philosophy rather than the ascent that Socrates himself undertakes in the company of Glaucon and Adimantus—the argument of the *Republic* from Book One through Book Seven—Brann attempts to understand and justify "the liberal arts curriculum . . . we at St. John's College follow" (258). According to her understanding, that curriculum is itself a propaedeutic to philosophy as it was conceived and practiced by Jacob Klein (337–8) who could speak of Plato's fabled "lecture on the good" "as if he had been there" (337). For Brann, Klein alone proved capable of recovering Plato's "unwritten teaching" as the core of his philosophy and of constructing an educational institution to prepare young minds to grasp that teaching in the practice of "true dialectic" (338).

It is perhaps her fascination with Plato's alleged "unwritten teaching" (as reportedly embodied in his "lecture on the good") that makes it possible for her to embrace that pedagogical practice of her college according to which the infinite complexities of the arguments of Plato's writings are made to serve as occasions for an independent discussion undertaken by undergraduate students in an effort to learn "nothing but what [they can] straightway recognize as [their] own" (342). As she declares in the final essay of the book "lecturing to a class on Plato's dialogues is a plain perversion of the spirit" (349).—Steven Berg, *Bellarmine University, Louisville*.

BUCHHEIM, Thomas. *Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit: Kein Traum, sondern Drama mit Zukunft*. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2006. 209 pp. Paper, €14.80—Though the question of the compatibility of freedom and determination has always been a lively one in philosophy, it has become especially urgent in recent decades with the advance of science into the realm of human personality. The new book by Thomas Buchheim, professor at the University of Munich, aims to answer the basic question, “Can the human longing for unrestricted freedom be satisfied against the backdrop of the world such as it is presented by contemporary science (7)?” In the course of responding to this question, the book articulates a novel conception of freedom with great appeal.

After a rich, but concise, introductory chapter laying out the dimensions of freedom that would have to be addressed philosophically to do justice to the “feeling of freedom” (9) that represents a universal datum of experience, Buchheim develops his view in four chapters: the first two work out the relationship between free acts and natural causality, while the final two chapters unfold the more general characteristics of freedom and argue for its essentially social nature.

Chapter two, entitled, “The Root of Freedom: The Living Nature of Potentially Free Behavior,” draws a distinction between events in the physical universe (*Ereignissen*) and those occurrences more properly characterized as “expressions of life” (*Lebensäußerungen*), since they have as their subject a living organism (38–9). Such expressions are “episodes” belonging to the life of the particular organism, which thereby extends and maintains its unity, so that we observe a “bridge of identity” between these expressions and their source, an identity that is lacking in all merely physical events (53–4). In these episodes, the “capability” or “faculty” (*Vermögen*) of the organism must be counted as cause.

But since expressions of life, however different they may be from events, are still occurrences in the physical universe, we have to ask whether they are subject to necessity, which would eliminate the possibility of freedom. In the third chapter, which is the longest and most complex of the book, Buchheim proposes that the various processes occurring in the physical universe in accordance with the laws of nature ought to be described in terms of “natural causality” and “natural determination” rather than “natural necessity” (86). He rejects logical necessity because causes and effects are logically distinct from one another, and he also rejects the physical necessity according to which a particular cause will always and everywhere produce the same effect regardless of circumstances. If we count the capability of living things among the causally relevant constitutions of things that produce the occurrences in the universe, we will be able to affirm a variety of possible effects (56–7) for a given cause without falling into unintelligible indeterminacy. Here we acquire the possibility of freedom without giving up a causally determined world.

But being an “expression of life” is not sufficient to make an event free; to warrant this title, it requires a further set of characteristics, which Buchheim develops in chapter four. A free action is one that is carried out in a determined, coordinated way. Such an action requires not only a capability but also an *ability* (*Können*), which is something

acquired fully only through disciplined striving (145–50). But we can speak of *coordinated* behavior only in reference to some *form*, which means that, to explain such behavior, we must appeal not only to causes, but to *reasons* (127–32). Because it also means that particular actions can be said to fail, there will always be some risk involved in freedom (147). We are free only when our action has an articulate form and we in fact posit it and intend it to be received as such. When we do so, we act “with authority,” which means acting, so to speak, in the place of others, doing what only we and no one else can in this instance.

In the final chapter, Buchheim considers the reality of freedom in relation to a community of inter-acting agents. If freedom presupposes action that exhibits articulate and meaningful form, then it will bear similarities to language. There is no language without individual speakers, and yet these can speak only in relation to one another, and only because others have spoken and their language exists as a general medium in which individuals understand one another (165). Freedom is similarly acquired through the disciplined appropriation of a common form, and through the dependence on others that such appropriation implies. It follows from this characterization, however, that freedom—again, just like language—is not simply given with nature, but requires sustained effort for its preservation. As Buchheim observes, it is possible in the end to make a wholly unfree creature out of what is biologically human (168), but doing so endangers the freedom of us all.

Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit advances the philosophical discussion of freedom by showing how it can exist within a causally determined world, and at the same time by challenging the reductivism in modern physics that ignores the causal significance of organisms acting precisely by virtue of their complex wholeness. Moreover, by linking freedom with form, Buchheim moves beyond the empty view of freedom as indeterminate choice, and enables an essentially *social* understanding that provides a promising alternative to the conventional account given by classical liberalism. One might wish for more argument for some of the assumptions (such as the oft disputed claim that freedom and necessity mutually exclude one another), or more direct engagement with alternative notions, but the book will be stimulating for anyone interested in the question of freedom, particularly those who work in the analytic tradition.—D. C. Schindler, *Villanova University*.

COLLINS, Susan D. *Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 193 pp. Cloth, \$70.00—The book owes its title to the author's conviction that within the contemporary Western world we have lost sight of the principles that support the social and political order we take for granted, the foundational principles necessary to secure our individual liberty. Collins argues that Aristotelian moral and political theory was eclipsed by the success of modern liberalism and the resulting attachment to Hobbes, among others. Aristotle's view that man is a social and political agent who freely elects

his mode of governance is contrasted to the liberal concept of the state, conceived as an association of rights-bearing free agents. Aristotle's polity requires virtue in the citizenry. In her discussion of contemporary liberal theory, Collins challenges John Rawls' reduction of "justice" to "fairness." She doubts that his doctrine of fairness will work if one does not accept a higher notion of the good, a higher criterion, that is, one normally associated with religious faith. Given that religion has traditionally played a role in shaping moral and political life, it is questionable if in its absence modern liberal philosophy can supply the principles needed to support the political order that has secured our liberties. Hence, Collins's recommendation that we return to Aristotle for the neglected anthropology and teleology needed for their defense. She finds the beginnings of such a return in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Amy Gutmann, Michael Sandel, and William Galston, among others.

She believes that many contemporary authors who are positively disposed to Aristotle, no matter how different their interpretations, remain unified by a number of unexamined liberal presuppositions. Collins acknowledges that it has been the achievement of the liberal state to create a framework in which diverse pursuits of the good are accommodated, but regrettably the liberal state fails to be an inspiring force in the cultivation of civic virtue. Collins provides an excellent survey of the moral and social virtues as described by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in Book III of the *Politics*. Throughout her account she reminds the reader that man is a social and political animal, a view that stands in disagreement with contemporary individualism. Aristotle may be taken as an antidote to contemporary treatments of individualism vs. the common good, insofar as he discusses acts in which a person deliberately and unjustly chooses his own good over that of another. Collins's summary of the virtues as found in Aristotle ends with some valuable pages on education.

The book is well written and presents a solid and largely complete treatment of Aristotle on the virtues, but it does not examine the anthropology underlying Aristotle's understanding of virtue and its requirement for human perfection. The author displays an admirable acquaintance with the relevant literature, both with respect to liberal doctrine and the teachings of Aristotle. The text is superbly edited, and the index facilitates discussion.—L. J. Elders, *Institute of Philosophy, Rolduc, The Netherlands*.

DARWALL, Stephen. *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 362 pp. Cloth, \$49.95—The second-person standpoint, the subject of Darwall's book, is the stance we take up when we address one another with reasons. Darwall contends that when we give and receive reasons from this perspective, we recognize each other as "you," or as another rational being standing in a certain relation to us, a relation that carries with

it obligations and reasons for acting that have to do exclusively with the dignity of persons and what is owed between them. He uses insights from P. F. Strawson, Samuel Pufendorf, and J. G. Fichte to fill out his second-personal picture of rights and responsibility before arguing that we “inescapably presuppose” second-personal reasons, and so also the dignity and autonomy of persons, when we take up the second-person standpoint. Furthermore, Darwall holds that the second-person standpoint is, if not an absolute structural requirement of practical rationality, the only standpoint from which rational consideration about what to do *qua* rational agent is possible. Darwall argues that this commitment to the second-person standpoint in turn binds us to its presuppositions, which include the dignity of persons, responsibility to others, and the agent-relative nature of valid claims on the wills and behavior of agents.

In Part I (Chapters 1–3) Darwall sets out the key elements of his theory. Discussions in Chapters 1 and 2 center on three “points” that Darwall uses to construct his arguments: Strawson’s (“Desirability is a reason of the wrong kind for holding others responsible”), Fichte’s (second-personal address constitutes a “summons” from one to another that presupposes mutual agency), and Pufendorf’s (in order for a reason to be binding, the agent to which it applies must be able to recognize it as such). In Chapter 3, Darwall begins to explain why Kant’s argument in *Groundwork 3* fails to establish the reality of autonomy and dignity and suggests that a new argument is needed, an argument he thinks his conception of second-personal reasons equips him to provide.

In Part II (Chapters 4–6) Darwall turns to the task of fleshing out each of the key concepts introduced in Part I, arguing that the second-person perspective is a formal requirement of moral obligation. Making ample use of historical perspectives, including an insightful discussion of obligation in early-modern voluntarism and further development of his “points” from Part I, Darwall argues that accountability presupposes the second-person standpoint, and that accountability is in turn the only viable foundation for moral obligation.

Part III (Chapters 7–8) constitutes a digression from Darwall’s mounting argument, as Chapter 7 looks at empirical research in psychology that supports a second-personal model of interpersonal interaction, and Chapter 8 is a detour into the relevant underpinnings of the disagreement between Hume and Reid on the metaethics of justice. While some sections of Chapter 7 seem inessential to his main project, in Chapter 8 Darwall presents a compelling case for the fundamental inability of a Humean conventionalist understanding of justice and obligation to make sense of acting “conventionally” without presupposing the second-personal structure of address and recognition.

In Part IV (Chapters 9–12) Darwall argues that moral obligation is necessarily presupposed as a “felicity condition” whenever we take up the second-person standpoint. Darwall begins this argument by critiquing Kant’s attempt in *Groundwork 3* to prove the reality of autonomy and the Categorical Imperative. He then turns to Fichte’s notions of “self-positing” and “summons” to show that second-personal address must always presuppose autonomy and obligation. In Chapter 11 Darwall addresses the remaining possibility that despite the necessity of presupposing obligation and autonomy in order to reason second-per-

sonally, these concepts are nonetheless “empty.” He works to set this worry to rest by demonstrating that we cannot help but recognize practical rationality as distinct from theoretical rationality, and that the only formal ends of practical rationality that make sense are those of the second-person standpoint. Chapter 12 concludes the book with the suggestion that contractualism is best suited to accommodate second-personal reasons and obligation, although Darwall means to offer a catholic theory of rights and obligation, not just a theorem of contractualism.

The Second-Person Standpoint is a rigorous and convincing volume of utmost importance to ongoing discussions of the foundations of rights and obligations in ethics and jurisprudence, as well as to the current debates on the foundations of practical rationality. Additionally, Darwall’s book is likely to be a catalyst for a new and beneficial discussion of the long neglected ethical doctrines of early-modern theological voluntarism and German idealism and the contributions these rich traditions can offer to contemporary thinking about morality, responsibility, and the dignity of persons.—Daniel M. Layman, *Athens, Ohio*.

DUMMETT, Michael. *Thought and Reality*. Lines of Thought Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. ix + 111 pp. Cloth, \$29.95—This tiny book comprises slightly revised versions of the Gifford lectures that Dummett gave at St. Andrews in 1996–97. Roughly speaking, the first five chapters explain and motivate Dummett’s distinctive conception of metaphysics and semantics, while the last three explore some of its metaphysical implications.

In a nutshell, the argument of the first five chapters is this. Metaphysics asks what facts there are and what constitutes their obtaining, but facts are true propositions, and propositions are abstracted from linguistic practices, which means that metaphysics rests on an account of what it is to grasp a proposition and of what it is for a proposition to be true. However, the classical approach which holds both that to grasp a proposition is to know its truth-condition and that every proposition is either true or false independently of our being able to tell which, is found to be “irredeemably circular”, because it identifies grasping a proposition with having *theoretical* knowledge of its truth-condition; which is tantamount to saying that to grasp a proposition is to grasp the proposition that says that it is true on such and such condition. It thus fails as a philosophical account of what understanding a proposition consists in. It is worth noticing that Dummett here rests his case against the truth-conditional account on this circularity objection and barely mentions the “manifestation” and “acquisition” arguments on which he had put much weight in his earlier writings.

Dummett’s alternative view (sketched in chapter 5) is that truth itself should be identified with justifiability, and that to grasp a proposition is to have the ability, when suitably placed, to recognize evidence for it and to judge correctly whether it is outweighed by counter-evidence; an

ability which he insists we may have even when the proposition in question is undecidable, in the sense that we lack any effective method of deciding whether it is true or false. Dummett points out that this view avoids the absurd consequence that no undecidable proposition is intelligible, but leads to rejection of the principle of bivalence and of the law of excluded middle and calls for a detailed explanation of what is meant by saying that a proposition *can* be justified.

In chapters 6 and 7 (and the last few pages of chapter 5), Dummett contends that justifiability consists in different things for different kinds of propositions. In particular, he holds that although *some* decidable propositions have a determinate truth-value (and thus sustain bivalence) even when it has not in fact been established, many propositions are such that they *come to be true* only when their truth is established. This, however, doesn't hold for all undecidable propositions, for Dummett here endorses the view that the past-tense counterparts of decidable present-tense statements do sustain bivalence, even though they are not themselves decidable. There is nonetheless a large class of intelligible but undecidable statements for which we are not in position to claim that they are determinately true or false in advance of having been established as true or as false, and which we may never be in a position to recognize as true or as false. From which Dummett concludes that some intelligible questions *may* have no answer, and that reality *may* be indeterminate. He argues further that *some* future-tense statements only become true at the time to which they relate, and that reality should therefore be seen as cumulative, in the sense that some facts come to obtain only when they are established as such.

All this points towards the conclusion that "our world" doesn't extend beyond what we know or could have known of it, but doesn't tell us anything about reality as it is in itself. This thorny question is addressed in the final chapter, where Dummett argues for the bold and nearly *Berkeleyan* claims that scientific realism is contradictory and that since we can make no sense of there being a world which is not apprehended by any mind, the only way to make sense of the conviction that there is such a thing as the world as it is in itself is to admit that how things are in themselves is *constituted* by God's apprehending them as they are.

For readers already familiar with Dummett's works, one of the main interests of this set of lectures lies in the fact that (as Dummett explains in the preface) it endorses a conception of truth which, *in contrast* with the one propounded in his 2002 Dewey lectures (published as *Truth and the Past*, New York, Columbia U. Press, 2004), licenses an asymmetric treatment of past and future tense statements. New readers will find here a very compact, and for that reason not always easy to read, introduction to the work of one of the leading philosophers of the last fifty years.—Daniel Laurier, *Université de Montréal*.

2007. 333 pp. Cloth, \$28.90—The authors have drafted a scholarly road-map through the narrow streets of the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution. Taking up the compass of Equal Liberty, they claim to have found a sensible way around the vexing ‘wall of separation’ concept, which has made merry with lawyers’ minds these past years. The authors argue that Equal Liberty is in sharp disagreement with the ‘separation-based’ solution to religious conflicts, and point out that ‘separation’ is truly an odd idea given all that Churches and their members are even now permitted to undertake: buy and sell property, run schools, and generally enjoy the fruits and freedoms of private laws that are passed and maintained by the state. Separation, they say, is a deficient metaphor, even self-contradictory. So too is special legal ‘immunity’ for religiously motivated conduct. Both, they argue, should be rejected.

In scholarly style, the authors then pose a question very different from the separation-inspired one: they ask how government should treat *persons* with religious commitment, rather than how it should behave toward *religion* in general. They attribute no special charm to the phrase ‘Equal Liberty’ per se, and put to one side the historical fact that it was used by founding-era disestablishmentarians. Instead, they build their thesis on two strands of Supreme Court case law. First, the cases that recognize personal autonomy against an overreaching state. And second, a ‘free association’ principle, the clearest recent example of which would be the year 2000 Boys Scouts of America ruling. Some historical and textual objections are then disposed of before the book really gets underway in chapter three—*The Exemptions Puzzle*. This phase of the work begins an engaging journey through real-world examples of problems in religious liberty. Dress codes, zoning issues, medical care cases and even prison diets are explored.

In the case of zoning laws, for example, the authors conclude that ‘religious liberty’ is not composed of a bare right to benefit from the orderly neighborhoods produced by such laws, and then to escape such laws when they place restrictions on one’s ‘religious undertakings’. Rather, under the reign of Equal Liberty, participation will be offered on ‘fair terms’ that guarantee ‘having one’s religious needs accommodated on the same terms as comparably serious religious and nonreligious needs.’ In the authors’ view, the comparison seems to boil down to the issue of whether government, ‘in coordinating diverse projects, is sharing burdens fairly among them.’

Chapter four is cleverly titled *Ten Commandments, Three Plastic Reindeer, and One Nation . . . Indivisible*. This is a reference to the annoyingly trivial, yet highly symbolic ‘display cases’ and provides entrée to an exposition of four structural features of religion against which public endorsement must be understood. According to the authors, religions are generally comprehensive in outlook, distinct in structure, ritualistic, and categorical as far as membership/consequences of non-membership are concerned. When religions are understood in this way, so the argument goes, one can see the importance of public endorsements and the dangers in valorizing some beliefs and not others. Personal reaction is not a good guide here (it leads to a ‘tyranny of the squeamish’) and so the suggested solution is to focus on whether the ‘social mean-

ing' of the religious display will be 'more or less the same as the meaning of the object displayed.' Fra Angelico paints again, but more as a great artist than as *Il Beato*.

The real question for this book is whether it will aid the courts in brokering peace in the culture wars. Eisgruber and Sager note that Justice Breyer offered a small olive branch in his judgment in *Van Orden v. Perry* (the Texas Ten Commandments case) when he pointed out that ordering the State of Texas to remove its monument might only *encourage* First Amendment disputation, rather than calming it. The authors boldly query whether Justice Breyer actually went far enough in this suggestion and wonder aloud if 'the court can cool tempers in America's debates about religion only if it gives the government much broader freedom to sponsor and exhibit religious symbols.' This is not an argument that one hears often in the salons of academia.

The chapter on *God in the Classroom* tracks its way through the issues of school prayer, curriculum, the Bible, evolution and intelligent design. The authors' approach to the latter would perhaps benefit by making reference to Cardinal Christoph Schönborn's July 2005 op-ed page article in the New York Times which points out the dangers of evolutionism (as opposed to evolution).

The work of these two formidable constitutional scholars concludes with chapters on the use of public money for religious programs, and some ideas on legislative responsibility for religious freedom. Their discussion of the *Religious Freedom Restoration Act* (RFRA) argues that the legislature overreached by promoting not equality, but special legal privileges for religious groups. Hopefully the response to this carefully crafted book will not be as rhetorical as it was in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's *Boerne* decision to strike down RFRA's limitations on state and local action.—Patrick Quirk, *Ave Maria School of Law*.

EVANS, C. Stephen. *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self: Collected Essays*. Baylor University Press, 2006. 352 pp. Cloth, \$49.95—This set of 19 chapters by an analytically astute and seasoned Kierkegaard scholar takes up the sorts of questions a Plantinga or Alston might raise about the religious epistemology (and to a lesser extent, ontology) latent or explicit in Kierkegaard's works, especially his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* and *Philosophical Fragments*. By showing how Kierkegaard can be given an affirmative, constructive voice in their debates, these chapters provide a singular benefit to readers familiar with "reformed epistemology" and its sophisticated critiques of classical foundationalism as these bear on issues in philosophy of religion. Writers like Alston and Plantinga shed new light on the structures of justified belief, reliable perception, and the role of "properly basic beliefs," in breakthroughs that Evans deploys to rescue Kierkegaard from the clutches of an extreme existentialist voluntarism, irrationalism, or from some skeptical variants of postmodernism: it's reasonable to refuse an unreasonably ambitious foundationalism. Kierkegaard thus becomes a colleague in a

legitimate branch of Anglophone philosophy. Evans gives carefully differentiated expositions of contemporary debates not only in epistemology, but about realism, about voluntarism in the formation of belief and about the formation of the self, positioning Kierkegaard in relation to them. Each essay has the paraphrase-resistant fine-tuning of a professional journal article. Their impact rests on the fine-grained give and take that Evans orchestrates between Kierkegaardian passages and contemporary analytic positions.

Roughly half the essays concern epistemology, while the remaining 9 or 10 essays are devoted to aspects of Kierkegaard's ethics, his theory of selfhood and becoming a person, and his use of irony and humor as philosophical techniques. Evans takes up Kierkegaard's definition of the self as "a relation to itself and to another" that can be linked to current preoccupations with "the other." And in a time when fanaticisms and fundamentalisms break out violently nearly everywhere, Evans' treatment of the Abraham-Isaac story is instructive. The crisis on Moriah is by no means a valorization of unthinking obedience to divine commands that trump ordinary ethics. In addition, he takes up the role of authority in the formation of the religious self and its beliefs. We find a corrective to MacIntyre's early view that Kierkegaard promotes a Sartrean "radical choice," and a corrective to the view that Kierkegaard's *Works of Love* advocates a denigration of relations of "personal preference" in light of the primary duty of neighbor love. These elaborations and correctives are tightly argued, true to the texts, and persuasive.

The book's great strengths—it might be the best of its kind—map its inevitable limitations. To single-mindedly draw Kierkegaard into a distinctive Anglophone tradition guarantees that many issues fly under the radar. What do poets and dramatists—W. E. Auden or Ibsen, for example—find so alluring in Kierkegaard's evocation of faith and the self? (Auden published the first anthology of English translations in the early 1950s.) What accounts for Kierkegaard's massive impact on early 20th century theology? If the seeds of continental philosophy are sown in discussions of Kierkegaard in the 1930s in Paris among Hegelians, Heideggerians, Levinas and Sartre, how did *they* frame issues of Kierkegaardian faith and the self? What part does "the aesthetic" play in Kierkegaard's view of faith and the self? From one angle, it's a romantic "life-sphere" to be set to one side, but it's also a way of writing and imagining exemplified in Kierkegaard's early works like *Either/Or* and *Repetition*, and in the heartfelt, beautifully composed sermon-like discourses. Why are poetry and drama so central to explorations of virtue, faith, and religious knowings and passion? While Kierkegaard's "dialectical works" (*Fragments*, *Postscript*) can be brought into affinity with the analytic aims of Alston or Plantinga, broadly aesthetic explorations are foreign to their style of thinking. What about the artistry of "indirect communication"? The work of John Austin (but not that of Plantinga) can help. Kierkegaard self-consciously powers his texts with Austinian perlocutionary force. To neglect the many ways texts effect change in their readers misses something central to Kierkegaard's philosophical ambitions.

Putting one thing in focus puts another in shadow. The contemporary Anglophone discipline that Evans enlists aims to find arguments that settle uncertainties about realism, free will, properly basic belief, the autonomy of ethics, the nature of the virtues, etc. Yet Kierkegaard might be seeking to establish a corrective to the ambition to find arguments that settle uncertainties. He might prefer to *induce* uncertainties. For all their love of argument, Kierkegaard and Socrates are inclined to profess ignorance, intimating that argument settles less than might be expected. Kierkegaard's passionate concern, we might think, is to instill urgency around matters of life and death whose culmination is in comportment more than in argumentative or dialectical success. He pushes us toward hearing a demand that we change our life. Evoking and delivering this demand from multiple angles in his rich and varied authorship, Kierkegaard then retreats to await our response, apt or miscued. Of course it's churlish to expect a book on so capacious a thinker to cover the full gamut of issues indigenous to the writing. In the present case, one can only welcome this rich and rewarding achievement, the cumulative effort that Evans delivers from his engagements with Kierkegaard throughout a long and distinguished career.—Edward F. Mooney, *Syracuse University*.

FABRE, Cécile. *Whose Body is it Anyway?: Justice and the Integrity of the Person*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. xiv + 232 pp.—In *Whose Body is it Anyway?*, Cécile Fabre challenges a common assumption among theorists of justice regarding rights over our bodies—that our bodies are not to be counted as resources among other resources in a theory of distributive justice. The book that results is bold, systematic and rigorous in its discussion of recent work on such topics as the ethics of organ donation, prostitution and reproductive surrogacy, as well as on justice, personal identity and gender equity. One original aspect of the book is due to its liberal orientation; there are consequentialists who make bold claims about obligations to provide bodies or body parts to others, and meanwhile religious moralists commonly stress the ways we are called upon to offer personal help to those in distress. But bold claims about an enforceable duty, for instance, to supply unneeded organs to those who need them, as a matter of liberal justice, are much less common. Fabre thus defends claims that rival those of Peter Singer in presenting unusual and unexpectedly forceful moral demands, but on a moral basis that is more widely shared, at least among political and legal philosophers.

Her focus is on four uses of the body, where there is controversy about the role of the state in regulating or enforcing such uses: emergency rescues, personal services (where duties include civil service and rights include sexual services), provision of organs for transplant (distinguishing transfers from the living—voluntary and involuntary—and from the deceased), and reproductive services. These topics neatly reflect chapter divisions, with two chapters on personal services (includ-

ing one of the more controversial, on prostitution) and three on organ transfer. There is also a broader division of topics (and chapters) into questions of duties and of rights—Fabre first defends duties to rescue, to offer personal help to the disadvantaged, and to provide blood, bone marrow and organs to patients who need these in order to live a ‘minimally flourishing life’; she then defends rights to sell one’s organs, to sell sexual services and to enter into surrogacy contracts. Issues concerning the nature of rights and duties, as well as the scope of theories of justice are addressed in a wide-ranging and largely theoretical first chapter.

Before commenting on some of the deeper issues raised there, I note a feature of the structure of Fabre’s treatment in each chapter. Each chapter begins with an argument for a duty or right that is based on the widespread acceptance of other duties or rights in liberal societies, then addresses objections, and then considers practical concerns such as the feasibility of the required legal regulations in each area. There is not much in the way of description of actual cases or historical background, though for her purposes, these omissions are understandable; but the recurring format sometimes limits opportunities for more wide-ranging reflection, for instance regarding the foundational issues raised in the first chapter—or indeed, regarding her assumptions about the moral soundness of widely accepted practices in liberal societies.

Fabre’s basic starting point, in her overall argument and in many of her specific arguments, is an assimilation of material resources such as money and property, and bodily resources such as organs and personal services. Her assimilation is not indiscriminate: she wishes to leave open the possibility that there is a bodily criterion of personal identity, and does not suppose that each person’s body is or ought to be entirely available for enforceable redistribution. She focuses, then, on uses of bodies that are only partially intrusive; and just as few theorists of justice would require citizens to part with all of their income, Fabre would not require us to be prepared to part with all or even most of our body in the name of justice. But beyond being entitled to as much of one’s body as is required for leading a ‘minimally flourishing life’, one must, in her view, offer up the rest for redistribution, when required for others to be able to lead such lives.

Fabre’s arguments are well-constructed and often convincing. Meanwhile, she holds back from endorsing more radical interference with bodily autonomy, due to doubts about consequentialism and about any purely psychological criterion of personal identity. But here I note a couple of reservations about her overall approach. She discusses the debate surrounding criteria of personal identity in Chapter 1, but too rarely acknowledges the relevance of this debate to her particular topics. As for consequentialism, it is perhaps not taken seriously enough as a rival view. In endorsing a sufficientist theory that incorporates elements of the capabilities approach, Fabre considers only a couple of extreme alternatives, rather than a more plausible consequentialist alternative such as prioritarianism. Furthermore, there are places where her argument seems to take a consequentialist form (at the moral level, for example, at bottom of p. 114), and places where she allows a foothold for a consequentialist approach (for example, at p. 48, on the fungibility

of bodily services). In any case, despite overlooking these opportunities for clarification and reflection on the moral foundations of her approach, her book remains challenging throughout and impressively unified in its treatment of these diverse topics.—Gordon F. Davis, *Carleton University*.

FIASSE, Gaëlle. *L'autre et l'amitié chez Aristote et Paul Ricoeur : analyses éthiques et ontologiques*. Bibliothèque Philosophique de Louvain 69. Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie Louvain-la-Neuve; Éditions Peeters: Louvain, Paris, Dudley MA, 2006. 320 pp. Paper, €50.00.—Gaelle Fiasse's book uses Paul Ricoeur's appreciation for Aristotle in *Soi-même comme un autre* as a lead for reading insights in Aristotle's texts. This yields some fresh readings of Aristotle's familiar work on friendship, and critical perspectives upon Ricoeur. The center of gravity here is Aristotle, with Ricoeur's insights given equal space but lesser drawing power.

The pole for bringing together their thoughts is the centrality of the other in ethics for Ricoeur and the role of the friend in happiness for Aristotle: not being the same, are they helpful, even compatible? Fiasse claims that the other can serve as a leading string to pull out emphases on the friend, while the correct grasp of Aristotle which this guide promotes can temper Ricoeur's treatment.

Fiasse well notes the ease of distorting each author with anachronisms. She deals with this by close attention to each one's texts, instead of globally appreciating them together. Close attention requires that half the book be devoted to each author. Were it not for this necessary approach, the book might become redundant, since the first half on Ricoeur is replete with references to Aristotle, mostly Ricoeur's own, and the second half on Aristotle is strewn with remarks on Ricoeur. Robert Sokolowski in his preface calls this a hermeneutical dialogue between them involving the reader.

The structure of each half shows what inveigles Fiasse toward each philosopher: their ties between ethics and metaphysics. Each half begins with a quarter on the author's ethics of otherness or friendship; and goes on to another but shorter quarter on the metaphysics that permits this ethics.

The ethical thrust of Ricoeur is to achieve the other to whom I am responsible for the promissings that narrate my own identity. This singular reality cannot be assimilated to myself. This ethical other cannot be reached from an essentialist metaphysics in which the singular holds a place derivative from the specific. The other's metaphysics must displace the givenness of substance, in favor of my constant self-making among my others in a metaphysics of action. The other is appreciated by my effective power to act reciprocally, a capacity that implies being acted upon and so the vulnerability of both.

Philosophy of action for Ricoeur, and of act for Aristotle, is one of the fault lines easily blurred between the two. Fiasse recognizes and is at pains to heal it: potency is our power in action; action alone actualizes these capacities.

Using this, friendship has ethical stature as the concrete actualization of the highest end, happiness, both practical and theoretical. Fiasse repeatedly insists that Aristotle's ethical goods, while serving as the actor's goals and aspirations (*visées* for Ricoeur), must be actualized outside of himself as objective causes of being. Friendship is a good only in the friend, the real person. Although my friend must be made a friend by my choice, and hers, her being as actual friend is an objective good, something of her own, so both of our goods. Choice cuts off substantializing the friend into an impersonal given, while activity according to virtue obviates the loss of self into the other.

An Aristototean metaphysics of act and potency underpins this ethics; but, unlike Ricoeur, Fiasse does not put it in opposition to a metaphysics of substance. *Ousia* in its plurivocity involves unique, accidental being; *energeiai* actualize the capacities for achieving fulfillments unique to the individual person, while feasible only for her as having a human *ousia*.

Debating Ricoeur scholarship is not the pivotal task, although Fiasse separates Ricoeur from a Levinasian totally other—some responsiveness is needed for a friend to be established, even if by extension of facial presence through justice as a projected good. More extensive is her mediation of debates in Aristotelean research. Fiasse needs to make use of analogy, particularly for the polysemia of *ousia*, and for friendship on the basis of virtue or on other bases and degrees; but she separates herself from Thomistic debates over proportionality or attribution. Fiasse devotes much effort to combating any blur of ethical *praxis* into artifactual *poiesis* that allows the utilitarian appropriation of Aristotle.

Sokolowski's preface, also in French, notes Fiasse's mastery of English—and French—written scholars' debates; the index of names cites Berti and Aubenque as often as Plato, followed by Joachim and Gauthier as frequently as Heidegger, each as often to support her positions as to be distinguished from them. Responsive mostly to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, she cites the *Eudemian Ethics* in her index more seldom, but with great reliance since her indispensable claims about the objectivity of the good stem mostly from there. She acknowledges that Aristotle does not articulate her key claim of the friend as the objective end of ethics, to be gleaned by interpreting the *Nicomachean Ethics* on friends with the *Metaphysics* on ends. Her lengthy bibliography of Ricoeur and its use throughout show the wider support for her claims there, as do her journal articles on both philosophers. Fiasse uses multiple translations; original texts appear in footnotes, usually a few words, at most two or three lines.

Gaëlle Fiasse accomplishes the task in her 2002 thesis of allowing each author to illuminate the other, and makes feasible their appreciation for the distant other that she several times associates with our days of globalization.—Christopher B. Gray, *Concordia University*.

FRANCK, Juan F. *From the Nature of the Mind to Personal Dignity: The Significance of Rosmini's Philosophy*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006. vi + 209 pp. Cloth, \$59.95—Anyone looking for a clear and thoughtful study of Antonio Rosmini's philosophy will welcome the publication of this most ambitious yet concise study of the great Italian philosopher-theologian. The title of the work, as well as its length, belie its breadth and scope, which encompasses the entire sweep of Rosmini's systematic philosophical vision.

Of course, anyone looking for a highly detailed study of Rosmini's philosophy that misses nothing would do better by turning to Rosmini's work itself. There is much in his thought that is merely glossed over if not passed over altogether in silence in this book. Rather than being encyclopedic, Franck's study is focused on answering a single, pointed question: "Why are personal beings endowed with the highest value, that is to say, with dignity?" (p. 1). Rosmini has a fascinating answer to this question, one which interests Franck, he tells us, not so much for its historical importance as for its philosophical value. But because it is one that cannot be comprehended without an understanding of the whole, it also functions as an occasion to sketch the broad outlines of Rosmini's entire philosophical system along with its place within the history of philosophy.

In order to answer the question of the ultimate ground of human dignity, Franck divides his work into two parts, the first dealing with the epistemological foundations of Rosmini's answer to this question, the second with the ontological significance of the most important fruit of Rosmini's epistemological enquiry, namely, the doctrine of the Idea of Being. Taken together, they constitute a sustained attempt "to show a line of reasoning that starts with the analysis of what a mind or an intellect is and ends with important considerations about the person" (p. 7). Although this line of reasoning is long and difficult to follow at times, its conclusion amounts to this: personal dignity is founded "on the being of the person, in what is innermost to him" (p. 7). It is a conclusion which "involves ontology (the study of being in general), metaphysics (the study of real being), and anthropology (the study of man)" (p. 186).

Given the extraordinary richness of Rosmini's interdisciplinary treatment of the question of human dignity, not to mention the idiosyncratic nature of many of his highly original philosophical doctrines, I refer the reader to Franck's study in lieu of making a quixotic attempt to provide a sketch of Rosmini's philosophy within the confines of this review. Instead, I will offer a few more general observations about the book as a whole.

One of its most salient features is the facility with which Rosmini's work is placed in historical context. Franck does this primarily by putting Rosmini into dialogue with his predecessors (for example, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes), as well as his contemporaries and near-contemporaries, chief among which is Kant. For the most part, Franck's interpretations are plausible and given considerable weight by his obvious mastery of the primary sources, Rosminian and otherwise, as evidenced by copious quotations in the body of the text as well as in dozens of footnotes. That having been said, I should add that some things Franck says about Aquinas caused this reviewer to pause. (See,

for example, p. 107 and n. 42.) Furthermore, the whole time that I was reading the book I had a nagging suspicion that all Rosmini's efforts to chart a course between the deficiencies of empiricism and the excesses of idealism were in vain because Rosmini never arrived at a proper understanding of Aquinas's theory of knowledge. A closer and more extensive treatment of this subject and Rosmini's understanding of it may have helped to avoid this suspicion.

These criticisms notwithstanding, I can highly recommend Franck's study to anyone looking for a helpful and sympathetic guide to the thought of this most original but neglected of 19th century philosophers.—Giuseppe Butera, *Providence College*.

GRAYLING, Anthony. *Descartes, The Life and Time of a Genius*. New York: Walker and Company, 2006. 368 pp. Cloth \$27.95—As one of the best known philosophers, both in and out of academia, Descartes deserves this useful, highly readable biography. It is accessible to the beginner and layman, and valuable for the professional philosopher as well. Since there is hardly a beginning class in philosophy which does not cover Descartes, not to mention more specialized courses in the philosophy of mind and epistemology, I would recommend this fine work to all of the above. In fact, something stronger should be added along the lines of making it required reading for academic philosophers. Grayling has successfully put historical flesh on the bare philosophic bones of views we professional philosophers lecture on. He accomplishes this feat by delineating the tumultuous 17th century setting for Descartes' work and life. The complex historical scene is set, and then there is a continuous juxtaposition of various stages in religious controversies, the rise of modern science, and Descartes' own philosophical and scientific views. This work is the best I know for concise and accurate surveys of each of these themes independently of the other. Then, when they are combined, a whole-is-greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts effect is achieved. To top this off, Grayling very tentatively suggests a tantalizing novel hypothesis to account in part for some of Descartes' movements. Descartes was born in 1596, lived to the age of 54, and died in 1650. He was educated by the Jesuits at La Fleche, and Grayling records that throughout his life, he was, and he wanted to be perceived as, Catholic. In an age when conformity was a requirement, he was dismissive of the conventional Aristotelian views. These had been combined with theological ones in the Middle Ages and became central for the Church. He believed his dualism made room both for the new mathematically oriented sciences of the natural world and for theologically accepted views via his account of spiritual/mental matters as being independent of the natural world. Descartes was like Galileo in being a leading critic of Aristotelian science and its naive empiricist methodology. Unlike Galileo, he was trying to hold on to, and to some extent propagate, views of the

new sciences, and yet avoid offending and coming into conflict with religious authorities.

His early travels, after La Fleche, were contemporaneous with the start of the Thirty Years War in 1608. It is simplistic to view the war as Protestant vs. Catholic. It was also Protestant (Lutheran) vs. Protestant (Calvinist) vs. others, and Catholic (French interests) vs. Catholic (Spanish/Jesuit/etc. interests) as well, and one must not leave out the persecution of heretics. His journeys covered key areas of conflict in that war. As a partial explanation of his movements, Grayling "outs" Descartes. He very tentatively suggests that Descartes was an intelligence agent, a spy, in the service of the Church's interests. Grayling is very tentative in making this suggestion. He backs it up by mentioning cultural figures who led similar double lives, for example, the Huyghens family and the painter Rubens.

Given the revolutionary character of Descartes' ideas on scientific, philosophic, and theological matters, his adult life was filled with conflicts. These begin (1618) with his long stay in the Netherlands where he resided for most of the rest of his life (except for trips to France and his last year in Sweden). Holland was in the midst of its Golden Age. Grayling invites us to "think of the interior scenes being painted by Vermeer." Descartes' *Discourse on Method* and *The Meditations* are published here.

During this same period the Inquisition condemned Galileo for maintaining ideas, such as those of Copernicus, which Descartes shared. Descartes was abreast of this and he argued both for the scientific correctness and the religious orthodoxy of his own dualist position. There is a side issue that I would like to call attention to here. Grayling does not indicate and may not have realized that he has provided a correction to a well-known account of the Galileo case. Grayling importantly indicates that Galileo's position was not acceptable to Cardinal Bellarmine and the inquisition even when offered only as a hypothetical, "as if" view, and not as true in some realist/correspondence sense. This conflicts with and corrects Karl Popper's account (*Conjectures and Refutations*). Popper adapted the Galileo case to distinguish and champion a realist view of theories as opposed to an anti-realist one. Popper described the situation as one where Bellarmine offered Galileo a way out, if Galileo adopted an anti-realist, as if, view in place of the realist one he held. Grayling points out that an anti-realist stance didn't save Galileo, and that Descartes was aware that it would not rescue him.

Descartes' dualist account of the mental involved him in controversies with both Thomistic/Aristotelian views as well as with the Calvinist ones prominent in the Netherlands. His account of the freedom of the will did not conform sufficiently to the Church's account and was at odds with the pre-determinist features of Calvinism. Grayling's book is filled with insightful accounts of the many controversies of the time, written in a style that makes for an extremely good read.—Alex Orenstein, *Queens College and The Graduate Center*.

GUYER, Paul. *Kant*. New York: Routledge, 2006. xiii + 456 pp. Paper, \$22.95—Guyer's addition to the new *Routledge Philosophers* introductory series is a very good book. In one volume he summarises Kant's entire philosophical output and presents an almost unbroken stream of incisive criticisms. The extent of Guyer's learning is as impressive as the seeming effortlessness with which he communicates it. While the book is intended to introduce students to Kant's philosophy, the depth of analysis will offer much to the scholar as well.

Guyer begins with a crisp summary of Kant's life and intellectual development based largely on Kuehn's biography. Chapter 2 explains Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy, offering detailed analysis of the arguments for the claim that space and time are nothing but the pure forms of our representations of objects, as well as a revealing rejection of the 'neglected alternative' to transcendental idealism. Further highlights of the chapter are a convincing refutation of the 'two-aspects' interpretation of transcendental idealism and a lucid account of the Transcendental Deduction of the categories. This section is a tour de force of interpretative analysis. Also deserving of mention is the effort to show that the Second Analogy of Experience does not contain a string of distinct proofs, but is a series of attempts to clarify one basic idea. Chapter 3 provides a compact and fairly sympathetic account of Kant's criticisms of the traditional arguments in rational psychology, cosmology and theology. Chapter 4 explains the role of systematicity in scientific inquiry, and relates various claims made about systematicity in the third *Critique* to corresponding claims in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first.

Turning next to Kant's practical philosophy, chapter 5 argues that all five of Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative can be derived from the Formula of Humanity as an End, inasmuch as the very idea of universalizability serving as a test of morality *arises from* the conception of humanity as an end in itself. Whether or not this argument succeeds, Guyer does make a strong case that the idea of treating humanity as an end is in some sense the most basic normative notion for Kant. The attraction of chapter 6 is its partitioning of Kant's thinking about freedom into five distinct phases, the last of which—fully articulated only with the publication of Kant's book on religion in 1793—represents the fruition of his efforts to arrive at a satisfactory position. The next two chapters detail Kant's system of duties, of virtue and of right, respectively. Some evidence is presented to show that political or legal duties ('of right') fall under 'moral' duties generally, so that morality properly divides into ethics and right. Duties of right are ways of preserving freedom that can be coercively enforced by the state, while duties of virtue are ways of promoting freedom that are enforceable only by respect for the moral law. An interesting outcome of the analysis is that Kant's ethics does not appear as wholly abstract and removed from the real context in which moral decision-making necessarily takes place as it does on most other accounts, but is intentionally mindful of the frailty of humans and the empirical conditions that need to be fulfilled if one is to cultivate a strong moral character. Another significant result is that the main aim of Kant's writings on politics is to provide a

philosophical guarantee of the possibility of perpetual peace between states, even though this offers us no assurance that it is ever likely to come about. But its bare possibility is enough to create a moral and rational duty for us to try to secure it through the proper use of freedom.

Chapter 9 offers a very clear explanation of the connection between aesthetic and teleological judgement, while chapter 10 argues that Kant's teleology still has something important to teach us, even though it has been rendered largely irrelevant by the progress of natural science. The final chapter suggests that Kant's deepest philosophical insight is that nothing outside of our own free choice can guarantee that humanity will achieve its highest moral goal without at the same time subverting our very efforts to be moral.

Of course scholars will have differing views regarding the accuracy of Guyer's interpretations, so the only worry to consider here is whether the work accomplishes its implied aim. The book is, unfortunately, rather difficult to read, since Guyer doesn't cut any corners, and students entirely new to Kant may be challenged. But the challenge is not unreasonable, since Kant is a difficult thinker in any case, and Guyer's prose is astonishingly clear. So all things considered the book is to be highly recommended as an introduction for students who aren't looking for a free ride.—Scott Stapleford, *University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg*.

HANNA, Robert. *Rationality and Logic*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006. xxii + 316 pp. Cloth, \$35.00—This book is a densely-argued and ambitious defense of a "broadly Kantian theory of human rationality and logic" (p. xx) that Hanna calls *logical cognitivism*. Logical cognitivism is the conjunction of *the logic faculty thesis*—"that logic is cognitively constructed by rational animals" (p. xiii)—and *the logic-oriented conception of human rationality*—"that rational human animals are essentially logical animals" (p. xviii).

Hanna first argues for logical cognitivism by attempting to discredit its principal rivals: logical psychologism and logical platonism (chapter 1). He understands logical platonism in such a way that it *prima facie* makes human knowledge and deployment of logic impossible (pp. 21–4), concluding from this that logical platonism bears a heavy burden of proof and that until that burden is met logical platonism need not be taken seriously.

On Hanna's conception of logical psychologism, either logical facts/properties and natural facts/properties are identical or the former logically strongly supervene on the latter (pp. 6–7). Logical strong supervenience is Kimean strong supervenience where the necessity at issue is logical or analytic (p. 12). (Hanna appears to identify logical necessity and analytic necessity.) Since, by Hanna's lights, (Quinean) scientific naturalism is the view that "all [properties/facts] logically strongly supervene on natural [properties/facts]" (p. 12, emphasis omitted), logical psychologism is a species of scientific naturalism, which Hanna argues

is false (pp. 19–21). So Hanna rejects logical psychologism, not because of Fregean or Husserlian critiques, but because he believes it is a form of scientific naturalism and scientific naturalism is false.

Hanna's characterization of scientific naturalism is problematic. For example, Hanna's understanding of natural facts (p. 12) renders scientific naturalism an extreme form of physicalism on which Quine himself fails to be a scientific naturalist (owing to his endorsement of mathematical entities which do not supervene on the physical). Hanna's argument against logical psychologism may be successful, but not because scientific naturalism is false.

The remainder of the book divides into individual arguments for the logical faculty thesis (chapters 2–5) and the logic-oriented conception of rationality (chapters 4–7). Hanna argues for the former by arguing that rational animals "possess a cognitive faculty that is innately configured for representing logic and is the means by which all actual and possible logical systems are constructed" (p. 25), such construction being governed by *protologic*: a single universal, unrevisable, and *a priori* "repertoire of metalogical principles and logical concepts" (p. 46) contained in the logic faculty. Hypothesizing that we possess a logical faculty so described, Hanna contends, best enables us to (i) avoid logical psychologism, (ii) explain the apparent unity of logic in the face of a multiplicity of (sometimes incompatible) logics (the *e pluribus unum* problem) and (iii) make peace with the fact that logic is presupposed in any defense of logic (the *logocentric predicament*). So we should accept the logic faculty thesis.

Hanna's argument for the logic-oriented conception of rationality winds through the better part of four chapters, but the weight of the case rests on his conception of rationality and appeal to Chomskyan/Fodorian nativism. For Hanna, rationality requires the "possession of concepts expressing strict modality" (p. xv), that is, concepts of logical, epistemic, and deontic necessity. Given this, Hanna finds a rational human lacking the cognitive capacity for logic impossible (p. 112–13) and concludes that rational humans are essentially logical. One might worry that a person could possess concepts of strict modality, as required by Hanna's conception of rationality, yet lack the cognitive capacity for logic. A capacity for logic requires the capacity to apply, not simply possession of, concepts of strict modality. Hanna needs rational humans to necessarily have the logic faculty. For this, Chomskyan/Fodorian nativism suffices. On this view, rational humans intrinsically (necessarily) possess a language of thought (LOT). Since, Hanna argues, a LOT requires a logic of thought (LogOT), rational humans also necessarily possess a LogOT. But a LogOT is a logical system, and so constructed by the logic faculty. So rational humans necessarily possess a logic faculty (chapter 4). Against this one might note that nativism of the sort invoked is controversial even among cognitive scientists.

A couple of technical problems need to be flagged. (1) There seems to be some confusion about Gödel's completeness and incompleteness theorems. For one thing, the statement of the second incompleteness theorem on p. 38 is at best infelicitous. Moreover, Hanna appears to claim that soundness and completeness hold until we get into

"arithmetic or other complex domains" (p. 137), where completeness fails. But this is correct only if the same notion of completeness is at issue in the incompleteness and completeness theorems, which is not the case. (See also pp. 38–40 and p. 134.) (2) Since some nonclassical consequence relations do not require necessary *truth* preservation (for example, the consequence relation of Priest's *LP*), Hanna's characterization of nonclassical logics (p. 43) is inadequate.—Jeffrey W. Roland, *Louisiana State University*.

HAWTHORNE, John. *Metaphysical Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. x + 299 pp.—Hawthorne's purpose in publishing this collection of fifteen essays is to "detail my struggle with a range of topics that lie at the heart of metaphysics" (p. vii). These topics include identity (essay #1), space and time (especially #2), causality, the constitution of plenitude, determinism, teleology, and the application of concepts to the world. Mereology is a constantly recurring concern. Although his recurring and hence principal interlocutor is David Lewis, Hawthorne also significantly engages Peter Geach, W. V. O. Quine, Timothy Williamson, Theodore Sider, and Bertrand Russell, among others.

Hawthorne's is metaphysics without substance. Although Aristotle merits a respectful mention late in the book, his thought plays virtually no role. The governing vision of the work is of the universe as a spatiotemporal plenitude (or alternatively a spatial plenitude in time) filled with parts which may be properties or primordial pieces of matter, which are bearers of properties (especially #3). "Perhaps the fundamental physical landscape is a world of space-time with various field values" (p. 117). The metaphysical problems therefore center around how the various parts of the plenitude can be distinguished as objects or objects divided into parts (especially #5). The most promising candidates for a solution are "quality objects," which are "primary bearers of the basic physical magnitudes" (p. 142). The metaphysical task is to determine what these are, how they might be characterized.

Throughout the volume, Hawthorne lets himself be guided by mathematical abstractions, in particular limit concepts such as the point and the instant. Consideration of these suggests that the plenitude consists of independent points. "A commitment of most so-called 'four-dimensionalists' is that instantaneous things are metaphysically fundamental" (p. 98). However, if this is so, then we are hard pressed to account for regional properties such as color and mass, which cannot be easily attributed to mathematical points (#7 and #11). He therefore also devotes considerable attention (especially #7, written with Frank Arntzenius) to true infinitesimals or, in Hawthorne's term, "gunk." Late in the book (#16), he develops a series of thought experiments inspired by Zeno's paradoxes and intended to challenge and clarify our conception of *contact* between two objects or entities. If the body is a mathematically open region then it cannot touch another open region, nor can two closed regions touch.

Besides mathematical constructions the metaphysician seeking to characterize the structure of reality may also consider laws of nature (especially #10). These laws may provide the "joints" between different objects and structures, an important consideration if the world is to have any discernible structure at all. In several of his essays Hawthorne addresses the Humean critique of nature's laws. Is, for example, *mass* necessarily related to causality or to causal laws?

More critical is the fundamental question of the application and applicability of predicates to objects in the world. Hawthorne directly addresses this in #8, "Vagueness and the Mind of God," which actually reflects on the adequacy of any language to represent reality clearly and comprehensively. The earlier essay, "Three-dimensionalism" (#5) suggests that it is anthropocentric and hence chauvinistic to expect to find words adequate to match the world as it is.

Having read this collection, we must ask, "But is it metaphysics?" If the project is to find the basic elements of reality, and if reality consists only in the physical realm, then does not metaphysics collapse into physics? We note that when scientists need to define or characterize the entities they deal with, they do not appeal to us philosophers. Witness the recent debates over the definition of "planet," which astronomers carried on satisfactorily using astronomical categories and laws. Philosophical reflections on the infinite mathematical divisibility of physical space are bootless in light of quantum theory. Most important and fundamental is exclusion of the human person as rational, self-governing being from the scope of metaphysics. At first glance one may approve Hawthorne's avoiding the "risk of anthropocentrism" (p. vii), until he examines more closely what this term means. The fact is that there exists a kind of physical being which is able to govern its own behavior rationally. It is more than a center of consciousness occupying a region of space-time (as suggested by essay #13, "Why Humeans Are Out of Their Minds"). Neither this essay nor #8 even considers the reality and operation of intelligence. Essay #15, on teleology, firmly rejects the concept of 'good' as metaphysically significant (p. 281). Indeed, Hawthorne allows as conceptually unproblematic the possibility of "zombies," beings like us in every way, except for their lack of consciousness (p. 221). Yet, it is precisely the existence of intelligence that led Aristotle to metaphysics, the science that is beyond physics, whose examination of being as such presupposes some class of being other than the physical.—Adrian J. Reimers, *University of Notre Dame*.

HOFFMANS, Stella, and REIS, Burkhard, editors. *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ix + 277 pp. This collection of essays on the virtuous life in Greek ethics is meant to be a celebration of the 65th birthday of Dorothea Frede, one of the outstanding scholars in the field of ancient philosophy and the president of the German Society of Ancient Philosophy. In the tradition of the

continental philosophy, in which she belongs, Professor Frede has put Greek and Hellenistic philosophy in a dialogue with modern and contemporary moral philosophy. Through the years, this dialogue has become increasingly interested in the issues of the role and formation of moral character and its link to moral responsibility, issues that are peripheral in post-Enlightenment moral philosophy due to its rationalistic vocation, naturally more attentive to calculating inferences (utilitarianism) and assessing a priori formal criteria of evaluation (Kantianism), yet almost deaf to "virtue ethics." As we may recall from Immanuel Kant's work, issues concerning character and the formation of moral sentiments belong to anthropology and psychology, not the discipline of morals whose scientific foundation demands that empirical questions and issues are left to practitioners, not theorists. Hence, whereas to the ancient Greek philosophers ethics should set out to teach human beings the good life as a whole, to modern post-Enlightenment philosophers moral philosophy's task is to justify moral principles or values and be an aid to the solution of moral dilemmas in a society, like modern democratic society, that is based on individuals' equality, reciprocity and a dialogic exchange of reasons and opinions.

This volume is composed of eleven contributions, of which eight are devoted to Plato and Aristotle, two to Epicurus and one to Empedocles. Articles by James Allen, Julia Annas, David Sedley and Margaret McCabe explore a series of arguments as they are discussed by Socrates and his interlocutors in some Platonic dialogues. Through an examination of the arguments on virtues in the *Protagoras*, Allen argues that Plato intends to depict a progress in moral argument from the stage of mere dialectic to that of demonstrative and didactic assertion. In her discussion of *Euthydemus*, Annas approaches the issue of the classification of Plato's dialogues according to whether Socrates plays the role of a negative examiner or of a positive expounder; yet this dialogues would show that Socrates adopted both perspectives. Annas' goal is not to claim for any unitarian reading of Plato—but in her mind both strategies can be seen as "mutually enriching for the person spurred to pursue wisdom and virtue" (p. 46). Sedley analyses the position Socrates plays in the *Symposium* in his attempt to persuade Aristophanes (who believes love is at root a quest to enhance the self) and Agathon (who links love to the goodness) and concludes that Socrates unifies at the end both positions by amending the former of its amoral implications and strengthen the intuition of the latter that love is not simply promotion of the self but of self's good. McCabe's last contribution on Plato brings us into an analysis of dialectics, Plato's preferred method of moral discussion: how it works, what it does, and whether its process is dialectic. The article discusses and dissects five features of conversation as they emerge from an analysis of Book 7 of the *Republic* (logical, psychological, sequential, epistemological and normative), five avenues by which means dialectic transforms the soul of the dialectician so as to put it in relation to the good.

The four articles dedicated to Aristotle focus more directly on the ethical issues of character and virtues. Christof Rapp discusses the intriguing idea that virtue is a middle state ("the mean relative to us"), which forms an important component of Aristotle's definition of ethical virtue.

Save few exceptions, the moderns have either neglected or severely criticized this topic, which was meant to on the one hand, make moral inquiry sensitive to the actor's specificity (her context and character) and on the other, make sense of the non-rational components of human actions and decisions. Gisela Strikert and Christoph Horn turn to the place of general rules in Aristotelian ethics and the relationship between ethics ad politics. Strikert discusses the concept of universal justice and reads Aristotle's *Politics* as a necessary supplement of the *Ethics*, while Horn focuses essentially on "equity," a virtue that Aristotle deemed on some occasions superior to justice itself. Finally, Jan Szaif turns to the *vexata quaestio* of the meaning and interpretation of Aristotelian *eudaimonia*, a hardly translatable term that speaks for the peculiarity of ancient moral philosophy, within which the virtuous life could not be conceived of as separated from the biological life and the world of non-moral goods. The two last papers are devoted to two related issues, namely happiness and responsibility. David Konstan discusses Epicurus' concept of *hedone* or the goal of life and argues that both pleasure and pain are irrational affects—this makes them effective thermometers of things and behaviors. But social culture creates exogenous beliefs and fears (false passions and prejudices) that become instead an obstacle rather than a guide to happiness. Through Epicurian ethics, Susanne Bobzien proposes another crucial aspect of ancient moral philosophy, namely the issue of the responsibility of the agent on the basis of a deterministic and materialistic world view that is foreign to allocation of praise and blame, as in Christian and modern philosophy. "The function of ethics is rather to give *everyone* a chance to morally improve," that is to understand the character of pleasures, or what makes them conducive to that end instead of distracting from it (p. 229). According to Brad Inwood, the same attitude can be detected in a presocratic thinker such as Empedocles, although he did so by invoking the religious argument of the transmigration of the soul as a punishment for a kind of primordial sin of which the individual was not personally responsible. Inwood's reading of Empedocles' circulation of 'souls' presents us with two interesting messages, on the one hand that of the unity of personhood and actually the continuity of our personal identity through the various stages of our life experience, and on the other that of the unity of our experience with the life of all creatures so as to make us responsible for the whole life of the planet as much as for our life and that of our species.—Nadia Urbinati, *Columbia University*.

HYLAND, Drew A., and MANOUSSAKIS, John Panteleimon, editors. *Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006. xviii + 194 pp. Cloth, \$65.00; paper, \$24.95—This volume arose from a conference at the American College of Greece in Athens in 2003. Some, but not all, essays were presented there. This collection consists of an introduction by editor John P. Manoussakis

and ten essays that more or less concern themselves with Heidegger's influential and controversial reading of the Greeks. Most of the essays write comfortably in Heidegger's idiom and with appreciation of his interpretation of the Greeks. Many of these essays suggest that Heidegger's critique of Plato and/or Aristotle is not entirely adequate to one or both of these philosophers and that Plato and Aristotle in this way or that anticipated Heidegger's critique. Two of the contributors, Francisco Gonzalez and Gregory Fried, take a greater and more critical distance from Heidegger.

Drew Hyland ("First of All Came Chaos") in a discussion of the concept of "chaos" in Hesiod criticizes the standard view that "chaos" means "gap." Rather, on his account, this notion is indicative of the precedence of difference over identity. Hyland asserts that his reading supports Heidegger's view that the Pre-Socratics recognized the ontological difference. He concludes by suggesting that three important concepts in Plato—*chora*, *eros*, and the good—carry this forward, contrary to Heidegger's reading.

Claudia Baracchi ("Contributions to the Coming to be of Greek Beginnings") provides a discussion of Heidegger's treatment in the *Beiträge* of the beginning of philosophy with the Greeks. She claims that Heidegger's "sweeping" account may forget the uniqueness and complexity of the Greek beginning. Plato's concept of the good and the aporetic character of Aristotle's thought are not adequately taken into account by Heidegger. She comments on Heidegger's "luminous insightfulness" and "simultaneous blindness."

Walter Brogan ("The Intractable Interrelationship of *Physis* and *Techne*") wishes to show the reader that behind Heidegger's negative critique of *Machenschaft*, of power and domination, is an attempt to come to terms with Aristotle's distinction of *techne* and *physis*. They should be understood as "complicit" and "reciprocal." *Physis* is dependent on *techne*, and yet Heidegger "restores power to *physis*."

Peter Warnke ("Translating *Innigkeit*") discusses Heidegger's appropriation of Hölderlin and the importance and difficulty of the concept *Innigkeit* which, for Heidegger, names the difference that grants the unity to all things.

Günther Figal ("Heidegger's Philosophy of Language in an Aristotelian Context") argues that there was never a turn to language in Heidegger's development. He was always concerned with language. He finds that Heidegger is an Aristotelian criticizing Aristotle. Language does not deal with "what is the case;" language is itself "what is the case."

William Richardson ("Toward the Future of Truth") discusses Lacan and Heidegger and has little to say about the Greeks, though he asserts that Heidegger relies on Aristotle for a notion of language. This essay suggests that Lacan can help keep Heidegger's philosophy honest.

Dennis Schmidt ("What We Owe the Dead") in his discussion of what we owe the dead, argues against Heidegger that mourning is equally fundamental as anxiety. It opens up "a different sort of finitude." The recognition of the debt to the dead brings us close to the political founding of the community. Art is better than philosophy in remembering and bearing witness to the dead.

Francisco Gonzalez ("Beyond or Beneath Good and Evil?") attends primarily to Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle from 1924 (*Gesamtausgabe* 18). He argues that as Heidegger ontologizes Aristotle's ethical concepts he inverts and perverts their ethical meaning. Virtue becomes reduced to seriousness. The distinction between the virtues of character and the dianoetic virtues is ignored and the former become intellectualized. The only Aristotelian virtues with which Heidegger is concerned is courage and truthfulness. Heidegger's ethics thus lack determinative content. There is no way to distinguish vice from virtue. Heidegger's politics are the consequence.

Gregory Fried ("Back to the Cave") attempts to provide a sketch of a Platonic rejoinder to Heideggerian post-modernism which is historicist and relativist. He finds that Plato anticipated the criticisms of post-modernism. He argues that Plato had no theory of the forms and that Heidegger takes insufficiently seriously Socratic ignorance, our "cave" status. Socrates was a zetetic skeptic. In Plato there are intimations of transcendence but not knowledge.

John Sallis ("Plato's Other Beginning") asks the question whether Plato in founding metaphysics also destabilizes it. He looks primarily at *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, and he reports that Heidegger told him in 1975 that he Heidegger no longer maintained the views of the essay. Sallis suggests that one can find both beginnings in Plato, the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical. For the latter he directs us to the *Republic* and its treatment of the good (517b) and Socrates' response to Glaucon in Book 7 (531-32) which Sallis asserts means that truth is always bonded to concealment. According to Sallis, the myth at the end of the *Republic* installs *lethe* everywhere.

As is obvious from this brief summary, this book provides a variety of perspectives on Heidegger's reading of the Greeks. A common theme is that, though we can learn much from Heidegger about the Greeks including their relevance to contemporary thought and life, Heidegger's account is not adequate to the richness and depth of Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger philosophizes with a hammer.—Robert Dostal, *Bryn Mawr College*.

KENNA, Constance and BATES, Stanley, *Walter Cerf: A Personal Odyssey*. Middlebury, Vermont: College Museum of Art, 2007. 269 pp.—The claims of beauty upon the serious attention of philosophers have glanced like pebbles across the surface of the darker waters of the 20th century. The life of philosopher, art and antiques dealer and philanthropist Walter Cerf illustrates the point. Assembled in a handsome volume, Kenna and Bates provide a scholarly look at a life in the crosscurrents of the great political intellectual conflicts of the past century and a life journey across many boundaries. As they write, in his biographical sketch:

Walter's was a life in and of the twentieth century. When he was in his twenties, the direction of his quite accomplished young life in Europe was altered irrevocably by the rise of Hitler and National Socialism. Forced to leave Europe, he sought new possibilities in North America, but his circuitous route encompassed over ten shifts in direction in less than ten years. Following more moves after World War II, he finally found permanent employment at Brooklyn College, but not until he was over sixty did his odyssey really end, when he settled in Vermont. Unlike Ulysses, he did not return to his native country. Fortunately for the many Vermont organizations and institutions that benefited from his generosity, Walter Cerf made Vermont his new home and honored his new neighbors with his gifts. Walter Cerf—a true citizen of the world—whose lifelong quest for learning was only exceeded by his wish to share his gifts with others. His generosity and caring touched the lives of more people than he could ever imagine (posthumous toast for Cerf's 95th birthday) (p. 43).

Cerf was a student of philosophy in Germany when the great thinkers who came to shape 20th century philosophy were alive and still actively creative. Husserl had written most of his major works when Cerf was a student, and he came of age with Heidegger, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Frege, Godel, and Russell.

To his credit, Cerf did not become a partisan of one of these emerging schools, but remained a generous reader and commentator on all. His aesthetic sense enabled him to move conceptually in and among these competing philosophies. In an academic climate in which partisanship is key to success, Cerf's intellectual contributions have not been in the mainstream. This is a loss, which this book helps to correct.

Perhaps the most satisfying rewards a reader takes away from encountering this book is the opportunity to re-enter a vital and creative period of thought. Cerf is particularly well suited to the role of Virgil on this journey because, as his biographers note, he was part of this creative ferment and a gifted writer. Although English was not his native language, he mastered the lithe, taunt, and concise lines of English to present complex ideas with clarity and wit.

As an illustration of his perspective and style, Cerf's essay "Logical Positivism and Existentialism" attempts to show that logical positivism, phenomenology, and existentialism can learn from each other and come together in a common dialogue. Cerf writes,

The main issue, the truly basic issue between phenomenology and logical positivism is: What is verifiability? What is acceptable evidence? Is this issue between phenomenology and logical positivism solvable? I believe that a meaningful discussion is in principle possible and that in the end phenomenology and logical positivism can work together, supplementing each other, within the same orbit, although on different levels, logical positivism as logic of the language of science, phenomenology as analysis of objects as constituted in the stream of consciousness (p. 60).

Cerf's satiric wit is reserved for existentialists, who he describes as that "host of mediocrities who pour out their soul in books on Man and God and Death and Love and Time and Nothing in particular" (p. 64). And yet, Cerf argues that the "antagonism" between existentialism and positivism "could indeed be used as reconciliation" (p. 63).

What Cerf holds up as the beacon for these competing schools of thought is a larger philosophical tradition—"what we need is to be re-awakened to those intellectual virtues—to 'the existential value' of

those virtues—that form the glory of the Western tradition in philosophy; reflection on method and evidence, analysis of meaning, clarity of thought, and discipline of communication” (p. 69).

In a new century once again on the verge of ideological and cultural warfare, the life and thought of Walter Cerf are all the more relevant. His ability to transcend the political and intellectual antagonisms of his day, to develop cognitive empathy, an aesthetic sense for the essential ideas bridging conflicting systems, and his ultimate gift for generosity in thought and life are examples critically needed.—Scott T. Massey, *Indianapolis*.

KONSTAN, David. *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2006. 422 pp.—This work has as its starting point the author’s presentations in the prestigious Robson Lectures at the Victoria College of the University of Toronto (Autumn 2001). David Konstan seems to have intended his work as a kind of thorough rereading and re-interpretation of some key moral and psychological concepts in the writings of Aristotle and in the literature of Classical Greece. In the end the work may prove to be less “revolutionary” and more useful as a deepening or bolstering of issues that were on the whole taken for granted, often without serious analysis.

The procedure resorted to is the following. Konstan takes words such as “fear,” “shame,” “gratitude,” or “pity” (in fact a total of twelve) and points to a number of significant contexts in which they are used, examining at the same time the way in which these terms were and are habitually translated or understood. He expresses sometimes agreement and sometimes disagreement with these interpretations and understandings. Most important, and I am hard pressed to think of any scholar who would not draw some profit from these examinations, Konstan goes into painstaking detail in order to find nuances, variants, alternatives, and distinctions in the usage of the Greek terms, and their families of meaning. Almost every chapter begins with a detailed reference to Aristotle (usually and primarily the *Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*), and proceeds thereafter to find modes of usage of the respective term in other Greek authors. These are taken usually from drama, but poetry (the Homeric corpus above all) is often resorted to, and once in a while even some Latin authors are mentioned.

The result is on the whole highly satisfactory, and has the merit of helping us to plunge in the lexical and, indeed, intellectual universe of the civilization of Classical Antiquity and to look at it with increased carefulness. (Let me just mention that notes, indexes, and bibliographies cover no fewer than 180 pp. of the book.)

To take one example, “anger” (pp. 41–76). Here Konstan underlies Aristotle’s sharp distinction between “anger and hatred or enmity” (p. 47), the relatively limited number of causes of anger (p. 46), the

consequences of anger in response or even revenge, the negative sides of anger, including excessive anger (p. 70) and other issues yet. These and other sections are strengthened by abundant secondary sources. (I was, however, surprised that in the chapter on jealousy, or envy [pp. 219–43] fundamental and well-established interpreters such as Schoeck and Girard are missing altogether.)

Are there any conclusions? Here I have to be a little more ambivalent. On the one hand we learn quite a bit about the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, specifically about the mode in which they mutually influence each other. Furthermore, the examples adduced by Konstan in his demonstrations are far from banal. Thus, he adduces usages picked from somewhat obscure plays, or at least texts that are not often remembered or anthologized: Euripides' *The Children of Hercules* would be one good example among many (p. 194).

On the other hand, the short chapter of "conclusions" at the very end (pp. 259–62) raises doubts. It proclaims, somewhat cavalierly, that the whole investigation demonstrates convincingly the "competitive" character of Greek society, and thus, implicitly, its resemblance with our own society. Konstan says that Aristotle evokes a world that is "highly competitive," "intensely aware of degrees of power," characterized by "emulation or rivalrousness" (p. 259). This is at best partially true, as Konstan (a little grudgingly, it seemed to me) ultimately admits. Or, even better said, it is true about a limited number of Greek cities and limited historical periods. Aristotle's own ethical background and ethical intentions were not dominated by competitiveness and they were in no case a blueprint for strife. Both Plato and Aristotle were on the search for harmony, stability, common sense, and balance. The great tragics themselves, irrespective of the subject-matter chosen, ultimately praised reconciliation and justice. We do not have to return to Winckelmann in order to recognize such rather obvious facts. This is not to minimize, or even to criticize, the useful spadework provided by Konstan, his conscientiousness, his impressive learning, and scholarly judiciousness.—Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America*.

LEPORE, Ernest, and LUDWIG, Kirk. *Donald Davidson; Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. ix + 446 pp. Cloth, \$74.00.—The concern of the present authors is to provide the reader with a critical and rigorous historical reconstruction of Davidson's theory of meaning and philosophy of language, and the consequences he draws for the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology. There are two broad themes in Davidson's philosophy of language. First, there is his attempt to construct a compositional theory of meaning for a natural language using a 'Tarski-style (absolute) truth theory' that demonstrates how we understand 'semantically complex expressions on the basis of understanding semantically primitive ones and their combinations' (p. 2). The other theme concerns the role of the stance of the radical interpreter of another speaker, an interpreter

whose evidence is confined to what can be observed regarding the speaker's intention and meaning from the other's behavior alone, and which excludes any information about the speaker's linguistic expressions and their meaning and any knowledge about the contents of his beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes (p. 2).

The text is divided into three major parts and an introduction. The Introduction is simply excellent. It provides an overview of Davidson's work as a whole and its broad implications for epistemology and philosophy of language. There is a section of 'Keynotes' on such themes as compositionality, meaning, and the rejection of Platonism. Finally, there is a synopsis of their text which neatly lays out what they claim to accomplish in each part.

Part I lays out the history of the program of adopting a Tarski-style truth theory as a basis for a compositional meaning theory. They describe the broad outlines of how to set up such a compositional meaning theory. They show how it is necessary and sufficient for a theory of meaning that one be able to match sentences in the object language with sentences in the language of the theory, the metalanguage. Of special interest here is their description of how some commentators have claimed that in using a truth theory to do the work of a meaning theory that Davidson was abandoning the traditional concept of meaning 'in favor of (a) more austere . . . theory of reference,' an interpretation the authors dub 'the Replacement Theory' (p. 92). In chapters 6 and 7 of Part I, they argue against the Replacement Theory, and in particular show how two objections to the project of using a recursive truth theory as a meaning theory, the *extensionality* and *determination* problems, can be overcome.

Part II elucidates the central role that radical interpretation plays in linking Davidson's compositional meaning theory for a natural language with broader issues concerning what it is to be a linguistic agent. Some of the issues dealt with here are (i) how to describe the project of radical interpretation, (ii) the role of the Tarski-style truth theory, (iii) the Principle of Charity, (iv) the role of the theory of agency, (v) the objective indeterminacy of interpretation theories, (vi) Davidson's unified theory of meaning and action, and finally his infamous claim that "there is no such thing as a language." In Chapter 17, they argue that this latter claim is unexceptionable when what Davidson means by a 'language' is appropriately qualified. Significantly, they conclude Part II by arguing that Davidson has failed to justify a priori, as he must, that radical interpretation can succeed for any speaker.

Part III, Metaphysics and Epistemology, is largely critical of the conclusions that Davidson draws for these areas on the basis of the project of radical interpretation; and conversely, that none of the arguments here succeed in showing, a priori, that radical interpretation is possible. In particular, Davidson has not shown that there cannot be radically different conceptual schemes; that he has not shown how the standpoint of the radical interpreter can explain first person authority and knowledge; nor has he justified the inscrutability of reference; and finally, that he has not shown how radical interpretation is a necessary condition for the concept of objectivity.

In summary, this is a rigorous and thorough historical reconstruction of Davidson's theory of meaning and his work in metaphysics and epistemology based on it for which this review provides only the barest outline. Along the way, it successfully dispatches two notorious misinterpretations of Davidson, namely that he abandoned the traditional theory of meaning as hopelessly confused and that his claim "there is no such thing as language" is to be taken as an unqualified rejection of the existence of language. Their most important central criticism is that the project of radical interpretation has not been shown to be possible, and hence his consequent metaphysical and epistemological claims remain without sufficient support.—Mark Starr, *Spring Hill College*.

MANSFIELD, Harvey C. *Manliness*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. xiv+ 289 pp. Cloth, \$27.50; paper, \$17.00—Harvey Mansfield defends manliness, which he thinks is wrongly disdained in our "gender-neutral" society. Since manliness is most pronounced in males, any esteem for the former would seem to imply privilege for the latter, and such privilege today is unacceptable. Our society denies the claim that natural differences between men and women are significant enough to justify distinct roles for the sexes. But if manliness is indeed natural, Mansfield argues, then we must account for it, we must in some manner provide for its salutary, rather than destructive, employment. After outlining the problem of the gender-neutral society in the opening chapter, Mansfield argues in the next that modern science confirms the existence of meaningful natural differences between the sexes, such as the greater tendency of males to behave aggressively and to think abstractly. But science does not appreciate the relation between the discrete elements of manliness, which is to say that science does not understand just what human nature is. Aggression and abstraction, for example, cohere as manly assertiveness, the public making of a point and the defense of it as the truth and as one's own. In chapter three, Mansfield looks to poetry rather than science to reveal this manly man as a distinct type. There is much to recommend his approach; his commentaries on the literary greats from Homer to Hemingway are perhaps the most engaging parts of the book. While some critics may quibble with his claims about the fixity of human nature, his account of the centrality of manliness in human affairs is persuasive.

But Mansfield's defense of manliness is not unequivocal. In chapter four, he explains that untutored manliness is not a virtue, that it can be as bad as it is good. Most philosophers are men, but so are most tyrants. This reflects the twofold character of manliness: it is both reasonable and prideful. When pride overwhelms reason, manliness becomes what Mansfield calls "manly nihilism," the assertion of all meaning and purpose out of the unfettered will. Modern philosophy, he argues, unleashed manly assertiveness from its age-old confines in the moral order sanctioned by God and nature. This manly nihilism is exemplified by

Nietzsche's notion of the will-to-power, but is also implicit in Theodore Roosevelt's "willpower manliness." Manly idealism, with its attempt to transcend natural limits, prefigures manly nihilism.

Manliness is not something to which we merely should defer, but rather something for which we must provide guidance. According to Mansfield, such guidance in no small measure must come from women. He adheres to the bromide that women naturally are the guarantors of morality; womanly moderation is the natural accompaniment of manly assertion. Yet feminism, schooled in the willful manliness of Nietzschean philosophy, undermined the old moral rules rooted in the natural sex differences. Indeed, in chapter five Mansfield argues that feminism, or at least radical feminism, is itself a certain form of manly assertion, a womanly form. This is seen most clearly in its principal claim against the old idea of nature: that we can remake ourselves as a matter of creative will. This claim is clearest in the work of iconic feminist writer Simone de Beauvoir. The revelation of this manly character of feminism is the chief irony of the book.

To be sure, Mansfield may be criticized for his rather narrow view of feminism (he barely mentions any feminist writers of the last generation). But he appears less concerned with feminism as such than with the larger question of the relation of philosophy and politics. Manly nihilism is the result of philosophy that has, in the spirit of manly transcendence, undone itself. Indeed, in chapter six Mansfield argues that modern liberalism, with its emphasis upon security and prosperity over against risk and nobility, prepared the way for men's acceptance of the gender-neutral society. Liberalism asserted in manly fashion new grounds for social and political order. He leads us to reconsider the womanly character of philosophy rightly understood, in particular womanly moderation of manly assertiveness, in contrast to the too-manly character of modern thought. Even though all the great philosophers have been men, they have not been typical manly men. After all, Plato's Socrates claimed that his principal teacher was a woman. It may be that Mansfield intends his overt critique of feminism to be read in this ironic light.

In the final chapter of the book he makes most explicit his defense of womanliness. He argues against a simple complementarity between the sexes, whether in feminist or Rousseauan form, in favor of a mutual transcendence of bodily difference through contested opinion. Instead of repressing or ignoring sex differences, Mansfield would celebrate them, keeping in mind the necessarily messy relation between manly assertion and womanly moderation. He concludes the book with an endorsement of the gender-neutral society, but one which appreciates more fully sex differences as they are privately manifested. In this way he aims to recover something of the classical view, which both respects and is wary of manly men.—Scot J. Zentner, *California State University, San Bernardino*.

MARCUS, Solomon. *Paradigme universale II. Pornind de la un zimbet*. Pitești: Paralela 45, 2006. 319 pp.

and

NITA, Adrian. *Temp si idealism. Metafizica timpului la Kant si Leibniz*. Bucharest: Paideia, 2005. 295 pp.—Current Romanian philosophy is abundant and diverse, although with no structural clarity. If better known by Western colleagues it could provide interesting contributions. Two recent works may serve as useful examples.

The work of Nita appears to have been originally a macro-dissertation at the University of Poitiers. (The author had previously published a few other studies about Leibniz, along with translations into Romanian from Leibniz, as well as of Gilson's book on Thomism.) His is just one of the surprisingly numerous approaches to Leibniz encountered in Romanian intellectual life. Nita attempts to strike a judicious balance between the theories of Eberhard, who had tried to demonstrate that most of Kant's theories can already be found, in one form or another, in Leibniz's writings, and the more widely accepted view that Kant's critique of Leibniz (specifically on the understanding of time) shows a clear incompatibility between the two. The main hermeneutic strategy of Nita is to refuse the limitation of his analysis to Kant's "Durchbruch" in the *Critiques*, but instead to look at the genesis and evolution of Kantian time conceptions throughout his career, including, of course, his early works. Nita reaches the conclusion that there is a *continuity* between the two kinds of idealism, particularly if we look more insistently at Leibniz's idealist project than at his ontological premises.

The most original contributions of Adrian Nita are probably to be found in the third section of his book (pp. 207–61) where he carefully argues that Leibniz's theory of time does not contradict the theory of liberty put forward by Kant. He also strenuously emphasizes that the widely accepted interpretation of the identity between Christian Wolff and

niz is an error, since Wolff overlooks many Leibnizian principles. On the whole, the results of Nita's research tend to depict a Kantian system that is closer to Classical and Medieval metaphysics than is generally known.

While Adrian Nita is a young and relatively unknown scholar, Solomon Marcus (who recently celebrated his 80th anniversary) is widely recognized as a major figure of Romanian intellectual life and is well-known in many countries of the world. He is primarily a brilliant mathematician of international visibility, but the interesting thing is that Dr. Marcus also consistently tried to construct himself as a "universal (or 'Renaissance' as used to be said) man," by pursuing valuable studies in fields such as structural poetics, analysis of art, and philosophy proper. He is not a Leibnizian, but the central idea of his book is that of "dissipation" or "dissemination." Marcus pursues this concept in a great variety of domains of knowledge. Thus, important sections of the book have to do with the intersection between semiotics/linguistics with mathematical models, others deal (less consistently) with episodes from the history of literature and art.

I regard, however, as the most ambitious and original part of the book pages 100 to 197, "Paradigms of Imprecision," where Prof. Marcus brings together conclusions of recent research on "fractals," chaos, inter-disciplinarity, computer science, and other fields. There he argues in a convincing and elegant way that imperfection, uncertainty, ambiguity, and approximation be considered key concepts of our modes of cognition (not least in the "hard sciences"), as well as strategies for achieving a valid image of the universe. Very importantly, the author's focus is on analogies and mutual supports between the humanities (and artistic/literary achievement) and physics/mathematics, rather than a resort to the social sciences. For him, the presence of beauty in mathematics and in avant-garde physical theorizing is incontestable and cognate to the functioning of the humanities. Spiritual paradox, metaphor, and symbol are organic continuations of "ambiguity," "imprecision," or "graduality" as used by mathematicians. "The discussion of chaos has provided a renewed impulse to the move toward inter-disciplinarity" he says (p. 167).

Professor Marcus differs from the majority of Romanian and, indeed of 20th century Continental philosophers, in this important respect: he is admirably capable to provide a credible collaboration between uncertainty and strict, disciplined thinking. There is little doubt in my mind that, all in all, Solomon Marcus is one of the prominent thinkers of our time.—Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America*.

McINERNY, Ralph. *Praeambula fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers*. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006. ix + 313 pp.—At a time when agnosticism or outright atheism seems to be the order of the day in academic circles on both sides of the Atlantic, McInerny reminds us that such need not be the case. The *praeambula fidei* of the title is the classical learning that was in place before the advent of Christianity. Acknowledging that "by and large, philosophers have become professionally hostile to the possibility of proving the existence of God," McInerny proposes as an antidote a return to the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas. Although the psalmist may write "The fool has said in his heart there is no God," Aquinas maintains that the existence of God is not self-evident to us. Thomas will say that human intelligence, quite apart from revelation, can reason to the existence of God and discern something of His nature and thus prepare the human intellect to acknowledge the truths provided by divine revelation. Unlike Kant, who is willing to posit the existence of God, or Kierkegaard, who is willing to leap into the dark, McInerny, like his mentor Thomas, holds that belief must be firmly anchored in natural intelligence.

McInerny devotes a third of the volume to a defense of the metaphysics of Aquinas, distinguishing between Thomas the philosopher and commentator on Aristotle and Thomas the theologian. Twentieth-century Thomists, such as Etienne Gilson, Henri de Lubac, and Marie-

Dominique Chenu, are subject to criticism by McInerny, not for their lack of respect for Thomas as a Catholic theologian but for ignoring his role as a philosopher, who as a philosopher is able to develop an Aristotelian-like natural theology independent of the faith. Speaking of some of his contemporaries, McInerny writes, "There is a tendency to 'theologize' St. Thomas in a manner reminiscent of Gilson and to suggest that Thomas cannot be understood even on such matters as the moral virtues by the mere philosopher." Christian philosophy for McInerny is more of a sociological description of the work of a class of philosophers who are Christian than a discipline in its own right. To think and to argue from the Christian faith is to engage in theology, not philosophy. The preamble that McInerny wishes to preserve is that of a natural theology accessible to all. That preamble consists in what can be known of God's existence and nature apart from faith or revelation. That enterprise, he insists, is open to believer and nonbeliever.

This book is not for everyone, but for those interested in the vagaries of 20th-century Thomism, it is indispensable. The reader will find interesting discussions of Gilson's attack on Thomas de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, the great 16th-century Dominican, DeLubac's similar criticism of Cajetan, and the negative reception of Marie-Dominique Chenu's book, *Une école de théologie*. With skills honed as a novelist as well as a philosopher, McInerny manages to recreate some of the excitement generated by the intellectual heavyweights of the early decades of the Thomistic revival. From records available to him, McInerny brings to life some of the discussions that took place within the French Thomistic Society of the 1920s and within Maritan's famous *Cercle d'études thomistes* at Meudon. Those issues of primary concern to disciples of Aristotle and Aquinas in the early decades of the last century retain in McInerny's retelling their compelling interest.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

MENDOLA, Joseph. *Goodness and Justice: A Consequentialist Moral Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 326 pp. Cloth, \$80.00—As novel as it is unfashionable, *Goodness and Justice* seeks to evade certain intuitive objections to classical utilitarianism through the unlikely marriage of a hedonic conception of the good and an egalitarian conception of distributive justice. With a nod to two often-divergent approaches in contemporary analytic ethics, Mendola structures his ambitious project around meeting two tests: provide a "direct argument" that gives a "transcendental vindication" of his moral claims and show how such a position is consonant with our "commonsense intuitions" about certain concrete cases.

Part one develops Mendola's unique form of consequentialism, Multiple-Act Consequentialism, or MAC. A distinctive feature of MAC is its view that the basic units of consideration are "atomic agents" or brief periods of enduring persons' lives. According to this theory, each of us is part of a multiplicity of overlapping group agents (p. 43). Thus the

task of MAC is the direct consequentialist evaluation of the options of the group agents of which we are constituents. When there are conflicts between different group acts, we should "defect" from group acts with good consequences only if we can achieve better consequences on our own. Though more complex than classical utilitarianism, Mendola convincingly argues that MAC is better able to "evade" three common objections to act consequentialism: namely, that it is too demanding, too permissive, and that it fails to respect special obligations.

Much of the remainder of the book is dedicated to developing the second element of the just good theory, what he calls the Hedonic Maximin Principle or HMP. Specifically, part two has the unenviable task of showing that pleasure is the only basic normative value, while part three is concerned with the distribution of that pleasure in a way that "skews our concern toward the benefits of the worst-off among us" (p. 5). In brief, HMP implies that "one outcome is better than another when the worst-off are better off, and also that relative wellbeing is, as the classical utilitarians suggested, a straightforward matter of pleasure and pain" (p. 6).

Mendola's hedonism is clearly an heir to Bentham's in that it, for instance, rejects qualitative differences between different forms of pleasure and pain (p. 172 ff.). However, he breaks with Bentham in rejecting psychological hedonism. Beyond the inadequate justification for rejecting qualitative concerns, one of the most troubling aspects of Mendola's hedonism is its insistence that pleasure and pain are the only "unconstituted natural normative properties found in the world" (p. 139). According to such a view, pain is an actual property on the surface of a Cuisinart blade in exactly the sense that yellow is a property of a school bus (p. 177 ff.). Mendola's claim that such a position is in keeping with "the most naive and natural human conception of the world" is far from compelling (p. 180).

Yet even if one were to grant a basic status to hedonic value, the author fails to give sufficient reasons why pleasure is the *only* basic value. His rejection of health as a basic value is characteristic. After noting that many non-human entities have healthy states, he eliminates it from consideration because the "dominant intuition" is that only "things with psychologies . . . are of genuine normative significance" (p. 125). For one interested in direct arguments and transcendental vindication, this sort of argument is particularly disappointing. Although Mendola's defense of hedonism falls short of convincing this reader, he was nevertheless successful in achieving one of his primary goals: to demonstrate that hedonism cannot be dismissed with the wave of a hand as radically counterintuitive.

The potential excesses of his consequentialism and hedonism are ultimately kept in check by the maximin structure of HMP. Whereas classical utilitarianism is concerned merely with maximizing pleasure, HMP is also concerned with the distribution of that pleasure in such a way that it gives greatest concern to the worst-off among us. It is in this way that Mendola seeks to respond to the chronic problem of distributional inequality that is usually the result of a pure consequentialism.

One of the more promising aspects of Mendola's position is its unusual focus not on individual lives, but on group agents and momentary bits of lives. No individual is properly understood apart from its relationship to the multiplicity of overlapping groups of which it finds itself a part. Yet, unfortunately, this recognition is not accompanied by the embrace of an organic metaphysical position that emphasizes the inter-relatedness of individuals. Indeed, Mendola not only explicitly rejects the notion that organic unities have any normative status (p. 203), he refuses to defend a single, coherent metaphysical position that would justify his hedonism. Despite its apparent difficulties, Mendola's *Goodness and Justice* is to be applauded for its daring attempt to simultaneously resurrect hedonism and respond to chronic shortcomings of consequentialism by making it more attentive to distributive justice.—Brian G. Henning, *Mount St. Mary's University*.

MOHR, Richard D. *God and Forms in Plato*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2005. xxv + 279 pp. Paper, \$28.00.—This is a re-edition of a collection of essays originally published as *The Platonic Cosmology* (Brill, 1985). The new edition contains (in a revised form) all the original essays, to which have been added four previously published papers as well as a new preface and conclusion.

Professor Mohr aims to explain "how, for Plato, God makes the world" (ix). He appropriately opens with the *Timaeus*, to which he devotes roughly half his book; but he also writes essays on most of the 'cosmological dialogues,' including the *Laws*, *Statesman*, *Sophist*, *Phaedrus*, *Philebus* and the *Republic*. According to Mohr, the *Timaeus* should not be read as a myth or a merely rhetorical display of speeches; rather, it contains Plato's serious views about cosmology and should be read literally, if also judiciously. Mohr characterizes Plato's doctrine as a "dualistic unitarianism," meaning that God and the Forms have complementary yet distinct roles in the process of creation (xv, n. 22). More specifically, the Platonic 'Demiurge' introduces (greater) order into the pre-existing and (partially) chaotic materials by using the Forms as templates; looking off to the Forms, he introduces "immanent standards" into the phenomenal realm. These standards are at once "instances of the Forms" while remaining "mired in the vagaries of the corporeal;" they enable us to lay hold of "true opinions" about the phenomena (54, 37). The role of the Platonic Demiurge is thus primarily epistemological, not moral or esthetic: he improves the world by infusing it with standards, thereby making it "more intelligible" (xxi).

Mohr regards Plato's doctrine of Forms as essentially true, even though it is characterized by "paradox" (79–80). All existing beings, he argues, ultimately depend "for their identification and intelligibility" upon the Forms taken as standards (40). Each Form is unique and differs, in particular, from every other Form. Remarkably, Mohr's Forms do not possess *any* of the specific characteristics that they enable us to identify (and understand) in other things. The Form of 'Animal,' for ex-

ample, does not possess *in any way* any of the characteristics belonging to the living animals. To hold otherwise, Mohr argues, would create a problem of infinite regress: each Form would then become (also) an instance of the class of things the members of which all share (a) common characteristic(s); but since to each class there corresponds a Form, a second Form, over and above the first, would have to be set over this 'expanded' class, which would itself also belong to the expanded class as it would itself possess the characteristic(s) in question, etc. Better to hold, then, that the Forms are "fundamentally individuals," mysterious beings which can receive no specific predicate (42). Mohr is aware that this 'Neoplatonic' view is open to weighty objections. For one, it seems to obliterate all distinctions between the Forms. In fact, if the Forms are transcendent beings, completely unsullied by the characteristics of phenomenal beings, aren't they beyond our ability to speak of them? Aren't they, as such, unknowable? Mohr insists that the Forms *are* knowable, though not through discursive speech; they can be known through a process of "unmediated acquaintance" that yields recognition "without doubt": each Form, being grasped with the mind's eye, is simply "taken in" as an individual (43-4, 49, 248). But isn't this sort of acquaintance insufficient to yield *knowledge*, which presupposes "the ability of the knower to give a *logos*, an account" (243)? Mohr grants the objection, but he has a ready reply: Plato has "a very loose notion" of what counts as a *logos* (*id.*). In keeping with this reply, Mohr's own explanation of the Forms moves chiefly through images and "extended metaphors" (239). He also refers to "the *truths* of Platonism" mainly as "Plato's cosmological *commitments*" (239, 240; for example, ix, xvii, 36, 42, 149, my emphasis).

Mohr's book is at its most useful when he points to the differences between the various cosmological dialogues. Why is the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* hampered by the recalcitrance of his materials, for example, whereas the God of *Laws X* is apparently not? Why is there no mention of the 'doctrine of recollection' anywhere in the *Republic*? In explaining these differences, however, Mohr often puts the interpretative stress, it seems to me, in the wrong places. The myth of the *Statesman*, for example, is not meant "to explain the proximate efficient cause of the reverse circuit of the universe," as no myth could possibly explain this; rather, it is intended to cast some light on who the (human) statesman is, and to illuminate the (apparently non-providential) order in which he lives and rules (153). More generally, Mohr remains insufficiently aware that Plato makes use of rhetoric in all the dialogues, and that the need for rhetoric is especially acute when he discusses cosmology: his own teacher Socrates was executed, after all, for replacing 'Zeus' with 'Ethereal Vortex' (*Clouds* 378ff). Mohr tends to approach the Platonic dialogue, however, as he would any modern book on cosmology. He is thus liable to see tight arguments where Plato sees "a mixture pretty near to child's play" (*Statesman* 268d8 ff).—Eric Buzzetti, *Concordia University*.

NEMOIANU, Virgil. *Imperfection and Defeat: the Role of Aesthetic Imagination in Human Society*. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2006. 150 pp.—This volume may be best described as a philosophy of history. An introductory first chapter is followed by chapters entitled, “The Dialectic of Literature and Religion,” “The Dialectic of Literature and History,” “Literature as Allegory of Human Persecution and Survival,” and “East/Central Europe as a Confirmatory Case Study.” Virgil Nemoianu, the William J. Byron Distinguished Professor of Literature at The Catholic University of America, derives the title of his book from Paul Claudel’s conviction that imperfect human nature is designed not to obtain victory but to ward off defeat.

In its opening pages, Nemoianu makes a distinction between what is regarded as history and what is commonly thought of as literature, and then discusses the relationship between the two creative forms. Certainly the writing of history resembles what we call literature. Nemoianu quotes his fellow countryman, the Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga, as saying that he wished he had “more literary talent, so that he could be a greater historian.” The relationship between the empirical and the historical record is of particular interest to Nemoianu. He writes, “When we look at what melts into thin air after a century or two, we find it is the ‘hard facts.’ Models and hypotheses have a better chance of survival.” The allegiance to Marxism, he claims, is not based on empirical data or on a purported class struggle but on emotional and imaginative factors. Nemoianu acknowledges that literary endeavor is fraught with ambiguity, but then he asks, “Are details principal?” With A. G. Baumgarten, he notes that any gain in distinctness is often accompanied by a loss of fullness and variety. Through the centuries, the timely, often political texts of one period become “literature” in another. “Vitruvius and Pliny, Burton and Darwin, even Newton and Kant as well as Burke and Marx, began to acquire a literary status as soon as their practical effectiveness began to decline.”

Speaking of what he calls the “anarchic destructive impulse” of contemporary deconstructions, Nemoianu writes, “It is better to accept frankly the nature of literature and come to terms with it, rather than build huge clunky machineries for hiding and compensating unpleasant realities.” The modification of literary canons for the benefit of social purposes he finds absurd. Having spent his early years under a dictatorial regime in his native land, Nemoianu is acutely aware of the dangers wrought by political attempts to control artistic content. The memory of the banning and burning of “degenerate” art by the fascist and nationalist regimes of the twentieth century should remain as a guide. Progress in art and literature is not like progress in other areas of human life: “Literature and art do not fit in with human order; they partake of irrationality, and randomness, and surprise; rejection and dispersion are part of their very essence.”

The unique contribution of this volume may be found in chapter four where Nemoianu addresses what he calls the “common ethos” of East Central Europe, that is, the geographic territory that today consists of Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the former Yugoslavia, and Romania. Given his encyclopedic knowledge of European history and literature, Nemoianu finds it easy to recognize a common cultural

identity that distinguishes East Central from Western Europe. He is impressed by the reverence for science and culture that he finds in Eastern Europe, something he takes to be an expression of a common ethos, one that values learning above gainful labor, common, too, in the sense that it permeates all levels of society from the poorest through the middle classes to the aristocracy. He gives an account of the ideological origins and manner of dissemination of this ethos and then chronicles its decline and "its unexpected survival/revival in North America." This broad and deep sociological survey is used to illustrate the theme of the volume, "imperfection and defeat" as reflected in the literature of a people bound by a common ethos.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

O'MEARA, Dominic J. *Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. 264 pp. Paper, \$45.00—With the publication of the paperback edition of this book, Oxford University Press has made readily available a monograph that covers a period of political philosophy many would have assumed did not exist, namely Neoplatonic political philosophy from Plotinus to the Arabic philosopher al-Farabi. All too familiar is Willy Theiler's famous dictum that Neoplatonism presents a "*Plato dimidiatus*," that is, a version of Platonic philosophy that has been deprived of its political and, to a lesser degree, of its ethical components. Dominic O'Meara, however, provides evidence that, far from being a-political, Neoplatonists did engage in developing philosophical theories of government and the good life in the footsteps of Plato.

O'Meara's approach is not chronological but thematic. This approach is partly due to the scarcity of Neoplatonic sources on political philosophy, which poses the major challenge for O'Meara's enterprise. He tries to reconstruct what has been lost by collecting remarks of a political character scattered throughout Neoplatonic literature and arranging them with the few complete texts that survived; interestingly, these are mostly of Christian provenance. In arguing that Neoplatonic philosophy was not primarily a philosophy of otherworldliness, he orders his material around the key Platonic concept of assimilation to god or divinization (*homoiôsis theô*), distinguishing two aspects: divinization of the soul (part I) and divinization of the state (part II). These two aspects correspond with the ascent and descent of the philosopher, which Plato describes in *Republic* VII. The final part of the book is dedicated to the reception of Neoplatonic political thought in Christianity and Islam (part III).

After presenting in the Introduction (pp. 1–26) his methodological approach and a useful survey of relevant Neoplatonic philosophers from Plotinus until the end of the Neoplatonic Schools in the 6th and 7th centuries AD, O'Meara proceeds to the first goal of Neoplatonic political philosophy, the divinization of the soul (part I; pp. 27–68). The starting-

point for this concept is the famous passage in Plato's *Theaetetus* (176a–b), where it is suggested that relief from the necessary evils of the human condition is possible only if the soul flees. This flight is, O'Meara argues rightly, not to be considered as 'Weltflucht' or otherworldliness, but as an attempt to render the soul divine through virtue. Beginning with Plotinus, Neoplatonists developed a scale of different levels of virtue, one of which is the level of "political virtues." Political virtues govern the relationship of reason on the one hand and the body with its desires on the other. While for Plotinus political virtues seem to be restricted to the relation of the individual soul towards the body it inhabits, in later Neoplatonism they are extended to the realm of political life as well, in so far as they govern the relations of citizens to each other and to political authority. Although political virtues rank lower than, for example, cathartic or theoretical virtues, they cannot be skipped; on the contrary, they are necessary as a preparatory step towards the higher virtues. O'Meara asks where political virtues could be acquired given the corruption of the political environment in late antiquity. It was in the philosophical schools, he argues, where with the help of a didactically structured canon of readings of Platonic dialogues the student would be guided towards an ascent of the soul. On the extent to which this philosophical education involved practical elements, the sources are silent.

The divinization of the state (part II; pp. 69–139) consists also in a form of assimilation to god. Even as god, the Good and source of all being, exercises providence in the universe, so must the philosopher, having perfected his soul, care providentially for his fellow citizens. This care consists in prudent legislation, following the principles of Plato's *Laws* (or an even less ambitious model) rather than the idealistic *Republic*. The aim of any philosophically-inspired reform is the divinization of all citizens in accordance with their capacities, in view of which religion plays an important role as both socially integrating and symbolically instructing, an aspect that was to gain importance as Christians and, later on, Muslims appropriated Neoplatonic political philosophy.

The final part of the book discusses selectively the reception of Neoplatonic political thought in Christianity and Islam (part III; 141–97). In a way, this part is the most exciting, because we can observe, as it were, Neoplatonic political ideas in action. Eusebius in the *Praise of Constantine* extols the emperor as a Christian version of a philosopher-king: As the philosopher-king imitates the Idea of the Good, so Constantine imitates Christ. Augustine, however, at first attracted by Neoplatonism, rejects in the *City of God* any pretensions to divinize citizens by means of the state. It is Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita who integrates the concept of divinization into a complex system of celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies that mediate between God and men. The church assumes the function of the state, with the bishop as a philosopher-king. Finally, in al-Farabi's *Best State* we find a hierarchically structured Muslim society that aims at the divinization of all of its members through appropriate legislation. To this end the monarch has to be himself an intellect in act, and at least one such philosopher-king has existed: Muhammad.

It is O'Meara's merit to have collected, systematically organized, and thoroughly discussed in this book the dispersed evidence of Neoplatonic political philosophy. Even if his account is a sketch, as he himself points out in the Conclusion (pp. 198–205), it certainly provides fertile ground for further fruitful studies, particularly, I should think, in the area of Christian and Islamic reception of Neoplatonism.—Matthias Vorwerk, *The Catholic University of America*

PAULSON, Ronald. *Sin and Evil: Moral Values in Literature*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007. viii + 403 pp. Cloth, \$42.00—This informative journey through centuries of literature, mostly British and American fiction, is the harvest of a distinguished career and brings together themes from the author's many previous publications. Ronald Paulson's running commentary on diverse literary treatments of sin and evil develops certain core theses. While well-versed in traditional Christian beliefs (with scant mention of other religions), the author is no apologist for them. Although raising important issues for theology and philosophy, this book views thorny issues of sin and evil almost exclusively through the prism of fiction. So it is not (and is not intended to be) a theological treatment of the topic or a philosophical examination of the theodicy problem.

Paulson distinguishes sin from evil (a distinction fudged in some of his authors), and "doing-evil" from "suffering-evil." He characterizes (p. 20) evil as directed downward, as suffering imposed on a person of lesser power by a greater power. Sin, in contrast, is directed upward, is the rebellion of a subordinate against its superior (disobedience to God or, by extension, treason against the monarch). The biblical God sometimes does evil to people as punishment for their sin. Human beings are both evildoers and sufferers of evil. Once done with this aspect of the biblical God, Paulson pays little attention to what philosophers call natural evil and its challenges for religious belief. He emphasizes the evil that people do to one another, of course a major topic of literature. What counts as suffering-evil he takes to be fairly uncontroversial.

The concept of sin he says is a social construct that depends on what behaviors those wielding social power decide to condemn and punish as deemed offensive to God. Such behaviors, sometimes punished by civil as well as religious authorities, who call them evils as well as sins, are often natural and relatively harmless acts. Moral values are based on custom (p. xii) and reflect a particular society's view of which acts are good and which are sinful (or amount to doing-evil).

Paulson lays his foundation with etymologies of Greek, Latin, and Old English terms for various evils, and with accounts of Paul and Augustine, of classical and Christian satire, of Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and Swift. Correlative examples from medieval and Renaissance painting present scenes of punished sinners in hell and of Christ's passion as suffering-evil. The center of gravity seems to be Hogarth's engravings of A

Harlot's Progress, with its antecedents in Gays' *The Beggar's Opera*. (Hogarth is the subject of several previous Paulson books.) Hogarth's anti-Puritan attitude pervades scenes of the harlot as the victim of authorities who punish her social transgression and victimless crime as sinful abominations. For Hogarth, evil is actually in their labeling of natural acts as sins against God; it is the socially powerful doing-evil to those of whom they disapprove. Hogarth, and Rousseau after him, reject the ancient conviction that natural evil experienced as suffering is divine punishment for moral evil or sin; instead, suffering-evil is something imposed by society on its victims.

Much of the commentary on Fielding, Hawthorne, Blake, and Dickens draws upon this theme from Hogarth. God is not much in Paulson's picture, for his spotlight falls on the socially powerful who perpetrate the suffering of their powerless victims. Their social constructions of (relatively harmless) individual acts as "sin" deflects attention from themselves as the institutions and persons who actually do evil to their subordinates.

Varieties of the supernatural (albeit not the traditional God) are given prominence. Paulson vividly portrays the vampire figure as evil and alluring parody of Christ's death and resurrection, and of eternal life gained from drinking his blood. He analyses uncanny types of demonic evil in Bram Stoker, Coleridge, and Henry James, as well as in the tales of Jekyll and Hyde, and of Dorian Gray.

Other fictional evils include: personal degeneration in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*; banal evil lamented in the poetry of Yeats and Eliot; corruption and the perversion of an ideal in Faulkner. Many figures enter the author's stage, from Jonathan Edwards to Poe and Melville, from Mary Shelley to Hardy, Wells, Golding, and Graham Greene. Especially unsettling is evil as cruelty enacted by a detached deity, in Mark Twain's *The Mysterious Stranger*.

Concluding reflections on modern evils stress the horrors of war (Hemingway, Vonnegut, Heller), of ideology and Holocaust (Koestler, Arendt), in which the perpetrators' detachment makes their task easier. Then coverage shifts to non-fiction, to accounts of the My Lai massacre. Here (p. 339) the approach becomes more political in nature.

This erudite and impressive study offers new perspectives on sin and evil in authors one has actually read, and helpful orientation to the others.—Robert F. Brown, *University of Delaware*.

RANASINGHE, Nalin. *Logos and Eros: Essays Honoring Stanley Rosen*. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2006. 271 pp. Cloth, \$45.00—According to Stanley Rosen, philosophy is aporetic but not impossible. By virtue of its nature, philosophy attempts to think the whole. But all attempts to exhaust the whole through language fail. Stated with maximum brevity (as Rosen himself might put it), there is a fundamental disjunction between discursive logos and the inarticulable vision of the whole that grounds speech. As rational animals we speak

and must speak. Yet according to Rosen, all such discursive schemes are artifices ultimately rooted in a prediscursive intuition or perception of some thing beyond themselves, the whole or being. While indispensable for our speech, that vision can never be pulled fully into speech, never be made fully articulate and hence never simply at the disposal of the human will. The orienting moment of vision is not, however, to be thought of, on Rosen's account, as somehow the preserve of some few geniuses alone (although the ability to translate that vision into speech may well be). Rather such pretheoretical vision underlies all of human life; as Plato's Socrates puts it, one cannot even be human at all without having had a prior vision of the ideas.

Rosen's mode of getting at this dimension of human life is what he calls ordinary life. Philosophy must therefore turn around to examine the pretheoretical roots of theory; not being able to achieve final discursive clarity about the whole, philosophy instead pursues the intimations of wholeness already present in ordinary life. Thus conceived, philosophy must take as its object the tacit reliance on vision that runs through ordinary life; in its self-presentation, philosophy must become poetic, able to point toward what it cannot say. Rosen's turn to ordinary life is a close cousin to Socrates' turn away from the attempt to apprehend being directly to the investigation through *logoi*—the so-called second sailing—as well as to Leo Strauss's turn to political philosophy.

Both the richness and breadth of Rosen's work is on display in this *festSchrift*. This volume brings together a variety of philosophical, personal, and poetic engagements with Rosen's thought from a number of distinguished colleagues and students. Alasdair MacIntyre, Drew Hyland, Laurent Jaffro, Herbert Mason, and Nalin Ranasinghe contribute essays on Rosen himself; Geoffrey Hill offers a poem; Eva Brann, Waller Newell, Robert Pippin, Richard Rethy, Sharon Rider, Richard Velkley, and Donald Verene give us essays on Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein; Michael Davis, Ronna Burger, Charles Griswold, Clifford Orwin, David Roochnik, and Damjan de Krnjec-Miskovic interpret Plato, Aristotle, and Herodotus. Most of these essays reveal an indirect but nonetheless real dialogue with Rosen himself in addition to being of much interest by in their own right. As a whole and in its parts, this volume will serve as a useful supplement for those interested in and perplexed by Rosen's body of work.

Faced with the breadth of topics and thinkers broached here, it might well seem arbitrary to single out one question as most important. Yet the question of how politics stands with regard to Rosen's "metaphysics in ordinary life" is raised in various ways by MacIntyre, Griswold, Orwin, and others, and it does not take much imagination to see that question lurking behind many of the other essays as well. One might therefore ask: does Rosen's turn to ordinary life point to, or culminate in, a political philosophy? The authors here pursue that question by asking about the relationship of *phronesis* to law, as MacIntyre does; by wondering whether Platonism is compatible with a recognizably liberal politics, as Griswold does; or by speculating about whether Kantian or Hegelian self-legislation can provide us with a source of normativity in the absence of a stable account of the whole, as Pippin does.

This line of reflection also raises the inevitable question of Rosen's relationship to his teacher, Leo Strauss, to whom Rosen dedicated his book on Plato's *Republic*. I am inclined to think that a pivotal thought of Strauss's *Republic* interpretation is this: "even the transpolitical cannot be understood as such except if the city is understood" (*City and Man* 138). The political is both the condition of and the obstacle to our access to the whole. If I understand him correctly, Rosen would agree with this claim. Transposed into suitably Rosenian language, Strauss's claim would read: even the extraordinary cannot be understood except if the ordinary is understood. Despite his well-known criticisms of Strauss, does Rosen then end up rediscovering Strauss's insight, if from a somewhat different angle? Whether or not this is the case, and even what such a claim can mean, are open questions. But among his other services to us, Rosen does not allow his readers to forget that, whatever its tactical guises and whatever the necessity of its concern with ordinary life, philosophy is by its nature directed toward the extraordinary.—Thomas W. Merrill, *St. John's College, Annapolis, and the President's Council on Bioethics*.

ROCKMORE, Thomas. *On Constructivist Epistemology*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. v + 164 pp. Cloth, \$ 56.00—This book provides a spirited defense and elaboration of *Epistemological Constructivism*, or EC. The core idea of EC is that the human mind is actively involved in and also in some way determines cognitive content, truth, knowledge, and logic. EC is a doctrine with excellent historical credentials, running forward from Hobbes, Vico, Kant, and Hegel through neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosophy, American pragmatism, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, the hermeneutic side of Heidegger, later Wittgenstein, C. I. Lewis, the pragmatic side of Quine, the Kantian side of Sellars, Goodman, the Kantian side of Strawson, the anti-realist side of Dummett, the internal realist Putnam, Rorty, McDowell, and Brandom right into contemporary philosophy. EC has also had a surprisingly powerful and wide influence in the contemporary human sciences and formal sciences: for example, in literary studies, history and history of science, women's studies and gender studies, ethnicity and race studies, film studies, sociology, human anthropology, Chomskyan and Whorfian linguistics alike, cognitive psychology, intuitionist mathematics, and non-classical (or "deviant") logic. Oddly enough, however, EC is largely ignored or explicitly rejected by the mainstream of contemporary Anglo-American *analytic* philosophy, which is predominantly realist, empiricist, modal-metaphysical, and strongly oriented towards (conservative extensions of) classical logic and the natural sciences—influenced primarily by Frege, Russell, the Tractarian Wittgenstein, Carnap, the naturalistic and logical sides of Quine, the naturalistic side of Sellars, Kripke, the scientific essentialist Putnam, David Armstrong, J. J. C. Smart, and the *other* Lewis, David Lewis. So it is both relevant and timely to revisit EC.

Although EC has interesting anticipations in Hobbes and Vico, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is really the Bible of EC. This is true both conceptually and historically. All forms of EC rest on grounds and principles roughly equivalent to those found in Kant's metaphysics of transcendental idealism; and since the history of philosophy since Kant is in effect a series of footnotes to *CPR*, so too is the history of EC.

Correspondingly, Rockmore's argument for EC is fundamentally historical. He begins by situating EC in Kant's metaphysics (Introduction). Then he contrasts EC with metaphysical realism (ch. 1) and makes two basic claims:

[F]irst, all theories of knowledge defend some form of realism; and second, no form of the metaphysical realist claim for knowledge can be made out (p. 29).

Chapter 2 describes various versions of EC, and chapters 3 through 5 unpack some basic elements of EC, including (1) "thick" or active and embodied subjectivity,

(2) contextualism about cognitive content and justification, and (3) the historical character of all knowledge. Several substantive theses emerge from these discussions:

What I have been calling thick subjectivity is another name for the Cartesian actor theory, a view of the subject as active and not passive, which is suggested but never worked out in Descartes' writings. In the actor theory,

1. There is no bifurcation between mind and body, which, taken together, constitute a human being.
2. The mind-body problem in its classical Cartesian formulation simply disappears.
3. The complex objects called human beings belong to the external world, hence are subject to the prevailing causal framework, within which mental events in the mind must be understood, since the mental and the physical cannot be sharply isolated.
4. We do not and cannot know an independent external world.
5. We have at best indirect access to the mind (pp. 70-71).

Since there is no way to know that our ideas correspond to mind-independent reality, we should give up the idea of accuracy of representation, hence of representation in any form whatsoever, in favor of the contextual justification of beliefs (p. 83).

How do we distinguish ideas that are objectively absolute from those that are merely objectively relative? The answer is that there is no way to make out this distinction, no way to show that some ideas, such as those we are most attached to, are, for that reason, more than objectively relative, more than what, in a given historical moment, some group happens for one or another set of reasons to find worthwhile (p. 86).

Semantic theories of truth, which are merely sophisticated versions of correspondence, fail. For it never can be known that cognitive claims correspond to anything more than appearance (p. 87).

All perceptual phenomena are "constructed." We know that the colors we perceive are not literally in the perceptual object, but rather the end product of a complex process through which a certain wavelength of light strikes the retina, then travels through the optic nerve, and is converted into a visual phenomenon. If our only access to the real is through perceptions "constructed" by the perceiver, it cannot be known than they correctly represent mind-independent objects (p. 89).

In the absence of assured access to independent reality as it is, the justification of claims to know is contextual in various ways, for instance relative to the actions of individuals and groups, then to individual disciplines, and, finally relative to society as a whole (p. 92).

If all cognitive endeavors are interpretive, hence always dependent on a mutually agreed upon but mutable conceptual framework, then all forms of knowledge, including natural science and mathematics, are also historical (p. 101).

Since the process of reflection can never be brought to an end, the distinction between a philosophy and a worldview—as well as between a folk view and science—can never be strictly drawn. Despite claims to the contrary, we can never be sure that we have freed ourselves from unexamined, or even examined, presuppositions. In that sense, a philosophy, any philosophy, can never become more than a particular type of worldview (p. 117).

Since philosophy is just another worldview, it follows that it has no *special* moral or social relevance. To hold the contrary—that philosophy is morally and socially privileged—is what Rockmore calls *social platonism*. Social platonism has been defended by a wide range of thinkers both outside (for example, Plato, Aristotle, and the ontological side of Heidegger) and inside (for example, Marx, Habermas, Derrida, and Rorty) the tradition of EC. So in chapter 6 Rockmore concludes the book by arguing against social platonism and for the thesis that the social responsibility of philosophers is no different from the social responsibility of any other critically reflective, intellectually active person:

Intellectual responsibility consists in utilizing intellectual capacities in understanding our times and ourselves. Since there are different kinds of philosophy, there are different things that philosophers can be expected to contribute to realizing the good life, different ways to play a socially responsible role. The result is a kind of historical relativism. But within the relation to the wider views of one's own time, there is knowledge. And the intellectual, including the philosopher, is justly regarded as responsible for doing what an intellectual does best, as providing insight in a variety of ways about the world and ourselves, but without any claim for cognitive privilege (p. 145).

While I am strongly sympathetic to EC, I do also have a basic worry about Rockmore's version of it. As I mentioned, the core idea of EC is that the human mind is *actively involved in* and also *in some way determines* cognitive content, truth, knowledge, and logic. Formulated in this way, EC seems to me to be true.

But it also seems to me that there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between two very different kinds of EC, which I will call *EC1* and *EC2*.

EC1: The human mind is actively involved in and *partially but not wholly determines* cognitive content, truth, knowledge, and logic. More generally cognitive content, truth, knowledge, and logic are all deter-

mined only as *the joint result* of the activities of the human mind *together with* various facts about the natural world beyond the human mind.

EC2: The human mind is actively involved in and *wholly determines* cognitive content, truth, knowledge, and logic.

According to EC1, the human mind necessarily *contributes to* cognitive content, truth, knowledge, and logic. But according to EC2, the human mind necessarily *creates* content, truth, knowledge, and logic. Now EC2 clearly reduces real objective facts to human mental activities, and thereby

(i) identifies the objects of mental representations with mental representations (idealism),

(ii) identifies truth with the individual or communal cognitive verification of propositions or statements (anti-realism),

(iii) identifies knowledge with individual or communal belief (cognitive relativism), and

(iv) identifies logic with empirical psychology (psychologism).

But surely the objects we represent are not always identical with our mental representations of them—because those objects can exist even if we do not. So idealism is false. And surely just because someone or many people have cognitively verified a proposition, it does not automatically follow that it is true—because cognitive verifications might not correspond to the real facts. So anti-realism is false. And surely just because someone believes or many people believe a claim, even with great confidence and mutual support, it does not follow that it is knowledge—because beliefs might not be adequately justified. So cognitive relativism is false. And surely logic is different from the empirical psychology of logic—because logic is a priori and necessary, while empirical psychology is a posteriori and contingent. So psychologism is false.

And it gets even worse than that. If the objects of mental representations are identical with those representations, then since there can be non-identical representations of the same object, then objects are non-self-identical. If truth is identical with verification, then since different people or communities can verify and falsify the same proposition, then truth is contradictory. And if knowledge is identical to belief, then since different people or communities can assert and deny the same proposition, then knowledge is contradictory too. And if logic is identical to empirical psychology, then logic is a posteriori because it is reducible to natural facts about human mental states and physical states; but since reducibility is an a priori logical relation (of logical strong supervenience or identity), then logic is a posteriori only if logic is not a posteriori. So, to summarize, if the mind necessarily *creates* content, truth, knowledge, and logic, then paradoxically content, truth, knowledge, and logic are all rendered *impossible*.

For all these *prima facie* intuitive, classical, and I think quite conclusive reasons, EC2 is false. I also think that Rockmore has confused EC1 with EC2, and so unfortunately ends up by defending EC2.

How did this happen? Here is my diagnosis. There are at least six (to me, anyhow) very plausible claims that individually and collectively support some form of EC, and in particular, EC1:

(1) The Rejection of Noumenal Realism: Things-in-themselves in the Kantian sense (i.e., absolutely mind-independent, unperceivable objects constituted by intrinsic non-relational properties) are both humanly uncognizable and humanly unknowable, because they cannot be directly perceived through the human senses.

(2) The Acceptance of Empirical or Manifest Realism: Natural objects and facts are all essentially appearances (i.e., in some sense mind-dependent, directly perceivable objects constituted by intrinsic relational properties necessarily corresponding to the structure of our representations of space and time) and not things-in-themselves, and thus their intrinsic properties are, at least in principle, humanly cognizable and humanly knowable.

(3) The Anthropocentric Character of Truth: A proposition is objectively true, whether contingently true or necessarily true, only if it can also be verified, whether by sense perception or rational intuition, by some actual or possible rational human cognizer from her own egocentric, embodied standpoint.

(4) Fallibilism and Pluralism: A great many beliefs in science, philosophy, and common life that are taken to be objectively certain by their holders are in fact false. Moreover, many beliefs contradict one another, not only across individuals (intersubjectively) and within individuals' lives (intrasubjectively), but also across communities, cultures, and historical periods.

(5) Context-Dependency: Cognitive content, truth, and knowledge are partially determined by irreducibly indexical, egocentric, embodied, causal, practical, and social factors.

(6) The Logocentric Predicament: Logic can be neither explained nor justified without presupposing and using logic.

But it is also perfectly possible to assert all of these plausible claims while still *denying* EC2, since as we have seen, EC2 is false. Therefore it is a fallacy—which we might dub *the Constructivist Fallacy*—to think that the collective truth of (1) through (6) *entails* EC2. If I have interpreted him correctly, then Rockmore commits the Constructivist Fallacy. Since (1) through (6) individually and collectively support EC1, however, the upshot is that EC1 should be carefully detached from EC2, and can be defended on logically independent grounds. And that, for my money, is the most important philosophical lesson to be learned from *On Constructivist Epistemology*.—Robert Hanna, *University of Colorado, Boulder*.

RORTY, Richard. *Philosophy as Cultural Politics. Philosophical Papers 4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xii + 206 pp. Cloth, \$80.00; paper, \$22.99—The essays in this collection form a manifesto designed to affirm (and sometimes to argue) the following propositions:

1. That professional philosophers are now quite properly little valued.

2. That philosophers should give up the search for truth and concern themselves with cultural politics—with which they have always been more interestingly concerned, even when apparently otherwise engaged.

3. That the history of Western thought shows that we have *advanced* from a religious culture through a philosophical culture to a literary culture.

4. That the aim of philosophers should be to increase tolerance, promote democracy and thereby advance human happiness.

In defending these propositions Rorty concludes that philosophy was once useful in freeing us from religion, and from the invocation of what he likes to refer to as “spooks”, but that it went off the rails (in ancient times through the influence of Parmenides and especially of Plato, more recently through that of Kant, viewed as exaggerating the worst aspects of Platonism) in a vain search for Truth or Reality. To repair this damage, “cultural politics should replace ontology” (pp. 3, 139).

Much of Rorty's book is a display of erudition about the present interests of Anglo-American philosophy departments: heroes are selected (Darwin, Dewey, Sellars, Brandom), villains castigated, especially Kantians. Empirically based claims of earlier thinkers are often dismissed out of hand: thus “pragmatists think that the idea of necessary limitations on all possible thinkers is as weird as Augustine's thesis about the inevitability of sin—*non posse non peccare*” (p. 156). Original sin is a particular bugbear (pp. 38, 41), though in the steps of Dewey we are allowed—indeed have a right (p. 25)—to be religious in private. More generally, however, monotheism is suspect: “Your devotion to democracy is unlikely to be wholehearted if you believe, as monotheists do, that we can have an ‘objective’ ranking of human needs that can overrule the result of democratic consensus” (p. 34).

Although Rorty's historicist account of the development of culture from its religious to its narrative or literary phase is posited as progress, there is little reason to deem it anything more than change. Rorty wants to insist that turning philosophy into cultural politics is no mere surrender to irrationality (p. 20), but his slide from change to progress certainly needs far more explication.

Though Rorty denies the existence of Truth and holds that the progress he discerns is an enriching of our intelligent comment on the nature of the world we inhabit, based on the formulation of a more varied collection of useful narratives, he knows that toleration and democracy—the latter remains undefined—are better than their alternatives: that is, one supposes, more likely to promote human happiness. This may or may not be the case; indeed so sure is Rorty that he knows what our goods are that he wants us to abandon many traditional linguistic practices in favour of the currently fashionable. Presumably we can always change again, if it turns out that toleration and “democracy” are either conceptually incoherent or pragmatically inadequate.

Further incoherence stares out when Rorty tells us that “the only constraint on this freedom and this diversity is the need not to injure others” (p. 37). How to understand what he means by freedom (and how he

would distinguish it from licence)? How, and in myriad cases, can he show whether certain behaviours injure others? Who should be given any benefit of the doubt?

According to Rorty we need to separate Enlightenment liberalism (which is good) from Enlightenment rationalism (which is bad). There may be reasons to challenge Enlightenment rationalism, but not those proposed by Rorty. Indeed in his examples he suggests that even pragmatically successful judgments made by historical figures—as by Churchill in wanting to defeat Nazism—were merely good guesses: Churchill “lucked it” (p. 59). Rorty tells us we should all believe in human brotherhood (pp. 33, 35), and that we have “no reason to give up the search for a single utopian form of political life—the Good Global Society” (p. 104). At the same time he admits he can provide no argument against being a fascist, or anything else (p. 32). And the worst is yet to come. Pragmatism, as Rorty envisages it, is a matter of making deals with all principles thrown to the winds, albeit it is hard to square that with the utopian dream. In a remark of numbing banality and extraordinary naiveté, he is willing to tell us that “pragmatists think that Danton and Robespierre—and for that matter Antigone and Creon—should have tried harder to make some sort of deal” (p. 81). If that mind-boggling supposition fails to reveal what has indeed brought many philosophers into contempt, it is hard to see what would.

It would be a mistake to conclude that there is nothing to be learned from Rorty’s essays, but the interesting is swamped by the trivializing or self-refuting. Alluding to Plato’s battle of gods and giants, he asserts that the giants have won (p. 73): we are all now materialists and—if right-thinking—possessed of an instrumentalist account of the mind (p. 107); also that in opposing his Platonizing foes he is a neo-sophist (p. 77). That at least is true—if anything is!—John Rist, *University of Toronto, Emeritus*.

ROWE, William. *Can God be Free?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. x + 173 pp. Cloth, \$69.95; paper, \$35.00—According to traditional theism, God is maximally great. If God is maximally great, then God must create the best world. But then God acts from necessity. Praiseworthiness presupposes freedom from necessity. So God is not praiseworthy for creating.

The foregoing constitutes the central argument of William Rowe’s latest book. His tentative overall conclusion is that God cannot exercise libertarian free agency (p. 7). Compatibilist free agency is not adequate to make God praiseworthy for creating the world. Rowe examines various attempts at defending divine freedom. He finds existing proposals—both historical and contemporary—wanting.

Rowe begins by considering whether Leibniz and Clarke’s conceptions of divine freedom are reconcilable with divine perfection. Leibniz defended a compatibilist account of freedom while Clarke was a liber-

tarian. For different reasons, neither Clarke nor Leibniz offers a conception of divine freedom that coheres with God's perfect goodness, according to Rowe.

Rowe next examines a Thomistic argument in defense of the "no best world" thesis that assumes each world may have an infinite quantity and quality of good because God inhabits each. So there is no best world, only "several equally good worlds and none better" (p. 53). But Rowe argues it is possible that some world have higher quality goods than others because of the types of creatures that populate those worlds and the quality of their lives (p. 52).

The chapters on the history of the debate conclude with Jonathan Edwards's defense of simple compatibilism. According to Edwards, for any agent *S* and action *A*, if it is within *S*'s power to *A* should she so will, *S* is free when she does $\sim A$ instead. Unlike most contemporary compatibilists, Edwards regards the lack of the moral ability to *A* (lacking the ability to choose *A*) not to undermine the moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of *S* for choosing $\sim A$. So someone who is morally unable to will to do what is right is still culpable. In the case of God, we have an agent who is morally unable to will what is morally bad. But God seems no more praiseworthy than the addict seems culpable, according to Rowe.

Unfortunately, Rowe never considers how Edwards's proposal about free agency compares to contemporary compatibilist proposals (for example, endorsement and reasons-responsive models). In fact, in the entire book he rarely considers how things would fare for the theist who avails herself of contemporary compatibilist views. This is unfortunate but not surprising since most philosophers of religion working on divine freedom who are theists are libertarians.

Some of the contemporary arguments Rowe examines represent refinements of arguments found in the history of the debate. Other arguments are more novel. For instance, Robert Adams argues that God does nothing wrong in failing to create the best world. Creating the best world is supererogatory. Rowe argues that while Adams may have shown that God has no such obligation, it still seems that God must create the best. If God fails to create the best, then it is possible that there is some morally better agent who creates the best world (this is later referred to as "Principle B"). And it is consistent with divine grace for God to create the best. Even if there is no sense in which creatures deserve such a world, that God would create such a world is a reasonable expectation.

The longest chapter (chapter 6) of the book is devoted to Rowe's defense of Principle B. In defending Principle B, Rowe mostly responds to the various replies that were offered to his earlier work on divine freedom. Most of the replies to which Rowe responds involve defenses of the no best world thesis. The one exception is Thomas Talbott's argument that God is still free if there is a best choice and action for God to execute. Contra Talbott, Rowe argues that if God does *A* (where *A* is the best) and God cannot do $\sim A$, then God is morally responsible for *A*-ing only if God is causally responsible for his nature. Whether God can cause God's own nature is the subject of the last chapter. Rowe cri-

tiques Thomas Morris's argument to this effect. Morris rejects divine simplicity. So God is not identical to God's nature. Morris claims that God causes God's nature. Rowe argues that even if this is correct, God has no choice with respect to causing the divine nature and so divine freedom is not enhanced.

This book deserves the attention of philosophers of religion. Rowe's arguments are rigorous, and the prose is simple and straightforward. There is no doubt that this book will generate much discussion and debate among philosophers for years to come.—Andrei A. Buckareff, *Marist College*.

SCHELLING, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*. Translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006. xxxv + 183 pp. Cloth, \$50.00; paper, \$17.95—Love and Schmidt provide a long-overdue new translation of one of the most characteristic works of Schelling's middle period (c. 1809–1815), replacing James Gutmann's serviceable but now old-fashioned and imprecise translation from 1936. The edition has a very extensive scholarly apparatus (translators' introduction, nearly 50 pages of notes and a selection of texts from Schelling's contemporaries), which is unfortunately of somewhat uneven value, and the translation, though flawed, is more accurate than the alternative.

The middle period texts (which also include the *Ages of the World* fragments) have been the focus of a renewal of philosophical interest in Schelling in the English-speaking world since at least the publication of the English translation of Heidegger's lecture course on the *Investigations* in 1985.

As the full title of the *Investigations* suggests, Schelling's concern is to vindicate what would now be described as a libertarian conception of human freedom, that is, one that takes seriously the possibility of radical evil. This problematic signals a decisive break with the broadly Hegelian stamp of his earlier writings. But Schelling's conception of freedom also takes him in more unexpected directions. One is theological, in which he gives a number of (inconsistent) analyses of *God's* freedom, variously his freedom not to have created the universe and even his paradoxical freedom not to have existed at all. In diluted form, these theological issues came to dominate Schelling's later intellectual life. Another direction, related to freedom by the idea of contingency, is a philosophy of nature in which the essence of nature is understood to transcend human conceptuality and order. This has excited much attention, prompting (in the German literature) comparisons with complexity theory and Frege's logic; and in the English literature, a number of challenging but important monographs, stretching from Žižek's 1996 *Indivisible Remainder* (the title is a quotation from the *Investigations*) to Iain Grant's *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling* a decade later.

Such new work has begun to displace the traditional view of Schelling, that he is not quite a proper philosopher, but either a purely transitional thinker, of interest only to historians of the period between Kant and Hegel; or alternatively a fundamentally religious thinker, of only theological not philosophical merit. The traditional views have some purchase on the early and late Schelling, but much less on the fertile period around the *Investigations*.

Love's and Schmidt's translation is more reliable than Gutmann's, but its accuracy is not combined with a readable English style. They defend a conception of translation that favors fidelity over smoothness, even at the expense of oddity or even ungrammaticality. Sometimes this strategy is revealing. For instance, they retain in abstract contexts the peculiar sense of motion implied by Schelling's use of the accusative: 'the word is spoken *out into* nature [*in die Natur*]' (p. 59). But more often they do not so much 'capture the strangeness of the original text,' (p. xxxii), as they claim they want to, as introduce their own quite unnecessary strangeness by refusing to use straightforward English where it could have been used. The very first sentence of the main text reads (in part) like this:

[T]he fact of freedom, no matter how immediately the feeling of which is imprinted in every individual, lies in no way so immediately on the surface that, in order merely to express it in words, an uncommon clarity and depth of mind would not be required (p. 9).

Schelling's German is slightly convoluted, but it can certainly be made closer to English without violence to Schelling's undoubted uniqueness—either textual or conceptual. This is not a return to the original, but a contrived *faux* authenticity.

The translators' introduction, notes and series of supplementary texts all seek, like the translation itself, to put Schelling back into his original context. The introduction defends a view of the text as fundamentally Leibnizian in character, and Schelling as attempting to construct a theodicy in the challenging circumstances of a post-Kantian conception of radical evil; it takes explicit issue with the views of Heidegger and Žižek (uncomfortably rolled into one). The supplementary texts (from Böhme, Jacobi and Herder) are with one exception (an extract from Schelling's colleague von Baader) already available in English, but not always easy to get hold of. The notes also provide up to page length extracts of the works Schelling is commenting on, especially Leibniz. Much of this material is useful, but the overall effect of so much concern for authenticity is to push Schelling back into the traditional view in which he is of historical or theological rather than quite contemporary philosophical interest.—Alistair Welchman, *University of Texas at San Antonio*.

pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$24.95.—*Illiberal Justice* is a study of John Rawls's "theory of justice" on its own terms and offers a critical analysis of its implication to and general ignorance of "the core tradition of constitutional liberalism of the American founders . . . the wisdom of America's greatest statesmen, as well as of the liberal philosophers who guided them" (pp. x–xi). It would be difficult to find a more profound and stimulating book than *Illiberal Justice*, covering in the most serious manner the whole of Rawls's corpus while demonstrating an understanding of representative, constitutional government and the rich and complex history of political philosophy upon which it was based.

The focus of Schaefer's book is Rawls's invention and defense of the "justice as fairness" principle, a theory according to which a society is deemed just only if its "basic structure" and principles are chosen and agreed to by people in the "Original Position" bargaining for principles of justice behind a "veil of ignorance." The people behind the "veil of ignorance" do not know their own race, class, birth, sex, or conception of the good. What principles or terms would be chosen and agreed upon under these limitations? Rawls's famous "difference" principle states that if each person were motivated by self-interest, people would agree to only those inequalities of wealth and power that benefit the least well-off class in society.

Schaefer subjects Rawls's standpoint to penetrating criticism. As he points out, Rawls's model of a social contract rests on several unexamined assumptions. By original position, Rawls means something like the state of nature teaching developed through the social-contract tradition by such philosophers as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The philosophers just named used the state of nature teaching to arrive at "the essential elements of the human condition that make it necessary for human beings to limit their . . . inherent freedom by establishing government—and therefore determine the character that government must have to be legitimate" (p. 19).

By contrast, Rawls replaces the state of nature of the social contract tradition with an "original position" from which he derives his principles of justice that avoids altogether a discussion of human nature. In fact, Rawls stresses in *A Theory of Justice* that his principles of justice are "not based on an empirical account of actual [human] motives" (p. 19). Without a sense of how human nature relates to principles of justice, however, how is anyone to choose one institution of government over a myriad of others that would best promote justice? Unlike "Aristotle, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, and American statesmen from the founders to Lincoln to Martin Luther King Jr.," whose writings are concerned with substantive content of justice and its relation to the human good and institutions of government, Rawls pursues an abstract and arbitrary formula, that would "promote consensus among people's judgments of justice" (p.16).

All the original position has to offer as a basis of consensus are "intuitively appealing' principles to which people's actual 'propensities and inclinations' must be subordinated" (p. 19). As Schaefer repeats throughout the book, the "we" to whom these "intuitively appealing principles" appeal to are the converted. Since Rawls severs the original position, the veil of ignorance, overlapping consensus—and the political

consequences he purports to derive from them—from human motives and claims to truth, grounding them instead on the arbitrary standard of his “intuition,” “they have no independent standing as a ground or criterion of justice” (p. 328). “If justice is something we are free to define as we choose how can we be bound to obey its mandates when they conflict with something else we wish to do? On what ground can a *self-defined* conception of justice take priority over the pursuit of our own good as we conceive it” (p. 31)?

Rawls’s original position is an inadequate alternative to the state of nature teaching developed by social contract tradition: “Rawls, unlike Hobbes, provides no criterion for assessing the urgency of the agreement that the parties to the original position are to arrive at” (p. 59). In the end, Rawls replaces the inhabitants of Hobbes’s and Locke’s state of nature with artificial “parties” who so little resemble us that they don’t know their aims or abilities and have no interest (positive or negative) in their fellows” (p. 80): “For the sake of theoretical simplicity, Rawls arbitrarily focuses on the needs of those who are materially least well-off, rather than addressing the problems of those who are, for instance, the victims of serious physical or mental disability . . . making more manifest how little value an abstract distributive principle can have for policymakers or citizens” (p. 321).

Although highly critical of Rawls’s theoretical and methodological assumptions, Schaefer’s book is “not animated by any hostility to liberalism, as originally understood” (p. x). *Illiberal Justice* is a persuasive defense of classical liberalism, in contrast to Rawls’ “invitation to judges to circumvent the democratic process so as to actualize” universal, abstract, and arbitrary “intuitions” of justice. Throughout the book, Schaefer draws from classical political philosophy and from moderate liberal thinkers such as Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, W. D. Ross, and Tocqueville as alternatives who “provide far more solid ground for liberty than does Rawls” (p. 12). *Illiberal Justice*, with its careful and tenacious analysis of Rawls’s theory of justice, is a book that admirers and detractors of Rawls’s work will find illuminating.—Khalil M. Habib, *Salve Regina University*.

THOMAS, Alan. *Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. 347 pp.—Thomas has written a wide ranging and dense scholarly work on the foundations of ethics. He constructs a cognitivist theory of moral justification that begins with phenomenological descriptions of “first person deliberation” (p. 49), then reconstructs how “the practical, the evaluative and the descriptive are intertwined in the use of thick concepts” to form ethical judgments “capable of truth” (p. 130).

Like many in the Anglo-American tradition, Thomas endorses the way the later Wittgenstein overcomes skepticism by developing a contextual analysis of claims. Thomas develops a unique form of moral contextualism buttressed by both an objectivism about knowledge and a non-convergent verificationism about truth.

In Part I, Thomas finds much sympathy with Wiggins's and McDowell's objectivist theories of moral knowledge that combine internalism about motivation with a commitment to "the existence of inherent normativity" (p. 52). They capture the experience of taking practical decisions not according to the attractiveness of value, but from "the demands of the deontic modalities" (p. 53). He defends them against Korsgaard's criticism that moral realisms postulate a mysterious inherent normativity in moral facts. Rather, he claims that the normativity in an agent's perception of moral circumstances "directly governs the will" (p. 66). Thus, even impartial reasons can be internal reasons. But impartiality is not a strict *a priori*, as Korsgaard holds, but a relativized *a priori* like those in geometry. Moral reasoning, however, generally requires a Hegelian kind of "perspectival ascent," increasingly less dependent on perspectival modes of conceptualization (p. 88).

Then in Part II, Thomas considers how Bernard Williams's non-objectivism poses a significant challenge to moral cognitivism. He considers Williams's fable of the hypertraditional society: cognitivists who use thick ethical concepts and adopt or withdraw them by means of discussion but do not realize that their practices are merely local. For Williams, such a realization would destabilize their practices and undermine their knowledge. Thomas replies that hypertraditionalists are actually foundationalist: they reflect on knowledge and a whole, and choose the aspect of it that fits them. He instead holds that objective moral knowledge and a non-destabilizing form of moral reflection are compatible. He agrees with Williams's claim that cognitive moral reasoning is based on a reflective transcendental claim that we can reason from our given practical engagement with the world to the way the world is. But rather than responding skeptically as Williams does to this transcendental assumption, Thomas simply affirms it phenomenologically: the world contains "value to which we respond and which we do not project" (p.161).

Part III explains how contextualists use the history of successful moral knowledge acquisition to give warrant to the reliability of the internal standards of their traditions. These standards don't normally come up for testing, and are contingently true. One's framework of beliefs sets the disciplinary parameters for an embodied and embedded engagement with the world. Thomas takes pains, however, to distinguish his contextualism from pragmatism. He agrees that both views focus on problem solving. But while a pragmatist requires a "vertical" frame of reference, a contextualist requires a "horizontal" one: contextually justified beliefs that eliminate other available alternatives. So while pragmatists claim that the objects of moral justification are not beliefs but only *changes* in beliefs, Thomas maintains that beliefs themselves are justified relative to an "irreducible plurality of contexts" (p. 191). Thus, Rawls's reflective equilibrium is a workable model that allows one to determine relations of epistemic priority among moral

intuitions. When moral beliefs are added in the process of reflection, some beliefs are still retained as considered and concrete moral judgments.

The phenomenological justification process Thomas endorses appeals to a "neutral" conception of experience and perception (p. 212). Moral perception appeals not to a special faculty, but only to an "appropriately trained judge" who has capacities for moral imagination, sympathy, and emotions. Thus conflicts can be resolved into reasonable disagreements that do not foreclose on continued inquiry toward agreements.

Thomas admits that cognitivism, like noncognitivism, has difficulty explaining moral error. His contextualism, after all, assumes that one always has a moral "location" (p. 48) and is "already in possession of considerable amounts of moral knowledge" (p. 250). But he points out that much moral error involves errors not of judgment but of fact. Moreover, some moral error stems from a lack of appropriate moral emotions, such as anger.

The virtues of the text are many, though a reader not familiar with many intricacies of some of the figures which Thomas engages will often need to consult their arguments elsewhere. But Thomas's vast array of references leaves some particular details so scant as to be misleading. For example, in chapter 1 he claims that he will discuss Habermas's arguments in detail in later chapters of the book, but ends up doing nothing of the kind. This failure might explain Thomas's strikingly odd claim that Habermas opposes moral cognitivism (p. 130). Actually, Habermas's discourse ethics is a form of moral cognitivism particularly sensitive to intersubjective and discursively grasped context.

Thomas presents a dense thicket of metaethical analysis, though for the most part devoid of any illuminating examples. So one could criticize him not for the argumentational support he gives his contextual principles but only for his failure to account for any problematic practical consequences that might arise from adopting his thoroughgoing contextualist stance.—James Swindal, *Duquesne University*.

WINFIELD, Richard Dien. *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006. x + 150 pp. Cloth, \$79.95.—Hegel's logic remains among the most problematic of philosophical texts. How it may be located among more familiar treatments of logic, whether it presents a comprehensible argument as opposed to a *tour de force*, and thus whether it constitutes a logic in any meaningful sense of the term are among the most serious of several disputed questions. Winfield begins by tackling them head on, first of all explaining what Hegel's general conception of logical science is and how it addresses fundamental flaws in both formal and transcendental logic. In so doing he reconstructs the key metalogical problems that Hegel addresses and reveals the argumentative backbone of

Hegelian logic. This involves showing that and how it meets logic's requirement to be a thinking about thinking whose rigor demands that neither its content nor method be presupposed. These demands raise a host of questions about how a thinking which proceeds without any given subject matter or form can operate coherently at all, never mind display argumentative rigor. Winfield clearly shows how Hegel's notion of the emergence of self-determination out of indeterminacy meets these requirements. In laying this out he accomplishes the not insignificant feat of showing that and how Hegel's logic works, making this book a work of historical interpretation which is at the same time a philosophical argument in its own right. In addition, his clarification of what is required for a genuine and thoroughgoing *self-determining* to take place involves showing that this logic cannot already contain explicit or implicit reference to a given thinking subject or a given world of objects, as either, or both would be unfounded external determiners voiding the necessary autonomy of self-determination. By showing that Hegel's logic abjures such indefensible foundational grounding, Winfield brings its non-descriptive, normative dimension to the fore. And because transcendental and formal logics presuppose these references to given structures of subjectivity and objectivity, properly presenting Hegel's logic as altogether outside this framework also helps to undermine the persistent misunderstanding of Hegel as an absolute idealist, since idealist metaphysics remain inextricably tied to a presupposed differentiation of subject and object. As Winfield cogently points out, just because all thinking is undertaken by embodied subjects inhabiting a given world and speaking particular languages in some given historical contexts, none of these factors can differentiate correct from incorrect thinking, which must be philosophical logic's fundamental concern. Hence foundational reference to them has no place in it.

Although two thirds of this book concentrates on the frequently neglected treatment of the concept in the second division of the logic, Winfield nonetheless provides a thorough, if schematic, treatment of the key theoretical and textual matters which an understanding of the subjective logic presuppose. He does this by guiding us through the crucial features of what precedes the subjective logic in the logics of being and essence, reconstructing the argumentative framework of the logic as a whole. What makes his treatment throughout especially worthwhile is that he combines his attention to the specifics of Hegel's logical arguments with repeated attention to larger issues about logic and philosophy. So while this exegesis and commentary provides illuminating access into features of Hegel's logical texts, its depth and range extend beyond the confines of Hegel scholarship, showing us why Hegel needs to be recognized as a logical heavyweight in the same league as Aristotle and Kant.

The most challenging part of Winfield's reconstruction is his detailed treatment of the subjective logic proper. It is here that we reach the consummation of self-determination, and Winfield carefully details how the subjective logic emerges from the objective logic, and how, as the self-determination of self-determination, it operates in a different fashion from the preceding logics of being and essence. It is here that the overall concision and terseness of Winfield's interpretive style works

against reader comprehension. The level of abstraction in the subjective logic, combined with the counter-intuitive nature of thinking outside of the frame of reference which holds determinacy fixed by locating it as about some already given determinacy means that we are moving in a very unfamiliar world. One wishes that a tour guide as adept and experienced as Winfield had used more text to make us at home. In this respect his fine book would have been better by being longer.—William Maker, *Clemson University*.

WIERCINSKI, Andrzej. *Inspired Metaphysics? Gustav Siewerth's Hermeneutic Reading of the Onto-Theological Tradition*. International Institute for Hermeneutics, vol. 2. Toronto: The Hermeneutic Press, 2003. x + 223 pp. Paper, \$35.00—Despite his influence on the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, the German philosopher and educator Gustav Siewerth (1903–1963) remains virtually unknown both in North America and in Europe. Siewerth was both a Thomist of an original sort and a student of Heidegger; he sought to show the relevance of the Thomistic metaphysics of *esse* for a proper understanding of Heideggerian “ontological difference.”

Since Siewerth is both a Thomistic and a Continental thinker all at once, his hermeneutic ontology has great potential to further dialogue between thinkers of both traditions. Dedicated as it is to furthering such a dialogue, by means of introducing Siewerth's ontology of difference to a wider readership, Andrzej Wierciński's *Inspired Metaphysics* is a book that is both timely and worthy of note. *Inspired Metaphysics* is actually the second of a series of volumes currently being published by the International Institute for Hermeneutics, of which Wierciński is the founder.

Wierciński carries out his analysis of Siewerth's ontology of difference fully cognizant of the fact that almost all of the valorization of difference that takes place in contemporary Continental philosophy occurs under the hermeneutical rubric of suspicion with respect to both ancient and medieval ontology. The tragic result of this hermeneutic of suspicion is almost total ignorance of the Thomistic metaphysics of *esse* that Siewerth attempts to reappropriate in light of Hegel and Heidegger.

Wierciński shows how Siewerth recognizes in St. Thomas's metaphysics of *esse* that which he so admires in Heidegger's understanding of Being: the determining role played by *difference* interior to Being, which makes possible all at once both the unity of Being *per se* and the diversity that obtains within the transcendentality of that same unity. Wierciński clarifies for the reader the sense in which Siewerth is able to understand Thomistic metaphysics as an “identity-system” in which Being is understood as an *eminent* or analogically excessive “identity of identity and difference.” It is on this basis that Siewerth can understand Hegel's *concept* to be similar to Thomistic *esse*, even as *esse* shows itself

to be ever more dissimilar to the dialectical identity of identity and difference that *esse* itself exceeds in order to render the dialectical process effectively possible.

Wierciński, however, does not seek to question postmodern "orthodoxies" concerning difference simply by lionizing Siewerth. One of the many merits of his book is its analysis of the unfortunate manner in which Siewerth himself, seeking to distinguish Thomistic metaphysics from that which Heidegger took to be onto-theology, failed in hermeneutical charity by being content to demonize Scotistic metaphysics as the source of Western philosophy's alleged forgetfulness of Being.

The book's introduction provides its unifying Ariadne's thread. Wierciński first treats of hermeneutic method with respect both to medieval philosophy in general and to Thomism in particular; he does so in order to help the reader gain access to the hermeneutically reduced sphere in which suspicion and sympathy are simultaneously distinguished and related. Wierciński here seeks to provide the reader with both an introduction to Siewerth's response to Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* and with an indication of the possibilities that open up before us when we read Aquinas in more resolutely hermeneutical a manner than that of which Siewerth himself proves capable.

The first half of *Inspired Metaphysics* is dedicated to such a hermeneutic reading of the medieval and Continental traditions in their essential interrelatedness. By means of such a reading, Wierciński seeks (1) to show how philosophical thinking is only possible only as dialogical thinking and (2) to show how dialogical thinking itself is possible only as effectively situated within Being. It is here in Section I that Wierciński discusses the baneful effect of Siewerth's reductive critique of the ontology of Duns Scotus as thought that valorizes conceptually unitary "presence" at the expense of ontological difference, and that therefore initiates Western philosophy's forgetfulness of Being.

Part II of *Inspired Metaphysics* constitutes the positive exposition and evaluation of Siewerth's hermeneutical effort to understand Being in terms of its being the always already and effectively achieved "suspended middle" ["ideality of Being" in the earlier Siewerth and "ontological difference" in the later Siewerth] that distinguishes creatures from God, in order peacefully to relate them, by recognizing the positivity of the uncreated and created manners in which God and created things actively identify themselves in order to differentiate themselves from one another. Being, which is thus the identity of identity and difference in a revised Hegelian sense, thus indeed shows itself to be the "place" that shelters human thinking and makes it possible.—Mark Wenzinger, *Saint Vincent College*.

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Phronêsis Transformed: From Aristotle to Heidegger to Ricœur,
THOMAS P. HOHLER

The article begins with Aristotle's discussion of *phronesis* for ethical life, only to discover the absence of a universal dimension. This issue of parochialism as opposed to a kind of universalism is a structural element of this paper. Secondly, Heidegger's ontological interpretation of *phronesis* creatively transforms *phronesis* to highlight a tension between ethics and fundamental ontology—a tension overcome in the paper's third section devoted to Ricœur. Thus, Ricœur's post-critical *phronesis* is shown to possess a universal dimension while disclosing ontologically. *Phronesis* responds to the need for universalization to overcome the parochial limitation but also incorporates an ontological disclosive power. Ricœur's post-critical *phronesis* is a plural, collective, and public argumentation. *Phronesis* is inventive and productive in resolving conflicts between legitimate universal claims or demands and is ontological.

Anselm and His Islamic Contemporaries on Divine Necessity and Eternity, KATHERIN ROGERS

Anselm holds that God is simple, eternal, and immutable, and that He creates "necessarily"—He "must" create this world. Avicenna and Averroes made the same claims, and derived as entailments that God neither knows singulars nor interacts with the spatio-temporal universe. Here, Katherin Rogers argues that Anselm avoids these unpalatable consequences by being the first philosopher to adopt, clearly and consciously, a four-dimensionalist understanding of time, in which all of time is genuinely present to divine eternity. This enables him to defend the divine perfections in question, and the claim that God creates "necessarily," while still maintaining the position that God knows singulars and acts in the physical world—in one, immutable, and eternal act.

*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

The Moral Status of Anger: Thomas Aquinas and John Cassian,
MICHAEL ROTA

Is anger at another person ever a morally excellent thing? Two competing answers to this question can be found in the Christian intellectual tradition. John Cassian held that anger at another person is never morally virtuous. Aquinas, taking an Aristotelian line, maintained that anger at another person is sometimes morally virtuous. In this paper the author explores the positions of Cassian and Aquinas on this issue. The core of his paper consists in a close examination of two arguments given by Aquinas in support of his view. The first involves the usefulness of anger in the moral life; the second focuses on the nature of the human being as a composite of soul and body.

On the Difference Between Social Justice and Christian Charity,
JAMES M. JACOBS

The notion of justice implies that what is given is owed to the recipient; charity, on the other hand, acknowledges the reality of a free gift that is not owed to the recipient. This difference is obscured in contemporary liberal societies where, because of the absence of transcendent metaphysical commitments, the demands of social justice replace charity. A Thomistic analysis, however, recognizes a metaphysical order as the basis for justice. This order limits the sphere of justice and so allows for acts of charity motivated by love for God. If we do not recognize this distinction, we reduce all charitable acts to acts of justice and therefore ignore the most important debt of all: the debt humans owe to God that can only be repaid by loving Him and our neighbor.

Grace and the New Man: Conscious Humiliation and the Revolution of Disposition in Kant's Religion, JOSHUA SCHULZ

Kant's discussion of radical evil and moral regeneration in *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone* raises numerous moral and metaphysical problems. If the ground of one's disposition does not lie in time, as Kant argues, how can it be reformed, as the moral law commands? If divine aid is necessary for this impossible reformation, how does this not destroy a person's moral personality by bypassing her freedom? This paper argues that these problems can be resolved by showing how Kant can conceive the moral law itself as kind of grace which, willed properly, makes moral regeneration possible without destroying the autonomy of the individual.

Ends, Means, and Character: Recent Critiques of the Intended-Versus-Foreseen Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect,
H. M. GIEBEL

In this essay H. M. Giebel first provides a brief explanation of the principle of double effect (PDE) and the propositions that it entails regarding the distinction between intention and foresight (I/F distinction) and the distinction's relevance to ethical evaluation. Then he addresses several recent cri-

tiques of PDE and the I/F distinction by influential ethicists including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and Jonathan Bennett. Giebel argues that none of these critiques is successful. In the process of refuting the critiques, he also gives *prima facie* reason to believe that the I/F distinction is relevant to evaluation of agents and their actions and that PDE is a defensible ethical principle.

Evil as Such is a Privation: A Reply to John Crosby, PATRICK LEE

Patrick Lee replies to an article in the ACPA *Proceedings* of 2001 by John Crosby in which he challenged the position that evil as such is a privation. Each of his arguments attempts to present a counterexample to the privation position. His first argument, claiming that annihilation is evil but not a privation, fails to consider that a privation need not be contemporaneous with the subject suffering the privation. Contrary to his second argument, Lee explains that the repugnance of pain is consistent with its being good in the appropriate context. Against his third argument Lee contends that he mistakenly supposes that a choice's being opposed to the good is incompatible with its being evil because of a disorder. Lee concludes by briefly reviewing one central argument for the privation position and contrast it with Crosby's arguments, which, in addition to their other problems, fail to specify any intensional content, beyond repugnance in the case of pain, for the concept of evil.

Doubts About the Privation Theory That Will Not Go Away: Response to Patrick Lee, JOHN F. CROSBY

Towards the end of his response to Crosby, Lee presents an argument for the necessity of interpreting all evil as privation. Crosby counters this argument by showing that it works only for what he calls "formal" good and evil, but not for what he calls "contentful" good and evil. In fact, evil that is "contentful" presents a challenge to the privation theory that Crosby had not discussed in his article. Crosby then proceeds, in the second part of his response, to revisit the three cases of evil that in his original paper he had presented as challenges to the privation theory. Crosby engage Lee's objections to these three counterexamples and tries to explain in a new way why the principle of badness in each of them, especially in pain/suffering and in moral evil, is not just a lack or a deficiency.

Desire and Self-knowledge, JORDI FERNANDEZ

In this paper, Jordi Fernandez proposes an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, Fernandez distinguishes several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, he makes the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Fernandez then argues that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, he compares this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.

Laws, Explanation, Governing and Generation, BARRY M. WARD

Advocates and opponents of Humean Supervenience (HS) have neglected a crucial feature of nomic explanation: laws can explain by generating descriptions of possibilities. Dretske and Armstrong have opposed HS by arguing that laws construed as Humean regularities cannot explain, but their arguments fail precisely because they neglect to consider this generating role of laws. Humeans have dismissed the intuitive violations of HS manifested by John Carroll's Mirror Worlds as erroneous, but distinguishing the laws' generating role from the non-Humean notion that laws govern undermines such responses, and renews the force of Carroll's critique of HS. However, it also undermines the assumption that HS is constitutive of Humeanism. The generating role of laws readily motivates a non-reductive Humeanism that violates HS. An account is sketched, and is seen to provide a novel explanation of the governing intuition.

Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants,
FRANCESCO PAOLI

Francesco Paoli discusses paradoxes of implication in the setting of a proof-conditional theory of meaning for logical constants. He argues that a proper logic of implication should be not only relevant, but also constructive and nonmonotonic. This leads him to select as a plausible candidate **LL**, a fragment of linear logic that differs from **R** in that it rejects both contraction and distribution.

Superlongevity and Utilitarianism, MARK WALKER

Peter Singer has argued that there are good utilitarian reasons for rejecting the prospect of superlongevity: developing technology to double (or more) the average human lifespan. Mark Walker argues against Singer's view on two fronts. First, empirical research on happiness indicates that the later years of life are (on average) the happiest, and there is no reason to suppose that this trend would not continue if superlongevity were realized. Second, it is argued that there are good reasons to suppose that there will be a certain amount of self-selection: the happiest are more likely to adopt superlongevity technology. This means that the adoption of superlongevity technology will have the effect of raising the level of aggregate utility.

The Illusion of Transparency, LAURA SCHROETER

It is generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. Here, Laura Schroeter argues that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.

The Phenomenal Sorites and Response Dependence, DALIA DRAI

Since Nelson Goodman [1951], the assumption that phenomenal indiscriminability is non-transitive is taken generally for granted. Moreover, this assumption was used (by Goodman [1951], Travis [1985], Dummett [1975] and others) to argue against the existence or coherence of subjective and/or observational properties. Recently, however, the assumption has been questioned [Fara 2001] and Dalia Drai agrees with Fara that the assumption is much more problematic than was thought, partly because it is not clear what is meant by the relation of phenomenal indiscriminability, and partly because it is not clear how to interpret ideas such as continuous change, and the limitations of our power of perceptual discrimination.

In this paper, Drai will bypass the question of the transitivity of phenomenal indiscriminability. Drai will use only the assumption about the existence (or even the possibility of existence) of a phenomenal sorites. This assumption is less controversial, and accepted (at least the version Drai will use) by opponents and defenders of transitivity alike. Drai will argue that the incoherence of 'red' (as response-dependent or purely observational) can be derived without committing ourselves to a view on the question of transitivity, will use this incoherence, to argue against the account of 'red' as a response-dependent concept.

A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism, NIKK EFFINGHAM and JONATHAN ROBSON

In this paper, Effingham and Robson argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. They argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory.

Non-Reductionism and Special Concern, JENS JOHANNSSON

The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar prob-

lems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper Johannsson challenges this widely held assumption.

Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct from Ordinary Wrongdoing?,
LUKE RUSSELL

Adam Morton, Stephen de Wijze, Hillel Steiner, and Eve Garrard have defended the view that evil action is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. By this, they do not mean that evil actions feel different to ordinary wrongs, but that they have motives or effects that are not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs. Despite their professed intentions, Morton and de Wijze both offer accounts of evil action that fail to identify a clear qualitative difference between evil and ordinary wrongdoing. In contrast, both Steiner's and Garrard's accounts of evil do point to qualitative distinctions between kinds of action, but it is implausible that either account correctly characterizes evil. The most plausible accounts maintain that evil actions have a necessary connection to extreme harms, and this suggests that evil is not qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing.

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On Burying the Dead: Funerary Rites and the Dialectic of Freedom and Nature in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, DAVID
CIAVATTA

Hegel's specific interpretation of burial rituals in the *Phenomenology* is an important part of his general understanding of the development of human freedom and of spirit. For Hegel, freedom is not something immediately given, but something that must be realized by way of the self's ongoing practical engagement with the world, and in particular by way of the self's transformation of the otherwise meaningless realm of nature into a vehicle for realizing a specifically human meaning. The practice of burial rites is construed as accomplishing such a transformation, and thereby as a crucial manner in which this dialectic between freedom and nature is played out. Attention is paid to Hegel's conception of the earth as the material condition for freedom's self-realization, and the symbolic dimension of burial rites is shown to have implications for Hegel's overall theory of human agency.

Relational Evil, Relational Good: Thomas Aquinas and Process Thought, CATHERINE JACK DEAVEL

In the paper, Catherine Jack Deavel first demonstrates that certain process philosophers and Aquinas hold extremely similar notions of evil. Whitehead and Hartshorne parallel Aquinas in understanding evil as relational, as a

conflict of goods, and as a necessary element in a larger good. On this last point, process philosophers contend that traditional theists must either reject the claim of God's omnipotence or admit that an omnipotent God would be responsible for evil, including moral evil. The author responds that Aquinas's distinction between physical and moral evil moves beyond the process position and avoids the conclusion that God's omnipotence must be abandoned. She argues that (1) the process position does not take proper account of Aquinas's claim that the cause of evil is a negation and (2) the initial criticism relies on a distinction between moral and physical evil that process philosophy cannot make.

Richard Rufus's Reformulations of Anselm's Proslogion Argument,
RICHARD DE WITT and R. JAMES LONG

In a Sentences Commentary written about 1250 the Franciscan Richard Rufus subjects Anselm's argument for God's existence in his *Proslogion* to the most trenchant criticism since Gaunilon wrote his response on behalf of the "fool." Anselm's argument is subtle but sophistical, claims Rufus, because he fails to distinguish between signification and supposition. Rufus therefore offers five reformulations of the Anselmian argument, which the authors of this paper restate in modern formal logic and four of which they claim are valid, the fifth turning on a possible scribal error. Rufus's final conclusion is that the formulation in *Proslogion*, chapter 3, is convincing, but not that of chapter 2.

Confucian Ethics as Role-Based Ethics, A. T. NUYEN

For many commentators, Confucian ethics is a kind of virtue ethics. However, there is enough textual evidence to suggest that it can be interpreted as an ethics based on rules, consequentialist as well as deontological. Against these views, A. T. Nuyen argues that Confucian ethics is based on the roles that make an agent the person he or she is. Further, Nuyen argues that in Confucianism the question of what it is that a person ought to do cannot be separated from the question of what it is to be a person, and that the latter is answered in terms of the roles that arise from the network of social relationships in which a person stands. This does not mean that Confucian ethics is unlike anything found in Western philosophy. Indeed, Nuyen shows that many Western thinkers have advanced a view of ethics similar to the Confucian ethics as he interprets it.

Hutcheson's Painless Imagination and the Problem of Moral Beauty,
AARON SZYMKOWIAK

A peculiar feature of Hutcheson's system is his claim that there exist no original pains in the imagination, and hence no real displeasures concerning form or beauty. This position, when set against a clear emphasis upon the pains of the moral sense in apprehending evil, seems to render tenuous his frequent analogies between the experiences of beauty and goodness. In light of this apparent discrepancy in Hutcheson's argument, the repeated use of

the term "moral beauty" presents interpretive difficulties, particularly on the matter of whether, and in what way, goodness is itself a species of beauty. These problems can be surmounted by way of close attention to Hutcheson's connection and ordering of the various "senses." On the present interpretation, Hutcheson denies formal displeasure as part of a broader theological argument concerning the moral function of the imagination. On this view, "moral beauty" is a special type of imaginative pleasure.

Human Person and Freedom according to Karol Wojtyla, RAFAL K. WILK

Karol Wojtyla—the future pope John Paul II—chose the human being, especially in its personalistic dimension, as the main point of his philosophical research. In accordance with the metaphysical rule *agere sequitur esse*, he investigated the dynamisms proper to a human being: the reactive dynamism of the human body, the emotive dynamism of the human psyche, and the personalistic dynamism associated with free choice of the will. These allowed him to experience and understand the human being as a complex yet integrated entity. The personal structure of the human being is manifest in terms of self-possession, self-determination, and self-governance. Thanks to self-possession, human beings experience freedom of the will, which expresses itself in each free act. Being endowed with a free will, the human being is able to grow in freedom but can also lose his freedom. Wojtyla's philosophical investigations are innovative by way of the use that he made of the philosophy of being according to Thomas Aquinas and the philosophy of consciousness articulated by Husserl. He not only pointed out man's structure but also presented man as an objective entity in an objective world. Each human being is constituted by his or her inner self, which is absolutely exceptional because it is completely irreducible to anything else in the world.

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Ethical Experience and the Motives for Practical Rationality: A Kantian/Levinasian Criticism of McDowell's Ethics, MICHAEL D. BARBER

John McDowell's ethical writings interpret ethical experience as intentional, socially-conditioned, virtuous responsiveness to situations and develop a modest account of practical rationality. His work converges with investigations of ethical experience by recent Kant scholars (Sherman, Brewer, Herman) and Emmanuel Levinas. The Kantian interpreters and Levinas locate the categorical demands of ethical experience in rational agents' demands for respect, while McDowell finds it in noble adherence to the demands of virtuous living. For McDowell, moral-practical rational efforts to justify ethics cannot transcend one's form of life and are motivated by desires

to coerce others under a veneer of rationality or an unnecessary modern anxiety to protect community beliefs. He overlooks how such justifications can be motivated by a desire to give an account of one's beliefs out of responsibility to others different from oneself, a responsibility elicited by others in ethical experience as depicted by the Kantian interpreters and Levinas.

The Relativist Challenge to Comparative Philosophy, EWING CHINN

The claim that there are incommensurable conceptual schemes through which different cultures see the world (or see *their* worlds) poses a challenge to the viability of comparative philosophy that cannot be easily dismissed. Donald Davidson's famous attack on the very idea of alternative conceptual schemes through his rejection of the "third dogma of empiricism," the dogma of the absolute distinction between scheme and content, has never been very well understood. Ewing Chinn will argue that the rejection of the dogma enables Davidson to adopt a realist position (as opposed to the anti-realist position of Rorty, who endorses the rejection) and forms the basis for his theory of radical interpretation, supported by his "principle of charity." Chinn will use John Dewey's "postulate of immediate empiricism" to explain Davidson's views. Together they provide a way to meet the challenge of conceptual relativism.

Dewey's Conception of Mind in Contemporary Debate, JAMES CRIPPEN

This paper considers the contemporary relevance of John Dewey's ideas concerning mind, the mind-body debate, and the mind-world debate. Adequately laid out, a Deweyan conception of mind will reveal features that challenge three of the most persistent implications of current theories of mind, namely, that the mind is disembodied, passive, and disconnected from the world. As an alternative, James Crippen identifies three features implicit in Dewey's writing that present the mind as embodied, actively focused, and fluid in relation to the world. Crippen also briefly considers past attempts to outline a Deweyan conception of mind. This consideration shows that none of these accounts adequately addresses all three of the features targeted here and thus that there is a possibility for a better account of the Deweyan conception of mind.

The Precepts of the Decalogue and the Problem of Self-Evidence, JAMES JACOBS

There is a dilemma at the heart of the moral life, in that we often appeal to the Decalogue as being the basis of a common morality, yet it is impossible to justify these precepts as self-evident. James Jacobs resolves this dilemma in light of Aquinas's analysis of the relation between the self-evident precepts of the natural law and the Decalogue. The self-evident precepts (that man should live in society and should know and love God) follow directly from human nature. The precepts of the Decalogue indicate how those goods are to be pursued in the context of just social relations. It is this contextualiza-

tion in terms of just relations that prevents them from being self-evident and, correspondingly, requires their revelation. Since the commandments act as invitations to pursue the good without the defects of injustice, they are the most manifest condition for achieving the end of human happiness.

Forbidding Intentional Mutilation: Some Unintended Consequences? HEIDI GIEBEL

In a recent *IPQ* article, Christopher Kaczor gave a promising argument in which he strove to reconcile the common belief that obstetric craniotomy (the crushing of nearly-born fetuses' heads) is immoral with his clear and intuitively attractive account of intention. One of Kaczor's crucial assumptions is that intentional mutilation is morally impermissible. In this article Heidi Giebel argues that Kaczor's analysis has three potential problems: (1) the mutilating features of craniotomy do not appear to meet Kaczor's criteria for being intended, so his account doesn't show craniotomy to be impermissible; (2) some commonly-accepted acts, including voluntary sterilization, are acts of intentional mutilation according to Kaczor's definition and are thus forbidden on his account; and (3) some acts that intuitively seem to constitute intentional mutilation do not meet Kaczor's definition of "mutilation" and are not ruled out by his account. Giebel suggests slight modifications to Kaczor's account that might address these difficulties.

Intention, Foresight, and Mutilation: A Response to H. M. Giebel, CHRISTOPHER KACZOR

According to H. M. Giebel, at least three difficulties arise for the author's view of intention, foresight, and mutilation. First, he must either give up his account of the intention/foresight distinction or conclude that obstetric craniotomy does *not* constitute mutilation. Secondly, his account of the intention/foresight distinction leads to counter-intuitive conclusions such as that surgical sterilization is impermissible but removal of non-functioning limbs against the will of the possessor is morally permissible. Thirdly, she suggests that his account of mutilation is incomplete for it rests on an understanding of "health" that is not adequately specified. In this paper, Christopher Kaczor argues that his original accounts of both the intention/foresight distinction and mutilation can, nevertheless, still be defended.

No Man Is an Island: Nature and Neo-Platonic Ethics in Hayy Ibn Yaqzän, TANELI KUKKONEN

Ibn Tufayl's story of the solitary philosopher Hayy who, aided only by the power of his natural reason, comes to his own on an uninhabited equatorial island, attractively portrays the neo-Platonic worldview of the Muslim *falasifah*. At the same time it forces to the foreground the most trenchant problem in any intellectualist ethics. If the highest virtue consists in the un-mixed contemplative life, what good can a thinker *do* any longer, in any more mundane context? In this article, a reading is proposed that integrates Hayy's cosmological explorations with his relations towards nature and his fellow human beings.

Religion in Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, JAMES A. HARRIS

It is shown that belief in providence and a future state are key components of Hutcheson's account of moral virtue. Though Hutcheson holds that human beings are naturally virtuous, religion is necessary to give virtuous dispositions support and stability. The aspects of Hutcheson's moral psychology which lead him to this conclusion are spelled out in detail. It is argued that religion and virtue are connected in this way in both the Dublin writings (the *Inquiry* and the *Essay*) and the later pedagogical texts, and that, therefore, there are reasons to question claims made by James Moore to the effect that Hutcheson had two distinct philosophical "systems."

Enlightenment and Freedom, JONATHAN PETERSON

Kant's main concern in his famous essay on enlightenment is the relation between enlightenment and the political order. His account of this relation turns on the idea of the freedom of public reason. This paper develops a new interpretation of Kant's concept of public reason. First, it argues that Kant conceives of public reasoning as a matter of speaking in one's own name to the commonwealth of the public. Second, it draws on Kant's republican conception of freedom in order to develop an account of the grounds of the freedom of public reason. It argues that the state's duty with respect to public reason is an aspect of its duty to protect the independence of citizens. Contrary to what is commonly thought, this duty is not an obligation to refrain from interfering in the sphere of public reason. The state may have a positive, though limited, role to play in enlightenment.

Race, Difference, and Anthropology in Kant's Cosmopolitanism, TODD HEDRICK

This paper explores the connections between Kant's theory of hierarchical racial difference, on the one hand, and his cosmopolitanism and conceptions of moral and political progress, on the other. Todd Hedrick argues that Kant's racial biology plays an essential role in maintaining national-cultural differences, which he views as essential for the establishment of the cosmopolitan union. Unfortunately, not only are these views racist, they also complicate Kant's ability to consistently think through the prospect of the human

species' moral progress. Thus, while in the abstract, Kant's attempts to understand the prospects for moral and political progress as rooted in historical reality, and his insistence that such progress is necessarily connected to the persistence of cultural difference, is appealing, his own way of carrying this out is decidedly not, being so intimately connected to racial hierarchy as a basic source of difference.

Romantic Cosmopolitanism: Novalis's "Christianity or Europe,"
PAULINE KLEINGELD

German Romanticism is commonly associated with nationalism rather than cosmopolitanism. Against this standard picture, Pauline Kleingeld argues that the early German romantic author, Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772–1801) holds a decidedly cosmopolitan view. Novalis's essay "Christianity or Europe" has been the subject of much dispute and puzzlement ever since he presented it to the Jena romantic circle in the fall of 1799. On the basis of an account of the philosophical background of Novalis's romanticism, Kleingeld shows that the image of the Middle Ages sketched in "Christianity or Europe" plays a *symbolic* role and should not be taken as a literal description of the historical past or as a blueprint for the future. Rather, the romantic picture of medieval Europe serves to evoke poetically the ideal of a cosmopolitan re-unification of humanity.

Between Enlightenment and Romanticism: Some Problems and Challenges in Gadamer's Hermeneutics, KRISTIN GJESDAL

The essay takes as its point of departure the way in which the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer has recently been adopted by philosophers such as Richard Rorty, John McDowell, and Robert Brandom. While appreciating the way in which *Truth and Method* has gained new relevance within an Anglo-American context, Kristin Gjesdal asks whether sufficient attention has been paid to Gadamer's romantic heritage. In particular she questions the way in which his notion of tradition and historical truth, designed as it is to overcome the ramifications of Descartes and the Kantian enlightenment, is modeled on the example of art and aesthetic experience.

Glasgow's Conception of Kantian Humanity, RICHARD DEAN

In "Kant's Conception of Humanity," Joshua Glasgow defends a traditional reading of the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Specifically, he opposes taking good will to be the end in itself, and instead argues that the end in itself must be some more minimal "rational capacity." Most of Glasgow's article is directed against some arguments that Richard Dean has given in favor of taking the end in itself to be a good will, or the will of a rational being who is committed to morality. In this response to Glasgow, Dean both considers Glasgow's main points, and proposes some general strategies for avoiding common interpretive pitfalls in discussing the humanity formulation.

MIND

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Syntax, More or Less, JOHN COLLINS

Much of the best contemporary work in the philosophy of language and content makes appeal to the theories developed in generative syntax. In particular, there is a presumption that—at some level and in some way—the structures provided by syntactic theory mesh with or support our conception of content/linguistic meaning as grounded in our first-person understanding of our communicative speech acts. This paper will suggest that there is no such tight fit. Its claim will be that, if recent generative theories are on the right lines, syntactic structure provides both too much and too little to serve as the structural partner for content, at least as that notion is generally understood in philosophy. The paper will substantiate these claims by an assessment of the recent work of King, Stanley, and others.

Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Scepticism, MICHAEL DELLA ROCCA

Spinoza's response to a certain radical form of scepticism has deep and surprising roots in his rationalist metaphysics. Here, Michael della Rocca argues that Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to his naturalistic rejection of certain sharp, inexplicable bifurcations in reality such as the bifurcations that a Cartesian system posits between mind and body and between will and intellect. He shows how Spinoza identifies and rejects a similar bifurcation between the representational character of ideas or mental states and the epistemic status of these ideas, a bifurcation to which Spinoza sees the radical sceptic committed. Spinoza's rejection of this bifurcation helps to explain some of his most cryptic statements concerning scepticism and also reveals a promising and highly metaphysical strategy for understanding and responding to scepticism.

On Telling and Trusting, PAUL FAULKNER

A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to be truthful and demonstrate certain reactive attitudes if they are not. Trust and the accompanying willingness to these reactive attitudes can then pro-

vide speakers with a reason to be trustworthy. So through ignoring interlocutors' engagement with the communicative process, the existing debate misses the possibility that it is an audience's trusting a speaker that makes it reasonable for the audience to accept what the speaker says.

A Tale of Two Envelopes, BERNARD D. KATZ and DORIS OLIN

This paper deals with the two-envelope paradox. Two main formulations of the paradoxical reasoning are distinguished, which differ according to the partition of possibilities employed. The authors argue that in the first formulation the conditionals required for the utility assignment are problematic; the error is identified as a fallacy of conditional reasoning. They go on to consider the second formulation, where the epistemic status of certain singular propositions becomes relevant; our diagnosis is that the states considered do not exhaust the possibilities. Thus, on their approach to the paradox, the fallacy, in each formulation, is found in the reasoning underlying the relevant utility matrix; in both cases, the paradoxical argument goes astray before one gets to questions of probability or calculations of expected utility.

Understanding Mixed Quotation, MARK MCCULLAGH

It has proved challenging to account for the dual role that a directly quoted part of a 'that'-clause plays in so-called mixed quotation. The Davidsonian account, elaborated by Cappelen and Lepore, handles many cases well; but it fails to accommodate a crucial feature of mixed quotation: that the part enclosed in quotation marks is used to specify not what the quoter says when she utters it, but what the quoted speaker says when she utters it. Here, Mark McCullagh shows how the Davidsonian can do better. The proposal rests on the idea that mixed quotation involves deferred demonstration: a mixed quotation specifies what the subject says partly by demonstrating the quoter's utterance of the unquoted part and partly by deferred-demonstrating the subject's utterance of the quotation-marked part.

Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended,
MARK TEXTOR

Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper Textor provides arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why Frege held the hybrid proper name view, he defends it against recent criticism, and argues that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties.

Epistemic Modals, SETH YALCIN

Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's paradox. Seth Yalcin here sets out the puzzling phenomena, explains why a standard relational semantics for these operators cannot handle them, and recommends an alternative semantics. A pragmatics appropriate to the semantics is developed and interactions between the semantics, the pragmatics, and the definition of consequence are investigated. The semantics is then extended to probability operators. Some problems and prospects for probabilistic representations of content and context are explored.

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Turtles All The Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality,
ROSS P. CAMERON

Cameron addresses an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, that is, that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. He discusses applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley's regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. Cameron discusses some arguments for the intuition, but argues that they are unconvincing. He concludes by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification he thinks best.

Identity Over Time: Objectively, Subjectively, BAS C. van FRAASEN
and ISABELLE PESCHARD

In the philosophy of science, identity over time emerges as a central concern both as an ontological category in the interpretation of physical theories, and as an epistemological problem concerning the conditions of possibility of knowledge. In Reichenbach and subsequent writers on the problem of indistinguishable quantum particles the authors see the return of a contrast between Leibniz and Aquinas on the subject of individuation. The possibility of rejecting the principle of the identity of indiscernibles has certain logical difficulties, leading us inexorably from ontology into epistemology. For the epistemological problem we attend to the differences that emerged between the (neo-) Kantian and logical empiricist traditions, also saliently displayed in Reichenbach's writings. After examining the contrast between Kant's and Leibniz's conceptions of empirical knowledge, specifically with respect to the irreducibility of spatiotemporal determinations, the authors explore an application of a neo-Kantian view to the same problem of indistinguishable quantum particles.

McGinn On Existence, PETER VAN INWAGEN

Van Inwagen compares the theory of existence and being (and of non-existence and non-being) presented in Colin McGinn's *Logical Properties* with those of well known predecessors such as Quine, Frege and Meinong. More recently, neo-Meinongians have held that being and existence are different concepts, and that although nothing lacks being, there are things which do not exist; possibilists have held that there are mere possibilities, things which possibly exist but do not actually exist. Van Inwagen examines a thesis advanced by McGinn which these two positions have also endorsed, namely, that there are things which do not exist. Van Inwagen surveys the function of 'existential quantification', and finally contend that the predicate 'does not exist' has at least three meanings, meanings which are determined by the context in which the predicate occurs and which are importantly different from one another.

Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence, ØYSTEIN LINNEBO

The notion of dependence figures prominently in recent discussions of non-eliminative mathematical structuralism. Structuralists often argue that mathematical objects from one and the same structure depend on one another and on the structure to which they belong. Their opponents often argue that there cannot be any such dependence. Here, Linnebo first shows that the structuralists' claims about dependence are more important to their view than is generally recognized. Then he defends a compromise view concerning the dependence relations between mathematical objects, according to which the structuralists are right about some mathematical objects but wrong about others. He ends with some remarks about the crucial notion of dependence.

A New Problem of the Many, NEIL MCKINNON

Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' has elicited many responses over the past quarter of a century. Here McKinnon presents a new problem of the many. This new problem, he claims, is resistant to the solutions currently on offer for Unger's problem.

Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism and Possible Worlds, BRADFORD SHAW

Possible-worlds talk obscures the debate about haecceitism, rather than clarifying it. Shaw distinguishes haecceitism and anti-haecceitism from other doctrines which sometimes go under those names. Then he defends the claim that any definition of 'haecceitism' using possible-worlds talk depends for its correctness on a substantive theory of the nature of possible worlds. This explains why using possible-worlds talk when discussing haecceitism causes confusion: the term will mean different things to parties who depend on different presuppositions about possible worlds.

The Extensionality of Parthood and Composition, ACHILLE C. VARZI

Varzi focuses on three mereological principles: the extensionality of parthood (EP), the uniqueness of composition (UC), and the extensionality of composition (EC). These principles are not equivalent. Nevertheless they are closely related (and often equated), since they all reflect the basic nominalistic dictum 'No difference without a difference maker'. All of them, individually or collectively, have been challenged on philosophical grounds. In the first part Varzi argues that such challenges do not quite threaten (EP), because they are either self-defeating or unsupported. In the second part he argues that they do little to undermine the tenability of (UC) and (EC) either.

Multiple Actualities and Ontically Vague Identity, J. R. G. WILLIAMS

Although the Evans argument against vague identity has been much discussed, proposals for blocking it have not so far satisfied general conditions which any solution ought to meet. Moreover, the relation between ontically vague identity and ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been satisfactorily addressed. Here, Williams advocates a way of resisting the Evans argument which satisfies the conditions. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity, he develops a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities. This provides a principled approach to ontically vague identity which is unaffected by the Evans argument.

PHILOSOPHY

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God, Physicalism, and the Totality of Facts, ANDREA CHRISTOFIDOU

The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible way forward in the search for an understanding of both physical and mental reality is a recognition of the mind as a metaphysically distinct entity.

The Concept of Moral Obligation: Anscombe contra Korsgaard,
MARIA ALVAREZ AND AARON RIDLEY

A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, the authors think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, Alvarez and Ridley try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument.

Hume's Sceptical Materialism, STEPHEN BUCKLE

The paper argues that Hume's philosophy is best described as sceptical materialism. It is argued that the conjunction is not self-contradictory as long as 'scepticism' is understood in its ancient sense, as the denial of knowledge of the essences of things. It is further argued that scepticism (thus understood) and materialism are natural bedfellows, since a thoroughgoing materialism denies any special status to human rational powers. The content of the *Treatise of Human Nature* is then shown to conform to this understanding: the *Treatise* consistently employs an implicitly materialist faculty psychology in order to arrive at its sceptical standpoint. Finally, it is shown that Hume's philosophy can be understood to be a sceptical rewriting of the dogmatic materialism of Hobbes.

The Other Side of Agency, SORAN READER

In our philosophical tradition and our wider culture, we tend to think of persons as agents. This agential conception is flattering, but in this paper Reader will argue that it conceals a more complex truth about what persons are. In (1) he sets the issues in context. In (2) he critically explores four features commonly presented as fundamental to personhood in versions of the agential conception: action, capability, choice and independence. In (3) he argues that each of these agential features presupposes a non-agential feature: agency presupposes patiency, capability presupposes incapability, choice presupposes necessity and independence presupposes dependency. In (4) he argues that such non-agential features, as well as being implicit within the agential conception, are as apt to be constitutive of personhood as agential features, and in (5) he concludes.

Nature and Natural Kinds, GUY ROBINSON

The paper examines the character and historical source of the mystifications of the notions of Nature and Natural Kinds in the misguided attempt to turn Nature into a secular substitute for the role played by God in the previous theological framework of thought in order to turn it into a secular one in the period of the rise of science and scientific understanding. The role and function nature was given in this would-be replacement framework turned it into a quasi-deity governing the world from outside and generated the mechanical world-view in which humans were mere cogs.

Against this is set Aristotle's conception of Nature and the Natural as simply 'what happens by and large and for the most part'—a description and not an explanation.

Truths, Facts and Values, LLOYD REINHARDT

The paper suggests a revival of the 17th century distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Some points are made which seem to me show it obviously false that a fact is merely a true proposition. Truths of fact, contingent truths, are rightly seen as corresponding to facts. Other truths, including ethical truths of right and wrong are, if true, necessarily true. In general, necessarily true statements, including those of mathematics are wrongly construed as factual.

Ethics and aesthetics, it is maintained, can be construed as noncognitive; but not because claims in these domains are other than claims to truth. They are, in large part, not claims to knowledge, which does not bar them from being claims to truth.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Frazer, JACQUES BOUVERESSE

This paper provides a systematic exposition of what Wittgenstein took to be the fundamental error committed by James George Frazer, author of the classic anthropological work *The Golden Bough*, in his account of ritual practices. By construing those rituals in scientific or rationalistic terms, as aimed at the production of certain effects, Frazer ignores, according to Wittgenstein, their expressive and symbolic dimension. It is, moreover, an error to try to explain the powerful emotions evoked even today by traditions such as fire festivals (which may once have involved human sacrifice) by searching for their causal origins in history or prehistory; the disquieting nature of such practices needs to be understood by attending to the inner meaning they already have in our human lives. Certain important general lessons are drawn about the necessarily limited power of scientific and causal explanations when it comes to alleviating many of our fundamental perplexities not just in the area of anthropology but in philosophy as well.

Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability, HANS-JOHANN GLOCK

This paper discusses conceptual relativism. The main focus is on the contrasting ideas of Wittgenstein and Davidson, with Quine, Kuhn, Feysabend and Hacker in supporting roles. Glock distinguishes conceptual from alethic and ontological relativism, defends a distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content, and rejects the Davidsonian argument against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes: there can be conceptual diversity without failure of translation, and failure of translation is not necessarily incompatible with recognizing a practice as linguistic. Conceptual relativism may be untenable, but not for the hermeneutic reasons espoused by Davidson.

'Back to the Rough Ground!' Wittgensteinian Reflections on Rationality and Reason, JANE HEAL

Wittgenstein does not talk much explicitly about reason as a general concept, but this paper aims to sketch some thoughts which might fit his later outlook and which are suggested by his approach to language. The need for some notions in the area of 'reason' and 'rationality' are rooted in our ability to engage in discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges. But because such exchanges can (as Wittgenstein emphasizes) be so various, we should expect the notions to come in many versions, shaped by history and culture. Awareness of this variety, and of the distinctive elements of our own Western European history, may provide some defense against the temptation of conceptions, such as that of 'perfect rationality', which operate in unhelpfully simplified and idealized terms.

Worlds or Words Apart? Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Language, GENIA SCHONBAUMSFELD

In this paper the author develops an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. She shows that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible—either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a 'doctrineless' form of life. The author offers a defense of Wittgenstein's conception against Kai Nielsen's charges that Wittgenstein removes the 'content' from religious belief and renders the religious form of life 'incommensurable' with other domains of discourse, thus immunizing it against rational criticism.

The Tightrope Walker, SEVERIN SCHROEDER

Contrary to a widespread interpretation, Wittgenstein did not regard credal statements as merely metaphorical expressions of an attitude towards life. He accepted that Christian faith involves belief in God's existence. At the same time he held that although as a hypothesis, God's existence is extremely implausible, Christian faith is not unreasonable. Is that a consistent

view? According to Wittgenstein, religious faith should not be seen as a hypothesis, based on evidence, but as grounded in a proto-religious attitude, a way of experiencing the world or certain aspects of it. A belief in religious metaphysics is not the basis of one's faith, but a mere epiphenomenon. Given further that religious doctrine is both falsification-transcendent and that religious faith is likely to have beneficial psychological effects, religious doctrine can be exempt from ordinary standards of epistemic support. An unsupported religious belief need not be unreasonable. However, it is hard to see how one could knowingly have such an unsupported belief, as Wittgenstein seems to envisage. How can one believe what, at the same time, one believes is not likely to be true? This, the author argues, is the unresolved tension in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.

Rules and Reason, JOACHIM SCHULTE


Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations (PI §§185–242) have often been discussed in terms of the debate occasioned by Kripke's interpretation of the so-called 'paradox' of rule-following. In the present paper, some of the remarks that stood in the centre of that debate are looked at from a very different perspective. First, it is suggested that these remarks are, among other things, meant to bring out that, to the extent we can speak of 'reason' in the context of rule-following, it is a very restricted form of reason—one which is basically to be understood as a kind of conformity. Second, by telling part of the story of the genesis of the relevant remarks it is pointed out that there is a certain tension between the 'liberating' character of earlier remarks bearing on rule-following (PI §§81ff.) and the 'sinister' side of later remarks like §§198–202, which helps explain why it took Wittgenstein such a long time to arrive at the views expressed in his rule-following considerations.

Rule Following without Reasons: Wittgenstein's Quietism and the Constitutive Question, CRISPIN WRIGHT

This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. Crispin Wright returns to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of his came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky, hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the *Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, 'the Rule-following Considerations'. The author begins by explaining his focus here.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Edward S. Casey has been nominated by the Nominating Committee of the Eastern Division of the APA for Vice President (who becomes President the next year). Casey has contributed to the *The Review* over the years. He is the author of many books, from *Imagining*, decades ago, to his most recent, *The World at a Glance*.



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
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
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
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
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ARISTOTLE'S DEFENSE OF THE THEORETICAL LIFE: COMMENTS ON *POLITICS* 7

DAVID ROOCHNIK

ARISTOTLE OPENS *POLITICS* 7, his discussion of the "best form of government" (*politeias aristēs*), which he later calls "the city according to prayer" (*kat'euchēn*), by informing his audience of his plan of attack.¹ Anyone who undertakes an inquiry into the ideal city must, he says, first determine what the most "choice-worthy life" is.² After all, "it is fitting for those who are best governed to act in the best way."³ To commence discussion of the nature of this best life he refers to

Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Boston University, 745 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215.

¹Aristotle, *Politics* (hereafter *Pol.*), 1323a14 and 1325b36. The Greek text is William David Ross' edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Translations are my own, unless noted otherwise. Translations by Richard Kraut, *Aristotle: Politics Books VII and VIII* (hereafter *APB*) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Carnes Lord, *Aristotle: The Politics* (hereafter *ATP*) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), and C. David Reeve *Aristotle: Politics* (hereafter *AP*) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998) have all been consulted. For a discussion of the phrase *kat'euchēn* see Richard Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy* (hereafter *APP*) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), who renders the phrase "a city that is the most one could hope or pray for" (p. 192). Also see Kraut (*APB*) for a defense of the claim that Book 7 offers a "description of the ideal city [that] must in some sense be realistic: it must be possible for such a city to exist" (52).

²One may, of course, object at the outset to Aristotle's procedure. Consider, for example, what John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 447–8, has to say: "Once the principles of justice are chosen . . . there is no need to set up the account of the good so as to force unanimity on all the standards of rational choice. In fact, it would contradict the freedom of choice that justice as fairness assures to individuals and groups within the framework of just institutions . . . Individuals find their good in different ways . . . This variety in the conceptions of the good is itself a good thing."

³Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323a1718. Kraut's (*APB*) translation is, "it is appropriate that those who should fare best who live under the best political system." Reeve (*AP*) is almost identical. Lord (*ATP*) does a better job: "it is appropriate for those who govern themselves best . . . to act in the best manner." He takes into proper account the fact that *tous arista politeuomenous* is the subject of *prattein*.

what he calls “the exoteric discourses,” which, whatever exactly they were, seem to have expressed basic ethical principles.⁴

Concerning one distinction, no one would disagree. There are three divisions [to be made within the best life]: external [goods], those of the body, and those of the soul. All of these must belong to those who are to be among the blessedly happy (*makariois*).⁵ For no one would say that the blessed man has no share of courage or moderation or of justice or practical wisdom, but is afraid of flies buzzing around, can resist nothing when he desires food or drink, destroys his dearest friends for a pittance, and is as foolish and prone to error when it comes to intellectual matters as a child or a madman. With these assertions everyone would agree.⁶

Aristotle is confident that no one would disagree that the best life requires possession of sufficient external goods (like money), a healthy body, and most important of all, the good which belongs to the “soul”; namely, “virtue” (*aretē*). He does not use this last word in the passage above, but his mention of courage, moderation, and so on, as well as the fact that he uses it shortly thereafter clearly indicate that “virtue” is what he has in mind.⁷

Even if it is granted that the best life requires virtue, it is not clear in what sort of virtue such a life consists. *Politics* 7.2 narrows the possibilities to two:

Which is the more choiceworthy life, that of engaging in political activity and sharing in the life of the city, or is it rather the life of the stranger (*ho xenikos*) whose ties to the political community have been dissolved?⁸

Among those who agree that the best life is most choiceworthy there is dispute whether the political and practical life is choiceworthy, or whether the life whose ties to all external matters have been dissolved—namely, the theoretical life, which some people say is the only life for a philosopher—is more choiceworthy. For it is nearly the case

⁴ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323a22. Lord (*APB*) states that a study of all of the references to Aristotle's ethical writings in the *Politics* “shows that all are demonstrably or arguably to the *Eudemian* rather than the *Nicomachean Ethics*” (19). Reeve (*AP*) says, that the “reference may be to lost works of Aristotle intended for a wider audience than the *Politics*” (76). In support he cites *Eudemian Ethics* 1217b22–3. Also see Kraut, *APB*, 53–4.

⁵ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter *NE*), 1101a6–8 and 1179a1–9 for the distinction between happiness (*eudaimonia*) and being “blessed.” The latter is free from misfortune.

⁶ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323a27–35.

⁷ See also, *ibid.*, 1323a36.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1324a14–17.

that the most honor-loving of men, both of the past and of the present, seem to choose these two lives when it comes to virtue. The two I mean are the political and the philosophical.⁹

From a long tradition, Aristotle inherits the view that there are two genuinely excellent forms of life: the theoretical-philosophical and the practical-political.¹⁰ In *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7–8 he argues unambiguously on behalf of the former. Most commentators think he is less straightforward here in the *Politics* 7.1. For example, Kraut says that Aristotle “does not decisively draw a conclusion about which is better.”¹¹ Reeve describes him as “cagey, dialectically balancing the claims on the political life against the philosophical, but not giving decisive precedence to either.”¹² Solmsen puts the point strongly by saying that “we have to accept the oscillations of Aristotle’s argument and the ambiguity of his conclusion; they are indicative of a deeper conflict between diverging tendencies and inclinations in his mind.”¹³ Miller concurs: “Aristotle’s discussion is somewhat inconclusive because he does not explicitly answer the question he has posed as to whether the best life is political and or philosophical.”¹⁴

Miller’s assertion is based on his reading of the following passage.

Some consider that the despotic rule over one’s neighbors involves the greatest injustice, while political rule, even if it does not involve

⁹ Ibid., 1324a25–32.

¹⁰ See Andrea Nightingale, *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), for a general introduction to the theory-practice issue in Greek thought. Throughout this paper the English theory and words related to it will be used to translate the Greek *theoria* and words related to it. For an explanation of why see David Roochnik, “What is *Theoria*? Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 10.7–8,” *Classical Philology* (forthcoming).

¹¹ Kraut, *APB*, 62. Kraut says that Aristotle here manifests “a reluctance to say unequivocally that a certain life is best for all” because he is leaving “open the possibility that the best life that can be achieved by nearly all of the citizens (a political life) is none the less inferior to a life that only a few of them can lead (a philosophical life)” (53). He later argues that Aristotle tries to show that “neither activity”—that is, neither philosophy nor politics—is “inherently flawed” (62). Reeve (*AP*) distinguishes between the best life and the best activity, and claims that while Aristotle does acknowledge that theoretical activity is best, he “does not tell us what the best life is” (p. xlv).

¹² Reeve, *AP*, xlv.

¹³ Friedrich Solmsen, “Leisure and Play in Aristotle’s Ideal State,” (hereafter LPA) *Rheinisches Museum fr Philologie*, 107 (1964): 196.

¹⁴ Fred Miller, *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics* (hereafter *NJR*) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 216.

injustice, nonetheless is an impediment to one's own well-being. Others hold nearly the opposite opinion. They consider the practical and political life the only one fitting for a man . . . Some have made this sort of judgment, while others say that the despotic and tyrannical form of government is the only happy one.¹⁵

Miller argues that because Aristotle here distinguishes the political from the tyrannical, which involves the performance of unjust acts of excessive possession towards one's neighbors, he leaves open the possibility that the political is a viable candidate for the title of best life.¹⁶ That Aristotle does indeed make this distinction is clear from his use of the phrase *despotikōs men . . . politikōs de* at 1324a36–37, and later material from Books 3 and 4.¹⁷

Such commentators are right in maintaining that Aristotle never explicitly argues on behalf of the theoretical life in *Politics* 7, and certainly does not do so in the same dramatic fashion he does in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10. Nonetheless, over the course of the entirety of Book 7 he comes down thoroughly and even decisively in favor of it. On this issue, then, the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are consistent.¹⁸ To explain and support this claim several segments of the sometimes choppy argument of *Politics* 7 must be examined.

I

As indicated above, Aristotle is confident that no one would disagree with his assertion that the best life requires possession of sufficient external goods, a healthy body, and virtue. Unfortunately, this rather optimistic picture of human agreement is immediately followed by an observation that, although expressed quietly, casts a shadow not only over the previous statements, but also (as we shall see below) over all of *Politics* 7.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1324a35–b3.

¹⁶ Miller, *NJR*, 215.

¹⁷ See, for example, Aristotle, *Pol.* 1279b5–10 and 1289b1.

¹⁸ There is thus no need to invoke the *deus ex machina* of chronology to explain this apparent inconsistency away as Kraut (*APB*) does when he claims that there is “a natural progression in Aristotle’s treatment of the rivalry between philosophy and politics. . . . The *Politics* . . . does not decisively come to a conclusion,” while the *Nicomachean Ethics* unambiguously “champions the philosophical life” (75).

With these assertions everyone would agree. Nonetheless, they differ on how much and what is preeminent. For while they consider any amount of virtue (*aretē*) to be sufficient, of wealth, money, power, reputation and all such things they seek an unlimited excess.¹⁹

While “everyone” (*pantes*) would agree that the best life requires virtue, “they” nonetheless subordinate concerns about virtue to the pursuit of money, power and fame.²⁰ “They” do so even though they know better. As we shall see below, “they” refers to “the many” (*hoi polloi*); that is, to most citizens, and the condition Aristotle (implicitly) attributes to them is “moral weakness” (*akrasia*): they know they should not do something bad, but do it anyway because they are overpowered by a passion.²¹ The morally weak are those who cannot abide by the conclusions of their own reasoning.²² As opposed to the genuinely vicious, their bad actions emanate from a passion or desire rather than from their basic character or from rational deliberation. Their knowledge of what they ought to do has temporarily gone to sleep and so their condition is similar to epilepsy.²³ When the “seizure” subsides, they will thus be “regretful” (*metamelētikos*).²⁴ Even when they do something wrong, after (*meta*) the fact the morally weak reveal that they care (*melein*) about doing what is right. As a result, even if they are diseased and do bad things they are still “curable.”²⁵

This diagnosis of the moral weakness of the citizenry dampens neither Aristotle’s confidence nor his apparent optimism.

We will say to them that it is easy (*raidion*) to reach a reliable conclusion about these matters by referring to what really happens (*dia tōn ergōn*). For we see that they do not acquire and then guard the virtues by means of the external goods, but the external goods by means of the virtues. Furthermore, it is more common for human beings to live happily, whether in pleasure or in virtue or in both, when they have an excess of

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323a34–8. In his translation Reeve (*AP*), adds “however small” to the phrase “any amount of virtue.” This has no basis in the text, but captures the sentiment of the sentence well.

²⁰ See also, Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323a34.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1324b32.

²² See also, Aristotle, *NE* 1145b11–14, 1150b27–8 and 1151a20–2.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1147a13, 1147b7 and 1150b34.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1150b30. See also, 1150a21

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1150b32. For a thorough treatment of moral weakness and its relationship to vice see David Roochnik, “Aristotle’s Account of the Vicious: A Forgivable Inconsistency,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 24(2007): 207–20.

character and thought but are moderate concerning the possession of external goods than it is for those who possess more money than is useful, but are lacking in character and thought.²⁶

Again, "they" refers to those many citizens who subordinate the pursuit of virtue to the quest for money, power and fame.²⁷ To "them" Aristotle offers what seems to be an empirical argument. If their strongest desires are for external goods, all of which are potentially "unlimited," they are doomed to unhappiness. No amount of money can be highest because there is always more money to be had. No amount of power or fame can be maximum, for even if one were to rule or be admired by all humanity, there would still be the gods left to conquer. Such goods themselves can supply no terminus point, no *telos*, to ground or even measure their worth. A life guided by them is thus infected with, as Durkheim put it, "a morbid desire for the infinite." The person living it "aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing."²⁸

Aristotle offers a theoretical argument (one that is *kata ton logon*) to accompany this empirical claim.²⁹ An external good is like a "tool" (*organon*); its value is instrumental.³⁰ As such, it must be used in order to become charged with value. Money, for example, is worthless if kept under a mattress. It must be spent. Since it can be spent either well or poorly, it can bring benefit or it can cause harm. In turn, how well it is spent can be measured according to some standard or "limit" (*peras*).³¹ If a man spends excessively on perfume the result may well be harmful both to himself and others. So too if he spends too little. Obviously, then, implicit in the argument is the notion of the "mean."³² When one seeks to acquire and then spend money the amount should be neither too much nor too little; it should be just right. Such a "mean" is rationally determinable by "practical wisdom," which in the scheme of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (6.5, 8–12) is an

²⁶ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323a24–23b6.

²⁷ In the Greek, the "they" is expressed only by means of verbs in the third-person plural.

²⁸ Émile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. John Spaulding (New York: Free Press, 1979), 271, is cited here because he too takes himself to be making empirical claims.

²⁹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323b6.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1323b8.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1323b7.

³² Note Aristotle's use of *metriazousin* at *ibid.*, 1323b4.

intellectual virtue and thus a form of "truthing" (*alētheuei*), a word which implies that the "mean" is objective and knowable.³³

An opponent, perhaps one of the "many" citizens who dedicate themselves to the pursuit of money, power and fame, could object here by denying that such a "mean" actually exists. If it did not, then "more" could well substitute for "better" and the external goods could thereby make it to the top rung of the ladder of desire. But Aristotle abruptly cuts off this possible debate:

The best life, both for individuals separately and for a city is a life of virtue sufficiently equipped with the resources needed to take part in virtuous actions. With regard to those who dispute this, we must ignore them in our present study, but investigate them later.³⁴

It is not clear why Aristotle suppresses this debate or to what later passages he might be referring.³⁵ In any case, at the end of *Politics* 7.1 Aristotle seems to have secured two propositions. First, the best life available to human beings must be determined in order to determine the nature of the ideal city. Second, the best life is the one lived in virtue. His confidence in these principles should, however, be tempered by his own earlier observation that even though "everyone" would agree with the second, and thereby acknowledge that they should not pursue external goods to the exclusion of virtue, they nonetheless "seek an unlimited excess of them." In short, many citizens suffer from moral weakness, a fact that will resonate through the remainder of the discussion.

II

Even if "everyone" agrees that the best life is spent in virtue rather than in the (endless and unsatisfying) quest for money, power and fame, it is not clear in what sort of virtue such a life consists. In *Politics* 7.2 the possibilities are narrowed to two: the political-practical and the philosophical-theoretical. Immediately after stating that "it makes no small difference which side has the truth," Aristotle abruptly begins a discussion of despotism: "some consider that the

³³ Aristotle, *NE* 1139b15.

³⁴ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1323b40–24a3.

³⁵ Lord, *ATP*, 266, tentatively suggests *Politics* 7.13.

despotic rule over one's neighbors involves the greatest injustice, while political rule, even if it does not involve injustice, nonetheless is an impediment to one's own well-being."³⁶ "Others hold nearly the opposite opinion. They consider the practical and political life the only one fitting for a man."³⁷ As mentioned above, Miller relies on this passage to support his claim that Aristotle does not eliminate the political life from the competition for "best" because he distinguishes it from the despotic life and thereby preserves its potential for virtue. This argument is unconvincing not least because Aristotle's next move is to focus exclusively on the evils of tyranny, which he does at some length.³⁸ For example, he says the following.

Thus while in most regimes most laws are, so to speak, random, in those cases where they do aim at some one thing all (*pantes*) aim for ruling (*kratein*). For example, in Sparta and Crete education and most of the laws have been devised with an eye to war. Furthermore, among all those nations, such as the Scythians, the Persians, the Thracians, and the Celts, which are capable of wanting more (*dunamenois pleonektei*), such power has been honored.³⁹

The laws of most regimes are haphazard, but—and this is an empirical claim—when cities have organized themselves with a specific purpose in mind, they "all" have aimed for domination over others. Such regimes suffer from *pleonexia* and their continual desire to have more drives them into expansionist policies. As a consequence their citizens are educated primarily in the art of war.⁴⁰

This lengthy passage should be puzzling and may well look like a digression. After all, the topic at hand is whether the practical-political or the theoretical-philosophical life is best, and yet Aristotle has gone into some detail on the nature of tyrannical regimes. One possibility, suggested by his claim that all regimes with an organized set of laws "aim for ruling," is that he is here conflating the political with the tyrannical. Miller, of course, would deny this and, on the one hand, there is support for his position. First, to reiterate an earlier point, in Books 3 and 4 Aristotle clearly distinguishes legitimate political re-

³⁶ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1324a33.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1324a35–40.

³⁸ See also, *ibid.*, 1324b3–25a15.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1324b4–11.

⁴⁰ For the purpose of this paper there is no need to inquire into the historical accuracy of Aristotle's claims about Sparta and Crete. See, however, Aristotle's earlier discussion of Sparta in *Pol.*, Book 2, especially 1271b2–6.

gimes from tyranny. Second, Aristotle does not offer this conflation in his own voice. Instead, he—in what Reeve would identify as his “cagey” dialectical manner—attributes it to “the many,” since it is they “who seem to believe that the despotic is the political.”⁴¹ But the many’s belief is not merely an abstract error in judgment that offers itself up as an exercise in dialectic. This is because the many are the citizens and so their belief that the “despotic is the political” is itself a political fact or reality. This implies that cities, constituted as they are by the many, have within themselves a tendency towards expansionism and the conquering of their neighbors.

To reformulate this point: the fact that the many believe that the despotic is the political is an extension on the political level of their moral weakness that Aristotle uncovered in *Politics* 7.1. Recall that even though “everyone” would agree that the best life requires virtue, “they” (“the many”) regularly subordinate a proper concern about virtue to the pursuit of money, power and fame. Bigger is better in their eyes, and so when it comes to the city, expansion is deemed the highest good. As a consequence cities, like their many citizens, tend towards the disease of moral weakness. They endlessly strive for more and more, and thus inevitably become excessive in their ambitions.

If the above is correct, the following argument, formulated as a *modus tollens*, can be extracted from *Politics* 7.2 and can explain why Aristotle here treats tyranny at such length: if the practical rather than the theoretical life were counted as the best life for an individual it would follow that expansionist cities like Sparta or Crete would have to be counted as the best regimes. This they are not. Hence, the practical life is not the best, and so the theoretical life wins the prize. The first premise of the proposed argument makes particularly good sense. If the practical life were counted as best, then the horizon for human activity would be the city itself. And if this were the case, if there were nothing beyond itself by which a city could be guided, then its activity would be restricted to the reproduction, extension or expansion of itself.

If the practical life were counted as best, then so too would expansionist regimes be best. But this they are not. We move next to a consideration of why they are not.

⁴¹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1324b32.

III

Regimes like Sparta and Crete seek to conquer their neighbors. Because their only purpose is to get bigger, they do so indiscriminately. This is where they go wrong.

It would be absurd if what is despotic and not despotic did not exist by nature. Therefore, if this is the case, there must be no attempt to rule over everybody, but only those who are fit to be ruled. This is analogous to the fact that one ought not to hunt human beings for food or sacrifice, but ought to hunt only that which is suited to this, namely those wild animals that are edible.⁴²

The key phrase here is "by nature." Just as some animals are fit to be eaten, some human beings are by nature fit to be ruled. Therefore, not all human beings are fit to be ruled. In turn, this implies that in its unlimited expansion, the tyrannical regime, in seeking to dominate all, is blind to the natural heterogeneity of a human population and so its actions are contrary to nature and thereby unjust.

This passage harks back to Aristotle's argument on behalf of natural slavery in *Politics* 1 in which he claims that the ruling-ruled relationship exists throughout nature.

In everything that has been conjoined from many and comes to be some one common thing, whether it comes from many things that are continuous or divided, a ruler and ruled appears. This is characteristic of the entirety of nature and belongs to living beings. Indeed, some rule is present even in nonliving things, like a chord.⁴³

The salient example of the ruler-ruled relationship in living things is that between soul and body: "one can first of all study despotic and political rule in an animal. For the soul rules the body with despotic rule."⁴⁴ Just as in a healthy animal the soul commands the body, so too in a healthy city the natural master commands the natural slave. In such a case, both parties are benefited. Indeed, this is the essential criterion by which to identify a natural slave: he must be benefited by his enslavement.⁴⁵ This he is because he is by nature constituted to receive orders.

⁴² Ibid., 1324b36–41.

⁴³ Ibid., 1254a28–33.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1254b4–5.

⁴⁵ See also, *ibid.*, 1254b16–25.

For being able to use thought to see ahead is characteristic of one who rules and is master by nature, while being able to labor with the body is characteristic of the one who is ruled and is by nature a slave. In this way, the interests of both master and slave are served.⁴⁶

The rational capacity of a natural slave is so limited that he does not have the foresight to make decisions for himself. He needs someone to think for him, which is precisely what the master does, and in doing so he benefits the slave.

This argument seems to run obviously afoul of our most cherished ideals of human dignity and equality. But before simply dismissing it as offensively and anachronistically elitist, the critic should first consider the role it plays in the argument. Lear has noted that because "Aristotle was the first political thinker to realize that slavery needed a defense" he was also the first to problematize the very institution of slavery.⁴⁷ Ambler makes the point more forcefully by arguing that Aristotle's teleologically based defense of natural slavery functions as a critique of slavery as actually found in the Greek world.⁴⁸ A standard Greek practice was to conquer a city, kill the men, and indiscriminately take the women and children as slaves. Therefore, as Ambler puts it, "Aristotle's natural master and natural slave establish standards which deny rather than establish the naturalness of actual slavery."⁴⁹ This contention is reinforced by the following passage:

There is both advantage and affection between the master and the slave when both are worthy of these designations by nature. When master-slave are not determined in this way, when the relationship exists by convention and has been instituted by force, the opposite is the case.⁵⁰

To be properly counted as natural, a slave must not only be objectively benefited by his master, but must also feel some affection for him. By contrast, in the conventional practices of actual Greek cities, which Aristotle implies are unjust, slaves conquered in war surely did not feel much affection for their masters. If affection is a necessary condition of being a natural slave, then such beings are certainly

⁴⁶ Ibid., 1251a31-3.

⁴⁷ Jonathan Lear, *The Desire to Understand* (hereafter DTU) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 197.

⁴⁸ Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery" (hereafter ANP), *Political Theory* 15 (1987): 390-410.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 398.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1255b13-15.

miniscule in number. In fact, it is even possible that Aristotle intends to define the natural slave out of existence. After all, the rational capacity of the putative natural slave seems to be so limited as to preclude any sort of deliberation about the future. But all human beings, except those whose brains are damaged, can do that.

The following statement reinforces this point: "Slaves by nature are those who differ to the same extent that the soul differs from the body, and a human being differs from a beast."⁵¹ On the basis of this analogy, a natural slave is not a real human being at all. At the very least, given Aristotle's criteria the number of natural slaves in any given population would have to be extremely small; so small, that he himself wonders whether one (*tis*) actually exists.⁵²

To sum up: "It would be absurd," Aristotle asserts, "if what is despotic and not despotic did not exist by nature."⁵³ If there were no distinction between higher and lower human beings, there would be no conceptual barrier to unlimited expansion. Because the distinction does exist (and because the number of natural slaves in any given population is extremely small), "there must be no attempt to rule over everybody," but only those who are fit to be ruled.⁵⁴

This critique of indiscriminate expansionism leads Aristotle to a discussion of the political role of the military.

It is clear that even though one must count all military pursuits as noble (*kalas*), they are not to be taken to be the highest *telos* of all. Instead, they are for the sake of the highest *telos*. Seeing how the city and the human species and every other community might share in the good life and in the happiness that is available to them is the task of the serious (*spoudaious*) law-giver.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Ibid., 1254b16–18.

⁵² See also, *ibid.*, 1254a17. I owe this observation to Ambler (*ANP*), who says "I am not surprised that he asks not whether there are many such creatures but whether there is any" (395). There is, unfortunately, countervailing evidence concerning Aristotle's stance on institutional (nonnatural) slavery. For he seems to take it for granted that slaves are a necessary component of the best city. See 1329a25–6 and 1330a25. Also, as Professor Silvia Carli pointed out to me, Aristotle even suggests that freedom should be held out as "a reward for all slaves" (1330a33), which is a clear indication that they are not "natural."

⁵³ Ibid., 1324b36–7.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 1324b38.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 1325a5–10.

Cities like Sparta and Crete are dedicated to nothing but expansion and so in them education and political culture generally aim to train the citizens for war. Because there is no horizon beyond the political, war becomes an end in itself. As a result such regimes are, one might say, Heraclitean, since for them "war is the father of all things."⁵⁶ As such, they are in violation of an essential Aristotle precept, one that will be discussed below: "war is for the sake of peace."⁵⁷ War can be a noble pursuit, but only when it is defensive and in the service of securing a peace that will allow its citizens to have a "share in the good life"; in other words, to live a life of virtue.⁵⁸

Once again, this material in *Politics* 7.2 may seem like a digression, for Aristotle may seem to have dropped the debate between the theoretical and practical lives. In fact, he hasn't. If the practical life were counted as the best, then expansionist regimes like Sparta and Crete would have to be counted as the best. But because for them war is not for the sake of peace, this they are not. Hence, the theoretical life is best. Such an argument remains implicit, but remarks from *Politics* 7.3 help to disclose it more fully.

IV

Aristotle's description of the theoretical-philosophical life as belonging "to the stranger (*ho xenikos*) whose ties to the political community have been dissolved" makes it tempting to agree with Solmsen who finds the claim that it is the best available for a human being "unacceptable."⁵⁹ First, determination of the best life is required in order to guide the conceptual construction of the ideal city. But if the theoretical life is that of the alienated stranger, how can it possibly accomplish this task? Second, "happiness is activity or *praxis*" (*hē gar eudaimonia praxis estin*), while the theoretical life seems utterly impractical.⁶⁰ Aristotle anticipates such objections and then begins to

⁵⁶ Heraclitus, B53. H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Rev. W. Kranz (Berlin, 1961).

⁵⁷ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1333a35.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 1325a8.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1324a17; Solmsen, *LPA*, 195.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1325a32

counter them by claiming that his critics misunderstand the nature of *praxis*.

But the practical (*praktikon*) life need not be in relationship to other human beings, as some think it must, nor should only those kinds of thoughts that come to be for action and for the sake of what results be counted as practical (*praktikas*). But much more [practical] are those thoughts that are autotelic (*autoteleis*) and the kinds of theory (*theōrias*) that are for the sake of themselves. For the *telos* is good *praxis* (*eupraxia*), so that it is some sort of *praxis*.⁶¹

There are two senses of “*praxis*” and its derivatives. The first refers only to political or ethical activity that is “towards other human beings”; in other words, that is essentially social. The second is far more broad, and refers to all forms of activity, of actualizing a potentiality, from metabolic functioning to theorizing. Even if it is not directly political, theoretical activity can surely be counted as “practical” in this latter sense. As such, Kraut’s translation of *praktikos* here as “active” may seem tempting. For reasons to be discussed in section VII below, this temptation, while reasonable, should nonetheless be resisted. As we shall see, the theoretical life is “practical” in both senses of the word.

In any case, Aristotle goes even further: theorizing, which is an end-in-itself, is “much more” (*polu mallon*) practical than conventional political activity. This description is somewhat mysterious.⁶² Kraut goes so far as to say that “unfortunately, Aristotle’s arguments are marred by his failure to face squarely the question of precisely what it is to be active.”⁶³ It is likely, however, that Aristotle here means that “theorizing” represents the maximum actualization of human capacities. This is at least the claim he makes for it in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 when he says that “the actualization of mind (*hē tou nou energeia*), which seems to be theoretical (*theoretikē*),” is the highest form of human activity, happiness and virtue.⁶⁴ It is also consistent with the description of the development of theoretical knowledge he presents in *Metaphysics* Book 1.1–2 and to which we shall next briefly turn.

⁶¹ Ibid., 1325b16–21.

⁶² Ibid., 1325b19.

⁶³ Kraut, *APB*, 73.

⁶⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1177b19.

The process of knowing begins with perceptions, and then develops through memory and "experience" until it culminates in the attainment of knowledge. Differently stated, it progresses from awareness of particulars to an understanding of the universal; from simply knowing "that" to knowing the cause or the "why." "Knowledge," Aristotle explains, "comes to be whenever from many thoughts that have emerged from experience one universal conception emerges about these similar things."⁶⁵ Relevant to our inquiry here is the distinction Aristotle draws between those who have knowledge, and so can offer "a rational account" (*logon*) of the cause, and those who are merely "experienced" (*hoi empeiroi*) and whose purview is thereby limited to "the particulars" (*ton kath'hekaston*). When it comes to "acting" (*pros men to prattein*) the latter, precisely because they are fluent in the particulars, may actually "succeed more often" (*mallon epitunchanousin*) than the former.⁶⁶ To explain by updating Aristotle's own example: someone who has experienced the pain of many headaches, and then the relief that came from taking aspirin, may well advise a friend whose head hurts to do the same. And her recommendation may actually work. But she has no explanation for why it worked, and hence no real knowledge. The physician, by contrast, does. Nonetheless, even a physician with a firm grasp of the science of anatomy may goof up in treating a patient precisely because the patient is particularized and thus only an incidental manifestation of a more general structure. Experience may be more useful than universal knowledge when dealing with real people.⁶⁷

Aristotle concedes this limitation but nonetheless insists that genuine knowledge of the universal is superior to even the most efficacious and "practical" forms of experience. On this point he cites the Egyptian priests who were the first to develop pure or theoretical mathematics. They were able to do so because, to introduce a critical word that will be discussed shortly, they were allowed "leisure" (*scholazein*).⁶⁸ They were "counted as wonderful by others" not

⁶⁵ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (hereafter *Metaph.*), 981a5–7. The Greek word for "knowledge" in this passage is *techne*, which is not used here in the narrow sense of "productive knowledge" that it receives in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 981a14–16.

⁶⁷ See also, Aristotle, *Metaph.* 981a5–b1.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 981b25.

because they had “done” anything useful, but simply because they were “wiser.”⁶⁹ Theoretical knowledge is good not for any consequence or specific application it may generate, but simply in and of itself, as the complete actualization of human nature. “It is clear that we do not seek such knowledge for any other need; but just as we say that someone who is for the sake of himself and not for another is free, so of the forms of knowledge this sort alone is free.”⁷⁰

To sum up this line of thought: in both *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 and *Metaphysics* 1 theoretical activity is described as autotelic. It is an end in itself and even if it cannot be applied to produce overtly practical results, it is the most complete actualization of human capacity. In this sense, a theoretical life could be construed as much more “practical” (*praktikos*) than any other form of human activity. With this result in mind, we can return to *Politics* 7.3. Against the critic who would complain that the theoretical life is neither active nor able to guide the conceptual construction of the best possible city, Aristotle argues that not all forms of *praxis* are ethical or political and that in fact the theoretical life is the highest form of *praxis*.⁷¹ To supplement this conclusion, and to begin to elaborate its consequences, he next offers the following:

Cities that have been established with respect to themselves (*tas kath'autas poleis*) and have chosen to live in this way do not have to be inactive (*apraktein*). For it is possible that [being active] occurs in regard to their parts.⁷²

This statement is in keeping with an earlier comment Aristotle had made:

A single city, the one which governs in manifest fineness, could be happy with respect to itself (*kath'heautēn*), if it is possible for a city to live by itself (*kath'heautēn*) using decent laws. Its form of government would not be directed towards war or domination of its enemies.⁷³

⁶⁹ Ibid., 981b15.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 982b24–7.

⁷¹ Kraut (*APB*) is thus wrong in saying that “Aristotle does not emphasize the point that philosophical thought is more active than others pursuits; that is, he does not turn this point into an argument for the superiority of philosophy, as he does in other works. His modest goal is to show that the philosophical life is not vulnerable to the criticism that it is inactive” (74).

⁷² Aristotle, *Pol.* 1325b23–6.

⁷³ Ibid., 1325a1–4.

A self-contained, nonaggressive city is like an organic whole consisting of a set of dynamically interacting and mutually enabling parts. As such, it can be every bit as active, even more so, than a city that devotes its energy to expansion beyond its borders.⁷⁴ Aristotle strikingly employs a metaphysical phrase to explain: cities can be "with respect to themselves" (*kath hautas*).⁷⁵ In other words, a city can be like a substance (*ousia*); namely a mode of being characterized by the highest degree of ontological independence. A substance does not depend on any other category for its being. By contrast, a quality (such as green) depends on there being a substance (such as tree) in which it inheres. In an analogous fashion, a substance-like city would attain self-sufficiency and remain content to stay within its political borders and economic limits. By contrast, expansionist regimes reflect ontological confusion: they wrongly elevate the category of quantity over that of substance, and thus the infinite over the finite. As a consequence they are doomed to catastrophe.⁷⁶

To push this thought even further, the best city emulates not only a substance, but both the cosmos and god as well.

For many communities are with respect to each other in their political parts. And in a similar vein this condition can be achieved by a single human being. For [if this were not so] then god could not be in a leisurely and fine condition nor could the whole cosmos, because they have no external actions in addition to those that belong to themselves.⁷⁷

The argument seems to be this: if a community or an individual could not be "itself with respect to itself," nor a substantial whole in which one part rules another, then god, understood as a maximally

⁷⁴To borrow language from the *Metaphysics*: it is more like an *energeia* than a *kinesis*. See 1048b28.

⁷⁵In the *Metaphysics* this phrase is said to refer to the essence of a being (1022a26).

⁷⁶Silvia Carli suggests that this statement conflicts with the notion that both citizens and cities suffer from moral weakness, for here I state that they "wrongly" elevate the category of quantity over substance. In other words, they seem not to know better. Recall, however, that Aristotle is convinced that "everyone" would agree that the best life requires virtue. Therefore the "confusion" I here attribute to cities is a component of the complex and conflicted condition that characterizes moral weakness. The arguments against expansionism are so "easy" to make that even regimes like Sparta and Crete would upon hearing them know they should change their ways; even if they don't.

⁷⁷Aristotle, *Pol.* 1325b23–30.

actualized being, could not be “itself with respect to itself” either. But god certainly is this. Therefore, it is possible for an individual or a city also to be in this condition, namely limited, localized, well-functioning and happy. The same argument applies to the cosmos. Since nothing is beyond it, it can only be active with respect to itself. Because the world is characterized by this consummate level of ontological self-sufficiency, so too can (and should) a city aspire to political self-sufficiency rather than the expansion of their power. The same holds on the level of the individual. Believing that greater and greater amounts of money or fame constitute happiness is fundamental self-deception. Instead, the best goal is to become substance-like, like god or even the world itself.⁷⁸ The best human life is one that stays at home and works hard to develop character and virtue rather than one that continually tries to gain the spotlight. And the maximum form of this work is theoretical activity. As explained in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, the theoretical is the most “divine” and “self-sufficient” of lives.⁷⁹ As such, it can function as a the model by which the best city is constructed and without a doubt wins the contest against the practical-political life for title of the “best.”

V

As if he understands that these arguments might be too abstract, Aristotle turns next to concrete descriptions of the ideal city. For example, it must have decent access to the sea, its citizens must be of Greek stock, and so on. Above all else, the best city knows when enough is enough. So, for example, it vigilantly monitors its population, making sure there are neither too many citizens nor too few. A city must not be excessively populous, since it should be ruled by law, and this becomes unmanageable if it gets too big. Furthermore, procreation must be limited because too many people will lead to more poverty, which in turn leads to instability.⁸⁰ Nor must a city be too

⁷⁸ Rmi Brague, *The Wisdom of the World*, trans. Teresa Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) is masterful on the theme of cosmology as ethics.

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1177a15, 1177b28 and 1177a27.

⁸⁰ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1265b9–12. Aristotle assumes that “the rich are everywhere few and the poor many” (*Pol.* 1279b37–8).

small, for like a work of art, it must be beautiful and fine, qualities it cannot achieve if it does not have sufficient magnitude. In general, a city does not become great "by number," which is of course without limit and hence unable to generate a meaningful *telos*, but by its "capacity" (*dunamin*); specifically, its capacity for excellent activity.⁸¹

Aristotle offers the following comparison: "as is the case with animals, plants and tools, when it comes to the magnitude of a city there is a certain proper measure (*metron*). For each of these will not achieve its own potentiality if it is too small or too big."⁸² A ship only a few inches wide or ten miles long is not really a ship. Similarly, living beings are big enough when they have matured and attained their proper form. More specifically, a city is big enough when it is self-sufficient and, most important, able to provide the conditions that allow the citizens, or at least some of them, to achieve their excellence, to live "in leisure and freely and with moderation."⁸³ As we will see in the next two sections, the best city is big enough when some of its citizens have the free time to theorize.

One final way to make this point: a good city must be of such a size that it can be "easily seen as a whole" (*eusunopton*).⁸⁴ Like the earlier use of *kath heautēn*, this word suggests a comparison with a basic metaphysical concept; namely, *eidos*, which is usually translated as "form," but because it is derived from the verb "to see" literally means the "look" of a thing as a whole. A properly scaled city should be form-like. Its boundaries must give it shape by limiting it to a specific place; not too big, not too small, but just what it takes to be easily seen as a whole.

To sum up: Aristotle's "ideal" city is of moderate size, does not aim for indefinite growth, and so does not need to order its form of government with an eye towards domination of its enemies. Its army is strictly defensive, for it understands that war is for the sake of peace. As mentioned, this principle goes to the heart of Aristotle's political teaching. Furthermore, it is regularly coupled with another, to which we now turn: lack-of-leisure is for the sake of leisure.

⁸¹ Ibid., 1326a12.


⁸² Ibid., 1326a35–8.

⁸³ Ibid., 1326b31–2.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 1327a1.

VI

Aristotle's closing arguments in 7.13–15 make it clear that the theoretical wins the competition over the practical life, for it is the best available to human beings. Aristotle begins by reconsidering the nature of happiness, which is here defined as “the complete actualization of virtue” (*energeian aretēs teleian*), and is the goal of both the best individuals and the best city.⁸⁵ In this context, he divides the soul into two parts: one that has reason (*logos*) and one that is capable of obeying it.⁸⁶ Next, reason itself is divided into its “practical” (*praktikos*) and the theoretical (*theōrētikos*) dimensions.⁸⁷ These divisions result in a tripartite hierarchy in which theoretical reason is the pinnacle of the activity of the soul.



Pace Reeve, Solmsen, Miller and Kraut, there is now no reason to doubt that Aristotle champions the theoretical life. Even if there were, the following passage would dispel it.

We shall say that actions (*praxeis*) stand in an analogous fashion [to the hierarchy sketched above]. Those are more choiceworthy that belong to what is better by nature for those who are able to attain them either all or two of them. For it is always the case that what is most choiceworthy is the highest which someone can attain.⁸⁸

Immediately after making these remarks, in yet another move that initially appears choppy or even digressive, Aristotle asserts, “life as a whole must be divided too into lack-of-leisure (*ascholia*) and leisure (*scholia*), and war and peace.”⁸⁹ In each pair the former must be for the sake of the latter. This mention of leisure has significant consequences, for it is a decisive feature of Aristotle’s conception of the

⁸⁵ Ibid., 1332a9.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 1333a16–7. Compare similar distinctions found in *NE* 1098a3 and 1102a25–1103a3.

⁸⁷ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1333a25

⁸⁸ Ibid., 1333a27–30.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 1333a30–1.

best life. Most important, it is integral to his account of the theoretical life. As explained in *Metaphysics* 1, only when men had leisure (as they did in Egypt) were they able to experience "wonder" and so be provoked to ask the "why" questions that begin scientific inquiry.⁹⁰ Because answers to them are universal and not readily applicable to the particulars, "why" questions drive the questioner away from the busy, particularized world of "experience."⁹¹ As a result, "when it comes to acting" (*pros men to prattein*), those with "causal" knowledge of universals are often inferior to those with only "experience."⁹² The latter are fluent in the particulars; the former, living in leisure, stand at some distance from the responsibilities, preoccupations, disruptions, interruptions, and general busyness (*ascholia*) of daily political or social life.⁹³ They are "strangers," precisely because they are concerned with universals, knowledge of which has value only "for itself."⁹⁴ Nonetheless, the life they lead is the best of all.

In *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7, Aristotle offers numerous reasons why the life spent in theorizing is the happiest and most virtuous. Among them are these: (1) We can theorize more continuously than we can do anything else. (2) Theorizing is most pleasant. (3) It is most self-sufficient; that is, it has the least need of external goods or human assistants. (4) Theorizing is the only activity loved for its own sake, for it produces no gain other than itself. These characteristics are encapsulated by (5): it is most leisurely.⁹⁵ Leisure activity is performed in the absence of external constraint and without an eye to the clock. As such, it is as close to "free time" as human beings ever come.⁹⁶ Only in leisure can the search for knowledge of "causes,"

⁹⁰ Aristotle, *Metaph.* 982b20.

⁹¹ Ibid., 981a17.

⁹² Ibid., 981a13. It is, of course, vital here to remember that Aristotle's conception of "cause" embraces the final and the formal, not just the efficient.

⁹³ In order to emphasize the fact that *ascholia* is composed of an alpha-privative, and thus depends for its very meaning on *scholē*, it is important to avoid words like "business" or "occupation" as translations.

⁹⁴ Kraut's (APB) translation of *xenikos* as "alien" is too narrow, for it suggests that what Aristotle has in mind is simply a non-citizen.

⁹⁵ See also, Aristotle, *NE* 1177a23–b15.

⁹⁶ Recall that "it is clear that we do not seek such knowledge for any other need; but just as we say that someone who is for the sake of himself and not for another is free, so of the forms of knowledge this sort alone is free" (Aristotle, *Metaph.* 982b24–7).

rather than merely learning how to get something done, take place. Such theorizing is the *telos* of human activity. Aristotle expresses this point by adding two more reasons on behalf of theorizing: (6) it actualizes what is most divine in us; (7) it actualizes what human beings in fact are, namely mind or intellect.⁹⁷

Although (6) and (7) may seem to contradict one another, they do not. To be most human is to seek an understanding of the cosmos, to think about universals rather than particulars. It is thus to be separated from, to be a “stranger” to, the commonplace or political; it is somehow beyond the human, for it is to emulate the divine (which is famously described in *Metaphysics* 12.9 as “thought thinking itself”). In short, to be most human is to cease, as much as possible, to be merely human.

To state the central contention of the next section: this argument, which may seem itself to be entirely abstract or theoretical, can actually be reinforced by practical-political considerations. It is ultimately good for a city to have philosophers in it who engage in theorizing.

VII

Recall that in part (4) above it was mentioned that when Aristotle states that “much more [practical] are those thoughts that are ‘auto-telic’ (*autoteleis*) and the kinds of theory (*theōrias*) that are for the sake of themselves,” the temptation to join Kraut in translating (the implicit) *praktikos* as “active” rather than “practical” is strong.⁹⁸ After all, the sense of *praxis* at work in the passage is that of an actualization of a capacity. Nonetheless, “practical,” a word which connotes political activity, was preferred. This section will explain why.

A fundamental symmetry obtains between an individual citizen and the city: both share the same *telos* and are governed by the principle, “the *telos* of war is peace, and of lack-of-leisure leisure.”⁹⁹ An individual requires leisure in order to live well; most important, in order to theorize. Analogously, a good city should aim to maintain the peace in order that its best citizens can be free from the least leisurely

⁹⁷ See also, Aristotle, *NE* 1177b30 and 1178a2.

⁹⁸ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1325b16–7.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1334a15–6.

of all activities, namely "military and political actions."¹⁰⁰ In order for a city to achieve this goal it must itself be virtuous. The citizens must be law-abiding and show moderation. When the city is attacked they must be courageous enough to put on their armor and hold their positions in order to defend it. When there is peace they must be sufficiently patient in order to engage in political deliberation, and be well enough disciplined to resist those who urge the city to attack its neighbors or expand its borders. Distressingly, however, it is during peace that the trouble begins.¹⁰¹ In a brief statement that has terribly sobering consequences—and that echoes the equally sobering acknowledgement of the citizens' moral weakness in *Politics* 7.1 (see section (1) above)—Aristotle says this:

For war forces men to be just and moderate, while the enjoyment of good fortune and peaceful leisure makes them more violently arrogant (*hubristas*).¹⁰²

As intrinsically desirable as both may be, peace and leisure are nearly impossible to sustain, for most men cannot tolerate them. Especially those with strong desires, who are high-spirited and ambitious, become restless. They lack the ability to amuse themselves and the self-discipline required to use free time well. Unconstrained by external commands, they don't know what to do with themselves and so become ill-at-ease. With too much time on their hands they get bored. They start pointless fights and do stupid things. That this regularly occurs is yet another expression of the disease that Aristotle locates at the heart of ordinary human and political life and which was discussed in the first two sections of this paper: most people and cities mistake the source of their own happiness even when "easy" arguments are available to show that they are being wrong-headed. They devote their best energy to the pursuit of wealth, power, or fame and thereby misconstrue the very meaning of their own lives. They are incapable of appreciating the gift of leisure and so they disturb the peace. In fact, most young men are far better behaved when they are in uniform. Military discipline forces them to act in a moderate fashion and to take heed of the common good rather than simply

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1177b5–6.

¹⁰¹ As Kraut (*APB*) puts it, "Paradoxically, although war endangers our lives and freedom, peace and abundance pose greater threats" (144).

¹⁰² Aristotle, *Pol.* 1334a25–8.

indulging their own violent impulses or selfishly seeking their own pleasures.

War is for the sake of peace, lack-of-leisure is for the sake of leisure, but most men can tolerate neither peace nor free time. But therapy is available. For when it "comes to leisure" (*pros tēn scholēn*) philosophy is both required and valuable.¹⁰³ It provides a paradigm for how to use leisure well.

In studying the world the philosopher separates himself from the ordinary doings of his fellow citizens. In this one sense he is almost like a criminal. But the philosopher teaches, or at least shows, how to separate oneself well. His activity and his healthy indifference to ordinary political affairs reveal that "human being is not the best thing in the world," which in turn implies that practical reason is not the highest form of reason.¹⁰⁴ Most people become restless or violent if no one tells them what to do. Not the philosopher. He does not need external constraint to keep him in line because the world, inexhaustible in its invitation to be studied, is always present as a source of wonder and amazement.

For it is on account of wondering and being amazed that human beings both now and at first began to philosophize. At first, they were amazed and wondered about those oddities that were staring them in the face, and then little by little they progressed and became puzzled by greater questions; for example, about the changing attributes of the moon and the sun and stars, and about the becoming of the whole.¹⁰⁵

The world is wonderful, beautiful, intelligible, nourishing and welcoming. For those who use their intellects, it promises rewards greater than money, power or fame. Only philosophy, the theorizing of the world, can satisfy even the most restless of souls.

These remarks hark back to a comment Aristotle makes in *Politics* 2.7. He first mentions that some acts of injustice are committed for the sake of pleasure and the "fulfilling of desire," and not just (as Phaleas mistakenly thought) to acquire necessary goods like food or shelter. For such wrong-doers, who are prompted by their own *pleonexia* and "who wish to enjoy themselves for the sake of *themselves* . . . there is only one cure: philosophy."¹⁰⁶ Because the strong and

¹⁰³ Ibid., 1334a23.

¹⁰⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1141a21–2.

¹⁰⁵ Aristotle, *Metaph.* 982b12–7.

¹⁰⁶ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1267a11–2.

restless desires of such criminals has already "separated" them from the community, only philosophy, which allows them to continue in their alienation, offers them a suitable and satisfying replacement for the money, power and fame they would otherwise seek to acquire. It offers them the entire world as an object for theoretical inquiry.

Philosophers bear some similarity to criminals, for they too are marginalized.¹⁰⁷ Preferring leisure to being-busy, and therefore opting out of the realms of politics and war, out of the competition for money, power and fame, they become strangers. But their alienation is simultaneously a completion. For they think, they theorize. In doing so philosophers function as a paradigm of how to use leisure well. They are reminders that the too familiar urge to succeed in the city rather than to pursue excellence is wrong-headed. Philosophers exhibit a *telos* for human activity, without which there would be nothing for humans to want but more of the same; without which it would be impossible to say when enough is enough. This is their "practical" contribution, however indirect, to the well being of the city. By being both inside and outside of the city at the same time they show the citizens that, however tied they may be to their local community, the world is much bigger than that given to them by their national borders. If there were no philosophers, then expansionist regimes like Sparta and Crete would have to be counted as the best of all. And this they are not.

To conclude: *pace* Kraut, Miller, Reeve and Solmsen, *Politics* 7, read in its entirety, provides a sustained and decisive, even if implicit, argument on behalf of the theoretical life. Furthermore, it does so on both theoretical and practical grounds.

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¹⁰⁷ By having Socrates associate with characters like Alcibiades, Critias and Charmides, this is a point that Plato regularly makes.

PRECEDENTS IN ARISTOTLE AND BRENTANO
FOR HUSSERL'S CONCERN
WITH *METABASIS*

JOHN K. O'CONNOR

HUSSERL'S WORK is marked by an abiding, if not always explicit, concern to avoid *metabasis eis allo genos* (a change into some other genus). This concern stands as a common element linking the pre-transcendental and the transcendental phenomenological phases of Husserl's thought. The theme is explicit and pervasive in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1900), the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* (1900–01), where the attack on psychologism exploits the fact that psychological treatment of logic commits a *metabasis* by confusing the domains of the real and the ideal.¹ The idealism of the *Investigations* is determined by the need to avoid psychologism's *metabasis*. In fact, Husserl believed his early idealism to be the lone alternative to psychologism.² Later, as he broaches transcendental phenomenology and a new form of idealism, the importance of avoiding *metabasis* provides Husserl with the basis for "a sufficient and complete deduction" of the need to perform the reduction.³ Now, as is well known,

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¹ Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 55–6. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, ed. E. Holenstein, *Husserliana* 8 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 21–2. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, ed. Ursula Panzer, *Husserliana* 19/1, 19/2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984). The convention for citing Husserl's works will be as follows. In a text's first appearance, full bibliographic details for both the translation and the critical edition (*Husserliana*) will be provided as above. For each appearance thereafter, page references to the translation will be followed by *Husserliana* (henceforth 'Hua') volume and page.

² Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 338; Hua vol. 19/1, 112.

³ Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. Lee Hardy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 30. Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, ed. Walter Biemel, *Husserliana* 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 39.

for the mature Husserl, the transcendental reduction is the necessary means of entry into phenomenology. As a result, phenomenological analyses take their significance from the meaning of the reduction and the field of experience that it discloses. Understanding Husserl's late idealism, then, requires that we understand the reduction—a task which, in turn, requires us to contend with *metabasis*. Thus, as both Husserl's early and late idealisms arise through the avoidance of *metabasis*, a proper understanding of this concept promises to shed light on the much-disputed issue of his idealisms.⁴ But what is *metabasis*? Why is it so pernicious?

Despite general acknowledgment of its importance, this concept has, to my knowledge, received no sustained attention, either in the form of a systemic exploration of its role in Husserl or as an examination of his historical sources.⁵ This paper seeks to fill this gap by considering these sources and precedents. That is, it reveals the historical roots of Husserl's concern to avoid *metabasis*. This will, in turn, serve as the foundation for a subsequent examination of its integral role in Husserl. An obvious source for the concept is Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. The fact that Husserl uses the Greek term to refer to the concept—a rarity for him—suggests that he intends the

⁴I contend, but cannot argue in this paper due to space, that a correct grasp of Husserl's concern with *metabasis* allows us to see the realism behind his sui generis transcendental idealism. In the literature, the range of interpretations of Husserl's transcendental idealism is vast, but three main interpretive tendencies can be identified. One extreme reads Husserl as a traditional metaphysical idealist: see Roman Ingarden, *On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Arnór Hannibalsson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). The other extreme reads Husserl as metaphysically neutral: see Harrison Hall, "Was Husserl a Realist or an Idealist?," in *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 170. David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality: a Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982). Finally, some read Husserl as a realist, but stress that he is beyond the traditional formulation of the realist/idealist debate. See John J Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990).

⁵The importance of avoiding *metabasis* is identified in, for example Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 30–1. Dallas Willard, *Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge: a Study in Husserl's Early Philosophy* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984), 165. Iso Kern, "The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*, ed. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).

reader to discern its ancient pedigree and at least some of its original sense.⁶ Nonetheless, we lack additional evidence that serious engagement with Aristotelian texts was an influence.⁷ Thus we should look elsewhere for Husserl's proximate source. Indeed, it is much more likely that his appropriation of Aristotle was mediated by Brentano. Accordingly, the paper opens with a brief examination of the concept's meaning and use in the *Posterior Analytics* in order to establish context. It then jumps to the 19th century to discuss Brentano's influence, where his insistence on properly delimiting psychology, along with his procedure of separating the senses of equivocal terms, clearly place the notion of *metabasis* (now under the heading of transgression of scientific or conceptual boundaries) at the heart of Husserl's philosophical upbringing.

I

Aristotle understands *metabasis eis allo genos* to be a fundamental error of scientific reasoning. That is to say that it is not an error regarding a syllogism as such, but rather an error regarding a demonstration, "a syllogism which produces scientific knowledge."⁸ Hence, although it is possible to shift from one genus into another in the course of a syllogism without affecting the formal evaluation of the syllogism, such a transition generally prevents the syllogism from rising to the level of science. In order to understand why this is so, let us consider the account of scientific reasoning in the *Posterior Analytics*.


To have knowledge of something (x) one must know (a) the cause of x and (b) that x cannot be otherwise.⁹ For example, to

⁶ In addition to the use of the Greek term, Husserl also employs "Ver-mengung," "Vermischung," "Verwechslung," and their variants to refer to the same type of category mistake.

⁷ Discussing the presence of Aristotelian themes in Husserl's work, Richard Cobb-Stevens points out that despite the commonality, there is nonetheless "no evidence that he [Husserl] was markedly influenced by a reading of the relevant texts of pre-modern philosophers"; Richard Cobb-Stevens, "Aristotelian Themes in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*," in *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's "Logical Investigations" Revisited*, ed. Dan Zahavi and Frederik Stjernfelt (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 80.

⁸ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b17–18, in *Posterior Analytics & Topica*, ed. G. P. Goold, trans. Hugh Tredennick and E. S. Forster, *The Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

⁹ Ibid., 1.2.71b9–17.



possess knowledge of the fact that all humans are mortal one must know both its cause/reason (that is, one must know why all humans are mortal) and also that all humans are necessarily mortal. Hence, it is not sufficient merely to grasp the fact that all humans are mortal, as would be the case were one simply to have arrived at the proposition through a guess or even through a process of enumeration. While the latter method would allow one to conclude as a simple empirical fact that all humans are mortal, the conditions for scientific knowledge would still be lacking, as the enquirer would know neither the cause nor the necessity of the fact.

Scientific knowledge is acquired by employing demonstrations. A number of conditions are required of such syllogisms in order to ensure that the conclusion meets the two necessary conditions for knowledge. Aristotle succinctly identifies these initial conditions as follows: "[I]f knowledge is such as we have assumed, demonstrative knowledge must proceed from premises which are true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and causative of the conclusion."¹⁰ That the premises must be true is not surprising. This is a standard necessary condition for a sound argument, and Aristotelian demonstration is a form of sound argument. The premises must be primary and indemonstrable, or else they would themselves require proof. Additionally, the premises must state the cause of the conclusion for, after all, to properly know the fact we must know its cause, and it is the demonstration which provides us with this knowledge. Finally, the premises must be prior to and better known than the conclusion. Aristotle's use of these terms should be understood ontologically.¹¹ Accordingly, the premises must appeal to what is prior to and better known than the conclusion, not with respect to our knowledge, but with respect to nature.¹² That is, the premises must concern what is ontologically more universal than the conclusion.¹³ In this way they

¹⁰ Ibid., 1.2.71b20–23.

¹¹ Although it is tempting to consider these terms as significant in relation to a process of scientific discovery, Aristotle was addressing the exposition of a developed science, not a science in the process of inquiry. See Sir David Ross, *Aristotle*, 6th ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), 43.

¹² This points to a significant contrast between Aristotle and Husserl. In Aristotle, the empirical/ontological genus is explanatory, but in Husserl one can identify an attempt to separate—at least in principle—the empirical/ontological from the explanatory. In this, Husserl appears to be following Descartes' lead as set by rule 6 of the *Regulae*. See René Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, trans. Dugald Murdoch, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21/381.

¹³ Aristotle, *Post. An.* 1.2.71b35–72a6.

can provide us with knowledge of the cause of the fact presented in the conclusion. It is not merely a logical relation that is being presented in the demonstration; the ontological relations expressed by the premises are the causes of the fact expressed by the conclusion.¹⁴

A science articulates the essential attributes and relations of its genus and then employs demonstrations to disclose how (that is, "by what cause?") the essential relations of the genus render a given fact—the conclusion—necessary.¹⁵ However, and this is the crux of the matter, in order to accomplish this goal, demonstration, and the science of which it is a part, must remain within a single genus.¹⁶ Hence each science is defined by and tied to the genus of its subject matter.¹⁷ For a demonstration to fail to remain within a single genus is for it to commit a *metabasis eis allo genos*. In moving from one genus to another the chain of essential relations is broken, resulting in the failure to demonstrate the conclusion.¹⁸ In losing the essential

¹⁴ This point requires some elaboration. Noting an additional condition placed by Aristotle upon the premises will help in this regard. Since knowledge is of that which cannot be otherwise, and we have this scientific knowledge via demonstration, mere truth of the premises is inadequate. Merely true premises do not guarantee necessarily true conclusions, but necessarily true premises do—assuming, of course, that the relevant formal conditions have been met. See Aristotle, *Post. An.* 1.6.75a1–11. The premises of a demonstration must be necessarily true, they must express necessary connections between the subject and predicate; Aristotle, *Post. An.* 1.4.73a21–25. See also 1.6.75a12–18. Although an attribute may be predicated of all instances of a subject, such predication alone does not constitute a necessary connection. Necessity arises with essential predication—those attributes that belong essentially or per se to their subjects belong necessarily. So, since demonstration requires necessary premises, and the attributes that necessarily belong to their subjects are the per se/essential attributes, it is clear that the premises of demonstrations must express essential relations. Cf. Aristotle, *Post. An.* 1.6.74b5–13. Knowing this, we can better appreciate how it is that demonstrations provide knowledge of the cause, for according to Aristotle knowledge of the essence is knowledge of the cause. Cf. Aristotle, *Post. An.* 2.2.90a32–33.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Post. An.* 1.6.75a28–31.

¹⁶ While introducing the dangers of *metabasis eis allo genos*, Husserl appears to make this same sort of claim regarding the ontological field of each science, but the issue becomes more complicated as the argument develops and Husserl introduces the notion of explanatory homogeneity.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Post. An.* 1.28; see also, 1.7.75b6–8. Adler summarizes this point with a well-chosen phrase: "scientific inference is genus bound" (Pierre Adler, "Prolegomena to Phenomenology: Intuition or Argument?" *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 16 [1992]: 6).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.7.75a38–9.

connections one loses both the knowledge of the cause and the necessity of the fact stated in the conclusion. As an example of *metabasis* Aristotle presents the attempt to use arithmetic to prove a geometrical proposition—that is, the attempt to use a science whose proper genus concerns discrete quantity to prove a proposition concerning continuous quantity. The attempt to use geometry to prove an arithmetical proposition is, of course, no less problematic. One science cannot prove the propositions of another. Attempting to do so involves a *metabasis*.¹⁹

On the basis of this discussion we can state that Aristotle's concern with *metabasis eis allo genos* primarily targets this category mistake in abstraction—"in abstraction" because the concern is with a logical scientific error, without regard to particular subject matter—and at the level of individual arguments, not at the level of the foundations of a science. Nevertheless, it is clear that the emphasis placed upon incidental argument *metabasis* could be broadened into a concern with systemic foundational *metabasis*. Such extension is exactly what we see in Brentano and, following him, Husserl.²⁰

¹⁹ Actually, while not relevant for my thesis, this is something of a simplification. Aristotle does allow one science to prove the principles of another, but only if the second science is subordinate to the first, as optics is subordinate to geometry: Aristotle, *Post. An.* 1.7.75b14–16. I would like to thank Patrick Byrne for calling my attention to the significance of this passage.

²⁰ While the broad outlines of Husserl's concern with *metabasis* can be articulated in terms of the *Posterior Analytics*, important differences exist. Notes 12 and 16 above already identify two such differences. Another difference is that Aristotle's emphasis on incidental, argument-level *metabasis* should be distinguished from Husserl's main concern surrounding *metabasis* as presented in the *Prolegomena*, where the issue is with *metabasis* at the very foundations of a putative science, such that the science itself systemically—and not simply incidentally within a single demonstration—combines heterogeneous objects within its field. But even this difference is largely a matter of emphasis and degree. Concern with systemic foundational *metabasis* is compatible with, and is even an extension of, Aristotle's explicit position in the *Posterior Analytics*. Since, for Aristotle, a single science is defined by and tied to the genus of its subject matter, to pass from one genus to another in a demonstration is to pass from the domain of one science to that of another. Thus a demonstration that commits a *metabasis* is a demonstration that blurs scientific boundaries. While a scientist working in a properly delimited science cannot prove his conclusion if the demonstration incidentally commits a *metabasis*, the problem becomes more pervasive if the science itself is founded upon heterogeneous fields. Quite simply, were heterogeneous fields permitted to blend together into a single science, that science's demonstrations would fail.

II

The precedents in Brentano for Husserl's concern with *metabasis* manifest themselves in two places. First, they are evident in Brentano's principled concern with scientific domains. In contrast with Aristotle, Brentano has a very concrete concern with scientific boundary delimitation. It is less a concern with scientific boundaries as such than it is with the boundaries of a particular science, namely, psychology. The boundaries Brentano argues for between psychology and physiology, and later between pure and genetic psychology, provide a clear precedent for Husserl's concern with boundary issues. It has been suggested that these distinctions in Brentano give rise to Husserl's later distinction between transcendental phenomenology and descriptive psychology.²¹ Perhaps, but even so, Brentano's emphasis on boundary delimitation affects Husserl's work far earlier than that account indicates. In fact, Brentano's concern with boundary delimitation is taken up by Husserl, radicalized, and then applied to the sphere of logic. Brentano thus influences Husserl's insistence on observing a rigid ideal/real distinction as well as the correlative distinction within logic between pure logic and logical technology.²² Here, we encounter the second main area of Brentano's influence over Husserl's concern with *metabasis*, namely, Brentano's insistence on the methodological importance of the analysis and resolving of equivocation. In Husserl, this lesson emerges in his diagnosis of an equivocation at the root of psychologism. In order to circumvent equivocation

²¹ Theodore deBoer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, trans. Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 52.

²² This is not to imply that Husserl actually drew the distinction between the ideal and the real from Brentano. Brentano's defensive statement that he never allowed the laws of logic to be confused with natural laws (as Husserl alleges occurs in psychologism) notwithstanding, Husserl's understanding of the distinction between the real and the ideal is more accurately deemed a Lotzean legacy. For Brentano's statement on the matter, see 'On Psychologism' in the appendix to Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. Antos C. Racurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 307n. Husserl's reception of Lotze can be found in Edmund Husserl, "Review of Melchior Palágyi's *Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in der Modernen Logik*," in *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, ed. Dallas Willard (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), especially 200–01. Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910)*, ed. Bernhard Rang, *Husserliana 22* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 154–7.

and avoid the dangers of psychologism, Husserl (following the spirit of Brentano's approach) is forced to use the descriptive-phenomenological method. This, in turn, results in his early idealism, a position that Husserl maintains represents the only viable alternative to psychologism. All of this influence, of course, manifests itself as early as 1900 in Husserl's attack on psychologism in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*. In the following sections, both lines of influence will be examined.

IIa

Scientific boundary delimitation. The text of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) reveals Brentano's concern with the proper delimitation of scientific boundaries. Particularly at issue is the boundary between psychology and physiology.²³ In the opening paragraphs of this work Brentano attempts to define psychology by identifying the proper domain of psychological research. In this context he self-consciously addresses the importance of scientific field delimitation. Brentano's approach to the initial definition of psychology is historical. Citing the broad notion of the soul and of psychology in Aristotle, he then notes approvingly the subsequent limitation of the domain of psychology.

This narrowing of the domain of psychology was not an arbitrary one. On the contrary, it appears to be an obvious correction necessitated by the subject matter itself. In fact, only when the unification of related fields and the separation of unrelated fields is achieved can the

²³ Brentano's thought underwent a significant development after 1874, particularly regarding the boundaries of psychology. As Husserl studied with Brentano ten years after the initial publication of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (well after Brentano's position began to change), tracing Brentano's influence by appealing to his thought as it stood in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* may appear inadequate. In response, I will simply make two observations: (1) Husserl's 5th *Logical Investigation* is marked by a close and explicit engagement with *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, thus revealing both familiarity and influence. (2) Careful consideration of *Descriptive Psychology*, a text comprised mostly of material from Brentano's 1890–91 lectures, reveals that although the notion of psychology has changed, (a) the concern with boundary issues remains a constant and (b) the changes can be read back into Brentano's earlier thought: see Franz Brentano, *Descriptive Psychology*, trans. Benito Müller (London: Routledge, 1995), xv–xvi.

boundaries between the sciences be correctly drawn and their classification contribute to the progress of knowledge.²⁴

Correct field delimitation is essential for the progress of any science. Psychology develops from Aristotle's conception of it as involving consideration of the vegetative, sensitive and rational aspects of life to the contemporary exclusion of the vegetative and of those aspects of the sensitive that are objects of external perception. This course of development reflects a process of scientific field delimitation in response to an increasingly refined attunement to the subject matter. For instance, consideration of vegetative life was excluded from psychology because the vegetative lacks consciousness. Then, noting that much of the animal aspects of life were similar to vegetative life in that they both are objects of external perception, mere animality was excluded from consideration. Hence, according to Brentano's account, psychologists gradually discovered that the objects given through external perception are quite different from those given in inner perception. Given this difference, psychologists then aligned their discipline with the field given in inner perception.²⁵ While the Aristotelian notion of psychology accidentally (and against its own precepts as a science) combined heterogeneous fields into a single discipline, the modern view considers a single homogeneous field.

Following the Aristotelian practice of defining a science according to its field gives rise to Brentano's basic distinction in the empirical sciences. On one hand, natural sciences are those that "study the properties and laws of physical bodies, which are the objects of our external perception."²⁶ On the other hand, "psychology is the science which studies the properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within ourselves directly by means of inner perception."²⁷ Brentano later refines these definitions to exclude reference to bodies and to

²⁴ Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4–5. It is not clear whether Brentano believes that the psychologists came to a self-conscious realization that the fields should be distinguished according to inner and outer perception, or whether they simply grew more and more attuned to the similarities uniting each field and to the differences separating them, but did so without recognizing the fundamental distinguishing property. In any case, it is clear that Brentano took this distinction between inner and outer perception to be essential to the distinction between physical and psychological sciences.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

the soul. In place of the potentially misleading substance language, Brentano refers to physical and mental phenomena as the fields studied.²⁸ Nonetheless, the distinction between inner and outer perceptual faculties and the corresponding distinction between the heterogeneous fields of phenomena they provide remain fundamental for the basic distinction between empirical sciences. In a revealing passage, Brentano writes that "if we turn our attention from the external world to the inner, we find ourselves, as it were, in a new realm. The phenomena are absolutely heterogeneous . . . It was for this very reason that we separated the psychological and physical sciences as the main branches of empirical science."²⁹

Even though correct field delimitation is essential for the development of science, and the distinction between the fields given by inner and outer perception is absolute, Brentano holds that the distinctions between the sciences that study these fields are not absolute. This is nowhere more evident than in the distinction between psychology and physiology, the physical science nearest to psychology. These two sciences share a common boundary line—in fact it was physiology that received much of the physical subject matter that psychology excluded over the years. While the phenomena investigated by the psychologist and the phenomena investigated by the physiologist are very different, they "are most intimately correlated."³⁰ Certain mental phenomena are consequences of certain physical phenomena; certain physical phenomena are consequences of certain mental phenomena. Because of this correlation, scientists working near the boundaries may be forced by their research to cross over into a field normally considered the domain of another science. For instance, in order to study the physical causes of sensation the physiologist must also consider the sensations themselves. Similarly, in order to investigate basic mental states that are caused by physical stimuli the psychologist must also consider the physical stimuli as well. These inevitable yet minor boundary issues reveal that the distinction between sciences is "somewhat artificial" yet at the same time "[t]hey do nothing to refute the correctness of the boundary line we have established."³¹ What does this mean? Brentano is not as clear on this point

²⁸ Ibid., 17–19.

²⁹ Ibid., 51.

³⁰ Ibid., 6.

³¹ Ibid., 7.

as we might hope, but the idea seems to be that while we can draw a natural distinction between the proper subject matter of the two disciplines, since the sciences occasionally have to consider phenomena outside their natural domain, the distinction between sciences is somewhat artificial. That is to say that a science is not strictly and exclusively correlated with its domain because even in pursuing its proper issues it may have to consider foreign phenomena just as a foreign science may have to consider its phenomena. Nonetheless, it seems that a science is defined by the domain in which its essential problems stand.

The nuances of Brentano's position concerning the relationship between psychology and physiology become even more evident in explicating the following statement. "Not only the surrender of psychological investigation to physiological research, but also the mixing of the latter with the former seems by and large ill-advised in important areas."³² There are two issues that must be examined in order to explain this passage: (1) What are we to make of Brentano's qualification "in important areas?" (2) What reasons are given for this view? Let us deal with the issues in order. The qualification "in important areas" appears to be made in recognition of the fact that there will be inevitable boundary encroachment. So long as these boundary issues are handled appropriately this occasional mixing of disciplines is not ill-advised. But then the qualification also suggests that at some point the mixing of the disciplines ceases to be a properly handled boundary crossing and turns into an ill-advised venture. Indeed, closer examination reveals that this suggestion is accurate. As noted above, there is a realm in which boundary crossing is acceptable in principle. As we will see below, however, there are certain practical limitations that may interfere. In any case, the qualification "in important areas" should be applied only to the mixing, and not to the surrender, of psychology to physiology. The outright assimilation of psychology by physiology is ill-advised in any area. This should become clear as we turn now to address the second question.

Brentano's reasons for his concern with discipline mixing and surrender fall into two categories, one which applies to mixing, the other which applies to surrender. The problematic case of surrender—here Brentano has in mind a situation in which psychology is

³² Ibid., 64.

based upon physiology—is countered with objections in principle. In opposition to the attempt to deduce basic laws of succession of mental phenomena from physiological laws, Brentano writes: “There are limits which cannot be exceeded in our attempt to explain nature; and, as John Stuart Mill quite rightly states, we run up against one of these limits when the transition from the mental realm to that of physical phenomena is involved.”³³ Others attempt to base psychology on physiology by analogy, but here too we run up against this natural limit.³⁴ “The phenomena [of the physiological and psychological realms] are absolutely heterogeneous, and even analogies either forsake us completely or take on a very vague and artificial character.”³⁵ So much then for the extreme of basing psychology upon physiology. What about the less extreme mixing of the two disciplines? When does it become a problem? To come to terms with this issue we must first discern how much mixing is, in principle, acceptable. Toward that end, consider Brentano’s account of the various tasks of psychology.

The proper tasks of psychology range from the fully psychological to the psycho-physiological. The first tasks are those that deal simply with the mental, and the first among these is the identification of the common characteristics of all mental phenomena. Next, psychology must determine the basic classes of mental phenomena. After these descriptive classifications have been carried out, the psychologist is in a position to consider “the ultimate mental elements out of which more complex phenomena arise” as well as to use induction to identify the “highest and most general laws of the succession of mental phenomena.”³⁶ So far all these tasks exclusively concern the mental, but insofar as the primary mental phenomena are sensations, and sensations result from physical stimulation, in-depth inquiry into this issue requires physiological considerations. The laws of succession similarly point the psychologist toward physiology, for such laws only state empirical regularities, and mere empirical

³³ Ibid., 47. Here Brentano refers to Mill’s *System of Logic*, 3, Chapter 14, Section 2. See John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive; Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973–4).

³⁴ Brentano identifies Adolf Horwicz as one such person. Ibid., 48.

³⁵ Ibid., 51.

³⁶ Ibid., 45, 47.

regularities stand in need of explanation. This explanation is to be sought by considering physiological facts, but not, however, by deducing the psychological from the physiological. As we have seen, Brentano vehemently opposes that project. Rather, explanation of these laws involves, in part, the identification of "the immediate and proximate physiological preconditions or concomitant conditions [of the mental phenomena] with the utmost precision."³⁷ Thus, in pursuit of the explanation of the mental laws of succession the psychologist will have to consider physiology. Ultimately, Brentano concludes that if this project were fully executed, then "the major part, if not the whole, of psychology would take on a half-physiological, half-psychological character."³⁸

Brentano, then, allows a fair amount of mixing between psychology and physiology in principle. Quite simply, the psychologist will have to use the physiological to explain the mental. Even when delving into physiological matters, psychological investigations retain their identity as psychological just as long as the essential problem is firmly planted in the mental domain.³⁹ Yet isn't this position inconsistent with the passage cited above in which Brentano appears to object to even this mixing? No. Because of the (then) current limits of physiology, there is no inconsistency. Brain physiology was not—and is not—sufficiently developed to provide the sort of answers needed by the psychologist. Physiology can provide little assistance for the psychologist. As a result, employing physiology is likely to engender more problems than it resolves. Even where boundary crossing is in principle acceptable, the *de facto* limits of physiological knowledge often impose a practical restriction on psychology. These are the "important areas" in which mixing is ill-advised.

So to summarize Brentano's position, there are strong in principle objections to assimilating psychology to physiology. Psychology is its own science and there can be no substitute for proper psychological research. At the same time, though, these objections are coupled with an acceptance in principle of a fairly large mixing of psychology and physiology as long as the issues remain properly delimited. Even so, despite this acceptance, the state of physiology poses practical

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

³⁹ For suggestion of this claim, see *ibid.*, 7.

impediments to discipline blending even within an otherwise permissible realm. Ultimately then, Brentano is torn between the Aristotelian demand to restrict a science to a single genus and the practical requirements of a contemporary psychology that strives to both describe and explain mental states. Brentano's Aristotelianism is here in a state of tension with the practical demands of his empirical psychology.

IIb

Grounding concepts in intuition & the analysis of equivocation. In addition to its concrete concern with scientific boundary delimitation, Brentano's work contains another important precedent for Husserl's preoccupation with *metabasis*. Writing about Brentano, Husserl declares that

It was from his lectures that I first acquired the conviction that gave me the courage to choose philosophy as my life's work, that is the conviction that philosophy, too, is a field of serious endeavour, and that it too can—and in fact must—be dealt with in a rigorously scientific manner. The pure objectivity with which he tackled all questions, treating them as *aporiai*, his fine dialectical weighing of different possible arguments, his analyses [*Scheidung*] of equivocations, the way he traced all philosophical concepts back to their sources in intuition—all this filled me with admiration and great confidence.⁴⁰

The procedures Husserl refers to here as analysis of equivocations and return to the intuitional sources of concepts are adapted in his own work, where they are intertwined with the concern to avoid *metabasis*. Analysis of equivocation first figures prominently in his attack on psychologism. For instance, in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* Husserl holds (a) that all logical terms are equivocal, having both real and ideal senses, (b) that there is a natural tendency to equivocate between the two senses, (c) that such equivocations lead to *metabasis* and ultimately to psychologism, and (d) that using intuition to distinguish and hold apart the two senses provides the means

⁴⁰ Edmund Husserl, "Reminiscences of Franz Brentano," in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. Linda L. McAlister (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1976), 48. Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921)*, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, *Husserliana 25* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), 305.

to counteract this *metabasis*. Later this type of analysis leads to Husserl's identification of an equivocation on "transcendence" at the heart of misguided modern epistemology.⁴¹ Brentano's appeal to intuition is also adapted and modified, first to form the cornerstone of Husserl's descriptive-phenomenological method. Later, after further alteration and purification, it plays an analogous role in his transcendental phenomenology. In both cases, however, this principled return to the things themselves is the means by which equivocation is identified and avoided, thus (a) allowing the phenomenologist to proceed free of category mistakes, and (b) thereby delimiting the nature of the resulting idealism. With this influence in mind, consider the appeal to intuition and the separation of equivocations as they are exhibited in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*.⁴²

According to Brentano, "inner perception constitutes the very foundation upon which the science of psychology is erected."⁴³ While it forms the foundation, it is not the sole source of relevant experience. In fact, there are three such sources: (a) inner perception, (b) observation of mental states in memory, and (c) indirect knowledge of others' mental phenomena. Inner perception stands out as a necessary condition for the other two. The justification for this seems clear. In order to observe our former mental states in memory, we must first have perceived them in their initial occurrence. This original apprehension takes place in inner perception, hence, memory presupposes inner perception. Similarly, observing the behavior of other people to infer their mental states requires that we establish an analogy with our own mental states.⁴⁴ Indirectly recognizing another person's mental state of fear requires my own awareness of my states of fear and their typical public expressions in, say increased heart rate, sweating, speech patterns, and so forth. Of course, this self-awareness involves both memory and its antecedent, inner perception.

But the significance of inner perception involves more than simply this logical priority; it possesses an evidentiary priority as well.

⁴¹ Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, 27–28; Hua 2, 35–6.

⁴² Note that what Husserl calls "intuition" when discussing Brentano corresponds to what Brentano refers to as "inner perception."

⁴³ Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 43.

⁴⁴ Of course, that such analogies are justified can be called into question. Ryle disputes this, and other, presuppositions of Brentano's psychology. See Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949).

Consider the contrast between inner and external perception. Inner perception has mental phenomena as its objects; external perception has physical phenomena as its objects.⁴⁵ These two types of phenomena are not distinguished simply by reference to correlative modes of perception, as though they were the same type of object seen through different windows. Rather, what it means for each to be a phenomenon is different. On one hand, physical phenomena are merely phenomena, as they are no more than appearances or manifestations of objects which are not themselves given. On the other hand, mental phenomena are none other than mental events, hence in no way indirect manifestations of an otherwise hidden entity.⁴⁶ As such, Brentano holds that they are given directly. Mental phenomena are precisely as they appear to be, and the inner perception that gives us such objects, gives them to us with "immediate, infallible self-evidence."⁴⁷

Now, psychology is defined in reference to the field of objects that comprise its essential subject matter, and such objects are mental phenomena, objects given in inner perception with immediate self-evidence. In short, inner perception presents the objects of the proper domain of psychology with an (allegedly) unassailable epistemic warrant. Furthermore, since inner perception constitutes the essential ground for all access to the mental—indeed it provides the only immediate access to (present) mental phenomena—we would expect the relevant distinctions between different mental phenomena, and hence the ground for appropriate distinctions between concepts of the mental, to be present to inner perception. In admiring the way Brentano traced concepts to their sources in intuition, Husserl is responding to the fact that Brentano, by employing the primary and essential means of access to his subject matter, attempted to draw his concepts from the things themselves. That is, Brentano was acting on what would soon become the phenomenologists' maxim.

This approach is exemplified in Brentano's execution of the first two basic tasks for psychology, namely (1) identifying the common characteristics of all mental phenomena and (2) distinguishing the basic types of mental phenomena. The most important distinguishing

⁴⁵ Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 91.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 10, 19.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 91.

characteristic of mental phenomena, according to Brentano, is the fact that they all bear within themselves reference to an object. That is, all mental phenomena have an intentional in-existence of an object. This is precisely the sort of characteristic that can be made evident to inner perception. Similarly, the distinction between the main classes of mental phenomena (presentation, judgment, phenomena of love and hate) can also be made evident to inner perception. After all, both of these observations treat only mental phenomena, and mental phenomena are given with immediate self-evidence in inner perception. In principle, execution of these tasks is a matter of simply reading the distinctions off of the mental objects, objects which are fully and immediately given to the psychologist in his own experience. Nonetheless, the *prima facie* simplicity of the task belies its true difficulty. Thus we once again encounter the tension in Brentano between what is possible in principle and the practical limitations of the concrete situation. If it really is so simple to read distinctions off of that which is fully given, why is there no consensus in psychology, why is it more of a battleground of opinions than a field of secured knowledge? The full significance of Brentano's analysis of equivocations can be found here, in his identification of and response to these difficulties.

Problems generated by equivocation and conceptual confusion threaten to discredit inner perception and thus to undermine Brentano's method. Although, as we have seen, inner perception provides us with the immediate, evident awareness of our own mental phenomena, this access carries with it a significant limitation. According to Brentano,

It is a universally valid psychological law that we can never focus our *attention* upon the object of inner perception . . . It is only while our attention is turned toward a different object that we are able to perceive, incidentally, the mental processes which are directed toward that object.⁴⁸

Failure to distinguish between inner perception and inner observation (introspection) is at the root of Comte's earlier rejection of inner perception.⁴⁹ As long as inner perception is confused with a form of observation, and observation is quite correctly understood to entail attention to the object, then there can be no such inner perception; there can be no privileged, immediate access to one's own current

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

mental events. All psychological knowledge would have to be indirect, with the phenomena only being grasped, as it were, after the fact and from the outside.

Thus the threat posed to Brentano's psychology lies not in the nonexistence of inner perception, but rather in the confusion or interchange (*Vermischung, Verwechslung*) of two modes of access to the mental and the errors it engenders.⁵⁰ Failing to recognize the distinction between inner perception and inner observation (introspection), psychologists fused two distinct phenomena under a single concept and term. Although they correctly discern the impossibility of inner observation, they inadvertently equivocate when they reject inner perception, since they take a property that is truly predicated of one phenomenon (that is, impossibility predicated of inner observation) and apply it inappropriately to another due to an unrecognized shifting of meaning. In order to secure the essential epistemic base for all properly psychological knowledge, Brentano identifies this confusion and insists on the separation of inner perception from inner observation.⁵¹ Here, then, is an example of what Husserl recognized and admired as the analysis or separation of equivocations.

Although distinguishing between inner perception and inner observation is a necessary step, by no means does it resolve all disputes within psychology. After all, there is disagreement even among those who recognize the viability of inner perception. Noting this, Brentano asks,

[H]ow are such justifications [of the distinction between classes of mental phenomena] to be achieved? Is there anything we can do besides appeal to inner experience . . . ? It would seem that no other means is available. Inner experience is clearly the only arbiter which can resolve disputes about the sameness or difference of intentional reference. But each of our opponents cites his own inner experience, too. And whose experience should take precedence?⁵²

How can there be such a problem, though, if inner perception presents its objects with immediate self-evidence? Should there not be universal agreement concerning the basic distinctions and

⁵⁰ Ibid., 29–34. Note Brentano's use of the German words Husserl will later use as near synonyms for *metabasis*.

⁵¹ Ibid., 30.

⁵² Ibid., 200.

characteristics of mental phenomena? The concern we encountered earlier has not, it seems, been resolved.

As Brentano has it, there are a number of reasons why psychologists may disagree over what they find in inner perception. These disagreements are not due to inner perception per se, but rather to various factors that cloud the view of what is given in inner perception.⁵³ In the context of addressing the confusion between inner perception and inner observation (introspection), and the resulting confusion of introspection and memory of inner perceptions, Brentano provides the following caveat:

Without such a confusion the fundamental question concerning the highest classes of mental phenomena would have been settled and finished long ago. The obstacle [presented by confusion] is so great that we shall often find ourselves in the position of having to refute by means of formal argumentation and *reductio ad absurdum* opinions which can actually be immediately recognized as false through the evidence of inner perception.⁵⁴

This warning implies that what should be evident in inner perception may not always be so; failing to grasp appropriate distinctions or confusing phenomena may cloud one's sight, leaving one blind to that which would otherwise be evident. In these cases, traditional argumentation may be required to refute an opponent's position or to remove obstructions from the line of sight. Brentano also notes that errors may arise through oversight and also by confusing actually observed characteristics with those that one infers ought to be there. Not surprisingly, the influence of well-entrenched prejudices may be involved in such errors. In difficult cases, as when prejudice is involved, it is not enough to merely identify the error. That is, instead of simply correcting an opponent's position by revealing a mistake and encouraging a second look, one must rather reveal the underlying cause of the error.⁵⁵

⁵³ We leave out of consideration here the other means of access to one's own mental phenomena, observation via memory. In addition to the problems of clouded perception noted above, a problem which would simply be reproduced in one's memory of the phenomena perceived in inner perception, memory suffers from its own problem. It is indisputably fallible. The interesting problem for our considerations is the source of obscured inner perception. For Brentano's view on epistemic problems associated with memory, see *ibid.*, 34–6.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 200.

Analysis of equivocation can now be seen in its full systemic significance both for Brentano and for his influence on Husserl. Since "equivocation is one of the main obstacles to recognizing distinctions," analysis of equivocation is far more than a one-shot means used to defend the viability of inner perception.⁵⁶ Rather, it is an essential methodological tool employed to expose fundamental errors and to open up a clear view of the phenomena. Among the equivocal terms diagnosed by Brentano in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* are "pain" and "thought." So, for instance, "pain" is used to refer to both the presentation of physical damage and the feeling of pain. Combining two senses of the word into one and slipping seamlessly between them helps perpetuate the confusion of these simultaneous phenomena. That is, it helps perpetuate the blurring of the presentation (of, say a burnt hand) and the feeling of pain into what appears to be a single phenomenon.⁵⁷ This alleged equivocation is thus implicated in (at least some instances of) the failure to recognize Brentano's fundamental principle that all mental phenomena are either presentations or are based upon presentations.⁵⁸ Distinguishing properly between the two phenomena and separating the two senses of the term "pain" clears the view so that the psychologist may grasp clearly that, even here, a feeling requires a presentation, and thus that this case is not a counterexample.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid., 84.

⁵⁷ Indeed, the equivocation may also have arisen from this confusion: "Experience shows that equivocation is one of the main obstacles to recognizing distinctions. And it must necessarily be the largest obstacle here where there is an inherent danger of confusion and perhaps the extension of the term was itself the result of this confusion" (ibid.).

⁵⁸ Ibid., 82–5.

⁵⁹ Concerning "thought," the other equivocal term mentioned in the text above, Brentano notes that it is involved in the failure to distinguish between presentation and judgment. There are both psychological and linguistic reasons for missing this distinction. The psychological reason is that "every act of consciousness, however simple it may be, as for example the act in which a sound is the object of my presentation, contains simultaneously a presentation and a judgment, a cognition" (ibid., 225). The linguistic reason is, of course, that the term "thought" refers both to presentations and to judgments. Brentano comments that "No one who knows the history of scientific endeavor will contradict me when I say that this has had a detrimental influence. If very distinguished modern philosophers have succumbed to the fallacy of equivocation time and time again, how could they have failed to have been misled by a similarity of terms in the classification of a realm of phenomena? . . . It is very natural, therefore, for the homonymy of the term 'thinking' to have exerted a detrimental influence in our case" (Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*), 227–8.

III

Conclusion. Aristotle considers demonstrative science as such in the *Posterior Analytics* and there addresses *metabasis* primarily at the level of individual arguments. A syllogism that commits a *metabasis* fails to demonstrate its conclusion. But a science that employs such arguments transgresses its legitimate boundaries and as such is a failed science. Brentano follows these Aristotelian implications, but shifts the emphasis such that the primary concern is with the proper delimitation of scientific boundaries. Against this backdrop, Husserl articulates his concern with scientific boundaries and their transgression in Aristotelian terms (*metabasis*) but modifies Brentano's tools (for example, resolving equivocation and the use of intuition) as means to escape this error.

Avoiding the *metabasis* represented by psychologism leads to, and in fact fully determines, Husserl's early idealism. Similarly, resisting the confusion represented by a more general epistemic naturalism necessitates the transcendental reduction and thus determines the nature of his later transcendental idealism. Early and late, Husserl's idealisms arise through avoidance of *metabasis*. Paradoxically, a close consideration of this concept's role should lead to a greater appreciation of Husserl's realism.

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SPINOZA'S VIRTUOUS PASSIONS

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A CENTRAL MESSAGE OF SPINOZA'S *ETHICS* is that we achieve freedom by mastering the emotions.¹ Harkening back to the ancient Stoics, Spinoza describes human bondage as "man's lack of power to control and check the emotions. For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not his own master but is subject to fortune" (4pref).² In order to help us become our own masters, Spinoza offers "remedies for the emotions," techniques for checking and controlling them. Of course, Spinoza did not believe, any more than the Stoics, that all emotions are harmful.³ Spinoza judges what is bad in the emotions with respect to our virtue, which he equates with our power (4def8). The importance of our power, in turn, stems from our nature: we are ultimately modes of the one substance, whose essence as power is expressed as our individual striving to persist in our being and to increase our power to act. Emotions are bad, then, to the extent that they frustrate our striving, decreasing our activity and power. Eliminating these contributes to our freedom because it prevents us from being directed by external forces.

On this basis, one would imagine that achieving virtue would require us to eliminate the passions, pursuing the Stoic ideal of *apatheia*. Since the passions arise from being passive to external forces,

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¹ This paper is indebted to the helpful criticism of Michael LeBuffe and participants at the History of Philosophy Round Table at the University of California, San Diego, particularly Donald Rutherford.

² Unless otherwise noted, translations are taken from: Baruch Spinoza, *Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley, ed. Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002). Where quoted passages are different, translations are my own. Passages are cited by part and proposition, for instance, 2p37. I will use the standard conventions for abbreviating further references to the *Ethics*: "a" = "axiom"; "c" = "corollary"; "d" = "demonstration"; "def" = "definition of the emotions"; "sch" = "scholium" and so forth.

³ I mean the *eupathia* or good emotions, though there is no appropriate Greek equivalent for 'emotion'.

the passions would seem to represent the sort of bondage which concerns Spinoza. Partly on this basis, it is often assumed that Spinoza understood a life of virtue as one of pure activity, with as few passions as possible.⁴ This paper aims to show that Spinoza reserves an important role for the passions in a life of virtue.⁵ Seen in a certain light, this claim might appear trivial: the passions, like sensations, are knowledge of the first kind, which provides us with the particular knowledge about external things necessary for comporting ourselves in the world. Since virtue amounts to increasing one's power, it follows that the passions, like sensation, must be virtuous in the gen-

⁴ It is very common to draw this conclusion in passing, for instance, see Ronald Sandler, "Intuitus and Ratio in Spinoza's Ethical Thought", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 13 (2005): 73. The position is more forcefully defended by those who read Spinoza as a Stoic, such as Susan James, who writes that "the claim that all passion is inimical to virtue, so that in so far as we become virtuous we become free of passion, was regularly decried by seventeenth-century philosophers and moralists as a Stoic aberration. In cleaving to this view, Spinoza aligns himself with a controversial tenet of Stoicism, and would have been seen to do so," in "Spinoza the Stoic" ["Stoic"], in *The Rise of Modern Philosophy*, ed. Tom Sorell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 289–316. Nussbaum also criticizes Spinoza for an intolerance of passivity and weakness, which she attributes to Stoic influence. See Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 502. The most notable exceptions are Ursula Goldenbaum, "The Affects as a Condition of Human Freedom in Spinoza's Ethics," in *Spinoza on Reason and the Free Man*, eds. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (New York: Little Room Press, 2004), 149–66, and Pierre-François Moreau, who argues that Spinoza leaves an important role to experience as a necessary supplement to reason, since experience involves interacting with and thus being passive to external objects. Moreau indirectly acknowledges the importance of passivity in *Spinoza: l'expérience et l'éternité [l'expérience]*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994). A final group of scholars argue that Spinoza rejects the model of the free man as a model to which we should hold ourselves. Since the free man is completely active, these scholars uphold the line I am pushing in a very roundabout way. See Don Garrett, "A Free Man Always Acts Honestly, Not Deceptively: Freedom and the Good in Spinoza's Ethics," in *Spinoza: Issues and Directions*, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-François Moreau (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 221–38, and Daniel Garber, "Dr. Fischelson's Dilemma: Spinoza on Freedom and Sociability" ["Dr. Fichelson"]; in Yovel and Segal, 183–207.

⁵ A nice example of Spinoza's sympathy for the passions is when he criticizes those who demonize the passions in the *Political Treatise*: "Philosophers look upon the passions by which we are assailed as vices, into which men fall through their own fault. So it is their custom to deride, bewail, berate them, or, if their purpose is to appear more zealous than others, to excrete them." Spinoza, *Complete Works*, 680.

eral sense that they are necessary for us to navigate the world successfully.

While I agree with these claims, my thesis argues that the passions are virtuous in a more specific, moral sense. The passions, unlike other knowledge of the first kind, corresponds to our degree of perfection. As such, the passions play an important role in moral reasoning by indicating what activities are good and bad for us. Indeed, it follows that the passions are indispensable to moral reasoning: a truly virtuous person would require the passions in order to engage consistently in the sorts of activities that increase her power, namely, following reason. Consequently, the passions are virtuous, not just in the general sense that they increase our power, but in the deeper sense that they are integral to a virtuous character. This particular sense of virtue is captured by Spinoza's notion of true virtue as living in accordance with reason.

This important role of the passions in a life of virtue has been neglected, in part, because it is difficult to make sense of Spinoza's claim that the passions track our perfection. Spinoza holds that passions are either pleasures, which indicate an increase in our perfection and power, or pains, which indicate a decrease in our power.⁶ It is not clear, however, how a passion can be pleasurable, in other words, contribute to one's power consistently with Spinoza's philosophy: when we are passive, we are directed by external forces, which would not seem to constitute an increase in our power of activity. The problem has led some commentators to conclude that Spinoza was mistaken to allow for passive pleasure and that perhaps he didn't really think such a thing is possible.⁷ In order to account for the importance of the passions, then, we must explain how they can increase our power. In brief, this paper will argue that, for Spinoza, even when we are passive, we are somewhat active to varying degrees. The passions represent activity because they exercise our understanding by providing us with intelligence about bodies, in particular, the degree of our

⁶3p11sch even defines pleasure as passive: "the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection," (see also 3doe2).

⁷See Paul Hoffman, "Three Dualist Theories of the Passions," *Philosophical Topics* 19 (1991): 153–200; Michael LeBuffe, "The Anatomy of the Passions" (forthcoming in the *Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics*); and Marx Wartofsky "Action and Passion: Spinoza's Construction of a Scientific Psychology" ["Action and Passion"], *Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Marjorie Grene, (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), 329–53.

own bodies' perfection. It follows that a passion can be sufficiently active to bring about an increase in one's power.

Section I briefly sets forth Spinoza's explanation of the passions as inadequate ideas corresponding to changes in our perfection. Section II aims to resolve the above difficulty in making sense of Spinoza's claim that the passions track our perfection. The rest of the paper argues that the passions are virtuous in a moral sense of the term. Section III considers three senses of 'virtue' in Spinoza and whether they are moral. The final section defends the claim that the passions contribute to our true virtue because of their importance to a character that is disposed to act in accordance with reason.

I

The Passions. In order to make a case for the passions, we should first consider how Spinoza understands them generally. For Spinoza, affects are expressed at both the bodily level, as bodily states or changes, and at the mental level, as ideas. In the case of a passion, the affect involves passivity at both levels. We are passive at the bodily level when we are an inadequate cause, either when we are acted on by external bodies or when our actions rely on the causal power of external bodies. At the mental level, passivity involves having inadequate ideas.

To understand mental passivity, we have to say something more about inadequate ideas. Spinoza defines an adequate idea as one that has all the intrinsic characteristics of a true idea in God's mind (2d4, see also 1ax6, 2p32). 'Intrinsic characteristics' refers to properties which ideas have in themselves, rather than their relationship to and agreement with objects. This suggests that adequate ideas are clear and distinct, while inadequate ideas are mutilated and confused (2p29n).⁸ Furthermore, since all ideas in God's mind are adequate, inadequate ideas arise only from particular minds to the extent that they fail to capture fully the true ideas in God's mind (2p36).⁹ In other

⁸ See also Spinoza's equation of adequacy and truth in letter 60.

⁹ Consequently, adequacy is a relation not a property. On this point see Jonathan Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* [Study] (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1984), 178.

words, our idea of *p* is inadequate in the sense that it is missing something contained in God's idea of *p*.¹⁰

In order to understand more precisely how such ideas are inadequate, then, we need to understand what they are missing. Spinoza's main examples are our ideas of our bodies and of external bodies. In describing their inadequacy he tends to use a phrase of the following form: there is knowledge in God in so far as he is affected by very many things, not in so far as he has only the idea of *q* (either our bodies or external bodies) (2p24–5, 2p28). His reasoning is that the true idea of *q* in God's mind is affected by other ideas in God's mind, just as *q* is affected by other bodies. Furthermore, the true idea of *q* represents the causal relationship between *q* and the bodies acting on it. However, the partial idea of *q* in our mind is not affected in the same way by other ideas in our mind; nor does it represent the same causal relationships between *q* and the bodies acting on it. To put the point more plainly, inadequate ideas fail to capture their causal antecedents—because they fail to represent the causal antecedents acting on their bodily counterparts or they fail to stand in the appropriate causal relationship with other ideas in our mind.¹¹

In light of this discussion we can see how having inadequate ideas involves precisely the same passivity we experience at the bodily level: when we have an inadequate idea, our minds are acted on by

¹⁰ This point helps explain Spinoza's somewhat obscure first claim about inadequate ideas at 2p11c: "When we say that God has this or that idea not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind but also in so far as he has the idea of another thing simultaneously with the human mind, then we are saying that the human mind perceives a thing partially or inadequately." In other words, our idea *p* is inadequate when one cannot fully conceive the true idea corresponding to *p* through *p* alone. Rather one must conceive both *p* and "another thing," whatever is missing from *p*.

¹¹ The importance of causal antecedents to adequate knowledge can be traced back (through 2p9, 2p8 and 2p7) to 1a4: "the knowledge of an affect depends on and involves knowledge of the cause." According to this axiom, knowing a thing involves understanding its causes (see also letter 32). The claim that we do not know antecedent causes requires some qualification. The most important antecedent causes are external bodies acting on and determining our bodies. Spinoza claims that we represent external bodies through their effects on our bodies (2p16, 2p16c1), though in a confused way: "the ideas that we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more than the nature of external bodies" (2p16c2). Consequently, we do have ideas of proximate antecedent causes, just not adequate ideas of them.

external ideas, just as our bodies are acted on by external bodies.¹² According to the above, for some body (*b*), its idea (*ib*) is adequate if it fully represents the body's causes, external objects (*e*). Thus our *ib* is inadequate, among other reasons, because the human mind lacks a full, true idea of the external objects (*ie*). Furthermore, according to Spinoza's parallelism, *ie* causes *ib*, just as *e* causes *b*. Since *ie* is not contained by the human mind and our *ib* is, this is an instance of something external acting on our mind. We can put the point slightly differently, by focusing on the explanatory sense of 'cause': We cannot conceive of *ib* entirely through our own mind, since a full account of *ib* would have to appeal to its cause *ie*, which is external to our mind; in other words, *ib* is "caused" by something external in the sense that its explanation requires appeal to something external.¹³ Thus describing an idea as inadequate literally means, as the name suggests, being an inadequate cause of an idea. Consequently, the adequacy of an idea is a measure of both its epistemic adequacy and our causal activity in having the idea.¹⁴

With the relevant Spinozistic machinery in place, we can now show how Spinoza explains passive affects: Suppose that while

¹² The claim defended in this paragraph is that all inadequate ideas are caused by external things, not that all ideas caused by external things are inadequate. As we will see, we can develop adequate ideas from external things in the case of common notions (see 2p39).

¹³ This discussion might give the false impression that we can never have adequate ideas. After all, if adequate ideas represent causal antecedents and we can never have all the ideas of the causal antecedents of a thing, it would seem that we can never have truly adequate knowledge. However, Spinoza allows two cases where we can attain adequate knowledge: First, we can attain adequate knowledge of properties which are common to all things in such a way that the properties are as much in the part as in the whole; the obvious candidates here are thought and extension (2p38). The reasoning seems to be that everything we need to know about such properties is contained in each mode which exhibits those properties such that knowing the causal history of the mode does not further contribute to our knowledge. Second, we can have adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God (2p47). The reasoning here is that such knowledge of God is contained within each mode as the condition for its existence (2p45). Consequently, it seems that we can attain adequate knowledge of only general things, universal properties, the infinite nature of substance and its connection to modes. We will always have inadequate knowledge of empirical, particular things.

¹⁴ Hence forth I will assume that the adequacy of an idea refers both to its epistemic adequacy and its causal adequacy.

camping on vacation I am bitten by a highly venomous snake. The bite will be fatal unless treated with antivenom and I am too isolated to reach assistance before the venom takes effect—for simplicity's sake, suppose that I know all of this. The result of the bite is that I experience the affect of sadness. Following Spinoza's parallelism the affect is an inadequate idea which is identical to a corresponding bodily event.¹⁵ Consequently, the explanation for the sadness must occur at both the mental and bodily level. On the bodily level, the bite gives rise to sadness because it decreases my bodily power of activity; we would explain the affect as passive because an external thing, the snake, causes the decrease in my bodily power of activity. On the mental level, the affect is sadness because it is an idea which represents the decrease in my bodily power of activity; it is an inadequate idea, first, because it represents the snake only partially through the snake's effects on my body (the pain of the bite) and, second, because my mind does not contain the cause of my idea of my bodily changes, the true idea of the snake in God's mind, corresponding to the body of the snake. Consequently, my mind is being acted on by an external cause.¹⁶

II

Understanding Passive Pleasures. Before explaining how the passions can be virtuous in a moral sense, we must first explain how Spinoza can consistently claim that the passions are virtuous in the more basic sense that they can contribute to our power. Let's begin by considering the evidence that passivity generally can be advantageous.¹⁷ Spinoza recognizes the possible advantages of passivity

¹⁵ Following Spinoza I will use 'affect' to refer to either the bodily or mental aspect of an affect. I hope that context will make the referent clear.

¹⁶ While I know that the snake bit me, this knowledge is only possible because my ideas of my body indirectly represent the snake through its affect on me; I do not contain the true idea of the snake, in God's mind.

¹⁷ Bennett argues that Spinoza in an earlier draft of the *Ethics* conceived of all pleasures as passive and imperfectly rewrote the text to allow for active pleasure (*Study*, 257–8). If Bennett is right it may account for a few remarks that Spinoza makes which seem not to allow for active pleasures (such as 3p11sch and 3p57d). At any rate, Spinoza's decided view is that there are both passive and active pleasures.

when considering our dependency on the basic necessities of life. "The human body needs for its preservation a great many other bodies, by which, as it were, it is continually regenerated" (2p13post4).¹⁸ To the extent that these bodies are necessary for our survival, it is advantageous to be passively affected by them (4p39).¹⁹ Furthermore, Spinoza recognizes that securing our well-being requires social organization and a state (4p40; see also 4p35c1). Any minimal distribution of labor in a society requires us to depend upon the labor and contribution of others for our well-being. In this way, being passive to others is also to our advantage.

A possible motivation for Spinoza's view on the value of passivity is that, for Spinoza, it is necessary that we are always passive to some degree, so that, if we are going to increase our power at all, it must be possible to do so passively. Our necessary passivity follows from Spinoza's definition of passivity as being an inadequate or partial cause: "we are passive when something takes place in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause" (3def2). It follows from this definition, first, that we are passive anytime that we bring about something through the cooperation of other things. For instance, one would be passive when building a sandcastle with the assistance of friends or, even, tools. In fact, since the sandcastle comes about partly through the power of the sand to maintain its shape and so forth, one would be passive to some degree even when building the sandcastle entirely with one's own hands. It follows, second, that we are passive anytime something acts on us: for something to act on us, it must bring about some change in us; otherwise, we would not say that the thing has exerted any causal power over us. Since such a change is partly brought about through the power of the thing, we are at best an inadequate cause of such change and, thus, passive.²⁰ It follows that a fully active person would not really

¹⁸ As an example, he claims that we require many different kinds of food in order to nourish all the parts of our body (4app27).

¹⁹ "We can never bring it about that we should need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our own being and that we should need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our own being and that we should live a life quite unrelated to things outside ourselves" (4p18sch).

²⁰ The same point is expressed in a different way by Wartofsky: our power depends upon our ability to act, which requires us to be capable of interaction which requires us to be acted on as well. Thus "the dependency on other bodies, in a strange and dialectical sense, is the very condition of a body's activity, since its power to act is its power to affect other bodies; as, in turn, the power to act of these other bodies is their power to act on this (my) body." "Action and Passion," 338.

interact with the world—they would only act on the world.²¹ Spinoza confirms the impossibility of such a thing when he claims that our power will inevitably be surpassed by the power of external forces (4p3) and, consequently, we will necessarily undergo changes which are not brought about by our own power (4p4).²²

It follows from this discussion that the passions, as a kind of passivity, must also be able to increase our power. In order to understand the difficulty with making sense of this claim, consider an instance where a passion might be said to represent an increase in one's power: suppose that after I collapse comatose in the wilderness from a snake-bite, I am found by a park ranger who, recognizing the bite, injects me with antivenom. Spinoza would explain the effect of the antivenom as passive pleasure: at the bodily level, the antivenom causes pleasure because it increases my bodily power of activity, for instance, by improving my bodily function; the pleasure is passive because it is brought about by an external thing, the ranger. At the mental level, the passion of pleasure is an inadequate idea because it conceives of the change in my bodily power of activity, though my mind does not contain ideas of the bodily causes (the ranger and the antivenom). The problem is that, since the pleasure arises from being passively affected, how can such a thing increase my causal activity? Spinoza's view seems almost paradoxical: a change caused by something else is an increase in my own causal activity!

²¹ I should note one way that we can be affected and still be active. Spinoza explains when he writes that God can be affected: "the idea of an individual thing existing in actuality has God for its cause not in so far as he is infinite but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing" (2p9). God is affected to the extent that he is identified with one of his modes, which is affected by another mode. God is affected *actively* because he is not affected from the outside; all the modes are in God. A human being could similarly be affected actively, for example, when some of her ideas are affected by other of her ideas. However, because humans are finite and do not contain all the modes, increasing the degree to which we are affected will inevitably lead us to be affected from the outside and thus to greater passivity.

²² Spinoza also confirms our inevitable passivity when he criticizes both the Stoics and Descartes for supposing that we can gain complete control over our passive emotions (5pref). On this point, see also "Action and Passion," 334.

One might try to sidestep the problem by conceiving of power as a capacity to act. Following this line of reasoning, one might think that the antivenom increases my power in the sense that it causes changes in my body which provide me with the capacity to act from my *conatus*, my essential causal powers, at a future time. This response is unsuccessful because it conceives of power in a way that is inconsistent with Spinoza, as something potential, contained but untapped, like the power in a battery. According to the *conatus* doctrine, at every moment, every thing expresses its power as much as possible. If one's power fails to bring about a particular effect, this is not because the power is stored and unused, but rather because one's power is countered in some way by the power of another thing. The only way that we could fail to express our power is if we were able to check our own power, which, according to 3p6, is impossible. Since Spinoza cannot admit the possibility of unexpressed power, he also cannot admit that the antivenom increases my power in the sense that it supplies me with a capacity to act at a future time.²³

In explaining a more successful solution, we will first concentrate on passivity at the mental level, though we will presently generalize our claims to the case of bodies. The solution is based on the claim that even inadequate ideas involve some causal activity. I do not mean by this that inadequate ideas are causally efficacious, that they bring about change; rather, inadequate ideas represent some causal activity on the part of the mind that conceives them. This might seem counterintuitive: since adequacy is a measure of causal activity, it would follow that inadequate ideas have some degree of adequacy.²⁴ However, Spinoza writes as though inadequate ideas can have some adequacy when he suggests that some inadequate ideas can be more or less adequate than others, for instance, claiming that some ideas are very inadequate (2p30). This way of thinking makes sense given Spinoza's view about the particular knowledge offered by inadequate ideas. In order to have truly adequate knowledge of something particular, say *q*, one must have all the ideas of all of *q*'s

²³ Of course, Spinoza might agree that the antivenom gives me the capacity to act better in the future; he just cannot regard this as an increase in one's power, given his understanding of power.

²⁴ I mean here that they represent causal activity, not causal efficacy. In other words, I mean that inadequate ideas represent the activity of the idea and the person having the idea, not that inadequate ideas have the power to cause changes in other things.

causes and their causes and so forth. While human minds—unlike God's (2p9d)—cannot meet this requirement, some of our ideas come closer than others. If I had ideas of all of *q*'s immediate causes, my knowledge would be more complete, adequate and involve greater causal activity than the knowledge of one who doesn't have any idea of *q*'s causes. Since affects are ideas, it follows that passive affects can be more or less active as well; thus the more adequate one's ideas, the more one's joy changes in character from passive to active, from, say, *amor* to *amor dei*. 5p15 acknowledges this scalar sense of activity in *amor dei* when it tells us that one loves God "the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions."²⁵

One might question how one's having inadequate ideas, in other words, being passive to external ideas, could involve being causally active at all.²⁶ The answer is that even passive affects express our *conatus* simply in virtue of the fact that they represent our body

²⁵ See also 4p59d: "In so far as pleasure is good, it is in agreement with reason (for it consists in this, that a man's power of activity is increased or assisted), and it is a passive emotion only in so far as a man's power of activity is not increased to such a degree that he adequately conceives himself and his actions. Therefore if a man affected with pleasure were brought to such a degree of perfection that he were adequately to conceive himself and his actions, he would be capable, indeed, more capable, of those same actions to which he is now determined by passive emotions." This reading of *amor dei* is also argued in Jerome Neu, *Emotion, Thought and Therapy: A Study of Hume and Spinoza and the Relationship of Philosophical Theories of the Emotions to Psychological Theories of Therapy* (New York: Routledge Press, 1977), 81.

²⁶ Spinoza's thinking about action also supports the claim that we are causally active when we have inadequate ideas. As is often recognized, Spinoza uses 'action' in two ways: In the first strong sense, occurrence *p* is my action if I am the adequate cause of *p*. Spinoza also uses the term in a weaker sense to refer to instances where we are passively determined. The weak sense is evident, for instance, in 4p59 when Spinoza describes being passively determined as an "action". He uses the term the same way in 2p48d when he says that the mind "cannot be the free cause of its actions" (see also 4p23). The weak sense of 'action' seems to be: occurrence *p* is my action if I am a partial cause of *p*. It follows that inadequate ideas, to the admittedly limited extent that they are caused by us, express our power and *conatus*. Spinoza confirms this when he writes that "the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its own being" (3p9). The strong and weak sense of 'action' is noted in Michael Della Rocca, "The Power of an Idea: Spinoza's Critique of Pure Will" ["Power"], *Nous* 37:2 (2003): 200–31, at 205–6. I should also note that Michael LeBuffe offers a different explanation for 3p9 in "Why Spinoza Tells People to Try to Preserve their Being," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 86 (2004): 119–45.

(3p11s).²⁷ This is because the power of the mind depends upon representing the body.²⁸ Spinoza employs this claim when arguing that, if the mind stops representing the body, the cause must be some outside force; this is because nothing can follow from the mind itself which is contrary "to the idea that constitutes the essence of our mind."²⁹ Furthermore, Spinoza claims that an idea increases one's mental power to the extent that it represents increases in the body's power of activity (3p11). For instance, our pleasure at receiving the antivenom is active to the extent that it represents the increase in the body's power from the antivenom.³⁰

Thinking of our inadequate ideas as involving some causal activity resolves the problem of passive pleasure in the following way: an inadequate idea, to the extent that it involves our causal activity, could represent an increase in one's power of mental activity sufficient to offset whatever decrease in power arises from its passivity.³¹ Return to the example of the antivenom. While having the affect de-

²⁷ Della Rocca has another explanation for why an inadequate idea must express our *conatus*: it follows analytically from the fact that an action is ours and we only act from our *conatus* that our having an even inadequate ideas represents some action of our *conatus* (Della Rocca, "Power," 208). I agree, but in this context the explanation is unhelpful because the question at stake is *how* an inadequate idea represents the *conatus*.

²⁸ Spinoza thinks this follows from the parallelism asserted by 2p7 (he specifically appeals to 2p8cor and 2p8s), though the derivation is unclear.

²⁹ Another reason to think that having an idea involves causal activity is that all ideas involve the affirmation of the idea as true (2p49). This is explained comprehensively in Della Rocca, "Power."

³⁰ Furthermore, the pleasure at receiving the antivenom involves anticipating the life that the antivenom allows me to experience. In doing so, the mind regards its own power, which also increases its power of activity (3p53). Della Rocca argues that Spinoza rejects future directed strivings because they violate his naturalism. Consequently, Spinoza conceives of them as anticipation, which is a present pleasure which comes from the idea of some future benefit. He bases this account, for instance, on 3p7. See "Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology," in *Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 192–266.

³¹ My solution should also be distinguished from another of LeBuffe's claims that passive pleasures might represent only localized increases in power (Cf. LeBuffe, "Anatomy of the Passions," 39–43). LeBuffe claims that this addresses the problem (partially) because it prevents any instance of passive pleasure which represents a net increase in one's power of activity; in this sense, passive pleasure is not ever a net increase in pleasure. Again, my reading disagrees.

creases my causal activity—simply affirming an inadequate idea involves a decrease in my activity—it can also increase my causal activity, in that it represents an increase in the power of the body (3p11). The solution suggests that in such cases one gains more activity from the affect than one loses. In this way, the affect is both passive, because it is brought about partly by external causes, and pleasure, because it involves a net increase in causal activity.³² Seen in this light, the solution arises from properly understanding the categories of adequate and inadequate ideas: Passive pleasure appears problematic if one supposes that inadequate ideas are purely passive. However, Spinoza understands inadequate ideas as those involving any degree of passivity whatsoever.

This should be distinguished from Wartofsky's admittedly "unsuccessful" explanation of passive pleasure: he argues that we may have a passive pleasure only when a pleasure counters and diminishes a pain, so that one's pain is less than it would be otherwise. For instance, taking aspirin may give me pleasure in the sense that it reduces the pain of the snakebite. On Wartofsky's solution, a pleasure could only become great enough to completely overcome a pain if it were active; therefore, *passive* pleasure can only consist in partial reductions in pain. In contrast, on my solution, being passive can increase one's net pleasure and power, not just reduce pain and decreases in power.³³ Wartofsky's claim is similar to LeBuffe's claim that passions can only be pleasurable to the extent that they restrain other passions.³⁴ As with Wartofsky's claim, I disagree on the grounds that being passive can actually increase our power, not just mitigate more harmful forces.

³² This solution implies that passivity can be cancelled out or checked by one's activity. Spinoza implies this conclusion when he claims that the mind strives to oppose and check ideas which diminish our power of activity with those which increase our power of activity (3p13). Of course, Spinoza's remarks in 3p13 concern the interaction between two opposing ideas, whereas the case of passive pleasure, as I have framed it, concerns a single idea with opposing tendencies. Nevertheless, the case of one idea should work similarly: the affect of passive pleasure simultaneously acts to increase and decrease one's power of activity and pleasure. The decrease would be cancelled out by the increase just as it is when two opposing ideas duke it out.

³³ "Actions and Passions," 348.

³⁴ LeBuffe, "Anatomy of the Passions," 39–43.

This solution can be generalized to the case of bodies as well. As in the mental case, being affected by bodies can involve our own activity as well. Even when we are passively affected by external bodies the changes in our bodies are brought about partially through the power of our own bodies. Remember the example of the sandcastle: one cannot mold the sandcastle without assistance from the power of the sand to maintain its shape. The same is true for the case of the antivenom: the antivenom is only effective because of my bodily mechanisms by which I process and circulate the antivenom to all of my tissues. If the ranger had come too late, I would not have the power to assist him in this way. Indeed, if I were purely passive and relied entirely on the power of the antivenom, the ranger's efforts would be no more effective than pumping antivenom into a corpse. Furthermore, to the extent that the effect is brought about through my power, the effect better expresses my *conatus* and is to my benefit. It is not hard to imagine that my contribution to the effect involves sufficient activity that I actually become more active by being passively affected by the antivenom.

One might object that this solution has not really shown that the passions can be advantageous after all: according to the solution, passive pleasure only increases our power to the extent that the affect is active; the general idea is that the adequacy and activity of the idea overpowers its passivity and inadequacy. Consequently, the objection goes, we cannot really conclude that one's *passivity* increases one's power; rather, the increase comes from one's *activity*.³⁵ The objection is correct in one sense: at the mental level, an inadequate idea is passive to the extent that it does not represent some aspect of a true idea. Clearly it does not make sense to say that our activity and power is increased by *not* representing something. However, there is a sense in which passivity itself increases one's power: being passive

³⁵ This is Hoffman's reason for thinking that passive pleasure ultimately cannot be explained in Spinoza's system. "While it [Hoffman's best proposed solution] may succeed in explaining how increasing the ways in which we can be affected by external objects increases our power of acting, and so succeeds in explaining how being affected by something external can be pleasurable, it does not succeed in making room for passive joy. Insofar as we are affected by something external that increases our power of acting, we are active, not passive." "Three Dualist Theories of the Passions," 179.

supplies us with ideas that we can only obtain by being passive. Since these ideas increase our power, it makes sense to say that passivity itself increases our power. For example, even though my idea of the antivenom is inadequate and based on how my body is affected, this idea still provides me with understanding, informing me, for instance, that there is an antivenom, how quickly it takes effect, its effectiveness and so forth. If my knowledge were limited to what I can understand through pure activity, in other words, adequate ideas, I would only know general properties of things and metaphysical facts, for instance, the relationships between substance and modes, their natures and so forth. Knowledge of particular things, like the antivenom can only be achieved by representing particular external objects in terms of how they act on our bodies, which requires us to be affected by them and thus passive.³⁶ Since my understanding and power can only be increased in this way by being passive, it makes sense to say that passivity itself increases one's power.

Spinoza acknowledges this reasoning when he explains how being affected by objects, and thus being passive, increases our understanding (4p38). Spinoza's reasoning is that the mind represents everything that happens in the body (2p14). So, the more our body is affected by things, the more things our mind will represent, increasing our understanding; "as the body is rendered more capable in these

³⁶ My claim here about the importance of the passions for giving us the particular knowledge required for action echoes Moreau's claim that experience is necessary for understanding the relationship between the general claims revealed by reason and particular finite modes, which we cannot derive from reason (*l'expérience*, Book I, chapter 1). My claim here is different from Moreau's, firstly, in that it is uniquely concerned with the passions, without claiming that Spinoza reserves any particular role for experience generally. Furthermore, my view argues that the passions contribute to a virtuous life in a different way than Moreau argues that experience can be beneficial. Moreau argues that experience, understood properly as distinct from vague experience and scientific experiment, is beneficial for a variety of reasons: it reveals the limits of what can be understood through reason and helps us when reason falls short, telling us of the existence of particular things and how to orient ourselves to them. He argues that the passions, in particular, give us the practical experience to confirm the claims of reason and that they make us particular individuals, accounting for the various ways that we understand, interpret and react to the world (Book II, chapter 3). Moreau does not consider the importance that the passions play in a moral life by revealing the degree of our perfection.

respects, so is the mind rendered more capable of apprehension" (4p38d).³⁷ Since understanding increases one's power (4p26–7), Spinoza also claims that increasing our understanding by being passively affected also increases our power. "That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in more ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in more ways, is advantageous to man" (4p38).³⁸ As Spinoza summarizes the point in 4app27 "the advantage we get from things external to us" is the "experience and knowledge we gain from observing them and changing them from one form to another." Our understanding of the particular properties revealed through passive encounters with external things is particularly important for us to act in ways which are to our advantage. For instance, my particular knowledge of the antivenom will incline me to carry antivenom on future hikes or to avoid hiking in areas with snakes and so forth.³⁹ This sort of knowledge allows us to navigate the world, telling us which foods make us sick, which bus goes up-town, which politician can be trusted and so forth.

III

Three Kinds of Virtue. While the foregoing explains how passions can be virtuous in the sense that they contribute to our power, do they qualify as virtuous in a moral sense of the term? While

³⁷ This conclusion is spelled out in 4p18sch: "If we consider the mind, surely our intellect would be less perfect if the mind were in solitude and understood nothing beyond itself. Therefore there are many things outside ourselves which are advantageous to us and ought therefore to be sought."

³⁸ Spinoza offers a helpful example illustrating this reasoning when discussing *titillatio* (imbalanced bodily pleasure). Spinoza claims that *titillatio* can be excessive and bad because it can "hinder the body's ability to be affected in numerous other ways" (4p43d). Presumably this is because excessive bodily pleasure disposes one to continue interacting with the world in the same way (say, through sex or drinking), without engaging in new activities which would increase one's understanding (see also 4p60). In this way, our understanding may actually be hindered by not being sufficiently passive to external objects.

³⁹ Of course, not all passivity will be to one's advantage, as in the case of being bitten by a snake or run over by a bus. Nevertheless, I could only understand the antivenom by being passive, since any analysis of the antivenom from my own nature would only reveal general properties of extended things or metaphysical truths about modes.

Spinoza explicitly defines virtue as power (4def8; 3p55cor2), he offers other more restrictive notions of virtue. The second is what Spinoza sometimes calls the highest virtue (4p36d; 5p27) or highest good.⁴⁰ This is attained through perfecting the intellect or reason (4app4), which amounts to having knowledge of God or, equivalently, an adequate conception of oneself and everything that falls within the scope of human knowledge. Spinoza explains that the highest virtue arises only from contemplating clear and distinct perceptions (4p52).⁴¹ The distinction between this highest virtue and the more general virtue mentioned above is, foremost, one of degree: the highest good is a good for the same reason as any other, because it increases one's power. However, since the highest good is so effective at increasing one's power, it also plays a more fundamental role in structuring the relations among other goods. Thus, Spinoza, following eudaimonistic ethics,⁴² argues, first, that the highest good is the only complete good—sought for its own sake, not for the sake of any other thing—and, second that other goods are only valuable to the extent that they lead to the highest good.⁴³

⁴⁰ 5p27 might appear to suggest that the highest good consists only in an intuitive knowledge of God, knowledge of the third kind (2p40sch2). However, other passages where Spinoza mentions the highest good (4p36d) show that any adequate conception of God constitutes our highest good.

⁴¹ 4p52d claims that our highest contentment comes from clear and distinct perceptions, while 4p52sch identifies our highest contentment with our highest good. 4p52 might seem to disagree with my reading because it identifies our greatest contentment as arising from contemplation of our own power, not God. However, we must remember that our own power is an expression of God's power, in particular, that aspect of God's power to which we have the greatest epistemic access.

⁴² Of course, there is a great deal of variety among these accounts. For instance, for Aristotle there are other practical goods which do not themselves constitute the highest good but which make it possible for us to achieve the highest good, such as a life with sufficient resources for rational reflection and participation in civic life, whereas Stoics deny that nonmoral things such as resources are goods, though they nevertheless describe such things as preferred indifferents: indifferent with respect to the good, but nonetheless choiceworthy.

⁴³ Cf. Spinoza, *The Emendation of the Intellect* [TEI] 1 and 5 in the *Complete Works*. These claims are not as explicit in the *Ethics*, though they are suggested, for instance, by 4p52. I generally agree with those who argue that the TEI should be read as clarifying the project of the *Ethics*; see *l'expérience* Book I, particularly chapter 1 and Herman De Dijn, *Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1996).

Thirdly, Spinoza writes that our “true virtue is nothing other than to live by the guidance of reason” (4p37sch1; see also 4p52d). Since Spinoza defines reason as having adequate ideas (2p40sch2), true virtue can only be attained from living in accordance with adequate ideas. This is a more restricted use of ‘virtue’ than the first because ‘true virtue’ would not include all increases in our power: winning the lottery might increase my power, but it is not necessarily an action in accordance with reason. True virtue is not the same as the highest virtue either, since true virtue is concerned with “living” according to reason. The highest virtue, since it consists in having clear and distinct perceptions of God’s nature and our connection to it, involves having highly intellectual knowledge, for instance, the metaphysics of mode and attribute, the nature of extension, the laws of physics and so forth. While it is true that, following parallelism, such knowledge would have bodily counterparts, it is unlikely that all of this knowledge has practical consequences in terms of guiding one’s action. Thus our highest virtue consists in simply having adequate ideas, while our true virtue is attained through acting in accordance with them.⁴⁴

Do any of these uses of ‘virtue’ refer to virtue in a moral sense? The first does not seem to be moral, since it holds that anything which is good for us, even obviously amoral activities such as eating and drinking, is virtuous. It is interesting that, although Spinoza often follows the Stoics, he clearly departs from them here. The Stoics argue, against Aristotle, that only virtue is good, thereby ruling out other sorts of goods, for instance, the sort of things which lead to a commodious life, such as a nice house. While Spinoza also equates virtue with the good, he does so by expanding the category of the virtuous to encompass all things which are good for a person, rather than by restricting the scope of the good narrowly to the virtuous.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ While this distinction is subtle, it is important because it allows that one can exhibit true virtue, even though she may lack the sort of metaphysical training required for many of our adequate ideas, such as our idea of substance.

⁴⁵ Moreover, it follows that Spinoza equates virtue with acting according to one’s nature (4p18sch), unlike the Stoics, for whom virtue is only one way of acting in accordance with one’s nature. Thus Spinoza says that raising one’s arm to strike a blow, to the extent that it is consistent with my nature, is virtuous (4p59sch).

Are the other notions of virtue restricted to moral goods and actions, thereby corresponding to a more Stoic view on the nature of virtue? The notion of highest virtue is clearly indebted to a eudaimonistic ethical framework. The highest virtue is a moral concept in the loose sense that it offers prescriptions for actions; calling something our highest virtue implies that we should engage in actions to help us attain it. The notion of true virtue also implies prescriptions for actions, though true virtue is a slightly different moral concept because it is achieved by *living* in accordance with reason, which implies regularly and consistently acting in accordance with reason. Consequently, true virtue is related to a more common notion of virtue as character, habit, dispositions. Spinoza's interest in this aspect of virtue is clear from his description of *fortitudo* (3p59sch) or strength of character.

It is important to note that 'highest virtue' and 'true virtue' are not moral in the stricter sense of pertaining to what is permissible and obligatory. Spinoza is clear that permissibility is determined by advantage (4app8), so that the category of the permissible is coextensive with virtue generally. Thus Spinoza regards as impermissible any action that decreases our power, even those which we regard as obviously amoral, such as skipping a meal. Spinoza has very little to say about duty and obligation, aside from general claims about how we ought to act, where 'ought' signifies what will best increase our power, again including obviously amoral actions. Consequently, it is not clear that Spinoza employs any sense of 'virtue' which maps on to this common way of thinking about the moral.

IV

True Virtue and the Intelligence of the Passions. Are the passions virtuous in either of the moral senses of the term? First, consider the notion of highest virtue. Spinoza does say that passivity improves our understanding from "the experience and knowledge we gain from observing things and changing them from one form to another" (4app27; see also 4p38–9). However, since Spinoza holds that the highest good consists in clear and distinct perception, which is only possible in the case of adequate ideas, increasing our power pas-

sively, because it provides us with only inadequate ideas, cannot contribute to the highest good.⁴⁶

Would the passions count as virtuous in the sense of true virtue? It is tempting to answer no, since true virtue involves acting from adequate ideas and the passions are inadequate ideas. However, we must remember that true virtue implies living in accordance with reason, in other words, consistently acting in ways which increase our power of activity. Since the passions serve as a barometer of our power, they would help us to increase our power by indicating whether an activity increases our power. For instance, my formative experiences with the painful consequences of breaking rules taught me that a life of crime will not assist my perfection, whereas the pleasure accompanying learning taught me that a life of education would. Indeed, there is a good case for thinking of the passions as necessary for true virtue. While one may occasionally get lucky and hit on the right action, it is unlikely that one would consistently act appropriately without the feedback offered by the passions. Since it can be difficult to tell whether one is acting in accordance with reason, one needs to know when she succeeds and fails. This sort of feedback cannot come from adequate ideas, since they are too general. For instance, while we can determine through adequate ideas that we should surround ourselves with rational people and love God, the actual pursuit of these activities requires us to know more specific, particular things than can be revealed through adequate ideas. For instance, I need to know which people are rational or whether my love for a particular person is leading me towards love of God or mere lust. Making these determinations requires experience, in particular, the experience of increasing or decreasing one's power, which is revealed only by the passions.

The foregoing argument presupposes that the passions provide a kind of intelligence, that one can tell from pleasure or pain the status of one's power. A possible problem with this claim is that Spinoza admits that some pleasures can be bad and some pains good. If a pleasure is bad, it decreases my perfection. But pleasure is supposed to indicate an increase in my perfection; "pleasure is not in itself bad, but

⁴⁶ As a side note, this point provides a possible explanation for those passages where Spinoza seems to contrast virtue to passions, saying, for instance, that humility "is not a virtue, but a passion" (4p53d): by 'virtue' here, the suggestion goes, Spinoza means something like "contributes to the highest good."

good" (4p41). A bad pleasure, it would seem to follow, must be an unreliable indicator of perfection; similarly if a pain is good, then it increases my perfection and, thus, the pain too must be unreliable. All of this suggests that pleasures and pains are generally poor barometers of one's perfection. In this case, the passions of pleasure and pain cannot provide us with the appropriate feedback for them to contribute to our true virtue.

In responding to the objection, we may focus our attention on bad pleasures, since Spinoza claims that pain is only good in so far as it checks bad pleasure. Spinoza explains that *titillatio* can be bad because it "is related to man when part of him is affected more than others" (3p11s). Spinoza argues that this can create an imbalance which actually decreases the body's power of activity: "The power of this emotion can be so great as to surpass the other activities of the body" (4p43d). In this respect, *titillatio* can be "excessive" and "bad." At first, it is difficult to reconcile these claims with the definition of pleasure as a transition to a state of greater perfection. Consider an example of excessive *titillatio*: my pleasure from eating can become excessive if I eat to the point that it is detrimental to my health, decreasing my ability to act. The difficulty is this: if excessive eating decreases my power, how can it be categorized as a kind of pleasure, since pleasure is supposed to be correlated with transitions to greater perfection?

The key to a Spinozistic resolution is his claim above that excess pleasure is related to a particular part of the body: one receives pleasure from even excessive eating because it accompanies an increased power of activity in some part of the body, namely the part occupied with digestion. Excessive eating makes one a more powerful eater, able to digest more food and store more energy. The problem is that this localized increase in power disrupts the proportion of motion-and-rest for the entire body, thereby decreasing the net power of the entire bodily system. Consequently, even bad pleasures can still be regarded as accurate barometers of perfection: *titillatio* reliably tracks a *localized* increase in one's power of activity, for instance, the power of a particular region or system of the body.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ This point is recognized by Hoffman, "Three Dualist Theories of the Passions," 175.

This explanation for how bad *titillatio* accurately tracks perfection can be generalized to all bad pleasures. Almost all of the bad pleasures are kinds of love, which Spinoza defines as pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause (3p13s). We can explain the varieties of bad love as pleasure in the sense of *titillatio*, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. This is supported by 4p44d: "Therefore *titillatio* accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love, and thus love can be excessive." Thus love is bad in that it corresponds to local increases in power which disrupt the entire body's power of activity. The immoderate loves (*ebrietas*, *libido* and *avaritia*) offer obvious examples, since one's sensual powers are heightened, at the expense of one's other powers, namely reason (3p56s). The only bad pleasures which are not strictly love are pleasures accompanied by the idea of an *internal* cause: pride (*superbia*) (3p26s) and passive self-esteem (*acquiescentia in se ipso*) (3p30s). Although these pleasures involve ideas of the self, they can just as easily be explained as kinds of *titillatio*. 4app30 indicates that Spinoza intends to explain all bad pleasures (and desires) in this way: "since pleasure is usually related to one part of the body in particular, the emotions of pleasure (unless one exercises reason and care), and consequently the desires that are generated from them, can be excessive" (see also 4p60).

On the basis of this discussion, we can say that Spinoza's inclusion of bad pleasures is, not only consistent with, but a consequence of the claim that pleasure tracks perfection. Following a strong naturalistic line, Spinoza intends many of his claims about human beings to apply univocally to all things, including each of the various parts and systems of our body: just as we have a *conatus*, each part of our body, in so far as it tends to persist in its existence, has a *conatus* as well. Just as our *conatus* undergoes changes in its power of activity, so too will the *conatus* of the parts of our body. Each of these changes will have a corresponding idea of pleasure or pain in the human mind. Furthermore, since some global decreases of power for the entire human body will inevitably be accompanied (or caused) by localized increases of power from its parts, it follows that some localized pleasures will also accompany (or even contribute to) global pains. The important point is that Spinoza is committed to this conclusion in part because he is committed to the view that pleasure accurately tracks changes in perfection (for each system of the body).

The foregoing provides us with a picture of how the passions can function in practical reasoning. At any time the mind contains any number of pains and pleasures corresponding to changes in the power of various parts of the body. Although we may be conscious of many of these ideas, the only ideas which track our *conatus* correspond to the power of activity for our entire being, its proportion of motion-and-rest. This requires us to discriminate the pleasures which are consistent with the flourishing of the entire body from those which are not. Such discrimination would be facilitated by the fact that, according to Spinoza's theory, any harmful localized pleasure should be accompanied by pain, corresponding to the overall decrease in one's power of activity. For example, although one may feel pleasure from excessive sensual pleasures, there will also be pain from the resulting neglect of his rational nature. Practical reasoning then involves sorting through and discriminating among the passions in this way.

V

Conclusions. This paper has shown, firstly, that Spinoza's admission of the passion of pleasure is, not anomalous, but rather of a piece with his philosophical system: Spinoza's division of our ideas as adequate or inadequate makes two lopsided categories. Adequate ideas are a narrow category pertaining mostly to general properties of things and metaphysical truths. In contrast, the category of inadequate ideas includes all other ideas and, consequently, ideas of widely varying epistemic quality. Spinoza recognizes this variety by allowing varying degrees of adequacy and activity in having inadequate ideas. This recognition is necessary, since the adequacy of our ideas comes, in part, from representing our power, as do many of our inadequate ideas to varying degrees. Furthermore, to the extent that some of our inadequate ideas represent increases in our power, given his definition of pleasure, it follows that they must give us pleasure, though perhaps not as much pleasure as do fully adequate ideas.

Secondly, given this proper understanding of the passions, we can see the important role they play in the life of the virtuous. For Spinoza the passions are necessary for us to act in the world: they provide us with the knowledge of particular things, which makes it possible for us to navigate external objects. More importantly, the passions

alone provide us with knowledge about our perfection and thus the feedback which makes it possible for us to act in accordance with reason. Since Spinoza's notion of true virtue involves a disposition to act consistently in accordance with reason, it follows that the passions play an integral and positive role in the virtuous life.⁴⁸

This point helps us to see how Spinoza's moral philosophy breaks starkly with the Stoics. For the Stoics, the passions are mistakes of reason, failures to follow *logos*. Consequently, they see the sage, one who is completely free from the passions, as obviously desirable. Moreover, for them there is nothing incoherent about the possibility of such a person, though Stoics admit that there have been few if any sages. In contrast, Spinoza's understanding of reason is much narrower than the Stoics', limited only to having a few, general adequate ideas. While Spinoza agrees with the Stoics that the passions are epistemically inferior, he cannot make sense of the notion that someone can function entirely through reason and, consequently, it would be incoherent for him to uphold *apatheia* as a realistic ethical goal. The result is a philosophy which is far more attentive to the irrational and affective aspects of human life, a philosophy which is more understanding of human passivity, vulnerability, and dependence.

While it is widely recognized that Spinoza criticizes the Stoics for imagining that it is possible for humans to completely master the passions, it is nevertheless common to see Spinoza as Stoic in the sense that he desires to eliminate the passions as much as possible. On this view, passions are, at best, necessarily evils. While it is true that Spinoza wants to reduce the causal power that external things exert over us and, consequently, reduce the causal power of the passions, this paper has shown that is not the case that Spinoza sees the passions as necessarily bad or that he wants us to eliminate the passions. On this reading, Spinoza's assertions of our passivity are not necessarily the "darkest" and most "pessimistic" part of the *Ethics*.⁴⁹ Rather,

⁴⁸ It may be tempting to conclude that the passions are necessary for a virtuous life only in the weak sense that they are necessary for any life at all. This would put them on the same level as food and shelter: necessary for a moral life, though without any moral significance. Although the passions are necessary for a virtuous life in this weak sense, unlike food and shelter, the passions are uniquely constituted to contribute positively to a virtuous life, providing us with the sort of information that is necessary in order to act in accordance with reason, thereby contributing to a proper character.

⁴⁹ "Action and Passion," 345.

they are optimistic, since passivity is a necessary part of the path to a virtuous life.⁵⁰

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⁵⁰ We should remember that Spinoza is careful to allow that recognizing our passivity can itself be active (4p53d). Although observing one's own weakness, when passive, is painful and bad, Spinoza allows that one who "conceives his own weakness from understanding something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he measures his own power of activity, we are conceiving only that the man understands himself distinctly; that is that his power of activity is assisted."

CAMUS ON SARTRE'S "FREEDOM"—ANOTHER "MISUNDERSTANDING"

RONALD E. SANTONI

SARTRE'S EARLY, formative view of freedom has bothered both passing readers of Sartre and eminent scholars—among them Gabriel Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and the brilliant philosophical writer, Albert Camus. Sartre's attribution of "absolute," "total" or complete freedom to the human being struck against the grain of dominant thinking in the history of philosophy. And, for many 20th century thinkers, it suggested disturbing consequences. But, in my judgment, the repeated criticisms and/or dismissals of Sartre's seminal views on freedom are often rooted in a basic misunderstanding and misinterpretation of his position. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Camus's critique, especially in his controversial *The Rebel* (*l'Homme révolté*) and the acrimonious, divisive, 1952 "confrontation" with Sartre regarding it.¹

Elsewhere,² I have offered only a preliminary outline of my case against the interpretation presented by Camus and variously made by Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, Frondizi, and others. In the present paper, however, I shall offer a detailed examination of this matter. Although my paper will attempt, primarily, to establish Camus's misunderstanding of Sartre's view of freedom, I believe (and intend) that my argument applies similarly to many other of Sartre's critics, including those mentioned above. On behalf of fairness, I shall not conclude

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¹ See Francis Jeanson, "Albert Camus ou l'âme révoltée," *Les temps modernes* 7, no. 79 (May 1952): 2070–90, and for the direct exchange between Sartre and Camus in a later issue, see: Albert Camus, "Lettre au Directeur des Temps modernes," 8, no. 82 (August 1952) 317–33. See also my detailed account of the confrontation: Ronald E. Santoni, *Sartre on Violence—Curiously Ambivalent* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 119–138. In subsequent citations, I shall use the abbreviation, *Sartre on Violence* to refer to this work.

² See, for example, Ronald E. Santoni, *Sartre on Violence*, 129–30; also Ronald E. Santoni, "Sartre and Morality: Jeanson's 'Classic' Revisited," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (Sept. 1981): 337–8. I also make this charge in my feature review of Peter Caws' excellent book, *Sartre* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 343–6, in the same issue. *The Review of Metaphysics* 61 (June 2008): 785–813. Copyright © 2008 by The Review of Metaphysics

without indicating how some of Sartre's own remarks have contributed to the repeated misinterpretation of his original position on freedom. If successful, my paper will have shown Sartre's concept of freedom to be considerably more complex than it is normally treated, and will also alert readers to the importance of distinguishing among dimensions of freedom, as they examine views of freedom in the history of philosophy, present as well as past.

In order to make my case, I shall begin with a résumé of the fundamental features of Sartre's original and core ontological analysis of freedom in *Being and Nothingness*. My account will attempt to confine itself to what is essential to my present argument.³

I

Sartre's Original Position. The root of Sartre's view of freedom, and equally of his ontology, is expressed early in *Being and Nothingness*:

Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of "human reality." Man does not exist *first* to be free *subsequently*; there is no difference between the being of a man and his *being-free*.⁴

This passage, it must be noted, comes in his chapter on "The Origin of Negation" and after his characterization of human reality in terms of consciousness (*being-for-itself*) and nothingness. Given this passage, among others, one might say that in part 1 of *Being and Nothingness*, there is a sometimes uneasy, complex, problematic equating of freedom with human reality or consciousness—more precisely, self-

³ Within a quite different focus, I have dealt with aspects of Sartre's concept of freedom in Ronald E. Santoni, *Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre's Early Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 90–4, 162–9, for example. In subsequent references to this work, I shall use the abbreviation *Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity*.

⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 25; cf. 439–41. In the footnotes that follow, I use the abbreviation *BN* for *Being and Nothingness*. The reader may note that Sartre seems to be at least partly in accord with what he later attributes to Descartes in his essay: Jean-Paul Sartre, "Cartesian Freedom," in *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, trans. Annette Michelson (New York: Collier Books, 1955), 180, especially.

conscious consciousness—and negation. Free conscious being or conscious free being, though ontologically groundless, arises (the “absolute event”) in its negation of Being, or, to put it another way, in the negation of itself as Being or as substantial. Free conscious being is not, at birth, *ontologically* autonomous or independent; to use Sartre’s terms, it is “born *supported by* a being which is not itself”;⁵ it is by itself devoid of content; it is “its own nothingness” (no-thing-ness), always at a distance from itself, always “in question,” always a “lack,” never at one with itself: it is a “non-substantial absolute” that came to be, that “posited” itself, in relation to and in a spontaneous negation of ontologically prior being—that is, *being-in-itself*. Thus, for Sartre, human reality is “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.”⁶ And, it is such because it is *free* being. It is free of all prior determination and “constitutes itself as negation.”⁷ With nothingness at its core, it is never anything, and is never determined by anything. As freedom I am not my past (Sartre says: “Freedom is the human being putting his past out of play by secreting his own nothingness”),⁸ and I am not determined by my past free choices, actions, characteristics, psychological states, habits, and so on. Although all (free) consciousness is consciousness *of* something,⁹ that is, of a being that transcends it, its choosing activity always involves the negation of all things other than what it chooses: this is what “particularization” or “individuation” is all about. And the fact that human consciousness has this “permanent possibility” of nihilating, of “rupturing” with, the world, as well as with itself, constitutes another way (for Sartre) of characterizing the freedom that the human being “is.”¹⁰ And, this, as I shall try to make clear, is the freedom to which we, as human reality, are ontologically condemned.¹¹ In showing this, I shall focus more on the practical dimensions and implications of this ontological account of freedom, for it is—as I have stated elsewhere—the failure to distinguish the *ontological* from the *practical* (or *existential*) with regard to freedom that

⁵ Ibid., lxi.

⁶ Ibid., lxv, 58, 63, 439.

⁷ Ibid., 27.

⁸ Ibid., 28.

⁹ Ibid., lxi.

¹⁰ Ibid., 439, 441, 486. Sartre also says, “I am my possibilities only through the nihilation of being-in-itself” (Ibid., 540).

¹¹ Ibid., 439, 485, for example.

leads too many writers on Sartre to offer misleading accounts of his basic view of freedom.

First of all, it bears repeating that for Sartre there can be no consciousness unless there is something of which to be conscious, that is to say, a world in relation to which it can "upsurge," relate, nihilate, choose, exercise a "nihilating withdrawal," project towards its possibilities. To put it in the terms which he uses later in another rich section of *Being and Nothingness* entitled "Freedom and Facticity: The Situation," "freedom requires a given," and "There can be a free for itself [that is, human reality] only as engaged in a resisting world. Outside of this engagement, the notions of freedom, . . . determination . . . necessity lose all meaning."¹² To state it yet another way, freedom is always in relation to a "datum," a "*plenum* of being," a "state of things," "brute existents," "brute things," the "given in itself," which it negates. More succinctly expressed, freedom for Sartre is always situated, always in a "situation," and always has a "coefficient of adversity."¹³ The *datum* is not the cause of freedom and never appears to the for-itself as a brute thing-in-itself. Rather, it is revealed to freedom "only as already *illuminated* by the end which freedom chooses." Thus, the free for-itself "discovers" itself as "engaged" in being, "hemmed in" by being, "threatened" by being, but only because freedom has already "posited" the end with respect to which the state of things becomes threatening—or favorable! For example, the cancellation of a week of classes by a professor becomes for a student either an unwelcomed hindrance *or* a source of delight or repose, depending on the end and project which the student has already freely posited or projected.¹⁴

This all-too-short clarification leads immediately to what Sartre calls the "paradox of freedom," which, among other of his contentions, I regard as axiomatic to an understanding of Sartre's overall theory of freedom: "There is freedom only in a *situation*, and there is a situation only through freedom": neither can exist independently. And by "situation," Sartre means the "common product of the contingency of the in-itself and of freedom." As a consequence, he regards "situation" as an "ambiguous phenomenon" in which it is impossible for the for-itself to distinguish between what comes from freedom and what comes from the brute in-itself. So human beings encounter

¹² Ibid., 483.

¹³ Ibid., 481–7, for this and other quoted expressions so far in this paragraph.

¹⁴ Ibid., 487–8.

obstacles and resistance only within "the field of their freedom," but these obstacles and resistances have meaning "only in and through the free choice which human reality is." There is no *absolute* obstacle. The given in-itself as resistance (or assistance) is revealed solely through the light of "a projecting freedom."¹⁵ This makes it clear—against the too facile interpretations of many writers on Sartre—that as early as in *Being and Nothingness* (1943) freedom for Sartre is always situated and that absolute freedom is never *in vacuo*, never unconnected to being in-itself, and is always revealed in the midst of the world. "I am never free except *in situation*"¹⁶ but I am the giver of meaning to the given (brute existent or in-itself) and, thus, part-creator of it.

Two additional considerations must be included in this summary account of Sartrean freedom. They help us understand further the complexity of Sartre's concept of freedom, and they are likely prerequisites to the paradox of freedom. First, we must note once again that we are *condemned* to freedom, "abandoned" to it, "thrown into it." Freedom is "the freedom of choosing but not the freedom of not choosing. Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose." "We are a freedom that chooses, but we do not choose to be free."¹⁷ In this sense, freedom is "absurd": freedom is not free not to exist or not to be free. This unchosen condemnation or abandonment is precisely what Sartre calls the "facticity [or "absurdity"] of freedom."¹⁸ Freedom is thus a *given*. And we may note that Sartre is here combining a consideration of freedom as an ontological facticity with that of the *practical exercise* of that "freedom of choosing," which I have repeatedly called "practical" or "existential" freedom."¹⁹ I shall return to this shortly.

But, secondly, one must note Sartre's own definition of freedom in the chapter from which I have been citing, "Being and Doing: Freedom" (*BN*, 433–81). Initially, Sartre affirms, against "common sense," that freedom does not mean "to obtain what one has wished," and that

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 487–9. Some of the preceding italics are mine. The reader may also note that, in his early chapter on "Transcendence," Sartre says that he has attempted to show "how the presence of the for-itself to being reveals being as a *thing*" (*Ibid.*, 97).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 509.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 484–5, 481, 509, 529.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 481, 485–6. See also, for example, 439–40, 479.

¹⁹ For example, Santoni, *Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity*, 102, 209–210; notes 87, 100: see also, my "Sartre and the Problem of Morality: Jeanson's Classic Revisited," 336–8.

"success" is of no importance to freedom. Rather, freedom means, "by oneself to determine oneself to wish (in the broad sense of choosing)," and Sartre insists that the "technical and philosophical concept of freedom," the only one that he is considering, "means only the autonomy of choice."²⁰ It bears mentioning once again that Sartre repeats this general point four years later in his interpreted attribution to Descartes of the meaning of "to be free."²¹ He continues, after the previously cited statement from *Being and Nothingness*, to make clear that the choice is "identical with acting" and, in order to distinguish itself from "the wish" or "the dream," the choice always "supposes" the beginning of its own actualization (or "realization"). And, here, he also acknowledges what he states later in "Cartesian Freedom"—namely, that "the distinction between *freedom of choice* and the *freedom of obtaining*" was recognized earlier by Descartes, "following Stoicism"; and that this distinction "puts an end to all arguments based on the distinction" between "willing" and "being able."²² Hence, we can already anticipate that any criticism which interprets or assumes that Sartre's view of "total" or "absolute"²³ freedom entails one's ability to do or attain anything one wants, is simply off the mark and wrong-headed.

II

"Ontological" or "Factual," "Practical" or "Existential" Freedom. I am now in a position to offer the last of my building blocks for my thesis that Camus, among many critics of Sartre,²⁴ has misinterpreted and misrepresented Sartre's early and controversial view of freedom. I shall appeal to, among others, a distinction to which I have

²⁰ BN, 483.

²¹ Sartre, "Cartesian Freedom," 184, for example: "To be free is not to be able to do what one wants but to want what one can."

²² BN, 483–4, italics mine.

²³ For example, see: BN, 555, and 509. In the former case, he was "totally free," in the latter, "absolutely free."

²⁴ I have in mind, among others, Gabriel Marcel in *The Philosophy of Existence*, Merleau-Ponty in *Les aventures de la dialectique*, Risieri Frondizi, "Sartre's Early Ethics: A Critique," in *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (LaSalle, Ill: Open Court, 1981). Although he is not necessarily a critic, I should also include Bernard-Henri Lévy, in *Sartre: The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century*, trans. Andrew Brown (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 236–7, for example. Originally published as *Le siècle de Sartre* (Paris: Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2000). Here, he even refers to Sartre's freedom as "dizzying."

alluded earlier, but which too many interpreters of Sartre have either overlooked or ignored—namely, the distinction between (1) the absolute ontological freedom, the complete “autonomy of choice,” to which we are abandoned and which constitutes human reality, and (2) the way in which and extent to which we choose to live, practice, exercise, “exist” the freedom that we are—what I have frequently called *practical* or *existential* freedom.²⁵ The latter, which includes political freedom, and what some others, following Sartre, have called “freedom of obtaining,”²⁶ presupposes the *ontological* or “factual” freedom (the absurd “facticity of freedom”), the “natural” freedom (as Jeanson terms it), to which we are abandoned. And it is not at all contradictory to speak of the “absolute” freedom of consciousness and autonomy of choice at the *ontological* level, and freedom within limits at the practical/existential level. To be sure, ontological freedom, as mentioned before, is not free not to be free or not to exist and “cannot escape its existence.”²⁷ But it must be remembered also that freedom is always “situated,” and that there can be no free consciousness except as related to a given in-itself for which it is a lack of being. So, to repeat, it is not contradictory to speak of a person as being ‘totally free’ ontologically, yet practically unfree or living in an unfree way (for

²⁵ Note again that I make this distinction as early as 1969. See my “feature review” of Fred Olafson’s *Principles and Persons* in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (March 1969): 141–5; see also footnote 2 above, and so on.

²⁶ *BN*, 484. See also, for example, David Detmer, *Freedom as a Value* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1988), 59–60. These are very telling pages in Detmer’s book. Although his basic distinction is not identical to mine (except terminologically), it certainly supports and expands it. Both, of course, intend to follow Sartre’s distinction. I also wish to acknowledge that during the course of writing the present article, Detmer’s article, “Sartre on Freedom and Education” appeared in a centenary celebration issue of *Sartre Studies International* 11, nos. 1 and 2, (Autumn 2005). Although I tried to resist reading it, I admit to dipping into it. I read it sufficiently to recognize that it supported his related contentions in *Freedom as a Value*, and it likely had some influence on my present analysis. I have benefited from our exchanges on “freedom” and other topics in panel discussions and personal discussions over the years.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 487.

example, acting as though one is determined to choose in a specific manner, or as though the situation determines a singular action). Sartre's frequently cited illustration of a mountain climber's deciding at the foot of a crag whether or not the rock is "scalable" shows well what is at stake here. As an "absolute freedom" at the ontological level, one nonetheless faces from the beginning a "brute thing," or "brute given," a possible *limit* to one's freedom of action at the practical level. But it is the climber's total freedom of consciousness, his ontological freedom, that first constitutes the framework and "ends" in relation to which the crag will manifest itself as a limit.²⁸ And this, of course, will relate back to his "initial" choice of his "original," "fundamental" project.²⁹ "But," says Sartre, "what my freedom cannot determine is whether the rock 'to be scaled' will or will not lend itself to scaling . . . The given in-itself as *resistance* or as *aid* is revealed only in the light of the projecting freedom."³⁰ Even the "red hot pincers of the torturer do not exempt [me] from being free,"³¹ do not take away from the absolute freedom which I am ontologically. But, because every "situation" requires also a brute *given*, I, like the prisoner, can regard "limits" as inalterable, or, to use another example, can choose to live in an "unfree" manner by treating (or giving meaning to) a possible obstacle as a definitive or absolute obstacle. Each of the latter is an instance of what it means to be practically or existentially unfree (and, may I add, is an instance of bad faith), and neither precludes—but, on the contrary, takes for granted—human reality as "absolute" ontological freedom or as "free choice." In this regard, it is important to recall—if not to repeat—that our ontological freedom would "vanish into nothingness" if there were not a brute given, a "brute thing," to negate, surpass, and illumine, and to which to give meaning. "The freedom of the for-itself is always *engaged*,"³² and the fact that the "coefficient of adversity" of a thing is "always indispensable to the existence of freedom,"³³ does not invalidate ontological freedom as autonomous, total and infinite. Nor does it convert all freedom into practical or "existential freedom." In fact, one's "total" ontological

²⁸ Ibid., 482.

²⁹ See, for example, Ibid., 463, 474, 480.

³⁰ Ibid., 488.

³¹ Ibid., 506.

³² Ibid., 479.

³³ Ibid., 484.

freedom is an abstraction apart from one's practical or existential freedom. And one's practical or existential freedom is an abstraction apart from the ontological freedom which, always situated, is part-creator of the situation in relation to which it chooses and illumines (or reveals) the "background" or "initial project" for its free choice of a mode of existing, or of deciding, for example, whether a brute given is to be an obstacle or an aid. Human reality encounters "obstacles" only by virtue of the project and ends she or he has freely chosen.

Before moving on, I must at least elaborate briefly on a related distinction that Francis Jeanson, at the time a 25-year-old philosophical "unknown," presented in his remarkable and influential book, *Sartre and the Problem of Morality*³⁴ (*Le Problème moral et la pensée de Sartre*), a work that is oft regarded as the "official" interpretation of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. Jeanson's distinction is between "factual freedom" and "freedom as valued." "Factual [or "natural"] freedom," the very "structure of our being," is what I have called "ontological freedom"—the absurd "fact" of freedom to which human reality is abandoned, and from which consciousness is "naturally" and perpetually inclined to flee in its futile desire to be substantial, to be the foundation of its being, to be an *in-itself-for-itself* or "God"—for Sartre, an impossible ideal. We surely must recall that ontological freedom is condemned never to coincide with itself. But, as Jeanson points out early in his interpretation of Sartre, this freedom to which we are condemned has to be made "our own", and "we determine ourselves *existentially* through the practical attitude."³⁵ In this regard, Jeanson finds in Sartre a contrasting sense of freedom, "freedom-as-valued," which I view as similar to, and at least part of, "practical" or "existential" freedom. This freedom refers not just to the very structure of one's being, that is, to "ontological freedom," but to a sense of freedom that "enjoins one to assess the value of the various uses to which it may be put."³⁶ In my terms, this sense of freedom refers to how we live or "exist" the metastable ontological freedom of

³⁴ Francis Jeanson, *Sartre and the Problem of Morality*, trans. with an Introduction by Robert V. Stone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). Originally published in French as *Le problème moral et la pensée de Sartre* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965). In subsequent citations, I shall refer to this French original as *Le problème moral*, and to the English translation as *Sartre and the Problem*.

³⁵ Jeanson, *Sartre and the Problem*, 14.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 191.

consciousness that we are. This is the freedom in which, weary of consciousness' futile pursuit of substantiality or self-coincidence, I reflectively decide to "valorize" the ontological non-coincidence of my free, undetermined, consciousness, instead of trying to flee it. By freely choosing it, I imbue it with value. So valued, freedom is not "ready made" and is not negative; it is, rather, a project to be lived, a project that accepts and affirms the "at-distantness" and emptiness of its ontological being, and refuses any reassurance through "bad faith justifications."³⁷ Of course, on Jeanson's account, Sartre's "freedom-as-valued" represents a distinct move towards moral agency, towards a moral mode of being in which I surpass my "natural" attitude and "factual freedom" without disowning them. And the "deliverance" to this valuing of freedom—that is, to "authenticity"—always presupposes and "refers [us] back to a singular act of an individual conversion"³⁸ rooted in what Sartre calls a "purifying reflection." This act constitutes a reflective radical choice to turn from a bad-faith way of "existing" one's ontological freedom to an *authentic* way of accepting, affirming, and living one's freedom as an identity-less, gratuitous, non-substantial human reality. In other words, for Jeanson's Sartre—and mine also—this choice initiates a passage away from freedom's original but futile project "*to-be-for-itself-in-itself*"—that is, the project to be God—to an authentic and a moral way of living.³⁹ As early as in the *War Diaries*, Sartre anticipates this passage as one of "adopting freedom as one's own,"⁴⁰ that is to say, of making freedom one's fundamental value and project.⁴¹ In contrast to Jeanson, I regard this "freedom-as-valued" as the highest but not the only form of practical

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 182.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 198, 200.

³⁹ For a detailed analysis of the conversion from consciousness' bad faith mode of being (that is, trying to ground itself) to authenticity and valuing one's freedom, see Ronald E. Santoni, *Bad Faith, Good Faith and Authenticity*, chapters 5–7, especially.

⁴⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The War Diaries*, trans. Quintin Hoare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 113.

⁴¹ In this general context, I must again mention the exploratory work that David Detmer, in *Freedom as a Value*, has done on differentiating types of freedom in Sartre's work. Although, in my judgment, he ascribes too much importance, for Sartre, to "freedom of attaining" and appears wrongly to restrict practical freedom to "freedom to obtain our freely . . . chosen ends. (p. 67)" Compare to Sartre, *BN*, 483–4. I agree with a significant portion of his analysis of Sartrean freedom.

freedom in Sartre. Nonetheless it is important to note that, despite our differences, Jeanson and I, as well as a small minority of other commentators on Sartre,⁴² regard it as imperative to make a distinction in Sartre between the absolute ontological freedom of consciousness ("freedom of choice") to which we *are* by abandonment, and existential or practical freedom, the freedom to choose and practice our way of existing, and to decide our "obstacles" in relation to our fore-chosen ends and fundamental project. In passing, I repeat that, for Sartre, "to be free" or "autonomy of choice" never implies being able to do whatever one might want, or success in obtaining "what one has wished."⁴³ On this note, and given the preceding background, I am now in a better position to argue my contention that Camus has misinterpreted and misunderstood Sartre's basic position on freedom.

III

Camus's "misunderstanding" We must first look at what Camus actually said about Sartre's concept of freedom. As early as 1939, in his review of Sartre's *Le Mur (The Wall)*,⁴⁴ published after Sartre's publication of *La Nausée (Nausea)* but before the publication of *Being and Nothingness*, Camus criticizes Sartre's characters for their "excess of liberty." "His characters are, in fact, free," he says, but their freedom "is of no use to them." In Sartre's world, he adds, man is "free of the shackles of his prejudices [note!], sometimes from his own nature" [note also: the early Sartre does not believe in a human "nature"], and is "reduced to self contemplation." He goes on to say that Sartre's human being is "alone, enclosed in his own liberty."⁴⁵ My criticism of these statements will be delayed in favor of pointing to other

⁴² I include here, among others, my fellow Sartre scholars Joseph Catalano and David Detmer. Although another perceptive Sartre scholar, Thomas Flynn, laments Sartre's "erroneous contrast of the ontological and practical" in his *Sartre and Marxist Existentialism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 198, I have the impression that he acknowledges that distinction in other of his writings.

⁴³ *BN*, 483.

⁴⁴ *Alger républicain* (May 23, 1939). Republished (in English) in Albert Camus, *Lyrical and Critical Essays*, ed. Philip Thody, trans. Ellen Conroy Kennedy (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 203–6. In subsequent reference, I shall use the abbreviation *LCE* for this work.

affirmations by Camus which directly or implicitly challenge Sartre's notion of freedom.

In the *Myth of Sisyphus* (1942), for example, which Camus might already have begun writing at the time of his earlier review of *Le Mur* (*The Wall*), he informs us that "knowing whether or not man is free doesn't interest me [surely an overstatement!]. I can experience only my own freedom." But then, in discussing the person who has experienced the absurd, he proceeds to say, "the only conception of freedom I can have is that of the prisoner or the individual in the midst of the state. The only one I know is freedom of thought and action." The absurd man enjoys not "the illusions of freedom," (this I suspect, is aimed at Sartre's "total" ontological freedom), but "freedom from the common rules"; the "absurd man" realizes that [hitherto] he was not really free although he might have felt free. Part of the "upset" caused by the abrupt realization of the absurd is one's awareness that the "higher freedom, that freedom *to be* [Sartre's ontological freedom, I assume], which alone can serve as a basis for a truth, does not *exist*." For Camus, "the absurd" and death become the "principles" of "the only reasonable freedom"; freedom simply "has no meaning except in relation to its limited fate."⁴⁶

Although Camus does not directly criticize or challenge Sartre in these passages of *The Myth of Sisyphus*, I suspect—as my preceding words in square brackets suggest—that Camus is trying here to distance himself further from what he takes to be Sartre's conception of freedom at the time, and to develop further a philosophical basis for his early criticism of it in his review of *The Wall*. But, if I am right in this judgment, I would maintain that Camus has wrongly viewed Sartre's "absolute" or "factual" and "total" ontological freedom—in contrast to his own emerging view of "absurd freedom"—as an expression of what he calls "eternal freedom."⁴⁷ For he goes on to say that if

⁴⁵ Camus, "On Sartre's *Le Mur and Other Stories*", in *LCE*, 204–5. See preceding footnote. I recognize that this essay was written before *BN*. Yet it was written after Sartre wrote his classic literary predecessor, *Nausée* (*Nausea*), in which many of Sartre's core existentialist views are rooted.

⁴⁶ Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 41–5; originally published as *Le mythe de Sisyphe* (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1942). This covers all preceding quotations regarding freedom in *The Myth*. After the initial reference, I shall continue to use *The Myth* as an abbreviation for this work.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 42.

absurd freedom obviates any chance of eternal freedom, it, on the other hand, enhances one's "freedom of action"—part of what Sartre includes in his view of "practical freedom." Moreover, when Camus states, in what I regard as an intended criticism of Sartre's view, that the only concept of freedom that he can entertain is that of, for example, "the prisoner in the midst of the state," he does not seem to realize that, for Sartre, freedom, as we have seen, is always "situated," always in relation to a "state of things" or a "brute given." Moreover, if he has Sartre in mind when in 1942, just before *Being and Nothingness* appeared in print, he repudiates "eternal freedom" in favor of "freedom of thought and action," and—taking Sartre's absolute ontological freedom as "eternal freedom"—asks "what freedom can exist in the fullest sense without assurance of eternity?"⁴⁸ (of course both he and Sartre reject eternity!), he, of course, is failing to understand the choice/action dimension of Sartre's ontological freedom. Accordingly, it is not surprising that in his review of *The Wall* three years earlier, Camus should mistakenly say that Sartre's characters are so free that their freedom is "useless" to them. Viewed in the light of Camus's misconstrual of Sartre's "freedom" in these passages, ontological freedom does appear empty. But we must turn to additional supportive evidence of Camus's misunderstanding.

We need, first, to take note of some of Camus's comments in *The Rebel* (1951),⁴⁹ comments which must have annoyed and angered Sartre and contributed to the fury with which, a year later (1952), he published his vitriolic response to Camus's "Lettre au directeur," a letter which had also appeared in *Les temps modernes* a few months earlier.⁵⁰ Early in *The Rebel*, Camus affirms that "freedom . . . is the motivating principle of all revolutions." That statement seems rather uncontroversial. "Without it," he continues, "justice seems inconceivable to the rebel's mind." But "there comes a time," he adds, "when justice demands the suspension of freedom."⁵¹ This statement

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁴⁹ Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Alfred Knopf, Vintage, 1956); originally published as *L'homme révolté* (Paris: Gallimard, 1951).

⁵⁰ I shall give and/or repeat the full details for these references in my subsequent discussion of freedom in this historically important but disappointing "debate."

⁵¹ Camus, *The Rebel*, 105. This reference to "suspension of freedom" should be noted carefully.

strikes me as more controversial. Camus does not, here, make his view of freedom any clearer. But later in *The Rebel* his readers attain a better understanding of the conception of freedom he opposes; and that view appears to be what he assumes is Sartre's "absolute" or "total" freedom—or something approximating it. Rebellion, he tells us, is not in any way "a demand for total freedom." In fact, the rebel wants it known that "freedom has its limits," wherever a human being is to be found. The rebel could never, consistently, claim the right to shatter the freedom or the existence of another. Moreover, he affirms the "impossibility of total freedom," while claiming for himself the relative freedom needed to recognize this impossibility. Rebellion, Camus goes on to say, "puts total freedom up for trial." Absolute freedom, "which is the freedom to kill," is "the only one which does not claim, at the same time as itself, the things that limit and obliterate it."⁵² To indict further the concept of "absolute freedom"—and Sartre, I assume, also—Camus makes other strong, even extreme, assertions which, if intended for Sartre, seem to me quite far from anything Sartre would endorse: "Absolute freedom is the right of the strongest to dominate";⁵³ "Absolute freedom mocks at justice; Absolute justice denies freedom";⁵⁴ Absolute freedom demands "the right to destroy the existence and the freedom of others."⁵⁵ As a consequence, absolute or total freedom for Camus leads to total, violent revolution, and "total revolution" demands the "unlimited power to inflict death"⁵⁶ and the "control of the world."⁵⁷ These, in turn, lead to the destruction of freedom—that is, the destruction of Camus's freedom "with limits," which must always accompany justice—and, hence to totalitarianism. One must remember that, on Camus's view of "freedom," freedom is "the only imperishable value of history."⁵⁸ But, in Camus's judgment, Sartre's absolute, total, freedom, like Sade's insistence on "unbridled," complete passion, leads to the total objectification of others, to the complete "subjection of the majority," to "coldly planned" dehumanization, and to a cynical, oppressive, nihilistic totalitarianism.⁵⁹

⁵² Ibid., 284–5.

⁵³ Ibid., 287.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 291.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 284.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 305, 107.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 107.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 291.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 42, 46–7.

Should any reader contend that Camus's intense critique of absolute freedom is not aimed at Sartre, he or she would do well to study Camus's direct attack on Sartre in the now famous quarrel between the two thinkers in 1952⁶⁰—a "debate" that I shall discuss briefly a little later—and also Camus's gloomy but confessional 1956 novel, *The Fall*.⁶¹ In the latter, the complex character, Clamence, criticizes Sartrean existentialism, mocks "absolute freedom," as he understands it, and appears, amidst much else, to be portraying Camus's "working through," and perhaps past, his disorienting 1952 "break with Sartre."⁶² But now, given that my criticism of Camus's interpretation has been largely *en passant* and sometimes implicit, I want, on the basis of my preceding analysis of Sartrean freedom, to show more explicitly how Camus's interpretation of Sartre's freedom is confused and mistaken.

First of all, it is important to note that in each of the above illustrations of Camus's criticisms of Sartrean freedom, from his early critique of Sartre's characters in *Le Mur*, through his criticisms of it in his two major philosophical works, *The Myth of Sisyphus* and *The Rebel*, as well as in some of his major literary works like *The Fall*, Camus sees Sartre's freedom as an unlimited, running-away freedom that permits the human being to do anything she wishes, unencumbered by brute givens. Camus appears not to have read, or to have understood, Sartre's "paradox of freedom," in which, as stated above, "factual" or "ontological" freedom cannot exist independently of a "situation," and a "situation," with its "brute existents," can exist only through freedom. Freedom for Sartre is always engaged: there can be no freedom for Sartre except as engaged in a resisting world. "Without facticity,"

⁶⁰ This took place on the pages of *Les temps modernes* 8, no. 82 (August 1952). I give detailed attention to this "confrontation" in my recent book *Sartre on Violence*. Ronald Aronson also does so in this recent book, *Camus and Sartre* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁶¹ Albert Camus, *The Fall*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957); originally published as *La Chute* (Paris: Gallimard, 1956).

⁶² Ronald Aronson, *Camus and Sartre*, 194–200. With regard to *The Fall*, I acknowledge the influence of Aronson's short but astute discussion, and also the discerning analysis by the Camus scholar, David Sprintzen, in *Camus: A Critical Examination* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 204–08, especially. As a close friend and a Camus expert, he has, over a span of 40 years, challenged me and helped direct my understanding of Camus's overall project and trajectory. That does not mean that I always agree with him.

he affirms, "freedom would not exist as a power of nihilation and of choice."⁶³ And even after Sartre has informed us that the only concept of freedom he is discussing in "Being and Doing: Freedom" means the "autonomy of choice," he immediately tells us that "I shall not say that a prisoner is always free to go out of prison, which would be absurd" (note!) but that "he is always free to try to escape" or to "project his escape . . . whatever his condition may be."⁶⁴ Sartre readily admits, in a number of passages, that freedom has its limits (for example, "the Other's existence brings a factual limit to my freedom,"⁶⁵ a "real limit to our freedom"⁶⁶), and goes so far as to say that "to be precise, freedom can exist only as restricted since freedom is choice" and "every choice . . . supposes elimination and selection."⁶⁷ Moreover, as I pointed out early in this paper, "human reality [for Sartre] everywhere encounters resistances and obstacles which it has not created," but they attain meaning "only through the free choice that human reality is."⁶⁸ So, at one level at least—perhaps only a linguistic one—the two writers are in some agreement regarding limits. And, in the light of Sartre's explicit example of the limits of the prisoner, Camus's counter-example, favoring his own declared view of freedom as that of "the prisoner or individual in the midst of the state," may not be, though exaggerated, totally unacceptable to Sartre. Moreover, if, indeed, Sartre's view of ontological freedom acknowledges facticities and limits, many of Camus's extreme criticisms of Sartre mentioned above simply do not hold. To cite but one example, how is Camus able to say that "Absolute freedom, . . . the freedom to kill, is the only one which does not claim, at the same time as itself, the things that limit . . . it?"⁶⁹ Has Camus not read, eight years after the publication of Sartre's major work on ontology, the essential parts of *Being and Nothingness* that deal with Sartre's views of freedom? Or might he simply have misinterpreted Sartre's sometimes ambiguous and misleading language about "absolute," "total," "infinite" ontological freedom. Consider, for example, "I am absolutely free and absolutely re-

⁶³ BN, 495

⁶⁴ Ibid., 483–4.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 523.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 524

⁶⁷ Ibid., 495.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 489.

⁶⁹ Camus, *The Rebel*, 284–5.

sponsible for my situation"; or "Man . . . is wholly and forever free or not free at all,"⁷⁰ statements which suggest that human freedom is unbounded?

Not only is Camus, here, merging different senses of freedom in the early Sartre but he appears to be attributing an aspect of moral permissibility to the extreme, unlimited actions and events which, in Camus's judgment, are allowed by, or necessarily follow from, Sartre's "absolute" or "total" freedom. Consider also some of the preceding examples cited to illustrate Camus's indictment of absolute freedom: "Absolute freedom is the right of the strongest to dominate"; or "absolute freedom . . . is the freedom to kill"; or total freedom leads to total violent revolution which, *ipso facto*, demands the "unlimited power to inflict death."⁷¹ In each case, it is clear, I think, that Camus is wrongly either assuming or implying that, because Sartre's absolute ontological freedom allows the choice of such possibilities, Sartre would view them as morally permissible or morally justifiable. (This is, doubtless, part of Camus's build-up to his 1952 acrimonious exchange with Sartre concerning *L'homme révolté* [*The Rebel*] and Sartre's legitimation of revolutionary killing). But despite Sartre's ambivalence regarding violence and murder in the body of his work,⁷² he surely would have none of this. What, for Sartre, one is ontologically free to do within a "situation" that he partly creates does not imply, as Camus seems to assume, either that one will necessarily do it, or that one has a moral right to do it. Sartre's ontological freedom does not entail extreme moral freedom or license. Moreover, as early as in "Materialism and Revolution,"⁷³ Sartre sees the revolutionary not as wanting to objectify and dominate, but as wanting to liberate the oppressed from domination by the strongest, and in doing so, minimize—not maximize—their destruction. The revolutionary's cause, for Sartre, is a human cause. "We, too, are human beings" applies to the oppressor as well as to the oppressed.⁷⁴ This humanist theme, I have argued elsewhere,⁷⁵ is

⁷⁰ BN, 441, 509.

⁷¹ Citations for these statements are provided in preceding footnotes.

⁷² My recent book, *Sartre on Violence*, focuses on this ambivalence in Sartre's *oeuvre complète*.

⁷³ Jean-Paul Sartre, "Materialism and Revolution," in *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, trans. Annette Michaelson (New York: Collier Books, 1962); originally published as Jean-Paul Sartre, "Matérialisme et Révolution," *Les temps modernes*, nos. 9–10 (June 1946–July 1946).

⁷⁴ Sartre, "Materialism and Revolution," 232.

included even in Sartre's apparent justifications of revolutionary killings, and seems to be in partial accord with, not in opposition to, Camus's emphasis in *The Rebel* on *mesure*—that is to say, on “moderation” or “measure.” Further, in passing, I must at least mention that, counter to the “rights” which, according to Camus, “absolute freedom” claims, Sartre has said, for example, that “the revolutionary is not a man who demands rights” but “a man who destroys the very idea of rights,” for he regards them as “a product of force and customs.” The revolutionary simply wants to free himself and the oppressed from the values and rules of behavior that the ruling oppressors have made and institutionalized.⁷⁶ But we must now return to my contention that Camus has conflated and confused at least two senses of Sartre's freedom.

In short, I contend that in *The Rebel* Camus has once again failed to note and comprehend the subtleties of Sartre's sometimes baffling and seemingly conflicting views on freedom, and, in particular, has failed to recognize the important Sartrean distinction between “ontological” or “factual” (Jeanson's term) freedom, on the one hand, and “practical” or “existential” freedom, on the other. Camus has treated Sartre's practical, existential freedom—that is, the mode in which we choose to “practice” or “exist” or “live” our ontological freedom within the practical limitations that facticities impose on us—as though it were ontological freedom. More specifically, in indicting, and even mocking, Sartre's concept of freedom, Camus is attributing to Sartre's “practical” or “existential freedom” some of the characteristics that Sartre has attributed to his “technical and philosophical concept” of “ontological freedom” (or “freedom of choice”)—namely, “absolute,” “total,” “complete,” “infinite,” and so on. Only on this kind of misinterpretation can he regard Sartre's practical freedom as an uncontrolled, pronouncedly dangerous, “freedom without restraint,” which leads to such dire consequences as total, murderous revolution, the destruction of values and freedom, the objectification of human beings, domination, totalitarianism, and the like. In so doing, Camus has wrongly merged at least these two senses of freedom and perhaps yet another—depending on whether one includes “freedom of obtaining” within my broad sense of “practical” or “existential”

⁷⁶ Santoni, *Sartre on Violence*.

⁷⁶ Sartre, “Materialism and Revolution,” 232, 231.

freedom. Sartre makes very clear, as shown above, that the freedom he is talking about when he is considering "ontological freedom" is not the "common sense" "empirical and popular concept of 'freedom'" which views freedom as "the ability to obtain the ends chosen,"⁷⁷ or the ability to do whatever one wishes, or the freedom to do whatever one can (that is, moral license). So when Camus criticizes "absolute freedom" for its extreme, dehumanizing practical consequences, he is, to repeat, either reflecting his ignorance of *Being and Nothingness* or erroneously attributing the "absoluteness" of Sartre's "ontological freedom"—that is, of the "free choice that human reality is"⁷⁸—to his "practical" or "existential freedom."⁷⁹ The latter, of course, includes "political freedom."

In retrospect, we can now see that Camus's 1939 remarks in his review of Sartre's *Le Mur* (*The Wall*) about—at once—both the "excess of liberty" in Sartre's characters and the uselessness of that freedom, assuming its excess, again reflect Camus's striking failure to understand the varying dimensions or typology of Sartre's freedom. When Camus says that Sartre's freedom is "of no use" to Sartre's characters and that the free person is "alone" and "enclosed in this liberty," he appears not to have recognized Sartre's practical freedom, or even that the practice or living of that freedom—including the pursuit of freedom as values—flows out of the absolute ontological freedom that we are. But, as indicated above, even this ontological or "factual" freedom is "situated" and can not exist without the brute in-itself that has ontological priority to it. Perhaps because of Sartre's focus in *Nausée* and *The Wall* on the awesome metaphysical loneliness of freedom, Camus in 1938 and 1939, four and five years before *Being and Nothingness* appeared, noted only the isolated, gloomy, and lonely side of Sartre's early characterization of freedom. Moreover, Orestes' proclamation to Zeus in *The Flies*—right after his cruel awakening to his autonomy and burdensome ontological freedom—that he is "alone . . . utterly alone in the midst of this well-meaning little universe of

⁷⁷ BN, 483–4.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 489; also 581: "the absolute freedom which is the very being of the person."

⁷⁹ I want to repeat that David Detmer also makes this distinction, although, at times, with somewhat different meanings and overtones, in regard to Sartre's freedom, in his probing book, *Freedom as a Value*.

yours," that he "must blaze [his] own trail," and that "from now on [he'll] take no one's orders, neither man's nor god's,"⁸⁰ provides some basis for Camus's (mis)interpretation. At the same time, it affords additional evidence that—contra Camus—Sartre's ontological freedom has practical, living implications and, thus, is of major use, not "no use," to human beings. To repeat: ontological freedom is not empty or totally detached from the world: free choice is always "situated."

The Camus scholar, David Sprintzen, appears to justify and agree with Camus on this matter. Linking Camus's charge of the uselessness of absolute freedom to Sartre's view of the human being (in *Being and Nothingness*) as a "useless passion" aiming to be an impossible God, or an *in-itself-for-itself*, he contends that "at the heart of the Sartrean world" is a view of an "ahistorical, non-situated ego whose absolute freedom is an ontological curse," condemned always to a futile quest for "an impossible identity." As a consequence, Sprintzen, speaking for and supporting Camus, sees the "terrible weight of this unbearable freedom" as leading the human being to bad faith strategies of either domination or servitude in order to escape her or his ontological plight and attain identity or substantiality.⁸¹ Putting aside Sprintzen's questionable use of "ego" in this Sartrean context, but acknowledging my partial agreement with him regarding Sartre's "bad faith" strategies, I maintain, in passing, that Sprintzen has overlooked the practical freedom which presupposes ontological freedom and is normally exercised in the bad faith mode of living in "flight" of our factual freedom. So, even if Sartre's early "characters" are, as Camus and, I assume, Sprintzen, contend, "unbearably" free, it does not follow that they "disintegrate" and are "deaf to the call of action or creation."⁸² Even the free choice of trying to glue down one's freedom is a response of action, however uncreative that action may appear to be. Sprintzen, like the Camus whom he's interpreting, appears not to recognize that ontological freedom is not, *ipso facto*, paralyzing: the

⁸⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Flies," in *No Exit and Three Other Plays*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), 92, 21, 122, 124. In this connection it is important to note also that, at about the same time (1943), Sartre says in *BN* that "I find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world for which I bear the whole responsibility without being able, whatever I do, to tear away from this responsibility?": *BN*, 555–6. Excessive freedom? Perhaps! Practically "useless"? Hardly!

⁸¹ David Sprintzen, *Camus: A Critical Examination*, 44, 216–7.

⁸² Camus, "On Sartre's *Le Mur*," in *LCE*, 204.

way one chooses to live or "exist" or practice one's ontological freedom—fleeing it or, after conversion, affirming it as nothingness (nothingness) and as a value—constitutes practical or existential freedom and still instantiates "free choice," or "the autonomy of a choice," or freedom of consciousness. Yet, I repeat, they are not identical and are not to be conflated.

IV

'Freedom' in the Camus-Sartre confrontation. Let us now turn to another important piece of evidence in support of my thesis that Camus misunderstands Sartre on freedom. I am referring specifically to a portion of what Sartre says in response to Camus in the acrimonious, mutually self-demeaning, 1952 public "exchange"—sometimes more accurately referred to as a "quarrel" or "confrontation"—between the two thinkers in the pages of *Les temps modernes*.⁸³ Because of my earlier extensive writing on this confrontation,⁸⁴ and since a full discussion of the entire "debate" is far beyond the scope of this paper, my present discussion will be restricted to the rather limited direct exchange in it that the two authors have on freedom.

After an untempered, mean-spirited and incendiary review⁸⁵ by Francis Jeanson of Camus's *L'homme révolté* (*The Rebel*), Camus, who assumes that the review-article was a work of collaboration between Jeanson and Sartre, (there is significant evidence for it!), writes a "Lettre au directeur"⁸⁶ to Sartre, the editor of *Les temps modernes*, in which he vehemently denounces many of what he takes to be Sartre-rooted criticisms. In regard, (he believes), to Sartre's combining an embrace of Marxism with "definitive freedom" (*la liberté défini-*

⁸³ The full exchange started with Jeanson's review-article in the May 1952 issue of *Les temps modernes* and continued vigorously in the August issue (full citation below). I wish to note, here, that the full exchange now appears in English in *Sartre and Camus: A Historic Confrontation*, ed. and trans. David A. Sprintzen and Adrian van den Hoven (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2003). But, in what follows, I use my own somewhat differing translation.

⁸⁴ Santoni, *Sartre on Violence*, 95–154.

⁸⁵ Francis Jeanson, "Albert Camus ou l'âme révolté," *Les temps modernes* 7, no. 79 (May 1952): 2070–90.

⁸⁶ Albert Camus, "Lettre au Directeur des Temps modernes," *Les temps modernes* 8, no. 82 (August 1952): 317–33.

tive), he states, partly following what we heard him say in his 1939 review of *Le Mur*.⁸⁷

"To free man from all impediment in order later to imprison him practically in historical necessity [remember that Jeanson has accused Camus of being anti-historical] amounts, in effect, to taking away from him, first, his reasons for struggling in order, finally, to throw him into any party whatsoever so long as it has no other rule but efficacy" (*l'efficacité*).⁸⁸

Moreover, on the same page, after suggesting that Sartre's freedom precludes a "principle of value" (*règle de valeur*), he denounces it as a "terrible and incessant freedom" (*la terrible et incessante liberté*), saying that it would deny meaning to history. There is no question that he is addressing Sartre more than Jeanson. And, in his vitriolic "Réponse à Albert Camus,"⁸⁹ Sartre makes it clear that he (Sartre) firmly believes that Camus is doing so: for example, "You pretend to confuse me with Jeanson";⁹⁰ or, "Everything, in fact, indicates that by the words 'freedom without brakes' (*liberté sans frein*) you are targeting our conception of human freedom."⁹¹ (I have no doubt that Camus is doing exactly that).

Sartre does not withdraw from, but, rather, reaffirms his *BN* view that "freedom has no brakes." In an arrogant, derisive, tone, he says to Camus: "... If you had devoted a few minutes to reflecting on the thought of another, you would have seen that freedom cannot be put on brakes (*ne peut être freinée*): What [or who] would put brakes on it? And why would it need to be slowed down?" Freedom has "no relationship to brakes." We are our own free projects, and it is through the light of our free individual projects that "our relationship to the world takes shape" (*se précise*), our "situation" receives meaning, and the "hostility of things" is disclosed. Moreover, in a taunting parenthetical comment, he adds, "For, if man is not free, how can he 'demand having a meaning' (*exiger d'avoir un sens*)? Only, you do not

⁸⁷ Camus, "On Sartre's *Le Mur*," 205.

⁸⁸ Camus, "Lettre au Directeur," 330.

⁸⁹ Sartre, "Réponse à Albert Camus," *Les temps modernes* 8, no. 82 (August 1952): 334-53. Subsequent references to this work will be indicated by the abbreviation "Réponse."

⁹⁰ Sartre, "Réponse," 340: "vous affectez de me confondre avec Jeanson."

⁹¹ Ibid., 343: "... par les mots 'liberté sans frein' vous visez notre conception de la liberté humaine."

like to think of that." And, then, Sartre, understanding that Camus's "without restraint" or "without limits" objection is at the practical/political level, yet without first offering a specific distinction here between ontological freedom and political freedom, makes a telling accusation: "You [Camus], like so many people, confuse *politics* and *philosophy*" (*vous faisiez, comme tant de gens, la confusion du politique et du philosophique*). So, now responding to Camus at the practical/political level, he tells Camus that "The limit of a right (that is to say, of a freedom) is another right (that is to say, again, freedom). And not any 'human nature'."⁸² Remaining on this level, he reaffirms—with, I believe, a dash of sarcasm—two of his repeated, "difficult," contentions: (1) that "the human being is free, and (2) that the human being is the being for whom the human being can become an object." These, he says "define our present situation and enable us to understand oppression." Then, vehemently rejecting Camus's claim that he (Sartre) has endowed his fellow human beings with a paradisaal (*paradisique*) freedom, only to place them later in shackles, Sartre says that he "sees around him only freedoms already enslaved (*des libertés déjà asservies*) trying to tear themselves away from the enslavement into which they were born" (*tentent de s'arracher à la servitude natale*). And he goes on to state—as if to engage Camus further at the political/practical level and to make evident both the distinction and connection between political freedom and ontological freedom: "Our freedom today is nothing other than the *free choice [ontological] to struggle in order to become free*" [political/practical freedom].⁸³ This paradoxical formulation, he adds, simply expresses the paradox of "our historical condition." And "we, too, Camus, [like our contemporaries] are in a cage" (*encagés*): . . . it behooves us, then, "to unite with them to break the bars" (*briser les barreaux*).⁸⁴

Thus, it seems to me that Sartre, in this exchange more than anywhere else, tries to show Camus that his (Sartre's) early view of ontological freedom—"absolute" though it may be in the senses outlined above—does not preclude, at a practical level, a possible lack of polit-

⁸² Ibid., 344, for all preceding quotations in this paragraph. I have inserted italics for emphasis; for example, politics and philosophy.

⁸³ Ibid., 345. "*Notre liberté aujourd'hui n'est rien d'autre que le libre choix de lutter pour devenir libres.*"

⁸⁴ Ibid., 344–5; citation is also for other quotations since preceding citation.

ical freedom for, or political oppression of, human beings. Camus, as I have argued, has wrongly inferred that the "totality" of Sartre's freedom at the ontological level—that is, with respect to freedom of choice, autonomy of choice, freedom of consciousness—applies equally to political freedom, which, in its excessiveness (on his view), leads to anarchy, oppression, totalitarianism, dehumanization. It is because of this misunderstanding by Camus that Sartre strongly emphasizes that we are all politically encaged, and challenges Camus and all of us to struggle to break down the barriers that politically restrain or imprison us as completely free ontological beings-in-situation. This means, of course, that Camus has attacked Sartre's view of freedom on terms (for example, severe restriction or excess) applicable only to political freedom, which—on my interpretation—is, for Sartre, a form of "practical" or "existential" freedom. In this manner, Sartre confirms the basic thesis of my present paper—namely, that Camus has merged his practical or existential freedom—in this case, political—with his ontological freedom; or, to use my (own) preferred translation of Sartre's words here, he has confused "the political and the philosophical." Yet, again, let it be clear that neither Sartre nor I, interpreting Sartre, would contend that the distinction between the two types of freedom implies that the two are unrelated to, or totally independent of, one another. For in Sartre—to repeat—there can be no practical freedom without ontological freedom at its base, and there can be no ontological freedom except as "situated" or engaged in a resisting universe.

But, as suggested at the outset, I cannot conclude this paper without acknowledging that Sartre is not entirely blameless with regard to Camus's misunderstanding, or the misinterpretation by others,⁹⁵ of his early, formative conception of freedom. Take, for instance, the paradoxical quote (Sartre acknowledges a "paradoxical aspect") from Sartre's "Réponse" that I offered above: "Freedom today is nothing other than the *free choice to struggle in order to become free*." Although I have used it to demonstrate the interconnection between ontological freedom and practical freedom, I would acknowledge that only a close awareness and study of the relevant portions of *Being and Nothingness* would make reasonably evident the paradox and complexity involved in Sartre's preceding statement. And even then one might understandably conclude that Sartre himself is conflating these two senses of his freedom. Moreover, some of Sartre's state-

ments in *Being and Nothingness* give readers cause for thinking that Sartre sometimes integrates and confounds the two. Consider, for example, his repeated affirmation that "even the red hot pincers of the torturer do not exempt us from being free."⁹⁶ Is not Sartre saying here that even the "limits" to our practical freedom do not limit our ontological freedom, for we are our freedom or the "free choice" that human reality is? So doesn't the allegation include within itself a merging of the two senses? Consider further his alternating statements regarding obstacles: "There is no obstacle in the absolute sense";⁹⁷ "our freedom itself creates the obstacles from which we suffer";⁹⁸ but, then, "the Other's existence brings a factual limit to my freedom" (that is, "by means of the upsurge of the Other there appear certain determinations which I *am* without having chosen them"; for example, being an Aryan or Jew, handsome or ugly).⁹⁹ I have attempted to show that these are not contradictory statements at all, but rather statements understandable within the framework of Sartre's distinctions between two important types of freedom that Camus and others have overlooked or misunderstood. But these quotations, as well as many others statements in *Being and Nothingness*, attest to Sartre's failure to make the distinction sufficiently clear or robust in specific contexts. Moreover, in some of his concessions to "limits," he—like Camus and

⁹⁶ Among these, I would include Gabriel Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, Risieri Frondizi, Karsten Harries, Emmanuel Hansen, Arthur Danto, and, in some places, Bernhard-Henri Lévy. Although Jeanson, in his discerning book cited above, is sensitive to two differing types of freedom, I seriously question his restricting practical or existential freedom to postconversion (for example, 191). Moreover, I believe Frondizi is conflating and confounding ontological and practical freedom when he says, for example, that "if man is [absolutely] free there is no need to liberate him," ("Sartre's Early Ethics: A Critique," in *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. Paul A. Schlipp, 381.) See also the conflation on 385–6 and elsewhere in Frondizi's piece, although, as I shall imply later, Sartre seems to concede, in the 70's, to the type of criticism that Frondizi makes in the Schlipp volume. I would also diverge from David Detmer's restricting "practical freedom" to "freedom of obtaining" (for example, *Freedom as a Value*, 60, 62, 81), although I acknowledge that Sartre makes an "essential distinction" between ontological freedom ("freedom of choice") and freedom of obtaining: *BN*, 484.

⁹⁶ *BN*, 506, 524, for example.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 488.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 495.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 523. Sartre makes a similar statement in "La République du Silence," 13. See full details for this citation in the footnote that follows.

other of Sartre's critics—appears to have conflated the two prominent types of freedom that he wishes to differentiate.

For one further illustration of the kind of statement by Sartre in his *Being and Nothingness* period that has baffled many of his readers, let us view the oft-quoted statement he makes at the beginning of his moving post World War II essay, "The Republic of Silence" ("La République du Silence"):¹⁰⁰

We were never more free than under the German Occupation. We had lost all our rights and primarily that of speaking; we were openly insulted each day [but] we had to remain silent, . . . everywhere on the walls, in the newspapers, on the film screens, we would continually find that obnoxious and insipid image of how our oppressors wanted us to view ourselves. Because of all of this, we were free.¹⁰¹

To say the least, this statement is puzzling. If Sartre is speaking, as it would seem, at the level of political and social freedom—and with regard to the imposed conditions of oppression by the occupying forces—it is hard to comprehend how the French people could possibly have been "more free" during the Occupation than ever before. For even if one can be completely free ontologically while being politically and practically unfree, it would not seem to follow that the greater the lack of political freedom, then the greater the degree of ontological freedom, for ontological freedom, free choice, autonomy of choice, is not quantifiable: it is always, for Sartre, absolute, complete, total, yet—admittedly—situated. Of course, Sartre might have intended to say that the greater the imposed restrictions and adversity, the greater the opportunity to affirm or exercise one's ontological freedom. But this interpretation, too, fails to eliminate completely either Sartre's ambiguity or a reader's initial bafflement regarding the statement.

¹⁰⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, "La République du Silence," in *Situations III*, (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1949), 11–14. Subsequently, I shall refer to it as "République."

¹⁰¹ "République," 11; translation mine. See also repetition of this passage in the film script from which the book *Sartre par lui-même* was made: Jean-Paul Sartre, *Sartre by Himself*, trans. Richard Seaver (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), 55; originally published as *Sartre par lui-même* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1977). The film, bearing the same name, was directed by Alexandre Astruc and Michel Contat, with the assistance of Simone de Beauvoir and others in the Sartre "family."

Finally, although viewing many of Sartre's statements about freedom in the late period of his philosophy and life does not exonerate Camus and other critics from misinterpreting and muddling his earlier formative and highly controversial views on freedom, it helps us understand how some readers, not sufficiently heeding the stages and progression of his thought, might conclude that his overall position on freedom is internally inconsistent or even self-contradictory. Look again at some of his utterances in his 1969 interview entitled "The Itinerary of a Thought." Reflecting on what he said about freedom in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre criticizes himself for not recognizing adequately "the power of circumstances" (*la force des choses*), that life had taught him as a soldier—something he, admittedly, "had not wanted to be." A few lines later he—rather astonishingly—confesses the scandal of finding, in his preface to a collection of his early plays, his "false" (he now believes) contention that "whatever the circumstance, there is always a possible choice." "When I read this," he adds, "I said to myself: it's incredible, I actually believed that!"¹⁰² And he goes on, in "The Itinerary of a Thought," to offer the evolution of a radically different perspective on freedom:

This is the limit I would today accord to freedom: the small movement which makes of a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him . . . a man can always make something out of what is made of him.¹⁰³

And Sartre qualifiedly reaffirms this point a few years later in *Sartre by Himself* as he repeats:

"You become what you are in the context of what others have made of you. . . . [But] personalization . . . necessarily implies previous conditioning. . . . Flaubert [was] free to become Flaubert, but he didn't have . . . many possibilities of becoming something else . . . Historical condition-

¹⁰² Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Itinerary of a Thought," in *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, trans. John Matthews (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 33–4. Originally published in *Situations VIII* and *XI*, (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1972). In subsequent references, I shall use the abbreviation, "The Itinerary." He is referring to his preface to a collection that included *Les Mouches* and *Huis Clos*. Sartre says virtually the same thing in *Sartre by Himself*, where he scoffs at his 1945 contention that "no matter what the situation might be, one is always free." "All that strikes me as absurd today," he states emphatically. p. 58.

¹⁰³ Sartre, "The Itinerary," 35; I have changed the order of sentences here; italics mine. He makes a similar point, as I have noted earlier, in *Sartre by Himself*, 58.

ing exists every minute of our lives. We can fight it but that doesn't mean it isn't there."¹⁰⁴

Sartre is not without troubling ambivalence in regard to this change, either. During his extensive 1975 interview for *The Library of Living Philosophers*, conducted by Michel Rybalka, Oreste Puciani, and Susan Gruenheck during roughly the same time that *Sartre by Himself* was still being prepared as a film, Sartre responds directly to an article in which Charles Tenney contends that Sartre's "ontology of freedom" appears to have been replaced by a "philosophy of engagement" that "places heavy socio-political obligations" on the freedom of an artist: "I do not consider there has been such a shift from freedom to *engagement*. I still speak of 'freedom;' and the engagement, if there is one, is *the result of freedom*. On this issue, I have not changed since *L'être et le néant*."¹⁰⁵ Thus, we see that Sartre's late and altered views about freedom in relation to conditioning are not without ambiguity. Moreover, we can observe, in this self-proclaimed rejection of his early *Being and Nothingness* views on freedom, his neglect of his own crucial distinction between ontological freedom and practical/existential freedom. But I have already said enough about this occasional lapse and/or conflation.

In conclusion, I submit that a retrospective examination of what Sartre says about freedom in the body of his philosophical oeuvre may help us understand why many relatively recent or contemporary commentators on Sartre have accused him of inconsistency, incoherence, or error regarding freedom. Yet, in fairness, I must state the obvious: we should not finally assess Camus's critique of Sartre's view of freedom from Sartre's post-Camus, post-1960 writings. Rather, we should evaluate Camus's assessment only on the basis of what Sartre said before and during his 1952 quarrel with Camus or, at most, before Camus's death in 1960. What Sartre wrote during that earlier period

¹⁰⁴ *Sartre by Himself*, 58–9.

¹⁰⁵ "Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre," in *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Com., 1981), 41. The italicization of the first "engagement" and "the result of freedom" is mine, for the sake of emphasis on my part, and I have substituted a semicolon for a colon after "speak of 'freedom'." Charles Tenney's article, "Aesthetics in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre," appears on pages 112–38 of the cited volume.

surely includes many of the core, central, and pervasive views in his philosophy of freedom.

Hence, given what Sartre had published by 1952, Camus should have known better. My dominant contention in this paper still holds: Camus's harsh and repeated criticism of Sartre on freedom is rooted in Camus's misunderstanding of it. If Camus believed, for example, while writing his remarkable play, *Caligula*, that Caligula's final rejection of murderous unlimited freedom—"I have not taken the right path . . . my freedom is not the right one."¹⁰⁶—constituted a refutation of Sartre's view of freedom, he revealed once again, this time in a powerful dramatic work, that he was not sufficiently familiar with and did not understand Sartre's core position on freedom. Like numerous other interpreters, he failed to see and distinguish among its key dimensions. If the present paper helps to eliminate this common misinterpretation, it will have succeeded.

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¹⁰⁶ "Je n'ai pas pris la voie qu'il fallait ... ma liberté n'est pas la bonne," *Caligula* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, Livre de poche, 1958), 154, translation is mine. This play was initially performed in 1945 and published in 1944 by Librairie Gallimard. See, also, English version, Albert Camus, "Caligula" in *Caligula and 3 Other Plays*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), 73.

THE INFLUENCE OF SCHLEIERMACHER'S SECOND
SPEECH *ON RELIGION* ON HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF
EREIGNIS

ALEXANDER S. JENSEN

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF THE *EREIGNIS* has fascinated and puzzled interpreters of his philosophy. The strangeness of this concept is illustrated by the number of different translations. It has been rendered as "event of appropriation," "enowning," "happening," and "emergence"¹—and this list of translations is far from complete. Various explanations for the background of this term have been given, including the Eastern concept of Tao.

In this essay, I suggest that Heidegger's use of *Ereignis* is rooted in the young Heidegger's study of Schleiermacher's speeches *On Religion* in 1917. In the second speech, Schleiermacher speaks of a "mysterious moment," in which an individual thing is immediately perceived in relation to the universe. Only in a second stage is this immediate perception conceptualized. The same structure, as I am going to argue, can be found in the revelation of Being in the *Ereignis*, which is later conceptualized as *Lauten des Wortes*.

Given Heidegger's reading of Schleiermacher at a formative stage of his life and the great similarities in Schleiermacher's and Heidegger's thought in this area, one may claim that the similarities are not accidental. I am not going to argue that Schleiermacher's "mysterious moment" is the only source of Heidegger's *Ereignis*. Nevertheless, I believe that although these later influences on Heidegger were

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¹ For "Event of appropriation," see: John Macquarrie, *Heidegger and Christianity: Hensley Henson Lectures, 1993–1994* (New York: Continuum, 1994); for "enowning," see: Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning)*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999); for "happening," see: Mario Enrique Sacchi, *The Apocalypse of Being: The Esoteric Gnosis of Martin Heidegger* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2002); for "emergence," see: Otto Pöggeler, *The Paths of Heidegger's Life and Thought*, trans. John Bailiff (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1997).

significant in shaping his understanding of *Ereignis*, this took place on the basis of his earlier understanding gained through his reading of Schleiermacher's *Speeches*.

The insights presented in this essay will have a number of implications. First of all, it will provide a relatively straightforward reading of the otherwise inaccessible and obscure material. Second, it will highlight the continuity of Heidegger's thought in a key-area of his philosophy throughout his lifetime. Third, it will present valuable insights into the nature of reference and meaning in existentialist philosophy. Finally, it will anchor Heidegger's thought closely in the German Romantic tradition.

I

It is interesting to observe that most authors do not venture to give a definition of *Ereignis*. Kockelmans's insightful study of Heidegger's later philosophy, for example, first observes that *Ereignis* "expresses the process in which Being appropriates to man his essence in order to appropriate him thus to itself."² Later, he points out that "the ontological difference, the difference of Being and beings, issues forth from the appropriating event [*Ereignis*]."³ Consequently, *Ereignis* is "Being as such."⁴ Kockelmans goes on to explore the notion of Being as "the clearing process by which things are lit up so that they can emerge as what they are."⁵ Finally, this clearing, or coming-to-pass of truth also has a negative aspect: "Being, giving rise to beings, must withdraw at the very moment that it reveals itself."⁶

In one respect, Kockelmans's description of the *Ereignis* is quite characteristic of the majority of interpretations of this concept. He describes what *Ereignis* does, yet he does not explain how it does it. There is, as it were, a void in the center of *Ereignis*.

Some interesting additional insights are offered by Hans Jaeger. He points out that the *Ereignis* is closely related to the "fourfold"—the four "regions" of earth, sky, divinities and mortals, on which all meaningful relations of being are founded. In this context, Jaeger

² Joseph J. Kockelmans, *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 59.

³ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

refers to an occasional remark by Heidegger, in which Heidegger suggests that we "should think the *Ereignis* as the center of the Fourfold."⁷ Jaeger connects this remark with Heidegger's notion of the word "Being" crossed through, as introduced in "On the Question of Being."



Heidegger explains this notion: "From what has been said, the sign of this crossing through cannot, however, be the merely negative sign of a crossing out. It points, rather, towards the four regions of the fourfold and their being gathered in the locale of this crossing through."⁸ Thus we see the four regions delimited by the cross as the four regions of the fourfold, that is earth, sky, divinities and mortals.

Jaeger understands Heidegger's remark in the context of the crossing through; thus the *Ereignis* is located in the center of the crossing through, where the four regions of the fourfold meet. It is the center of the meaningful relationships of being in which an individual being is embedded.

These two discussions of *Ereignis* are typical insofar as *Ereignis* is located carefully, but not described. Given the deliberate mystery in which Heidegger clouds this concept, it is not surprising that authors generally shy away from this task. However, I suggest that to read Heidegger's writings on the *Ereignis* in the light of Schleiermacher's second speech *On Religion* will allow for a relatively simple and straightforward understanding of this otherwise obscure concept.

II

Heidegger's indebtedness to the Romantic Movement has been widely recognized,⁹ yet, surprisingly, Schleiermacher's influence is not often, if at all discussed. This is surprising insofar as Heidegger studied Schleiermacher at a crucial turning point of his life. It is generally

⁷ Hans Jaeger, *Heidegger und die Sprache* (Bern: Francke, 1971), 105. (My translation.)

⁸ Martin Heidegger, "On the Question of Being," *Pathmarks*, trans. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 310–11.

⁹ See, for example, Tristan Moyle, *Heidegger's Transcendental Aesthetic: An Interpretation of the Ereignis* (Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).

known that Heidegger broke with dogmatic Catholicism, that is the enforced allegiance to a system of teaching and the ensuing restriction on the freedom to research and teach,¹⁰ between June 1916 and March 1917. At the end of the following semester, he spent the summer of 1917 reading Schleiermacher, especially Schleiermacher's second *Speech On Religion*.¹¹ It would thus be surprising if Heidegger's philosophy was not profoundly influenced by this. And indeed, as Kisiel points out, the reading of Schleiermacher and Dilthey caused a "hermeneutic breakthrough," which would influence his whole life's work.¹² With regard to *Ereignis* this is underlined by the fact that Heidegger used this term in its technical sense for the first time in a lecture course given in 1919.¹³ It is only much later, however, that he would make full use of it and develop it into the complex and puzzling concept that we are discussing here.

III

Friedrich Schleiermacher published the *Speeches On Religion*¹⁴ anonymously in 1799. They were meant to be a defense of Christianity in a context that was dominated by Enlightenment Rationalism and Kant's critique of the same. In the *Speeches*, Schleiermacher famously argues that religion is neither metaphysics (knowledge) nor morals (doing). Instead, Schleiermacher bases his defense of religion on the notion of feeling. He develops this theme in the *Speeches* using the terms "intuition and feeling (*Anschauung und Gefühl*),"¹⁵ or "sen-

¹⁰ Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, trans. Allan Blunden (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 107; Thomas Sheehan, "Reading a Life: Heidegger and Hard Times," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 72.

¹¹ Ott, *Martin Heidegger*, 101–2; Sheehan, "Reading a Life," 75–6.

¹² Theodore J. Kisiel, "Heidegger's Apology: Biography as Philosophy and Ideology," in *Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts*, eds. Theodore J. Kisiel, Marion Heinz, and Alfred Denker (New York: Continuum, 2002), 26–7.

¹³ Martin Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy: With a Transcript of the Lecture Course "On the Nature of the University and Academic Study"*, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002), 58, 63–4.

¹⁴ Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, trans. Richard Crouter (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

sibility and taste for the universe (*Sinn und Geschmack für das Unendliche*).¹⁶

"Intuition and feeling" are at the heart of Schleiermacher's understanding of religion.¹⁷ They constitute the religious perception of the world as distinct from rationalist or idealist perceptions. It is important to note that in his *Speeches* Schleiermacher describes religion as a way of perceiving the world, as an epistemology, which is based on intuition and feeling. In other words, religion is the right use of intuition and feeling.

Thus, in rejecting traditional dogmatic understandings of religion, Schleiermacher defines religion as an attitude towards the world and the universe. Schleiermacher is quite open about the fact that his endeavor is deeply influenced by Baruch Spinoza's pantheism. He even goes as far as calling upon his readers to identify with Spinoza in the manner of classical antiquity: "Respectfully offer up with me a lock of hair to the manes of the holy rejected Spinoza!"¹⁸ As Julia Lamm has pointed out in her study of Schleiermacher's use of Spinoza, Schleiermacher's appropriation of Spinoza's thought enabled him to develop a "Christian doctrine of God within the limits set to reason by Kant's philosophy."¹⁹

Schleiermacher learned from Spinoza that, in Lamm's words, "everything is determined by limits and relations, everything comes from, and is part of, the infinite."²⁰ This means that all individuals (human and material) are embedded in the infinite, yet, at the same time, different from it. The infinite, for Schleiermacher, is the totality of being. It is not just the sum of all things, but the higher unity and order which is situated beyond the world but not separate from the individual things.²¹

Consequently, Schleiermacher needs to develop an epistemology that allows for the perception of the individual as part of the universe, and which at the same time overcomes the distinction between the observer and the observed. Observers must be aware that they, together

¹⁶ Ibid., 23.

¹⁷ Ibid., 24.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Julia A. Lamm, *The Living God: Schleiermacher's Theological Appropriation of Spinoza* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 5.

²⁰ Ibid., 65.

²¹ Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, 35–6.

with the object of their observation, are part of the same totality of being.

At the heart of Schleiermacher's epistemology lies the insight that the observer is actually passive; the universe, which is the ultimate beholden, is active. Schleiermacher formulates this poetically: "the universe creates its own observers and admirers."²² Lamm summarizes Schleiermacher's thought by saying that religion "is a viewing, a discovering. It recognizes real existence—the infinite and the universal relationship of all that is finite. It views, it feels, it intuit, but it does not itself create."²³

Thus Schleiermacher's epistemology begins with the assumption of a meaningful reality, of which the observer is part. This reality, the universe, is beholden rather than constructed; it is immediately perceived rather than created.

Schleiermacher describes the immediate impression of the universe in the flowery language that is typical for the *Speeches*:

That first mysterious moment that occurs in every sensory perception, before intuition and feeling are separated, where sense and its objects have, as it were, flowed into one another and become one, before both turn back to their original position—I know how indescribable it is and how quickly it passes away. But I wish that you were able to hold on to it and also to recognize it again in the higher and divine religious activity of the mind. Would that I could and might express it, at least indicate it, without having to desecrate it! It is as fleeting and transparent as the first scent with which the dew gently caresses the waking flowers, as modest and delicate as a maiden's kiss, as holy and fruitful as a nuptial embrace; indeed, not *like* these, but it is itself all of these. A manifestation, an event develops quickly and magically into an image of the universe.²⁴

In other words, when we encounter and perceive something, then there is first an immediate (unmediated) impression, in which the distinction between the observer and the object is overcome. This immediate impression is not conceptual and therefore not yet understood. The religious way of seeing the world is special in so far as the individual thing or event becomes an "image of the universe," or, to put it differently, as the totality of being becomes manifest in a single thing. This immediate experience is consequently understood

²² *Ibid.*, 58.

²³ Lamm, *The Living God*, 71.

²⁴ Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, 31–2. Note that "event" in the last sentence is a translation of *Begebenheit*, not of *Ereignis*.

and conceptualized through the parallel processes of intuition and feeling. Intuition, in Schleiermacher's words, "proceeds from an influence of the intuited on the one who intuits, from an original and independent action of the former, which is then grasped, apprehended, and conceived by the latter according to one's own nature."²⁵ In short, intuition is the formation of a mental concept of the object.

Intuition is always accompanied by feeling. As Schleiermacher points out, "Your senses mediate the connection between the object and yourselves; the same influence of the object, which reveals its existence to you, must stimulate them in various ways and produce a change in your inner consciousness."²⁶ Feeling is thus not an emotion, but a nonverbal form of self-consciousness, probably close to what the early Heidegger will call self-understanding.

Initially, intuition and feeling are one, yet as soon as one reflects on the experience, and thus one conceptualizes the perception, intuition and feeling are separated: "Immediately upon this contact the simplest matter separates itself into two opposing elements, the one group combining into an image of an object [that is, intuition], the other penetrating to the center of our being, there to effervesce with our original drives and to develop a transient feeling."²⁷ Now that intuition and feeling are separated and thus the perception has been conceptualized, it can be reflected upon and communicated.

This basic epistemological and hermeneutical insight is developed in various parts of Schleiermacher's later work. In his lectures on hermeneutics, for example, Schleiermacher developed the thought that "hermeneutics is supposed to lead to the understanding of the thought-content" of an utterance.²⁸ The thought-content of the utterance can be understood in two ways, either as the conceptual thought behind the utterance, or as the nonconceptual experience, the "feeling" of the author. In his *Hermeneutics*, Schleiermacher does not use the term feeling, but speaks of "thought" or of "that by which the author is moved to the utterance."²⁹ Later, in *The Christian Faith*,

²⁵ Ibid., 24–5. Crouter, in a note relating to this passage, points out that Schleiermacher's understanding of intuition is "commensurate with Kant's use."

²⁶ Ibid., 29.

²⁷ Ibid., 31.

²⁸ Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and other Writings*, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8.

²⁹ Ibid., 90.

Schleiermacher puts feeling at the very heart of his hermeneutics; theological language communicates the religious feeling of the author to the interpreter.³⁰ I cannot discuss here the differences between the understanding of feeling in Schleiermacher's early and later work, but it will suffice to note that Schleiermacher does assume that language ultimately relates to the preconceptual, nonverbal feeling. Interpretation serves to recover the feeling of the author, and to enable the interpreter to participate in the author's feeling. (We must keep in mind here that feeling is not emotion, but self-consciousness.)

In sum, Schleiermacher developed an epistemology that allows the human person to perceive something in its relation to the totality of being, seeing it in its place in the meaningful whole of the universe.

IV

There are some striking parallels between the epistemology of Schleiermacher's *Speeches* and Heidegger's *Ereignis*. Jaeger summarizes Heidegger's understanding of language pointing out that for Heidegger, language does not describe objects, but expresses meaningful relations of being. "Through language, which does not only talk about single beings, or Essent (*Seiendes*), but puts Being (*Sein*) and relations of Being (*Seinsbezüge*) into words, the world is explicitly disclosed and communicable in its meaningful significance."³¹ Already in this short description of Heidegger's understanding of language we can see one key parallel with Schleiermacher's understanding; for both language is not about isolated objects, but about relations of Being, or the observer and the object both embedded in the totality of being, the universe.

For Heidegger, the disclosure of the meaningful relations of being takes place in the *Ereignis*. He emphasizes that the *Ereignis* is not the result of a cause but that it is the giving of language.³² In the *Ereignis* the human being encounters language; Being is disclosed and the human being is enabled to speak. In the *Ereignis*, language

³⁰ Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans. James S. Stewart and H. R. Mackintosh (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), § 133, pp. 611–3.

³¹ Jaeger, *Heidegger und die Sprache*, 15.

³² Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language," in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 127.

gives itself to the observer, and human language can answer to language.³³ In this context, we need to distinguish carefully between language as *Sage* (saying), or, as Heidegger uses it elsewhere, *Geläut der Stille* (peal of stillness³⁴) on the one hand and language as *Lauten des Wortes* (sounding of the word) on the other. Language as *Sage* is the meaningful relationship of being as it is disclosed to the observer, whilst *Lauten des Wortes* is human language, which attempts to express what has been disclosed. In the *Ereignis*, a human being encounters Being, a single thing is unveiled in its relation and difference to the world.

This is congruent with Heidegger's remark that the *Ereignis* should be seen as the center of the fourfold.³⁵ In the *Ereignis*, the meaningful relations of the individual thing to the totality of Being are revealed. Focused on an individual thing, the totality of being becomes manifest.

In this way, the *Ereignis* is the link between language as *Sage* (saying) and *Lauten des Wortes* (sounding of the word). "Appropriation [that is, *Ereignis*], needing and using man's appropriations, allows saying to reach speech."³⁶ Saying, in this context, seems to refer to the totality of meaningful relations of being, which are made manifest in the *Ereignis* and then come to speech. Heidegger, albeit before he introduces the *Ereignis* as the link between speaking and saying, describes the relation between the two in a complex way.

Language speaks by saying, this is, by showing. What it says wells up from the formerly spoken and so far still unspoken Saying which pervades the design of language. Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching into all regions of presences, summons from them whatever is present to appear and to fade. . . . In our speaking, as listening to language, we say again the Saying we have heard.³⁷

We recall that for the young Schleiermacher, the universe reveals itself to the beholder in what he describes as a "mysterious moment," in which an individual thing is revealed in its relation to the totality of being, to the universe. This revelation is then conceptualized and can

³³ Ibid., 129.

³⁴ Martin Heidegger, "Language," *Hermeneutical Inquiry*, vol. 1, ed. David E. Klemm (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 153.

³⁵ Jaeger, *Heidegger und die Sprache*, 105.

³⁶ Heidegger, "The Way to Language," 129.

³⁷ Ibid., 124.

be expressed in language. If we read the later Heidegger's approach to language in the light of Schleiermacher's understanding, then *Sage* can be seen as the totality of meaningful relations that await their expression in language, and the *Ereignis* as the immediate revelation that makes these relations manifest, and speaking as the conceptualization of this revelation of meaningful relations of being.

I believe that these remarkable parallels between Schleiermacher's and Heidegger's thought lend support to the claim that Heidegger's study of Schleiermacher's *Second Speech* during the summer of 1917 had a lasting effect on his thinking, and influenced deeply his later philosophy. As noted earlier, I am not suggesting that Heidegger's concept of *Ereignis* is exclusively built on Schleiermacher's *Second Speech*. Far from it, Heidegger's thought was influenced by too many other thinkers and currents. For instance, his teacher Husserl further shaped his thinking, as did his later fascination with Far-Eastern thought. These influences, however, shaped his understanding of *Ereignis* which was based on his earlier reading of Schleiermacher.

V

Reading Heidegger's later philosophy of language in the light of Schleiermacher's *Speeches* sheds light on an area of Heidegger's thought that has often been found inaccessible and obscure. In fact, it allows a comparatively straightforward reading of the complex material. It does not, however, allow an exhaustive explanation, as other influences will have altered Heidegger's thought. But this, I believe, took place on the basis of the basic insights that Heidegger had gained from his study of Schleiermacher's *Speeches*.

This also sheds light on the continuity of Heidegger's thought. Heidegger's reading of Schleiermacher in the summer of 1917 seems not only to have led to his "hermeneutic breakthrough," which would influence his whole life's work,³⁸ but also to have given him the philosophical tools with which he could attempt to solve the questions raised in his later philosophy.

In addition, the reading of Heidegger proposed here contributes to our understanding of meaning and reference. For both Heidegger

³⁸ Kisiel, "Heidegger's Apology," 26–7.

and Schleiermacher, language ultimately refers to the immediate disclosure of being. We have seen in Schleiermacher's *Speeches* that the immediate disclosure of the universe in relation to an object is then processed and conceptualized through the double movement of intuition and feeling. Now the observer begins to understand the disclosure, and can articulate it.

Heidegger uses a different terminology, but develops a very similar thought. For him, the meaningful relationships of being, of which both the observer and the object are part, are disclosed immediately (without mediation). Heidegger describes this as "language speaks," referring to language as *Sage*. The human observer, having received language (*Sage*), can now answer in human language (*Lauten des Wortes*). Nonconceptual language (*Sage*) has thus been translated into human language. Heidegger does not explain how the "answering," that is the translation from the preconceptual encounter with language (*Sage*) in the *Ereignis*, takes place, but he must assume some process by which the preconceptual thought is conceptualized.

So for both, human language refers to human thought, which refers to the disclosure of meaningful relationships of being. This is the "thought content" of language, or, to use the language of the hermeneutical tradition, the "mental image." In this way, both Schleiermacher and Heidegger follow the Augustinian tradition,³⁹ according to which the preconceptual thought (inner word—*verbum interius*) is translated into conceptual thought (external word—*verbum externum*), which can then be articulated. This translation obviously does not happen without loss, so that the conceptual thought is never a fully adequate representation of the inner word.⁴⁰ The interpreter of the utterance then attempts to retrieve the thought content of the utterance. This, however, will never be fully possible, as both Schleiermacher and Augustine agree.

Thus for Schleiermacher and Heidegger, language has an ultimate reference, which is the thought content of the utterance. It is not a thing or state-of-affairs, but the impression that the encounter with the thing or state-of-affairs made on the observer, and how this changed the observer, either by penetrating the center of our being and there

³⁹ Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* 15.10.19.

⁴⁰ Jean Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 32–9. Alexander S. Jensen, *Theological Hermeneutics* (London: SCM, 2007), 45–7.

changing our drives and motives, or by altering our self-understanding. After the critique of ideology, psychoanalysis and other critical theories, we are aware today that the conceptualization of this will always be influenced by the observer's presuppositions, prejudices, social context, psychological condition, and other factors. However, following Schleiermacher and Heidegger, we can assume that there is an ultimate reference, distorted as its linguistic representation may be.

So the reading of Heidegger's later philosophy of language in the light of Schleiermacher's links Heidegger firmly in the Romantic tradition, in which he seems to have been embedded much more firmly than he was prepared to admit.

Finally, it will be interesting to establish if rereading other elements of Heidegger's thought in the light of Schleiermacher's theology will produce similarly fruitful interpretations. In this case, interesting new perspectives on Heidegger's thinking could be opened.

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BOOK REVIEWS

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

JEREME HUDSON AND STAFF

AMERIKS, Karl. *Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. vi + 335 pp.—*Kant and the Historical Turn* is the fourth of Karl Ameriks' studies on Kant. As one would expect it includes crucial and often decisive interventions in the field. The book is made up of a number of free-standing and invariably absorbing chapters, most of which have already appeared as papers. These chapters cover a wide range of material. Chapters 2 through 6 provide close analyses of Kantian problems. Chapters 7 through 10 deal with the implications of Kantianism in the nineteenth century. Further chapters illuminate Ameriks' reading of Kant by way of disputes and debates with other scholars in the field: James Van Cleeve (ch. 3), Jean-Marie Schaeffer (ch. 9), Frederick Beiser (ch. 11), and Manfred Frank (ch. 12).

Because of its interest in the problems of Kant interpretation and in the complex appropriation, reconstruction, and rejection of transcendental idealism in subsequent nineteenth century German philosophy *Kant and the Historical Turn* takes a more hermeneutic approach than Ameriks' other works. The distinctive concern of the book, however, is its development of the idea of a historical turn.

The keynote chapters grapple with how we might specify this idea. Offering a series of important distinctions Ameriks proposes that the historical turn consists in philosophy's interest in historical specificity with an attendant anti-historicist optimism about the possibility of philosophical progress. What this means, Ameriks writes, is "stressing that historical considerations are a crucial part of the effective presentation of at least some arguments central to philosophy as a developing systematic discipline" (6).

This idea, however, renders the title of the book quite intriguing. As it turns out the pivotal figure in the historical turn is, actually, Karl Reinhold rather than Kant. Ameriks does suggest that even Kant's critical philosophy contains a historical dimension due to the influence of "Rousseau's call for a new world of political freedom" (4). His

*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

conclusion, though, is that "it surely would take a very extensive revisionist argument to dislodge the common and proper thought that Kant is fundamentally a nonhistorical thinker" (190).

Ameriks argues that the way in which Reinhold sought to make accessible Kant's almost incomprehensible philosophy stimulated a style of philosophical presentation that produced the historical turn. Although Reinhold was a convinced Kantian he had also been open to Herder's brand of historicism. Ameriks' suggestion is that this somehow produced a "dual form" (8) in Reinhold's philosophy which gave him the facility to understand that human needs "determined what could count as a proper acceptance or crucial misunderstanding of rational philosophy in a particular context" (8). This led Reinhold to present Kant's philosophy as attempting to "overcome a whole sequence of entrenched philosophical positions" (10). Moreover, Reinhold, Ameriks argues, proposed a reading of Kant as historically relevant to the problems of religious conflict. In this regard Kant's philosophy could be seen to serve the "needs of the age" (8).

The product of Reinhold's *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* was, as Ameriks describes it, a philosophy intended as "a complex kind of hermeneutical progress, one wherein each generation has a chance of genuinely advancing from previous philosophical discussions by enriching them with concrete improvements that are introduced through an *explicit* reconsideration of their precise relation to a sequence of actual past alternatives" (11). This is clearly an enormous innovation and for that reason it is Reinhold who emerges as the hero of the book. Interestingly his heroism is sometimes highlighted by contrast with the villainous Hegel. Going further than defending Reinhold against Hegel's "bitter critique" (199) Ameriks suggests that Hegel's conception of philosophical progress was none other than Reinhold's, a position "that Hegel was later unfairly to claim as his own—in contrast to Reinhold's!" (203). (Hegel also comes off rather badly in relation to his reading of Kant's aesthetics.)

Ameriks' idea of the historical turn is further articulated through a consideration of its influence on philosophy in the twentieth century. Given the very systematic definition of the style of thinking characteristic of this turn one might imagine that the historical turn is, in the end, a rare philosophical occurrence. However, Ameriks points to the philosophical contributions of such figures as Williams, Rawls, MacIntyre, Cavell, Schneewind, Wolterstorff, Darwall, and Brandom, whose work, he notes, "turned to largely historical investigations without giving up their distinctive and highly analytical approach" (14). Yet it might be suggested that some of Ameriks' definitions of what is involved in the idea of historically oriented philosophy could well preclude the efforts of the "analytic" philosophers amongst this group. We can see this in Ameriks' engaging (and compelling) analysis of the notion of "conversation," a notion which is often used to characterize historically conscious philosophizing. Conversation may be treated synchronically, but an historically conscious conversation, Ameriks specifies, "requires, at the least, a sense that there exist deep distinctions between very different eras, and that, even though these areas are not totally cut off from one another, they connect with one another in an essentially diachronic way

that involves particular restrictive kinds of order and gaps in influence" (187). One might need more persuasion that Brandom, for example, is a conversationalist of this kind. Undoubtedly Brandom finds rich new ways of articulating his own inferentialist position through, for instance, his quite original reading of Hegel, but might it not be too much to say that Brandom's approach to Hegel is, as Ameriks describes an historically conscious conversation, "a 'destruction' or 'overcoming' of the main conceptual claims of earlier philosophic eras"? (188).

Nevertheless Ameriks shows us that the idea of an historical turn is by no means protean. *Kant and the Historical Turn* powerfully thematizes the very idea through a series of remarkable historico-philosophical analyses. In this way, this book is itself a fine contribution to the very practice of historically oriented philosophy it wishes to define.—Brian O'Connor, *University College Dublin*.

BENCIVENGA, Ermanno. *Ethics Vindicated: Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. xiv + 193 pp. Cloth, \$55.00—Bencivenga reconstructs what he takes to be Kant's transcendental answers to the most basic problems for ethics: freedom, values, and moral imperatives. Freedom is pure rationality, and there is no room for it in the world of nature. However, a naturalistic causal account of an event does not prevent us from thinking of a different, definitive account that involves inserting the event into a rational pattern. Conforming to that possible pattern exemplifies autonomy because the law of the event can be said to originate from the rational, or free, agent herself. As to values, their existence in the world of facts is not puzzling if we recognize that value judgments are reason's commentary on facts; what makes categorical judgments possible is the categorical nature of the agency that issues them. Moral imperatives arise because human beings are imperfectly rational. When the independent register of rational discourse is halted, reason disapproves and holds people responsible, however incomprehensible the idea of such responsibility turns out to be. Reason favors the patient reestablishment of rational interaction, and thus prescribes behavior to human beings—prescribing that they act as if believing in the practical postulates of freedom, God, and the immortality of the soul.

In the course of his exposition, Bencivenga repeatedly argues that Kant is intent on showing the limits of philosophy and of knowledge in relation to our moral concerns. Because philosophy is entirely constituted of cognition from concepts, no knowledge can issue from philosophy. Philosophy can only establish logical possibilities; real possibilities would require intuitions. Rational discourse may be edifying, but it cannot prove the veridicality of its tenets. Moreover, internal conceptual clashes within the criteria of objectivity that reason imposes mean that there is no ultimate horizon of interpretation for reason to rely on. Hence, the application of these criteria is restricted to limited contexts,

so that the occurrence of knowledge depends on an act of synthesis that is a spontaneous choice of context. In addition, contrary to Descartes, the experience of self-consciousness affords no knowledge—it is just a formal unity that is dependent on the categorial unity of the spatiotemporal content of that experience. Freedom and rationality are merely fictions inasmuch as they cannot be verified empirically. Furthermore, one can only hope, not know, that one's empirical self is identical with the rational "I" when one's actions can be meaningfully read as conforming to a rational pattern. Lastly, any ability to act according to moral imperatives is incomprehensible because the causal link between the intellectual and sensitive worlds is mysterious, and philosophy cannot inculcate the moral feeling that is necessary to motivate moral behavior. However, what compensates for all these deflationary points about reason and philosophy, according to Bencivenga, is that fictions and storytelling are what philosophy is really about as a practice and that, in acknowledging this, Kant "allows for a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the complexity of our form of life" (p. 10). The oscillation between an empirical and an intelligible perspective is an example of the conflictual conception of the human form of life that Bencivenga finds so refreshing in Kant.

There are some flaws that make this book less helpful than it might be. A serious weakness is its failure to engage explicitly with any contemporary work on Kant's ethics. Its theses are hardly so original as to preclude any such engagement. In addition, it depends to a considerable extent on Bencivenga's earlier book *Kant's Copernican Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), but its attempt to explain the conclusions of that book in relation to the present one is not as clear as it ought to be. Another shortcoming is that the constant barrage of quotations from all over Kant's corpus tends to blunt or obscure the basic arguments rather than illuminating them—especially since Bencivenga's aim is supposed to be more constructive than exegetical. Having said all this, Bencivenga's encyclopedic knowledge of Kant's works is impressive. Also, he has original things to say on some familiar topics in Kantian ethics. For example, his discussion of Kant's absolute prohibition on lying or revolutionary action is illuminating. Additionally, although he is not the first to address the question of whether Kant can allow that evil is ever freely chosen, his intricate discussion is stimulating and original. He focuses on the important point that reason paradoxically approves the retrospective ascription of responsibility for evil, even while taking evil behavior to be purely naturalistic. Finally, read in conjunction with the earlier book, *Ethics Vindicated* marks an important attempt to understand the unity of Kant's *Critiques*.—Joe Casey, *Milltown Institute*.

BARNES, Jonathan. *Truth, etc.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. viii + 551 pp. Cloth, \$65.00—"Ancient logic is not sexy," laments Jonathan Barnes in his introduction to *Truth, etc.* Yet in the tradition of Lewis Carroll,

Barnes has given us a book on logic that is witty, entertaining, and idiosyncratic. In a word, sexy. Not that it is an easy read, or that the arguments are not subtle, or the scholarship not impeccable. Barnes makes use of passages drawn from a large cast of characters, both well known ones such as Aristotle and Proclus, and ones not so well known such as Dionysius Thrax and Herminus. He also makes many references to modern logic. The book is based on the John Locke Lectures given at Oxford, 2004, and it sticks to the lecture format in that it contains no bibliography or scholarly references. It does, however, contain footnoted Latin or Greek texts for each passage quoted, a general Index, and an Onomasticon (one-line biographies of those quoted).

It should be pointed out that in *Truth, etc.* only the first chapter has anything to do with the notion of truth. The "*etc.*" forms the main body of the work, on ancient logical and grammatical theory. In what follows, no more than indications can be given as to the full contents.

Chapter 1, "Truth," opens with a reference to the Stoic Chrysippus' maxim that "every assertible is either true or false" (p. 1). This statement of the law of excluded middle sounds straightforward enough, but then, what is an assertible? Simplicius and others suggest that an assertible, as contrasted with a question or imperative, is defined as what is either true or false. Apart from the problematic nature of this definition when applied to Chrysippus' maxim, what about assertibles that are neither true nor false (future contingents), both true and false (paradoxes), and true at one time and false at another? In considering these questions, Barnes discusses whether Aristotle and other ancients thought of the "is" in such statements as "the number 2 is even" as timeless or tenseless, as modern logicians do, or whether they thought of them as true omnitemporally, that is, true in the past, now, and in the future. This leads to a consideration of whether the ancients held to something like Tarski's theory of truth. Barnes concludes that they do, but if an assertible is primarily a thought, as the Stoics held, then "snow is white" is true iff snow is white" would be the case only if someone actually had the thought that "snow is white." This Barnes takes to be absurd. Barnes ends the chapter with a linking of Chrysippus' maxim, which he has interpreted to mean "every assertible is at every moment of existence either true or false," to his Stoical metaphysical fatalism: every assertion of future events is either true or false. This contrasts with the Epicureans, who said that statements of future contingents are neither true nor false, and thus denied Chrysippus' maxim.

In chapter 4, entitled "Forms of Argument," Barnes discusses what makes Aristotelian (and Stoic) logic a 'formal logic'. Aristotle himself, the inventor of formal logic, does not explicitly consider this issue, but Alexander of Aphrodisias and others do in some detail. They distinguish the matter of a syllogism—the terms—from the form—the figure and mood. By using symbols for terms, says Alexander, Aristotle shows that the terms themselves can be disregarded when considering the validity of a syllogism. Only the form of a syllogism is relevant.

But then, asks Barnes, what is the status of these symbols, or, as Barnes calls them, 'logical letters'? Are they like modern Fregean variables? No, says Barnes: variables have no reference and sentences using them

can be true or false only through the use of quantification. Aristotle's sentential descriptions of syllogism, however, cannot be quantified, and so they have no truth value. Barnes suggests that Aristotle's use of letters is to be understood in the same way as Euclid's use of diagrams. According to Barnes (following Proclus), Euclid first proves a theorem for a specific figure (for example, a specific triangle), and then universalizes the result to every possible specific triangle that can be referred to. Similarly, Aristotle's logical letters are meant to have *some* specific reference, but no specific reference in particular.

Chapter 5, "Is Logic a Science?" considers the Parapatetic position that logic is not a science, because it is 'topic neutral'. Rather, logic is an art, a technique which is applied to objects of science. Barnes asserts that logic must surely be a science in the Aristotelian sense, because it is the study of a unified and determinate species of objects. Indeed, the Aristotelian syllogistic exemplifies the idea of a demonstrative science: it is an axiomatic deductive system. The axioms are perfect syllogisms such as Barbara and Celarent, while the items proved are the imperfect syllogisms. Much of the chapter is concerned with examining this Aristotelian concept of perfection. Barnes holds that perfection is (strictly, it seems) an epistemological notion concerning self-evidence of validity. He considers the rule of the infamous *dici de omni et nullo* in establishing perfection. Ultimately, he says, the *dictum* does not establish it, and that, contrary to what Aristotle claims, no syllogism is perfect. Indeed, the principle of conversion (used to prove the validity of some imperfect syllogisms) is a better candidate for perfection.

The initial sections of the final chapter return to the question broached in the initial sections of the previous two chapters: what is the philosophical status of the Aristotelian syllogistic? Barnes considers the ancient quarrel between the Stoics and Peripatetics such as Alexander of Aphrodisias as to whether logic is a part of philosophy (Stoics) or simply a tool of philosophy (Peripatetics). The Peripatetics held the latter position principally because they thought of syllogistics in terms of methodological application in scientific demonstration. Barnes finds this position to be at best pointless and at worst pernicious. Insofar as Aristotelian logic is a formal logic (chapter 4) and is a science (chapter 5), its status must certainly be greater than the merely utilitarian one assigned to it by the Peripatetics. And Barnes hints that Aristotle would agree with him. The rest of the chapter is taken up with discussion of some consequences of the Peripatetic position.

No review can do full justice to the diverse contents of *Truth, etc.* One can certainly take issue with many of Barnes' assertions. Of course, that is beside the point, as any good philosophical work is bound to be provocative. One might wish that Barnes had not simply assumed modern logical theory to be superior to the ancient, and had attempted to show how deeper philosophical presuppositions of ancient logic might throw light on those of the moderns. More trivially, although one can admire Barnes' 'in your face' attitude towards certain scholarly conventions, this publication of his lectures could have used at least a few explanatory footnotes. For it is not quite the case that, as he claims, the book "does not presuppose any prior acquaintance with logic, either ancient or modern" (p. vii). Nevertheless, for anyone who

finds ancient logic interesting and worthwhile, *Truth, etc.* is an indispensable read.—Edward M. Engelmann, *Bolton, Massachusetts.*

CORRIGAN, Kevin and TURNER, John, eds. *Platonisms: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern.* Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007. xi + 278 pp. Cloth, \$167.00—These studies on the “history of Platonisms” approach the *Dialogues* “textually and intertextually” as “an inexhaustible mine of possible trajectories” to correct “simplistic views or slogans of Platonism uncritically accepted in the contemporary marketplace” (pp. 4–5, 14). They are grouped into four sections: Classical, Late Antiquity, Renaissance and Modern World, and Postmodernity.

The first begins with T. Slezak’s comprehensive examination of Plato’s dialectic as “the only discipline that deserves the name *episteme*.” He establishes that “reduction of oppositions to a first . . . was undoubtedly a Platonic project, and not merely an Aristotelian development,” and that this endeavor requires “the three methods of elenchus, of *diairesis*-and-*synagoge*, and of analysis-and-synthesis” as illuminating all things (pp. 28, 32–3). As the “path” that involves *noeta* of soul seeking and the Good sought it adumbrates *eudaimonia*, the privilege of gods and divine beings, and intimates visionary knowledge of its goal, the *thea* (pp. 34, 38–9). L. Brisson analyzes Plato’s inclusive hierarchical “psychic continuum” as englobing vegetative, animate, and human, as well as demons and gods, entailing discontinuity only between souls of gods and demons that never “fall into a body subject to destruction” and those that do, and between sensorially mediated intellectual power of human souls and rational power of animals along with desiring power of plants (p. 50).

J. Turner depicts the shift of emphasis from the *Timaeus* in Middle Platonism to the *Philebus* and *Parmenides* in subsequent Neoplatonic speculators and the Platonizing Sethian treatises, the latter abandoning by the third century “all interest in the Genesis protology in favor of a transcendental theology” (pp. 57–64). Turner also refines determinations of M. Tardieu, P. Hadot, and W. Theiler not only by establishing that these treatises center on “a supreme unity-in-trinity whose nature could only be described in largely negative terms,” but also that their doctrines likely originated in sources prior to post-Plotinian Neoplatonic speculators such as Porphyry and Victorinus (pp. 85–6). S. Strange adds precisions to our knowledge of the history of fourth-century Neoplatonism by analyzing chronological and topical references in Proclus’ *Parmenides Commentary* to enigmatic “ancient authorities,” *palaiotai*, which includes speculators up to Iamblichus, by relating these to Proclus’ metaphysical reading of the second part of the *Parmenides*, which Proclus suggested originated with Origen and Plotinus and contrasted with prior dominant “orthodox” logical interpretations (pp. 98, 102–3, 108). The final study in this section is Guldmann Reydamns-Schils’ on differences between Platonists, especially Simplicius, and Stoics

such as Epictetus concerning virtue, marriage, and parenthood. The Stoics “radically challenge the very dichotomy of theoretical and practical wisdom” as evidenced in Simplicius’ sustained “distinction between natural and rational affection,” since not only is “rational order embedded in nature, and nature an expression of that rational order,” but also because “higher virtues entail the lower” (p. 112). Implications of these conclusions supported commitments that contrasted with Platonic ambivalence towards women generally promoted among Neoplatonists and traditions influenced by them that relegated marriage and parenthood to “the mere interstices of being.” (pp. 124–5).

Section three begins with Guldmann Bechtle’s depiction of methodological problems in applying the notion of *mathesis universalis* to ancient philosophy, for such requires examination of each speculative specimen to determine “which form it takes, and whether there is a universal science, and if it is mathematizing in any significant way” (pp. 134, 144). Bechtle presents pertinent texts in Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Syrianus, Boethius, and Gilbert of Poitiers to reveal how modern concepts can be “hermeneutically useful” in viewing ancient doctrines in a new light (p. 154). R. Hedley analyzes the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist R. Cudworth, who countered what he believed to be the source of contemporary atheism in Epicurean materialist empiricism by appealing to a “Mind Senior to the world” and “Plastick Nature” supported by his reading of the *Enneads* and the *Laws* (pp. 165, 171). A. Cuda depicts W. B. Yeats’ agonistic concern with Plato’s tension between inspiration and knowledge which relegates the poet to being a *philodoxos* barred from *phronesis* (p. 206). Yeats emerges as a phenomenologist of the enigmatic experience of the “generative circularity” of knowledge and inspiration that offers expansive potential intelligibility of a poetic articulation, even to its poet elucidator (p. 214). R. Berchman insists that since “the constitutive activity of the subject in experience” is a “clear-cut modern notion,” and since no philosopher prior to Kant advocated such, “any constructivist, be it rationalist, empiricist, idealist, or phenomenological, reading” of the ancients is problematic (p. 190). Any granting of priority to representationalism thus assures that “a shared language of metaphysics between these ancient and modern philosophers is unlikely” (p. 178). While this assertion is valid regarding immediate, direct cognition of things, it arguably would require qualification in reference to reflexive apprehension of immediate concomitants within consciousness in cognizing. Moreover, it seems circular to define “realism” as the view that “there are real objects that exist independently of our knowledge or experience of them,” for *obiecta* ambivalently connotes reflexive apprehension of the represented (p. 189). The reflection by J. Dillon, in contrast, offers an astute, sympathetic analysis of how the renowned Neo-Kantian, P. Natrop, in his *Platons Ideenlehre* was perhaps justified in discerning in Plato an acknowledgment of a certain “construction which the mind puts together by application of its own laws” in knowing, since various Platonic texts portray delimitation of consciousness according to “laws of procedure” (pp. 204, 200). Whether Natrop’s reading of Plato implies that such applies

to immediate, direct cognition or solely to reflexively derived cognition, and whether to cognizing as performed or intelligible content cognized is not explored.

The final section includes K. Corrigan's reflections on E. Levinas' "diachrony" as "the impossibility of bridging the gap between the same and the other in terms of one or the other," and how such can "make us re-think the history of thought in a new way" (p. 232, 235). Corrigan reveals the profound accord of Levinas, Plato, and Plotinus concerning the infinite and the "Good [as] the most familiar presence in or to us" which is "pure experience, not recollection." (pp. 219–21, 226). The final study is S. Gersh's multi-layered reflection on Derrida's readings of (Neo-)Platonism, in which he reviews phases of Derrida's musings on the "metaphysics of presence," the "opposites of prior (superior) and posterior (inferior) terms," and his contrasts of the "quasi-method" of deconstruction with negative theology (pp. 254–6, 258–9, 252–4, 241). He appropriately ends with advertence to texts in Plotinus and Deutero-Dionysius that imply "disruption of oppositions" due to "the complex semantic relations between being, non-being, matter, good, and evil when conceived as emanations" (p. 259).

These studies not only remind one that Plato's *Dialogues* have encoded much of the "cultural, ascetic, spiritual, and literary heritage of the Western world" (p. 3), but also that Socrates' final words concerning the truly wise at the end of *Lesser Hippias* especially apply to Plato, since "questioning him" inevitably brings "benefit by learning."—Michael Ewbank, *Logos Philosophical Institute*.

DeBRABANDER, Firmin. *Spinoza and the Stoics: Power, Politics, and the Passions*. London and New York: Continuum, 2007. x + 149 pp. Cloth, \$120.00—In his study, Firmin DeBrabander argues that Spinoza is to be understood in light of his profound indebtedness to ancient Stoicism and of his resolute rejection of what the author calls (Judaeo-) Christian metaphysics. What is perplexing about his study, however, is that he shows just the opposite, while at the same time evincing real insight into Spinoza's philosophy. Indeed, he explicitly (and correctly) shows that Spinoza both rejects fundamental elements of Stoicism and embraces fundamental elements of Scripture (biblical religion). Further, in identifying Christian metaphysics with the teleology and anthropomorphism of which Spinoza gives so definitive a critique in the Appendix of Part I of the *Ethics*, he fails to appreciate the fact that this metaphysics is rooted in ancient philosophy, including Stoicism, not in the Bible (whether Jewish and/or Christian).

What makes the study of DeBrabander exciting is that, unlike so many philosophers, he truly sees that "Spinoza's philosophy is thoroughly social, down to its very roots" (p. 56). Indeed, he points out that the fact that human beings are finite modes and thus not identical with God (infinite substance) "indicates the perpetual weakness of my being, that I

am ultimately dependent upon God. . . . [This] also indicates my dependence upon other persons. Thus, we are led to the role and importance of society in the life of virtue" (p. 56). But it is precisely "the sociality of virtue" (which serves as the title of Chapter 3) that, as DeBrabander properly shows, both distinguishes Spinoza's philosophy from Stoicism and aligns it with biblical (what I would call covenantal) ethics based on the golden rule, the love of neighbor.

DeBrabander rightly sees that, in contrast with Spinoza's concept of virtue as social (and political), the virtue of the Stoic sage is indifferent to the social (and the political). It involves teleology (p. 11), anthropomorphism (p. 35), perfectionism, total control over (indeed, the eradication of) the passions, and self-sufficiency, all of which Spinoza firmly rejects. DeBrabander writes that Spinoza identifies social ethics with the struggle to render the passive affects active (and so free and loving). "Ethics is a matter of continual struggle against more powerful forces that can never be vanquished . . ." (p. 54). Furthermore, he points out that the one time that Spinoza refers to the Stoics in the *Ethics* he does so only to reject their central tenet that we have complete control over our passions (*Ethics*, Part 5, Preface). Spinoza also rejects the Stoic idea of rational suicide. For, as DeBrabander observes, Spinoza holds that to subordinate life (existence) to death is to show that one has succumbed to external causes (or passive affects) and does not live by freely determining things from oneself alone.

The attentive reader will have noted that the concepts of dependence and struggle (involving imperfection and finitude) that DeBrabander attributes to Spinoza are not only anti-Stoic (as he acknowledges) but also consistent with what Jewish and Christian moralists call sin (which he does not acknowledge). Just as he fails to see that the teleology and anthropomorphism that Spinoza shows to be fundamental to superstition define ancient metaphysics, not biblical religion, so the doctrines that he ascribes to Christianity are infused with ancient metaphysics: a transcendent (supernatural) God, the subordination of desire (will, human agency) to the good, the concept of life in this world as but a means to the next life as its end, and religious morality as externally imposed. He fails to see that all of these notions (as he conceives them) are not true to the fundamental doctrines of biblical theology: creation from nothing (the creation of human existence as the good) and the two basic commandments of the covenant (the law): to love God and neighbor—in this life, now. While God (like the neighbor) is transcendent as other, God and human beings are partners in creation. The golden rule, which Spinoza views as the very basis of both ethics and politics (and thus of the democratic pact in the *Theologico-Political Treatise*), involves mutuality, sociality, equality, and freedom, not external imposition. To view life in this world as a means to another life reflects ancient metaphysics, not biblical ethics. Yet it is also the case that DeBrabander properly recognizes that for Spinoza biblical religion has the same content as philosophy (based on the ethics of love) and that religion (when stripped of the superstition founded on teleology and anthropomorphism) is not only compatible with but fundamental to civil society. He

writes: "Religion [for Spinoza] provides incomparable nourishment for the bond that holds humans together, and in turn enables all human possibilities" (p. 8).

What DeBrabander's study allows us to grasp, consequently, is the importance both of setting the Bible (biblical religion) in the context of the history of Judaism and Christianity (and today also Islam), and of making the history of Judaism and Christianity subject to biblical hermeneutics (consistent with Spinoza's concept of biblical interpretation). Then we shall possess the critical methodology by which to recognize that the very basis of Spinoza's rejection of fundamental Stoic principles presupposes (depends on!) Judaeo-Christian metaphysics when understood as rooted in the Bible, not in ancient philosophy.—Brayton Polka, *York University, Toronto*.

FRANCIS, Mark. *Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life*. xiv + 443 pp. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. Cloth, \$45.00—If the prolific nineteenth-century English intellectual Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) is remembered at all nowadays, it is as a prototypical "social Darwinist" who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest," and as the subject of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's remark, apropos of the Supreme Court's ruling certain state regulations of the economy unconstitutional, that the American Constitution "does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*."

Mark Francis, in his extensively researched but often repetitive "intellectual biography" of Spencer, seeks to challenge the conventional interpretation of Spencer's thought, denying that he was ever a libertarian or "individualist," and deprecating his late, anti-socialistic work *The Man "versus" the State* as a deviation from his typical thought, which was opposed to individualism no less than to collectivism. Curiously, however, Francis never endeavors to demonstrate that Spencer was in any way an inventor of "modern life," as his title suggests. (His only observations along these lines describe Spencer as "a precursor of the modern taste for self-doubt and alienation" and as having "had the altruism to bare his soul [in his *Autobiography*] for the good of succeeding generations," hardly a distinctive contribution, and that, obscurely, he "argu[ed] with Plato, Hobbes, and Rousseau as if they offered coherent, although misleading" political theories.) Indeed, in his conclusion Francis finds it difficult to identify any of Spencer's ideas that "could possibly be a useful legacy for the twenty-first century," or any aspect of his personality (characterized by "hypochondria" and "aesthetic absolutism") that remains worthy of emulation. Francis's account of Spencer's variegated, changing, and often idiosyncratic reflections as well as his personal eccentricities leaves the reader wondering, in the end, why Spencer is worth reconsidering—or why, therefore, Francis should have put so much work into this study.

The four parts of Francis's book address, in sequence, Spencer's personality (including his "longing for passion," his "problem with women," and other "eccentricities"); the "lost world" of his "metaphysics"; his biological writings and "philosophy of science"; and his writings on "politics and ethical sociology."

Spencer, as Francis describes him, was certainly a queer fish: "unable to experience love" out of fear that such a passion would "cause the re-emergence" of his father's "aggression towards women", able to sympathize only with the sufferings of far-off people, a hypochondriac who believed sex to be "debilitating" and unpleasant and was appalled by the modern "work ethic" and disdainful of social proprieties as "among the greatest" evils, and who wrote his *Autobiography* as "an act of expiation" to warn others against suffering his own unhappy fate.

According to Francis, the aim of Spencer's "philosophical system" as conceived in the 1850's was to develop "a new morality and metaphysics with which to replace both orthodox Christianity and materialistic positivism." Spencer espoused what was called "The New Reformation," whose central tenets were the rejection of rationalistic ethics and the worship of an "Unknown." At the same time he advanced a doctrine of the "moral sense" whose ultimate triumph would "make society harmonious and government unnecessary." Spencer first achieved fame with the publication of his *First Principles* in 1862, embodying the foundations of his metaphysical system, which made him "the purveyor of modern science" to "intellectual masses" abroad. He particularly prided himself on "protecting philosophy from the taint of German idealism"—even as he tried "to avoid discussing the absolute validity" of any system as distinguished from its "relative" truth. In the end, he hoped that "a science of psychology" could solve the metaphysical problem by "invent[ing] a living universe with personal meaning." Still, Spencer's philosophy, Francis judges, "always contained basic contradictions": three times he calls it "anodyne."

Although Spencer discussed evolution seven years before Darwin's *Origin of Species*, his biological writings, Francis emphasizes, were really "a theoretical enquiry about the meaning of life," not an empirically grounded science. Spencer lamented the existing "state of nature" as "morally intolerable," since "it included micro-organisms and parasites that lived at the expense of more highly developed organisms." Nature's "cruelty" eroded "his early faith" in its kindness, though he looked forward to a future in which no species would experience pleasure at others' expense. The nervous breakdown Spencer suffered at age 35, however, "soured his utopian dreams" of a world where "the greatest possible numbers of individuals existed without suffering the pangs of reproduction or death."

Francis's account of Spencer's political thought emphasizes his pacifism and anti-imperialism. His denial that Spencer was a social Darwinist seems unpersuasive, however, since all he means is that Spencer opposed military aggrandizement and acknowledged the need for laws to punish such crimes as fraud—and that he corrected the "racist message" of his writings on psychology from the 1860's in his later writings on sociology. While depicting Spencer as a "liberal," Francis observes that in his later writings he avoided viewing rights "as necessary for the

well-being of either individual citizens or the people as a whole," and avoided advocating the expansion of liberty, since (in Spencer's words) "the degree of liberty a people is capable of in any given age, is a fixed quantity." Francis stresses as well Spencer's "constant" "contempt" for people's "average intellect," his strong criticism (following his "democratic youth") of "popular control of politics," and his opposition to public education, which could only lead to the election of unqualified "working-class parliamentarians." Modern governance should be left to "skilled professional administrators," subject only to the supervision of politicians who were bound by "tradition." Nonetheless, Francis oddly maintains that Spencer's lack of "individualist and democratic qualities" made his version of "liberalism . . . all the more valuable."

The only sort of democracy that Spencer favored, according to Francis, was a "psychological" one such that future individuals would be "internally governed by a collective decision of their feelings," rather than subordinate them to the tyranny of reason—thereby enabling them to enjoy more pleasure. Because Spencer encouraged the popular tendency to pursue pleasure and resist the call of duty, Francis concludes that Spencer, despite his disparagement of political democracy, "spoke for the common man's hope for the future." To this reader, that conclusion, like much of Spencer's thought as Francis recounts it, seems unintelligible.—David Schaefer, *Holy Cross College*.

GULDMMANN, Rony. *Two Orientations Toward Human Nature*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007. 231 pp. Cloth, \$99.95.—Rony Guldmann makes the case that our culture has a bifurcated view of human nature that is manifested through at least two flawed orientations. The first orientation presumes that egoism is the most common motive for action. According to Guldmann, this presumption is reinforced by a cultural narrative that appeals to it to explain the condition of capitalism and individualism. This orientation thinks about action in terms of the bifurcation between egoism and altruism. The second orientation towards human nature rejects egoism as the locus of its analysis and instead refers to contrasts such as "wholeness vs. alienation" and "authenticity vs. inauthenticity." Guldmann makes the case that these are irreconcilable orientations and the result of incompatible models of human agency which must be reconceived.

Guldmann characterizes a "mundane version of egoism" as "a tough-minded" approach that acknowledges perpetual asymmetries between the desires and motivations that an agent wishes to act upon in social situations and the resistance to or revision of those actions posed by other individuals. This "tough-minded" approach is a pre-theoretical outlook that presumes a propensity to settle conflict in favor of one's own allegedly pre-social desires and motivations without any robust, normative basis for doing so. Guldmann presents "economic egoism" as the more theoretically-explicit version of mundane egoism. The latter

highlights a "tendency," whereas economic egoism presents more of a "hypothesis" about the condition and motivations of humans that this tendency presupposes (p. 32). Economic egoism treats "calculating acquisitiveness" as the motivation for just those asymmetries that the "tough-minded" individual recognizes and so provides an explanation for such actions: why we forego helping others when such "indiscriminate generosity" undercuts the most optimal acquisition strategy. Guldmann characterizes the limitations of conventional critics of egoism (the "official opposition"). They reject an egoistic psychology, while emphasizing the prevalence of social factors in the formation of our dispositions (p. 49). Guldmann contends that this is hardly an opposition to egoism, since it merely concerns itself with the empirical status of egoism—its extent and impact, rather than its conceptual status.

Guldmann makes the case for what he calls a "heroic" model of agency. Egoism amounts to a "digestive" model of agency where desire drives the consumption of and processing of goods that apparently support only "abstract purposes," such as pleasure, pride and power rather than the "releasing of its potential" (p. 79). The heroic model of agency is concerned with significance. Heroism is a "primitive phenomenon" where agents may find ennobling significance in the face of necessity. If there is a "goal of action" for the heroic model, it is to manifest a way of acting that is akin to a dramatic performer on stage. The simulation of those actions and the ideals they imply allows the person to more greatly identify with the character "one is playing at being" (p. 80). According to the heroic model of agency, persons are hard to distinguish from what they are invested in. There are no simply self-regarding impulses instincts to be sharply contrasted with other-regarding one's, but rather any number of beliefs, longings and projects in which persons invest themselves (p. 139). Self understanding is always connected with that which the person experiences as "heroically significant," and so, if one were to highlight a "self," it would always be understood in relation to the former (p. 139).

One may wonder whether Guldmann's critique of egoism doesn't also require him to provide a more formidable reconstruction of a suitable alternative, lest we slip into recapitulations of egoism or altruism. Consider the role of honor in Guldmann's contrast of Hobbes and Rousseau. If it is plausible that human beings might be wholly hedonistic in their drive for honor, albeit a drive for honor that, in actuality (as Guldmann rightly admits), could not be viably formed and sustained prior to social interaction, then why should we exclude the possibility that a need for honor or recognition is a part of the structure of human agency? This might be of special concern if a person's appreciation of heroic significance is grounded in a self-understanding that is necessarily connected with recognition and impossible to divest from its social context. For Rousseau, if "self-love" (*amour soi*) can be preserved *within* society without the intensification of "self-love misunderstood" (*amour propre*), then self-love remains competitive. According to Rousseau, preserving the integrity of my self-love requires that others love me *more* than they love themselves. While Guldmann sees Rousseau as a promising source for an alternative to the digestive model of agency, it looks like the achievement of authenticity can easily slip into a struggle for

recognition that is as self-regarding as in standard samples of the “digestive model.” Guldmann tries to vindicate Rousseau’s anthropology by separating it from his account of the state of nature, and so avoid the objections that stem from it. While there are considerable objections to Rousseau’s view of the state of nature and its role in his theory, Guldmann’s new and improved Rousseau further complicates its value as a viable alternative to the digestive model, as it seems to reinforce the necessity and magnitude of our “social fallenness” and the intractability of recognition in society.

At any rate, it would be helpful for Guldmann to spell out in more detail the conceptual features of the heroic theory of agency and how it might avoid the mistakes and limitations of egoism, altruism and their misleading, misconceived dichotomy. Of course, Guldmann advances a thesis that is very broad—both in its historical and contemporary aspirations. To fully develop it would require a level of substantiation that would be difficult to achieve in a single book. Still, Guldmann does an impressive job pulling together a considerable range of historical and contemporary reflection into a well-crafted, synthetically-rich and engaging tour of human nature.—Ronald Weed, *Tyndale University College, Toronto*.

LORENZ, Hendrik. *The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 229 pp. Cloth, \$74.00—The concept of motivation is as troublesome in philosophy as in psychology, and this is for a variety of reasons. At the level of explanation, accounts of the manner in which desires bring about satisfaction by way of physical activity are less than convincing. In more innocent times, the theory was that desires arise from tissue-needs and that states of satiety at the phenomenological level reflect some sort of homeostatic state at the level of physiology. How troublesome, then, when non-nutritive substances such as saccharine were entirely effective in reducing the “drives” allegedly arising from nutritional deficits. Long before rats sped down runways for sugar or for saccharine, ancient philosophy tested various theories regarding the sources of our actions and the extent to which rational and non-rational factors were causally effective. The most influential efforts along these lines were, of course, those of Plato and Aristotle. Hendrik Lorenz undertakes in this work an analysis and a fresh interpretation of their theories and, in the process, expresses reservations regarding what he reasonably casts as the standard view.

Perhaps the earliest consideration of the difference between first-order and second-order desires is recorded by Socrates in *Republic*. He recounts the story of Leontius at once desiring to see but also to avoid seeing the dead victims of executions, only then to condemn his eyes for looking: “Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight” (440e). Lorenz offers this and similar examples to make clear that conflict at the

level of desire is not simply a conflict between attraction and repulsion, but a conflict arising from finding oneself thus conflicted! On some accounts, the Platonic position thus requires more than the soul's tripartite composition (reason, desire, spirit), for now there are second-order desires presumably operating beyond the ambit of first-order desires, etc. It is precisely on such grounds that Aristotle famously avoids notions about "parts" of souls, insisting that explanations should be at the molar level of the acting person. How, then, should Aristotle and Plato be understood at this fundamental level, this most basic of ontological questions regarding human psychology and motivation?

Lorenz argues that the simple picture long drawn to reveal Plato's theory is in need of enrichment. It is clear from Plato's own examples that the appetites operate at the lower levels of psychic composition, but that their satisfaction requires some capacity for means-ends reasoning or problem-solving. This immediately suggests the intervention of the soul's rational powers, but there are simply too many instances in which the relationship between appetite and its satisfaction seem to bypass any such intervention. It is Lorenz's position that, properly interpreted, the Platonic account actually includes non-rational cognitive resources that operate at the level of appetite.

Lorenz recognizes that positions he is at pains to defend include a central one actually rejected by Plato, viz., that non-rational parts of the soul are capable of sustaining beliefs. Specifically, Lorenz advocates—and Socrates rejects—the functions of appetite as including belief. To make his case, Lorenz points to the less than consistent position on this found in different dialogues. Where *Timaeus* and *Theaetetus* rule out such functions, *Republic* seems to be more accommodating. Even in *Timaeus* the theory is seen to be problematic by Timaeus himself. Calling it *Timaeus'* problem (p. 57), Lorenz notes that the account has reason somehow influencing the appetite which on this very account must be utterly uncomprehending of the very point of the influence.

Timaeus, coming after *Republic*, is understood by Lorenz as reassessing the nature of belief and then reserving it to the non-appetitive rational powers of judgment, measurement, etc. What, then, is the dividing line between *Timaeus* and *Republic*? There is indeed evidence enough in *Republic* of the acceptance of non-rational grounds of belief. More than this, the "non-rational soul parts", as Lorenz dubs them, receive and retain sensory appearances and serve as centers of motivation essential to effective dealing with information from the environment. Thus, it is not reason that becomes divided against itself in states of conflict, but two divisions of the soul, the rational and all that comprises the non-rational, including appetite and desire. Supporting the overall reading Lorenz offers a close account of Socrates on the dangers of imitative poetry in *Republic*. The process is winding but sure: Sensory impressions are revived and included in (rational) thoughts about the prospects awaiting a given course of action. Timaeus makes clear that the appetitive part of the soul is particularly sensitive to images and appearances. Thus, the gap between and among the dialogues narrows on this point, the advantage going to the more developed conception found in

Timaeus. With images and appearances there arises imagination, and it is this that permits Lorenz to construct a conceptual bridge to Aristotle, by way of *phantasia*.

As something of a *pax philosophica* this book offers a guide to reconciliation between the conflicting positions of Plato and Aristotle on the soul. Lorenz's interpretations will not satisfy all and surely will strike some as overdrawn. Nonetheless, they arouse further and even deeper thoughts about the progress made long before "cognitive neuroscience" in attempts to account for the grounding of desire and the interplay between it and our rational aspirations.—Daniel N. Robinson, *Oxford University*.

KEYS, Mary M. *Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. xiii + 255 pp. Cloth, \$70.00—The relation between St. Thomas Aquinas and the pagan philosopher Aristotle is a subject of endless debate for scholars. It is also of vital interest to contemporary citizens and political theorists because the "common good" is central to Aquinas' and Aristotle's conception of a just society, yet it is not addressed adequately by modern liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, or by communitarianism, with its emphasis on collective goods. As Mary Keys ably demonstrates, we can benefit from re-examining Aquinas and Aristotle on the common good, although she admits that they too are not quite satisfying, and the common good remains a necessary but elusive idea for politics.

The specific agenda of Keys' book is to accomplish three goals: to show the superiority of Aristotle and Aquinas to contemporary political theorists on the issue of the common good (Part I); to show that Aquinas improved upon and corrected Aristotle by developing a natural law foundation for the common good (Parts II and III); and, finally, to show that even Aquinas' view of the common good is deficient because he committed "excesses" in advocating the punishment of heretics by the state (Part IV, especially chapter nine). The book is therefore a work of advocacy for classical and Christian thought as well as a painstaking analysis of Aquinas' commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* and a critique of Aquinas.

The first part goes down easily since the contemporary political theorists discussed by Keys—John Rawls, Michael Sandel, and William Galston—recognize the need for the common good but cannot quite explain or justify it. Keys shows that they defend shared goods in equalizing wealth or shared values for character formation in a liberal democratic society; but they cannot find the right balance between the individual and the community, and they lack a substantive theory of the human good that is grounded in human nature. A fresh look at classical and Christian thinkers is therefore warranted.

Keys turns to Aristotle and Aquinas in parts two and three, and argues that they are better able to explain and defend the common good. She reduces Aristotle's conception of politics to three foundations: the naturalness of the *polis*, the variety of political regimes, and the articulation of the best regime. She argues that Aristotle tends to treat the common good as varying with the idea of justice in each regime, even though he says the best regime according to nature requires a virtuous elite to rule on behalf of the whole community and to inculcate virtue through moral education. Aquinas largely accepted the Aristotelian view, Keys continues, but he modified it in his commentaries on Aristotle in order to improve upon and correct Aristotle. In making this claim, Keys disputes Harry Jaffa's interpretation that Aquinas distorted Aristotle by imputing Christian ideas to the pagan philosopher (112–13; 166–67). In her view, Aquinas was deliberately correcting the deficiencies of Aristotelian natural right for being changeable, weak, or relative to the regime. Aquinas replaced natural right with natural law—a new foundation that emphasized “the natural inclination to virtue” and a more universal view of justice as the basis of the common good. Keys supports her interpretation with a nice quote from Aquinas' *Commentary on Boethius*, where Aquinas says he is not watering down the Gospel by employing pagan philosophers but “changing water into wine”—that is, transforming and improving them (quoted 165). Following this logic, Keys shows how Aquinas intentionally supplements pagan moral virtue with Christian virtues, including a re-interpretation of magnanimity that adds elements of gratitude, charity, and humility (172). Whether Keys finds Aquinas convincing on this point is hard to tell, but she definitely favors the Thomistic version of the common good because it is more universal and less relative to the regime than Aristotle's view. For her, the common good includes classical virtues as well as some Christian virtues such as gratitude and piety, which she illustrates with the American example of national holidays like Thanksgiving, which Lincoln established in 1863 as “a day of thanksgiving and prayer to our beneficent father” in order to inculcate piety and gratitude to God for America's blessings, as well as repentance for national sins and mercy for war victims (222).

The fourth part of the book is the most interesting because Keys is forced to wrestle with the implications of Aquinas' correction of Aristotle—namely, the requirement to protect the Christian faith from corruption by heretics and apostates. Keys thinks that Aquinas is inconsistent on this point, since he has a fairly modest view of the state's ability to impose virtue. She concludes that Aquinas was misled by personal anger or indignation against heretics and should have shown more respect for the “human subject of faith” (263)—a nod by Keys toward contemporary Catholic personalism which defends the rights and dignity of the human person in matters of religious conscience. According to Keys, then, the best formula for the common good combines Aristotle, Aquinas, and certain elements of liberalism, at least in so far as Catholic teaching about the human person requires the right of conscience in the community of shared goods and virtues. Whether this is a stable synthesis is the subject of another book.—Robert Kraynak, *Colgate University*.

MACINTYRE, Alasdair. *The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Volume 1*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 244 pp. Cloth, \$70.00; *Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, Volume 2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 252 pp. Cloth, \$70.00—The twenty-two essays and lectures in these two volumes are a fine distillation of Alasdair MacIntyre's mature work, and include his most important brief contributions since *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, published in 1970, some of which are essential to a full understanding of *After Virtue* and the work that followed it. Helpful prefaces explain the origins of each essay and place them in the broader picture of MacIntyre's career. These are not just collections: intentional outlines unify both volumes, so they also read coherently as books. This review will summarize all twenty-two essays and offer a few remarks about the importance of the most notable pieces.

Volume I, *The Tasks of Philosophy*, begins with "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," a truly pivotal work, which, MacIntyre notes, "marks a major turning-point in my thinking during the 1970s" (*Tasks of Philosophy*, vii). MacIntyre uses the concepts of epistemological crisis and dramatic narrative to elucidate problems in Thomas Kuhn's and Imre Lakatos's approaches to the philosophy of science. Treating theory as a kind of narrative that must, like other forms of narrative, be rooted in the tradition of a community, MacIntyre reasserts the role of tradition in the philosophy of science and in philosophy generally. This essay establishes the philosophical methodology of Alasdair MacIntyre's mature work.

The next two essays focus on the problem of relativism. "Colors, Cultures, and Practices" revisits the meaning of "practice" from *After Virtue*. MacIntyre shows that the work of seeing and distinguishing colors constitutes a culturally bound practice, and that this practice can develop toward a more adequate ability to see and distinguish the objective colors of our world. "Colors, Cultures, and Practices" is a remarkably lucid illustration of MacIntyre's account of tradition, relativism, and truth. "Relativism, Truth, and Justification" lays out the incoherence of relativism, both epistemological and moral, showing the dependence of both upon a non-relativist conception of truth. It outlines the requirements for the kind of enquiry that can allow some people to overcome tradition-dependent local standards of rationality and to make real progress toward a more adequate grasp of the world. It also concedes the inability of those who are not so engaged to recognize such progress. "Relativism, Truth, and Justification" ranks near "Epistemological Crises" among the most important essays in this collection, because it presents MacIntyre's position on relativism with a brevity, precision, and focus that *After Virtue* and its two successor texts had not quite achieved.

MacIntyre moves from the method of philosophy to its subject with two essays on the free human agent. In "Hegel on Faces and Skulls," MacIntyre shows that Hegel's rejection of attempts to reduce the study of human character to studies of faces and skulls also applies to more recent reductive "would be sciences." The previously unpublished "What is a Human Body?" explores the unity of the person as an

embodied mind, illustrating the shortcomings both of dualism and of materialistic monism, in order to establish a new starting point for philosophical anthropology.

MacIntyre rounds out the section "Defining a Philosophical Stance" by considering the place of academic moral philosophy in the contemporary world. In "Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Social Practice: What Holds Them Apart?" MacIntyre investigates the failure of contemporary analytic moral philosophy to inform or affect social practice.

The second part of *The Tasks of Philosophy* groups four Thomistic essays under the heading "The Ends of Philosophical Enquiry." Many readers of MacIntyre's major works have questioned MacIntyre's commitment to Thomism, since his books seem to give more support to historicism than to metaphysics. The four essays in this section should serve to answer these questions.

"The Ends of Life, the Ends of Philosophical Writing," considers the relationship between the real questions of life and the practice of philosophical writing and reading. MacIntyre contrasts authors whose books draw their readers away from their questions about life into an engagement only with the text, with authors whose books tend to return their readers to their questions. One characteristic that MacIntyre finds in the writings of both Aquinas and Mill (two authors who return their readers to their questions) is that both are willing to subordinate "the technical or semitechnical treatment" of issues they take to be of central importance, "the nature of truth, of good, of rational justification, and of meaning" to "the purposes of the conversation" (*Tasks*, 131). MacIntyre likewise subordinates the technical treatment of these metaphysical issues to the purposes of his writings, without taking these issues any less seriously.

One place where MacIntyre does treat metaphysics explicitly is in "First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues." This is another of the most important essays in this collection. "First Principles" has been called "the hidden key to an adequate understanding of MacIntyre's philosophy" (Kent Reames, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy: The Centrality of the 1990 Aquinas Lecture to MacIntyre's Argument for Thomism," *The Thomist* 62 [1998]: 419–443; 420). Here MacIntyre distinguishes the Cartesian propositional notion of a first principle, from the Aristotelian substantial notion of a first principle (*arché/principium*). He calls Cartesian first principles "mythological beasts" (*Tasks*, 143), but defends Aristotelian and Thomistic first principles, along with the Thomistic metaphysics of truth and knowledge. This distinction allows MacIntyre to defend his respect for "the situatedness of all enquiry" (what is often characterized as historicism) even as he defends Thomism against the anti-metaphysical and anti-teleological criticisms of modern and post-modern authors (see Alasdair MacIntyre, "Prologue: *After Virtue* after a Quarter of a Century" in *After Virtue* 3rd ed. [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007], xii).

The last two essays in volume 1 explore the philosophical implications of John Paul II's encyclical *Fides et Ratio*. "Philosophy Recalled to Its Tasks" explores John Paul's condemnation of relativism and historicism, defending Thomistic realism and its recognition of the possibility of error against modern and post-modern nominalism and

pragmatism. MacIntyre also makes some brief remarks about the implications of realism and nominalism for human moral and social formation. "Truth as a Good" explores what it means to take truth as the goal of enquiry.

Volume 2, *Ethics and Politics*, presents twelve essays on moral and political philosophy. In the first two essays, "Rival Aristotles: Aristotle against some Renaissance Aristotelians" and "Aristotle against some Modern Aristotelians," MacIntyre shows how the contemporary presuppositions of some renaissance and modern commentators on Aristotle have shaped their interpretations. These essays explore the problem of reading ancient texts, and illustrate the difficulty of setting aside one's own presuppositions to grasp an author's meaning without imposing one's own.

"Natural Law as Subversive: The Case of Aquinas" continues on the theme of the situatedness of all enquiry by placing Thomas Aquinas in his own political and social milieu and developing an interpretation of Thomistic natural law from a reading of the text in this setting.

"Aquinas and the Extent of Moral Disagreement" addresses a crucial topic for anyone who would defend the universal availability of an objective natural law. If Thomas Aquinas were committed to the view that everyone knows the natural law, then our experience of moral disagreement would seem to indicate that those commitments were mistaken (*Ethics and Politics*, 69). In this essay, MacIntyre argues that Aquinas's accounts of shared deliberation and natural law leave ample room for moral disagreement, including disagreement born of error (MacIntyre also addresses this in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, pp. 330–331).

"Moral Dilemmas," marks another key moment in MacIntyre's career; he writes in the preface: "In it I conclude . . . that Aquinas was right in holding that moral dilemmas do indeed occur, but only as the result of some prior action that was itself a violation of some precept of the natural law" (*Ethics and Politics*, ix). This essay, arguably reverses the position that MacIntyre took in *After Virtue*, in which his denial of the unity of virtue (AV, 178–80) made it possible for him to propose that virtue could serve injustice (AV, 163, 223–25), that practices could be evil (AV, 199–201) and that tragic moral dilemmas need not presuppose any fault (AV, 196–97). I have argued in *Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre* (pp. 98–102) that MacIntyre's acceptance of the unity of virtue, stated in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (in the preface, p. x) and worked out here in detail, makes it possible to supplement *After Virtue* in a way that closes this path to relativism.

Two remarkable essays on the morality of truth telling and lying complete part 2, "Truthfulness and Lies: What is the Problem and What Can We Learn from Mill?" and "What Can We Learn from Kant?" The first essay introduces an apparent dilemma: We teach our children that it is wrong to lie, but there are times when it is permissible to mislead, and—according to some—even to mislead by lying. How are we to understand the issues involved in this dilemma? From Mill we learn, surprisingly perhaps, the extraordinary social importance of truth; from Kant we learn the exceptionless character of genuine moral rules. Drawing together the lessons of Mill and Kant, MacIntyre seeks an exceptionless

principle that proscribes ordinary lies while prescribing certain exceptional lies. He finds this principle—and with it a way to begin to integrate two apparently contrary Christian traditions concerning lying—in a morality of social relationships.

The final section of volume 2, “The Politics of Ethics” gives a suitable name to the application of a morality of social relationships. In “Three Perspectives on Marxism: 1953, 1968, 1995,” the preface to the 1995 edition of *Marxism and Christianity*, MacIntyre traces the history of his interest in Marxism, his critique of the free market, his rejection of political liberalism, his understanding of philosophy as a practice, the relationship between theology and philosophy, and his commitment to the politics of local participatory communities.

“Poetry as Political Philosophy: Notes on Burke and Yeats” considers a question about the truth of images presented in poetry by exploring deception and self-deception in the political poetry of two men: Edmund Burke and W. B. Yeats. This interesting essay is the source of MacIntyre’s remark that being asked to die for the modern nation state “would be like being asked to die for the phone company” (163, compare to *Dependent Rational Animals*, 132–133).

In “Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered,” MacIntyre assesses the failure of the Enlightenment project by its own standards (172). The two central tasks of that project were (1) to adopt universal reason in order (2) to discover the universal rules of morality, with the expectation that this would lead to the development of ideal social structures in which liberated individuals could participate in common deliberation and self-government. Instead, pervasive disagreements about the rules of morality have undermined faith in universal reason, and the social structures created in an effort to liberate the individual have instead yielded new forms of oppression.

“Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency” explores the influence of social roles in restricting agents’ knowledge of and responsibility for the acts they perform as inhabitants of their various social roles. This might be taken as a response to critics, like Thomas Nagel, who claim that choosing to engage in ethical enquiry within a tradition entails uncritical adherence to the social structures and moral claims of that tradition. After considering the “case of J” and the problem of “compartmentalization” in late modern societies, MacIntyre returns the focus of morality to human excellence, and concludes that moral agency and responsibility remain when agents make conscious efforts not to question and not to know what human excellence demands that they know and act upon. This is a challenging essay to anyone interested in the primacy of conscience for two reasons. First, it sharpens the demands of appeals to conscience by showing that many facile appeals to conscience and ignorance hold little water. Second, it calls into question the extent to which cultural malformation can excuse moral error.

The final essay, “Toleration and the Goods of Conflict” asks “When ought we to be intolerant and why?” (*Ethics and Politics*, 205) and explores the significance of this question, gleaning some valuable insights from Locke and Mill. Here, perhaps more clearly than in any previous text, MacIntyre explains his focus on local communities, and tells us why local communities must be the locus for politics and why they must

be safeguarded, even, at times, by intolerance (*Ethics and Politics*, 223). He concludes that toleration and intolerance alike are exercises of virtue when and in so far as they enable us to pursue and achieve "certain individual and communal goods" (*Ethics and Politics*, 223). MacIntyre ends by identifying the challenge to shared rational deliberation posed by the contemporary political and commercial culture and its mass media.

These are two excellent books. Anyone who enjoys reading MacIntyre will find them refreshing. MacIntyre's critics should find them challenging. These judiciously chosen writings are necessary to complete the picture drawn by MacIntyre's major works, and thus constitute required reading for anyone who wants to do serious research on MacIntyre's philosophy.—Christopher Lutz, *St. Meinrad School of Theology*.

MANENT, Pierre. *Democracy without Nations? The Fate of Self-Government in Europe*. Trans. Paul Seaton. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007. xiv + 109 pp. Cloth, \$20.00—This slim volume may be read as an extended meditation on the condition of Europe, that is, on the nature of democracy and the importance of national identity as the old nations of Europe are increasingly absorbed into the amorphous and ever-expanding European Union. Manent asks if democracy can exist apart from a national context. By "nation" he means a political body, not an expression of particularity, that is, a region, territory, or distinctive culture. The nation, Manent maintains, is the irreplaceable political context for human action, the instrument of self-government, the locus for deliberation and the administration of justice. Democracy requires that the population consent to the political structure proposed to it. "Not too long ago, the democratic idea justified and nourished the love each people had naturally for itself. But now in the name of democracy and openness to the other, that love is criticized and mocked."

Manent fears that Europe is on the verge of self-destruction. The democratic nation, he believes, has been lost in Europe, the very place where it first appeared. "Europe's political contrivances," he writes, "have become more and more artificial. With each day they recede further from the natural desires and movements of their citizens' souls." The United States, he thinks, remains a genuine nation-state, but European countries are no longer sovereign, nor do they aspire to retain their identity. European nations are caught between their old identity and that of the new European Union. After Maastricht, the EU's bureaucratic contrivance detached itself from the national political bodies that formed the Union. The artifice took on a life of its own. "Europe" crystallized as an *idea* endowed with legitimacy, suppressing all others, and that idea became equipped and fortified with institutional mechanisms capable of reconstructing all aspects of European life. Instead of increasing self-governance, Europe's new instruments of governance shackle it more with each passing day, promising an indefinite

extension that no one wills and no one knows how to stop. "Embracing democratic 'values,' we (Europeans) have forgotten the meaning of democracy itself—its political meaning, which is self-government, the self-government of a people." Enlightened despotism has returned in the form of agencies, administrations, courts of justice, and commissions that lay down the law or create rules, ever more meticulously contrived. In creating an uncontrollable bureaucracy, Europe, in effect, has institutionalized the political paralysis of democracy.

Europe, Manent holds, does not understand that if it wants to think and act politically, it must first think and will a definite territorial arrangement, both within and beyond its borders. He writes, "The sovereign state is the necessary condition of the equality of conditions." It brings equality into being, the equality implied by the human condition. Sovereignty is not only challenged by Brussels, but threatened by the power of judges to elevate "rights claims" at the expense of legitimate political authority. Aided by a wayward and over-reaching judiciary, a few noisy litigious people have the ability to block government actions that are in the interest of everyone else. Often in the wake of judicial decision, the state is compelled to protect the criminal against the person it could not protect.

In Manent's judgment, Europe's governing classes, without explicitly saying so, aspire to create a homogeneous and limitless human world. In fact, given its intellectual climate, what distinguishes Europeans from one another cannot be evaluated or even publicly named. The effort to outlaw and stamp out any and all discrimination in society, Manent believes, is not only causing Europe to depart from its original liberal impetus but is leading to the destruction of the state itself. The European value that seems to comprehend all others is "openness to the other," a universalism without limits. "We do not possess any particular existence," Manent writes, "we do not want to possess any shape or manner or form a distinctive existence of our own, one that would necessarily be particular." *Universal humanity*, he finds, "tends to overwhelm differences so much so that it sometimes seems that between the individual and the world . . . nothing intrudes except perhaps a void where various ethnic, religious, and sexual identities flood, each demanding respect".

In passing, Manent offers reflections on the war in the Middle East, on Israel, on Islam, and on the role of Christianity in Europe. Civilizations, he reminds his reader, do not make war; political bodies do. To parry the threat of self-destruction, Manent is convinced that "nothing is more important than to get a grip on our centuries-old development. And that means first of all we must again become fully aware of the original Christian character of our nations." He is insistent that this claim is not a call to roll back the secular state: "The neutral state and Christianity go hand in hand."

While *La raison des nations: reflexions sur la democratie en Europe* was written with that continent in mind, Manent's reflections possess trans-Atlantic value as the United States itself seems to be undergoing an identity crisis.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

McADAMS, James A., ed. *The Crisis of Modern Times: Perspectives from The Review of Politics, 1939–1962*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. xiii + 444 pp. Cloth, \$75.00; paper, \$35.00—No short review can do this volume justice. All one can do is to call attention to an exceptional collection of essays from the University of Notre Dame's *Review of Politics*, essays that were published in the journal from 1939 to 1962. Quite apart from the essays themselves the names alone of the authors selected are apt to awe the reader. In his introduction, McAdams complains of the labor involved in culling the magazine for the present volume but promises other collections organized along different themes. Almost any one of the essays selected is worth the price of the volume. Among the authors included are Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Aron Gurwitsch, Josef Pieper, Denis de Rougemont, Louis de Raeymaeker, Russell Kirk, John U. Nef, and Eric Voegelin. Maritain is represented by four selections, including his influential essay, "Integral Humanism and the Crisis of Modern Times," Arendt by two, and Nef by three. Readers may be chilled by the contemporary relevance of de Rougemont's essay, "Passion and the Origin of Hitlerism." Few will fail to recognize de Rougemont's description of the political office seeker, who, in addressing a mass audience, plays upon emotion and studiously avoids intellectual argument, preferring instead to present his audience with "an affective *fait accompli*." Speaking of the naiveté of the European leaders of his time, de Rougemont notes that they persist in believing that they can come to terms with those who wish them ill, with those whose fanatical hatred of Western values and commitments is not likely to be altered by compromise.

The Simon selection, "Common Good and Common Action," is ever timely. There is an interesting exchange between Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt on her 1951 work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Also included is Carl J. Friedrich's, "The Deification of the State," a learned essay that includes discussions of Aristotelian, Roman, and Thomistic theories on the nature and function of the state. Friedrich early on saw the danger of National Socialism and, upon emigrating to the United States from Germany, accepted appointment to the faculty of Harvard in 1926. After the war he was actively involved in the German reconstruction effort and contributed to the composition of the new German constitution.

To find these remarkable essays within the pages of a single journal is no doubt due to the vision of its founding editor, Waldemar Gurian, and his steadfast successors, Fred Crosson, Donald Kommers, Walter Nicgorski and the present editor, Catherine Zuckert. During its early years, under the editorship of Gurian, the *Review* focused on current events, the threat of Hitlerism and Stalinism, and the prospect of a democratic peace in Europe. Gurian consciously set out to make the education of democratic leaders the journal's primary objective.

McAdams is to be lauded not only for the selection of these essays but for his admirable introductory essay that for its insight and judgment establishes him as a peer with the authors presented. Reminiscent of de Rougemont's 1941 essay, McAdams poignantly asks, "Are democratic leaders sufficiently committed to defending the ideals and values on

which their societies are based? Or in times of uncertainty, is their belief in the rightness of their views so tenuous that they continually fall prey to pragmatic and utilitarian solutions to problems that are deeper than they appear on the surface?" Gurian's founding ambition remains ever relevant.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

MURPHY, Nancey, and W. R. STOEGER, S.J. *Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xii + 378 pp. Cloth, \$110.00—Divided into sections on philosophy, science, and theology, the anthology consists of an introduction and postscript by the editors, plus fourteen articles devoted to examinations of top-down causation and reductionism, particularly as seen through the prism of recent developments in complexity theory.

Part I is devoted to the philosophical problems concerning the possibility of reduction of emergent properties of natural phenomena. After categorizing various forms of reductionism, Nancey Murphy argues that the emergentist thesis rests on a defeat of causal reductionism and that the tangled recurrent properties of complex dynamical systems provide a way of understanding top-down causation in terms of the context-sensitive constraints in systems. Robert Van Gulick's contributions consist of edited versions of two previously published articles that are considered by many to be classics in the field: in the first, which includes a fairly exhaustive overview of the emergence/reduction debate, Van Gulick maintains that lacking a clear-cut account of how higher-order properties can do causal work without overriding lower level laws, non-reductive pluralism, which pairs an acceptance of epistemic emergence with a realization or composition version of ontological reduction, might at present be the most reasonable option. In his second contribution Van Gulick attempts to "expose the pretension of what he calls "the specialness of the physical" by showing that insofar as higher order, natural physical patterns exert causal efficacy by the selective activation of physical powers, a form of downward causation is at work even at the physical level. Terrence Deacon's piece closes the first section with a definition of three categories of emergence: evolutionary, self-organizing, and supervenient emergence, each of which is composed of relationships between the lower order ones and characterized by its own configurational causality.

George Ellis's article is in a philosophical vein, despite being included in the science section. In it he describes the different ways in which downward causation occurs in the various physical sciences, and concludes that if, as he maintains, the real is the causal, then "four worlds" can be identified: the physical, the conscious, the world of physical and biological possibilities, and finally the realm of Platonic ideas. The remaining articles in the section are more directly about scientific issues. Don Howard discusses the phenomenon of quantum entanglement and argues that it is the best example of what he calls "S-emergence," where

the higher level structure is not determined by the lower level. Martinez Hewlett outlines various experiments and theories concerning both the emergence of life from non-life, and the complexification of life itself, and Alwyn Scott provides brief introductions to the topics of nonlinearity and reductionism as they pertain to questions about causality and the nature of time, and their implications for the ontological status of emergence in the "cognitive hierarchy." Our recent understanding of the operation of "order parameters" in nonlinear dynamic hierarchy could provide conceptual insights into the role meaningful information plays in specification hierarchies, Scott suggests.

William Stoeger opens the section on theology with an exploration of the role allowed for divine action, theology of nature and anthropology by our current understanding of reduction and emergence. Next, John Haught draws on the writings of Whitehead, Polanyi, Tillich, de Chardin, and others to claim that because the analytical methods with which modern science attempts to understand emergence leave out life and subjectivity; a reversal of this vision is called for. In contrast to Haught, Arthur Peacocke suggests that within a panentheistic perspective, our understanding of God's interaction with the world might be better conceptualized on the analogy of the whole-part causal influence displayed in complex systems. Niels Henrik Gregersen and Philip Clayton round out the volume. The former welcomes the implications of Artificial Life research by proposing that triad of matter, energy and information might become a rich metaphorical analogue for the Trinity. The latter offers a modest process theology that limits "emergence" to the gradual manifestation of certain aspects of the agency of a pre-existing God.—Alicia Juarrero, *Prince George's Community College*.

OLSON, Kevin. *Reflexive Democracy: Political Equality and the Welfare State*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. xii + 249 pp. Cloth, \$35.00—The author is a political scientist who seeks to provide sophisticated (or, in one of his favorite words, "elegant") arguments to justify public policies that are perennially suspect in the eyes of perhaps most of the citizenry. Almost immediately, however, he executes a "political turn" in which economics gets lost. Perhaps not surprisingly, it turns out that women, apparently no matter how affluent they might be, are those with the best claim to the kind of welfare the author advocates, the best example being Justice William O. Douglas's discovery of the "right to privacy" (contraception and abortion) in the Constitution. Among other things the book again demonstrates that in liberal circles gender always trumps other issues, including poverty and race. Despite the author's dependency on Jurgen Habermas, he makes no systematic effort to justify his own assumptions, which are the familiar ones of contemporary liberal academia, while those same ventures into philosophy, oddly for a political scientist, remove all historical and empirical considerations from the issue. "Equality" and "welfare"—however vaguely

understood—are treated as self-evident goods, and the author does not find it necessary to examine what effects welfare programs actually have on society and the individual. Characteristically but again unsurprisingly, he makes not the barest nod to the undeniable fact that much of the economic and political “inequality” that he deplores is directly traceable to the breakdown of the family, a breakdown that in turn is traceable to the very welfare programs that he apparently wishes to justify.—James Hitchcock, *St. Louis University*.

O'SHEA, James R. *Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn*. Key Contemporary Thinkers series. Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007. xii + 256 pp. Cloth, \$64.95; paper, \$24.95—Books about Wilfrid Sellars's complex and systematic philosophy are beginning to multiply, as befits a thinker of his stature. James O'Shea's *Wilfrid Sellars* is a very welcome addition to the field. O'Shea explicitly states that the target audience for his book is “upper level undergraduate students” and that readability was a major priority for him. He succeeds admirably in writing a book that will be intelligible and helpful to (relative) beginners in philosophy while still containing much of value to seasoned practitioners in the field. O'Shea consciously stresses the architectonic principles that inform Sellars's philosophy. O'Shea repeatedly brings to the fore Sellars's distinction between the Manifest and the Scientific Images of man-in-the-world and how their dynamic relation organizes Sellars's treatment of issues in metaphysics and epistemology. Again, O'Shea returns several times to Sellars's conception of humans as *sensing, thinking, and willing* beings, and the organization induced in his philosophy by that trio of human capacities. Finally, O'Shea stresses how Sellars's “*norm/nature* meta-principle” (that “Espousal of principles is reflected in uniformities of performance”) supplies an underlying structural theme in Sellars's attempt to place man in nature.

O'Shea begins with the clash between the Manifest and Scientific Images, which informs Sellars's conception of the task facing philosophy today. This leads him to probe Sellars's philosophy of science, especially his scientific realism. Then O'Shea identifies the concepts of *thought* and *intentionality* as the linchpin notions in the Manifest Image: “So, given the scientific realist image of the human being as ‘a complex physical system’ . . . , how . . . do we find a place in nature for . . . conceptual thought?” (p. 48). Many philosophers have attempted to understand intentionality as a relation to objects, perhaps concrete, perhaps abstract. Sellars uses language as a model in his theory of thinking and resolutely denies that either linguistic meaning or the intentionality of thought is relational in form. O'Shea formulates Sellars's functional role theory of meaning and intentionality clearly, including a discussion of the nominalism that complements Sellars's naturalism. O'Shea then moves on to a discussion of the epistemology and metaphysics of mind that Sellars develops on the basis of his theory of intentionality.

Reversing the order of exposition in Sellars's classic "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," O'Shea discusses first Sellars's seminal idea that our conception of and access to the mental is like that afforded by a theory that utilizes a publicly accessible phenomenon (in this case, language use) as the model for an explanation of some unobservable domain. Then O'Shea considers in some detail the epistemology that arises out of Sellars's arguments, especially his critique of the myth of the given. These epistemological issues lead him to consider the role of sense impressions in our cognitive encounter with the world—an area in which Sellarsian thought is at its most complex and subtle. O'Shea meets these issues head-on with one of the clearer discussions of Sellars on truth and picturing that I have seen. The book rounds off with a return to the clash between the Manifest and Scientific Images and Sellars's attempt to formulate a synoptic vision, which O'Shea calls Sellars's "Naturalism with a Normative Turn." The central elements of that view are: (1) the idea that nature is ultimately one interconnected, law-governed, causal network in which humans are complex systems of ontologically more basic entities, (2) though humans and their behaviors are "causally reducible" to complexes of whatever ultimate elements science tells us compose the world, nonetheless, (3) there is no possible logical or conceptual reduction of the norm-rich framework of persons as rule-governed strivers capable of right and wrong in perception, thought, and action. Humans are complex patterns of the ultimate physical entities that nonetheless have a right to use normative concepts.

It is interesting to compare O'Shea's *Wilfrid Sellars* with the like-titled *Wilfrid Sellars* recently published by Acumen/McGill-Queens University Press (open admission: the one I wrote). DeVries's book is longer and more detailed, but can be difficult and technical at times; O'Shea is more economical with his prose and will be easier to digest for most readers. There seems to be no fundamental disagreement between the two books and little significant disagreement even about the details, though the two do seem to envision the final synoptic unification of the Manifest and Scientific Images differently. Students trying to crack Sellars will probably want to start with the O'Shea, then move to DeVries, and, if their eyeballs haven't dried up, then go on to Jay Rosenberg's new *Wilfrid Sellars: Fusing the Images*.

Until now, Sellars devotees have been relatively few in number because of the intense effort it takes to see the unity and the articulation of Sellars's diverse and diffuse corpus. Books like O'Shea's provide an overview and a point of entry into Sellarsian thought that will, hopefully, make this seminal and original thinker a familiar dialectical interlocutor in the ongoing conversation that is philosophy.—Willem A. DeVries, *University of New Hampshire*.

RAWLS, John. *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*. Edited by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-

versity Press, 2007. xix + 476 pp. Cloth, \$35.00—The title of this book is misleading: the lectures are not on the history of political philosophy (nothing is said, for instance, about the ancients or medievals). Nor are they on the history of *modern* political philosophy (although modern authors are the only ones discussed). The lectures are much narrower. The course for which they were given was called *Modern Political Philosophy*, which would be an accurate enough title if the themes of Rawls' own *Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism* can count as the substance of such a course. What the lectures are about is the origins of *Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism*, as Rawls admits in several programmatic remarks (so it would have been nice if the editor had made the title do the same). Their express object is the thought of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Mill, Marx, Sidgwick, and Butler, but they do not give a general or overall account. If readers want that, says Rawls, they should look elsewhere. What he gives here is only how these authors "treat certain topics discussed in my own writings on political philosophy" (p. xvii).

It is, of course, not new that Rawls is working out of the Social Contract tradition which had its modern beginning in Hobbes. But that Hobbes' view of the selfishness of the natural man is an anticipation of *Theory of Justice's* primary goods or *Political Liberalism's* overlapping consensus, or that Locke's rejection of Filmer and Sidgwick's rational method of ethics are an anticipation of *Theory of Justice's* reflective equilibrium, or that Hume's judicious spectator is an anticipation of *Theory of Justice's* veil of ignorance, or that Rousseau's general will and Mill's principle of liberty are an anticipation of *Political Liberalism's* public reason, or that Mill's higher pleasures are an anticipation of *Theory of Justice's* priority of the right to the good, or that Marx's public economic planning is an anticipation of *Theory of Justice's* difference principle, or that Butler's conscience is an anticipation of *Theory of Justice's* sense of justice and its psychological satisfaction—all this came as a welcome surprise to me. It not only made Rawls' thinking and reasoning more transparent but also displayed how exceedingly fine and subtle a reader of others he could be.

I was not surprised, although I was disappointed, that in these lectures, as indeed throughout his work, Rawls has no serious discussion of, nor makes a serious attempt to grapple with, the great thinkers of the ancient and medieval worlds. The Hobbesian problematic, which is absolutely definitive for all modern political thinking, including that of Rawls (for although those who came after Hobbes often rejected his answers, they seldom rejected his way of posing the problem), was, if not decisively refuted, then decisively put into question by Plato's *Republic* (to say nothing of Augustine's *City of God*). Should not Rawls have somewhere raised the question of whether doing political philosophy according to this Hobbesian problematic was the right way to proceed? True, he does in these lectures raise criticisms against the authors he discusses, but the purpose, he says, is to examine the respects in which "we, from our point of view and concerned with our own questions or problems, do not find their answers or solutions altogether acceptable" (p. 104). A not unworthy aim, but a limited one—so limited, in fact, that one may wonder if Rawls has not thereby abandoned political

philosophy for political apologetics. The charge, indeed, that Rawls did thus abandon philosophy has often been leveled against him since he openly professed his aim to be 'political and not metaphysical'.

Actually I wonder whether he even got as far as being political. For while he here justifies the study of political philosophy because it is part of the "general background culture of a democratic society" and because certain "classic texts" are part of "public lore and a fund of society's basic political ideas" (p.3), and while he refers in this context to the *Declaration of Independence* and the *Gettysburg Address*, he never discusses, indeed he barely mentions, that text which really forms the "background culture", the "public lore", and the "basic ideas", whether political or otherwise, of our society. I mean, of course, the Bible, which is at least the subtext of both the *Declaration* and the *Address* and is the express text of a host of major political documents from the Founding Fathers on. No one who, like Rawls, professes to be concerned with the "background culture" or with "our questions and problems" can afford to ignore the Bible. That Rawls does so throughout his writings is a puzzling omission—an omission that these lectures do nothing to rectify.—Peter Simpson, *City University of New York*.

ROSENBLUM, Bruce and KUTTNER, Fred. *Quantum Enigma: Physics Encounters Consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 211 pp. Cloth, \$29.95—At the heart of the 'quantum enigma' lies the measurement problem. Put crudely, this runs as follows: the dynamics of quantum theory tells us that the state of a physical system is a superposition of possible states, yet when we make a measurement we always find the system in a definite state. What can explain this transition, or 'collapse' from a superposition to a definite state? Since the states of any further physical system that interacts with the system in question will themselves be incorporated by quantum mechanics into the superposition, it would appear that this transition cannot be accounted for in terms of physical interaction. Hence—again, putting things crudely—it was argued in the years immediately following the quantum revolution that the explanation had to be sought in the non-physical, namely consciousness.

Although often presented in popular discussions of quantum physics, this argument was demolished on philosophical grounds in the early 1960s, and physicists themselves have developed alternative responses to the problem, such as the Bohm interpretation and the infamous many worlds view. Recently, however, the possibility of delineating a role for consciousness has been raised again, and Rosenblum and Kuttner have hitched their horses to this revived bandwagon. Their book offers yet another popular account of the 'quantum enigma', in all its various guises: covering Bell's Theorem, the EPR 'paradox', the nature of

superpositions, the two-slit experiment and so on, all nicely leavened with the usual 'history-lite' and some cute pseudo-Galilean dialogues to help explain what's going on.

However, what they do not do is delineate and defend an appropriate role for consciousness in this context. First of all, they fail to adequately critique and rule out alternative accounts. Thus to take the two mentioned above, the Bohm interpretation, in its most well-developed form, appears to leave no room for consciousness, invoking instead a form of hidden variable and quantum 'potential' to account for what we observe. The authors' response is to cite a comment from Bohm and Hiley in which they express the 'intuition' that consciousness and quantum mechanics are in some way related. But even leaving to one side the observation that Bohm and Hiley had quite idiosyncratic philosophical views, mere intuition is no substitute for an *argument* that this interpretation cannot avoid incorporating consciousness. No such argument is given, nor do the authors explore any of the standard objections to the Bohm interpretation. On the many worlds view, there is likewise no transition from a superposition to definite state, but rather a kind of division or splitting of reality along lines set down by the dynamics, so that each state in the apparent 'superposition' forms the basis for a different world. Here, the authors seem content to say only that it remains a fascinating basis for further speculation, without touching on any recent developments that have taken this view beyond speculation, or, again, considering any of the well-known objections.

Secondly, although they do outline Chalmers' much discussed position, their discussion of the nature of consciousness remains at the shallow end of the spectrum, even for a popular work. In particular they fail to tackle the central objection to presenting consciousness as a solution to the measurement problem, namely: how does the non-physical effect such a transition in the physical? It was this that lay behind the philosophical demolition job noted above. Of course, there are ways of getting around such objections. Interestingly, one of the earlier defences of the role of consciousness—the London-Bauer account, typically but erroneously regarded as a mere summary of the 'standard' view—gives an intriguing and radical phenomenological interpretation which dissolves the distinction between the physical and consciousness to begin with. Of course, this is a problematic line to take but it is surely beyond time to consider such alternative accounts and determine what we might learn from them.

Relatedly and finally, the authors never really show *how* it is that consciousness bears on quantum physics. Again to be crude, their account amounts to little more than placing the 'quantum enigma' up against the 'mystery of consciousness' and waving their hands over them! Although its good to see consciousness brought back out of the shadows, if it is going to survive in the harsh light of day its going to need more subtle and sophisticated treatment than this.—Steven French, *University of Leeds*.

SELINGER, Evan, ed. *Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. xi + 308 pp. Cloth, \$86.50—This volume is a critical review of how Don Ihde has contributed to and stimulated phenomenology, postphenomenology and the philosophy of technoscience over the last four decades. Evan Selinger brought forth this admirable tribute to his mentor by assembling original essays from nineteen of Ihde's former students, colleagues and professional peers. All leading scholars in the field, their contributions make for required reading, not only for Ihde aficionados but for anyone interested in the history, sociology, or philosophy of technoscience.

Ihde dwells in the borderland between philosophy and other disciplines in that his phenomenological approach directly pertains to actual experience in many of its forms. Some of the essays are devoted to insights from or pertinent to Ihde that advance understanding of concrete things and events. Trevor Pinch writes a history of the electronic synthesizer and discusses the tension between its having a voice of its own and its capacity to emulate other instruments, while Judy Lochhead explores the impact of various forms of visual notation on the experience of hearing and understanding music. Robert P. Crease addresses the nature of experimentation in scientific laboratories. Peter Galison turns a Heideggerian perspective on the Columbia disaster and other problems in the space program to examine the issue of breakdown in complex technological systems, and Donna Haraway considers the numerous implications of the expanded technology-human-animal interface that is brought about by attaching cameras to turtles, whales and penguins.

Haraway's paper also embodies a theme that crops up repeatedly in the volume, as well as in Ihde's work, which is to shift attention from individual things or activities to the relationships that emerge from their combinations. This theme takes several forms, one of which is the relation between science and technology. Selinger recounts in the Introduction (p. 6) how, in a seminar in Colombia in 1982, Ihde was denounced for affirming a distinction between science and technology that masks how the interworkings of the two are often used both ideologically and materially to undermine indigenous cultures. The experience had complex ramifications, one being to fix in Ihde the necessary and historically ubiquitous interconnections of science and technology, to be studied by the philosophy of "technoscience." This issue is taken up in essays by Paul B. Thompson, Robert C. Scharff, and Hans Lenk.

Another aspect of the emphasis on relationships is that between people and things. Rather than thinking of a person using a tool or instrument, the human-tool combination is better considered as a single agency: an actant or a cyborg. Carl Mitcham points out the link between Ihde's phenomenology and the pragmatism of Dewey, who also held that things commonly considered to be outside the body—tools, friends, institutions—are better understood as belonging to it. Donn Welton examines the difference between mechanical extensions of the body and machines embedded in the body. A fascinating elaboration on the human-instrument nexus is found in Finn Olesen's account of the impact of the stethoscope on the practice of medicine and the conceptualization of disease. Andrew Feenberg insists that the body's linkage with

things affects not only what that extended agency does, but also its passive role of how it is treated. Albert Borgmann elaborates Ihde's distinction between technologies that directly extend our senses (such as a telescope or microscope) and those hermeneutic extensions that require interpretation of texts (for example, read-outs from the Hubble telescope).

Selinger's essay is one of several noting that Ihde has not pursued the ethical implications of his work as far as might be desired. This may be partly because, as Richard A. Cohen points out, Ihde has avoided the dystopian judgments about technology of thinkers like Heidegger and Ellul. In his concluding essay Ihde discusses several facets of this issue, among them (perhaps as another upshot of the criticism he received in Colombia) the "paradox of prognosis," which concerns how technologies generate unintended consequences and have different impacts in different cultural settings. The volume's most focused effort to extend the ethical dimension is Peter-Paul Verbeek's contribution, "The Morality of Things." He surmises that ethics may be on the verge of a Copernican revolution that will include things among moral agents. Things are invariably involved in human decisions and actions, he holds, and they should therefore be implicated in the morality of those decisions and actions. The difficulty, of course, is dealing with the complaint that things do not act intentionally and do not receive rewards or punishments. (It was not always such. Ihde's concluding essay refers to the medieval practices of punishing the animal as well as the human participants in bestiality and flogging bells that were used to call people to insurrection.) Certainly it is high time to extend moral responsibility to include animals and things. But instead of investigating them in isolation it would be better to hew to the emphasis Ihde and others place on relationship, and to concentrate on the moral status of extended agencies composed of various combinations of human and nonhuman elements.—F. Allan Hanson, *University of Kansas*.

SELLARS, Wilfrid S. *In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars*. Edited by Kevin Scharp and Robert B. Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. xxviii + 491 pp. Cloth, \$45.00—The editors of this volume boldly proclaim Sellars to be the greatest American philosopher since C. S. Peirce. They are probably right, but this is a minority opinion, as the state of Sellars's *oeuvre* attests. The original publishers of Sellars's principal books have let them go out of print. A small house, Ridgeview Publishing, originally published *Naturalism and Ontology*, and has valiantly republished Sellars's other works and even added collections of Sellars's early essays, his work on Kant, and editions of Sellars's lectures on Kant and on epistemology. Slowly, Sellars is emerging from his relative neglect. Sellars's well known essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM] is now available in two editions: one from Harvard, edited by Brandom, and another from Hackett, with a substantial commentary by deVries and Triplett. With *In the*

Space of Reasons more of Sellars returns to the list of a major academic publisher.

This volume aims to collect "the papers most important for understanding the core of [Sellars's] synoptic philosophical vision" (p. vii). It clearly bears the stamp of Brandom's focus on "the metaphysics of intentionality." Seventeen essays are included in 5 parts: "Language and Meaning," "Abstract Entities," "Mind, Language, and the World," "Science and the Mind," and a final section of historical essays on Kant. Sellars published around 100 essays, so this is still very much a selection. Six of the essays originally appeared in Sellars's 1963 collection *Science, Perception and Reality* [SPR]. Of the other 11 essays here, only one predates SPR, "Inference and Meaning" (a major influence on Brandom). The essays complement each other across as well as within the sections. Sellars had a comprehensive philosophical view, but his individual essays contain no more than partial perspectives of the complex whole viewed in the light of a particular issue. Read together, the multi-dimensional solidity of his philosophy emerges.

The essays form a good introduction to Sellars's vision, and I am particularly pleased that attention is given to his treatment of abstract entities, but there are omissions. Sellars's historical essays (other than a few on Kant) and his essays in ethics are notably absent. These are two areas that separate Sellars from other American luminaries, for example, Quine and Davidson. That Sellars's extensive historical writings (never merely philological exercises) could not be included is understandable. But omitting Sellars's essays on ethics and values is a tremendous pity, for at the very core of Sellars's synoptic vision is the distinction between empirical description and normative prescription, and it is in these essays (for example, "On Reasoning about Values") that he examines the logic of prescriptive discourse.

Given the influence of EPM on contemporary epistemology, it is surprising that epistemology is not more prominent in the collection, perhaps via "The Structure of Knowledge". Similarly, though Sellars was an important philosopher of science widely known for his scientific realism, there are only traces of these issues here.

These are regrettable omissions, not because Scharp and Brandom chose the wrong essays, but because no one (reasonable) volume could do justice to Sellars's thought. Let us hope this volume does well enough to justify a second volume in which these omissions can be made good.

One omission is culpable: there is no bibliography of Sellars's works. Even a partial bibliography of other significant works would have been tremendously helpful. Thankfully, a complete bibliography along with a large number of secondary resources is available on line at the "Problems from Wilfrid Sellars" website: <http://www.ditext.com/sellars/>. On the positive side, the volume is thoroughly indexed, which will be extremely valuable for close work on these essays.

The editors' introduction to this volume is brief and consists mostly of thumbnail sketches of the essays. These thumbnails are sometimes frustratingly sketchy and occasionally inaccurate. At one point it is claimed that in his treatment of singular distributive terms, Sellars

believes “the lion is tawny” is sense-equivalent to ‘all lions are necessarily tawny’” (p. xvi), but this is a much stronger claim than Sellars himself ever commits to. The editors also claim that Sellars’s famous Ryleans—protopersons who have not yet become conscious of their own psychologies—“perform only linguistic acts, not actions” (p. xx), which is contradicted by Sellars on page 271. Sellars’s theory of perception is called a “version of direct realism” (p. xxii), but surely it is more accurate to call it a version of *critical realism*. The thumbnail of “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”—Sellars’s best known paper after EPM—does not distinguish properly between the Original Image and the Manifest Image and claims that Sellars thinks the scientific image falls short in not being able to “explain social activity,” whereas Sellars really thinks that the scientific image lacks “the language of community and individual intentions” (p. 408). The point of the language of intentions is not to interpret or explain the world, but to change it.

The bottom line is unmistakable, however: Here are central works of the most profound and fertile American philosopher of the post-war era: everyone should have these essays.—Willem A. deVries, *University of New Hampshire*.

SETIYA, Kieran. *Reasons without Rationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. xii + 131 pp. Cloth, \$29.95—This is an excellent book: original, intricately argued, yet admirably compact. It makes important contributions to both the philosophy of action and ethics.

Early in the book Setiya argues, roughly, that a consideration counts as a reason for ϕ -ing just in case the disposition to be moved to ϕ by that consideration is a good disposition of practical thought—that is, just in case it is good *as* a disposition of practical thought. (No claim of metaphysical or epistemic priority is intended here; this is just a biconditional.) But dispositions of practical thought are also traits of character; they consequently can be evaluated *as* traits of character. How are these evaluations related? Setiya’s central thesis is that they are one and the same: being a good disposition of practical thought *just is* being a disposition of practical thought that is good as a trait of character. Setiya calls this the *virtue theory* of practical reason. Putting his claims together yields the view that a consideration counts as a reason for ϕ -ing just in case the disposition to be moved to ϕ by that consideration is a virtue of character.

Setiya’s master argument for the virtue theory of practical reason is simple and arresting. If being a good disposition of practical thought is *not* the same as being a virtuous disposition of practical thought, then there must be something in the *nature* of practical thought that explains why it is subject to its own standards of evaluation. Setiya dubs attempts to derive standards of practical thinking from the nature of practical thought *ethical rationalism*, and he spends most of the second half of his book arguing against all possible versions of the view. He rejects most versions because they presuppose something he argues against in

the first half of the book, namely that intentional action always takes place under "the guise of the good"—that is, that acting for a reason necessarily involves taking one's reason to provide some degree of *justification* for one's action. Recognitionists, who hold that good practical thought is thought that shows a proper sensitivity to normative or evaluative facts, assume that practical thought is thought concerning what we have reason to do, or what will promote the human good, or some such. Constructivists, who attempt to derive standards of practical thought from a conception of what it is to be a rational agent, assume that rational agents are those who seek to justify their actions. But not all versions of ethical rationalism presuppose the guise of the good thesis. Setiya also rejects versions presupposing that practical thought is thought about how to satisfy one's final desires (or, somewhat more obscurely, that it is thought ultimately "triggered" by one's final desires) or that it aims at self-knowledge. His discussion of this last view, which is associated with David Velleman, is especially important because Setiya's account of intentional action is quite similar to Velleman's. Setiya argues that despite the similarities the correct account (his own) is insufficient to support Velleman's version of rationalism.

In one way or another, most of Setiya's arguments against ethical rationalism rely upon claims he defends in the first half of the book. There he advances his account of intentional action, according to which intentionally ϕ -ing is a matter of ϕ -ing because of a desire-like belief to the effect that one is ϕ -ing at least in part because of that very belief. Crucially, the "because" that figures into the content of this belief is explanatory, not justificatory: intentionally ϕ -ing involves having a belief about what is *motivating* one's action, not about what justifies it. Since Setiya thinks the primary argument for the guise of the good thesis is that it follows from a correct understanding of intentional action, he takes the truth of his account to undermine that thesis. He also briefly considers and rejects some other possible rationales for the thesis.

Setiya's overall argument is long and complex; there are numerous points at which one might try to dig in one's heels. Many will resist Setiya's account of intentional action (although his arguments for it should not be dismissed lightly). But even such readers will find the rest of the book well worth studying. Is Setiya right that if it is possible to act for a reason without seeing that reason as providing some justification for one's action, then it cannot be that practical thought is good *as such* only if it yields justified action? Is he right that the virtue theory of practical reason is the only non-skeptical alternative to ethical rationalism? Setiya has done us a real service by raising such questions and by giving us such subtle and powerful arguments to wrestle with.—Matthew Hanser, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

us in her introductory chapter that "My aim is to involve these authors in each other's problems and to engage both in reconsidering the contemporary difficulties to which they speak with surprising frequency in one voice, or at least genuine harmony." She succeeds admirably. One comes away from this volume with the feeling that one has audited a brilliant conversation between Confucius and Aristotle. Forced into dialogue by Sim, her authors find greater accord than disaccord on issues related to the self, to family life, and to social relationships.

Sim's knowledge of Aristotle, it may be noted, was achieved under the tutelage of Alasdair MacIntyre; her knowledge of Confucius derives naturally from her personal cultivation of an inherited Chinese tradition. Virtue ethics thus becomes a focal point in her presentation of both, including her discussion of rights.

In Aristotle's view, humans are by nature moral beings; each is endowed with a spontaneous sense of morality. They are naturally inclined to meet each other and to live together in families, in villages, or in larger communities; they establish political societies governed by laws that are expressions of common moral intuitions. These natural dispositions are developed through learning and training. This is especially true for those who live within the Confucian orbit. Ethical issues for the Confucian are not determined or formulated apart from the social setting in which they arise. In fact, one does not find in Confucian ethics a clear demarcation between moral rules and other sorts of rules. One finds rather in Confucian ethics a theory of virtue rather than a theory of obligation.

Both Aristotle and Confucius recognize the importance of the cultivation of moral virtue for a just society. Each acknowledges the guiding role of exemplary individuals, and each allows for context in the application of principles. Yet Confucius and Aristotle have very different attitudes toward the rule of law. Confucius tends to identify moral principles with customary norms and, unlike Aristotle, relies heavily on the exemplary person to inspire others to moral and civic virtue. Aristotle, while not denying a role for the exemplary figure, recognizes the rarity of such an individual, and consequently places greater confidence in the rule of law. Given Aristotle's understanding of human nature and purpose in nature, Aristotle is positioned to evaluate custom in the light of transcendent norms. Law, from an Aristotelian perspective, possesses greater sovereignty than custom, although Aristotle would not dismiss the role of custom in preserving a just society. Identifying another difference, Sim writes, "Aristotle sharply distinguishes the political role of the statesman from the household rule of fathers. Confucius assimilates political rule into household rule: political government is simply the father-son relationship writ large." Unlike Aristotle, Confucius offers no theoretical analysis of the state and political rule. Absent too is any explicit theory about nature and teleology.

Aristotle's analysis of the nature of law, Sim concludes, may help the Confucian understand that the rule of law is not antithetical to a respect for custom and the cultivation of virtue. On the other hand, the Confucian account of ritual propriety can supplement Aristotle's "all too brief account of unwritten law." Confucians are peculiarly sensitive to what

Aristotelians call "ethos," insofar as they have an acute sense of the way in which ceremony and ritual focus and intensify custom and moral practice.

A not-insignificant contribution of this volume is that Sim, in reading Aristotle through a Confucian lens, brings out aspects of Aristotle that are often overlooked by Western eyes accustomed to reading him in the light of his metaphysics, colored by the subsequent development of his thought in Western moral and political theory.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

SMITH, David Woodruff. *Husserl*. Routledge Philosophers Series. New York: Routledge, 2007, xiv + 467 pp. Paper, \$24.95—Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) is, without doubt, not only one of the most influential philosopher of the 20th century but also one of the most important thinkers in the history of the discipline. Husserl was not only the founder of phenomenology, which he defined as the science of the essence of consciousness, but he also made significant contributions to a wide range of other fields within philosophy. These include logic, epistemology, ontology, value theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of the natural sciences, and philosophy of the human and social sciences. Husserl is often thought to have influenced primarily continental philosophy. However, his influence and significant contributions also extend to the more formalistic tradition of analytic philosophy, which is primarily concerned with logic, mathematics, language, and the natural sciences.

It is, therefore, fitting that the Routledge Philosophers Series should devote a volume to the thought of this most creative, prolific, and influential philosopher, and that the person to write this volume should be David Woodruff Smith, an important and influential phenomenologist in his own right. Because Smith is an analytic phenomenologist, associated with what is often called the 'California school' of phenomenology, he is able not only to address the Husserl embraced by the continental tradition, who influenced Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, among many others, but also to address the Husserl that impacted the analytic tradition, that is, Husserl the logician, mathematician, and philosopher of language. One of Smith's chief goals in this volume is also to present the synoptic Husserl, the philosopher who is able to integrate all the various branches of his thought into one coherent system. As Smith puts it, in his introduction, "[t]his is the systematic philosopher who sees all things as interdependent . . . who even produced a theory of dependence itself, a theory that binds together his many other theories about consciousness, nature, society, number, ideal 'logical' forms in all these things, and so on" (p.1).

Smith begins his task with a discussion of Husserl's life and works, a biographical sketch that is aided by a very helpful chronological timeline prior to the introduction. Following this biography, Smith makes a

case for the claim that Husserl was a synoptic thinker. Smith does not merely assume that Husserl was a systematic philosopher but, instead, develops a sustained argument for unity among the various strands of Husserlian thought and for the coherence and completeness of this system. After making his argument, Smith then proceeds by discussing these strands and devoting to each an individual chapter, always keeping in mind how each fits as a coherent element within Husserl's complete philosophical system. Smith, thus, assigns a chapter each to logic, ontology, and epistemology respectively. In these chapters, he clearly examines the many complex elements that hold Husserlian thought together. These include Husserl's theory of logic and its relationship to his philosophy of language, mind, and science, his theory of essences and categories, his development of the phenomenological method and one of its key concepts, the notion of phenomenological reduction or *epoché*, and his theory of intentionality as the essential characteristic of consciousness. Besides treating these topics with depth and insight, Smith also pays close attention to aspects of Husserl's thought that have received less attention than his theories of logic, mathematics, consciousness, and intentionality. I am referring here to Husserl's work in ethics, value theory, social theory, and political theory. In fact, the entire penultimate chapter of Smith's book is devoted to Husserlian value theory. Finally, Smith concludes this rich volume with a discussion of Husserl's legacy, in terms of its influence on both analytical and continental philosophy.

Smith's clear and precise discussions are complemented by short synopses at the beginning of each chapter that both explain the chapter and relate it to those that came before it, by a glossary of important terms located at the end of the book, and by several clever illustrations throughout that help to clarify the otherwise very complex elements of Husserlian thought. This book will serve very well as a clear and cogent introduction to Husserlian phenomenology for the uninitiated, but it will also be of use to the advanced student as a guide to tying the various strands of Husserlian thought together into a complete and coherent system. In this 467 page book, Smith achieves one of his chief goals, that is, to clearly and cogently explain the various individual aspects of Husserl's extremely complex body of thought and to show the unity of these various aspects as one cohesive whole. In doing this, he also succeeds in showing that Husserl was not only a synoptic and revolutionary philosopher but also one whose legacy and influence, like those of all great thinkers, will continue to impact philosophy probably for generations to come.—Marina P. Banchetti-Robino, *Florida Atlantic University*.

WIPPEL, John F. *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II*. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 47. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007. ix + 316 pp. Cloth, \$59.95—In this book John Wipfel has gathered together nearly a dozen

essays published since 1984. The volume is meant to be a sequel to the author's prior collection of papers, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1984), and it complements the synthetic presentation of Aquinas given in his *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2000). In the present volume one finds precise and detailed analyses of some of the most important notions and principles in Aquinas's metaphysics.

After an opening chapter that criticizes the description of Thomas's thought as "Christian philosophy," Wippel turns in the second chapter ("The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics") to discuss four points in Aquinas's metaphysics which reveal a clear influence of Avicenna: (1) his understanding of metaphysics as the science of being as being, (2) his description of the process by which the metaphysician discovers being as being, (3) his theory of the real distinction of essence and existence, and (4) his views on the procession of creatures from God. In criticizing Avicenna's theory of emanation, Thomas argues that God produces creatures freely, not by the necessity of his nature, and he explains how multiplicity arises in the order of being. The third chapter ("Truth in Thomas Aquinas") is the longest one. It presents a very careful and comprehensive explication of Aquinas's texts on truth, focusing on issues such as whether truth is formally present only in the intellect, or also in reality; in what sense truth is transcendental; whether truth may be assigned to God intrinsically, or only as a cause; whether truth would exist without the presence of mind; the role that essence plays in grounding truth; whether truth is attained by the mind through simple apprehension, or by judgment; and how Thomas fits together the definitions of truth given by earlier thinkers.

The middle chapters of the book examine some of the central axioms in Thomas's metaphysics: "what is received is received according to the mode of the receiver" (Chapter Four); "unreceived act is unlimited", and its corollary, "act is limited only by a distinct potency that receives it" (Chapter Five); "every agent produces something like itself" (Chapter Six); and "*forma, dat esse*" (Chapter Seven). Gathering together the relevant texts, Wippel discusses Thomas's understanding of these axioms and his justifications for them. Chapter Seven also makes a very important analysis of the role that Thomas assigns to creatures in the production of *esse*.

Two chapters are devoted to metaphysical themes concerning God. Chapter Eight ("Thomas Aquinas on Demonstrating God's Omnipotence") makes a careful review of Thomas's texts, and shows that he regarded divine omnipotence not as an article of faith, but rather as something that could be established by purely philosophical argumentation. Chapter Nine ("Thomas Aquinas on God's Freedom to Create or Not") offers a response to the criticisms of Thomas by Arthur Lovejoy and Norman Kretzmann. Here one finds a very careful presentation of Thomas's defense of God's freedom to create or not, of his freedom to create this world or any other possible universe as he sees fit, and of Thomas's interpretation of the Neoplatonic axiom that goodness is diffusive of itself.

In Chapter Ten ("Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*") Wippel considers Thomas's intention as Aristotelian commentator. Some have held that Thomas wrote the commentaries to support his work as a theologian. Others have regarded them as mere expositions of Aristotle, containing nothing of Aquinas's personal thought. Still others have held that everything in the commentaries expresses Thomas's personal thought. Examining a number of test cases from the *Metaphysics* commentary, Wippel defends a highly nuanced position. In writing the commentary Thomas is proceeding philosophically, not theologically. His aim is to expound Aristotle's thought as carefully and faithfully as possible. If Thomas attributes to Aristotle certain positions that he did not in fact hold, this is because he is philosophically convinced that the position is true, and he believes that Aristotle himself must have held this same view. On Wippel's reading, Thomas's commentary is an important source that should be taken seriously by students of Aquinas's metaphysics, yet it must not be viewed as a complete or adequate expression of Thomas's personal metaphysics.

The book's final chapter ("Platonism and Aristotelianism in Aquinas") examines whether there are significant non-Aristotelian elements present in Aquinas's metaphysics. Although much of his metaphysical vocabulary is Aristotelian, Thomas's notion of *esse* as the *actus essendi*, and the real distinction between essence and *esse*, are wholly foreign to the thought of Aristotle. Although there are significant Neoplatonic elements in Aquinas's metaphysics (for example, his understanding of *esse* as intensive act, his theory of participation, and his theory of divine ideas), one ought not to reduce his thought to Neoplatonism. In Wippel's judgment, Aquinas is an original thinker who has reworked elements from the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions to create a deeply personal and highly original metaphysics.

With this fine collection of essays John Wippel has once again put scholars of medieval philosophy in his debt. Specialists will find much to profit from in these essays; students new to the field will find in them a reliable and trustworthy guide to Aquinas's metaphysical thought.—Mark D. Gossiaux, *Loyola University New Orleans*.

WOOLHOUSE, Roger. *John Locke, a Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xviii + 528. Cloth, \$39.99—Roger Woolhouse's *Locke* is the first major biography of John Locke to appear in fifty years and the second to be based on the rich collection of manuscripts (the Lovelace Collection): letters, journals, notebooks, and account books acquired by the Bodleian Library in 1946. Woolhouse has the advantage over his predecessor, Maurice Cranston (*John Locke, A Biography*, London: Longmans, 1957), of having at hand a descriptive catalogue of the manuscripts, a masterly edition of the letters and scholarly transcriptions and commentary on many of the texts. He has used these well and accordingly has provided his readers with a detailed, reliable and sympathetic chronicle of Locke's life. The narrative is engaging, often

carried forward in Locke's own words, which, given the personal nature of much of Locke's literary remains, affords the reader a kind of intimacy with its subject. The manuscripts so employed are adequately contextualized but in a manner that is understated and not intrusive. The narrative is eminently readable and for best advantage, viz., to acquire a familiarity with the person John Locke, should be read straight through. However, anyone desiring to know what Locke was doing when and where, will find it a useful reference work.

Readers of a biography of Locke are most likely drawn to it by a previous interest, historical or philosophical, in one of Locke's major writings, especially *Two Treatises of Government* and *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*. In Woolhouse's biography they will find much historical background and an exposition of specific content that is clear and concise. What they will not find is an explanation of how Locke came to write them, how this Christian humanist and minor natural philosopher became John Locke the author of foundational works of political liberalism and empiricism. What Woolhouse does show is that Locke was constantly engaged in intellectual pursuits, not only about the major themes with which he is justly associated, but about natural history, chemistry, medicine, climatology and about the historical criticism of the Bible and theology. These engagements are recorded in detail. So also are the public disputes that Locke felt compelled to enter during the last decade of his life: with John Edwards on the alleged Socinianism of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (which Woolhouse rightly disputes); with Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, and Thomas Burnet, who argued that the views expressed in the *Essay* promoted heterodoxy, especially with respect to the trinity and the immortality of the soul; with Jonas Proast on toleration. In all of Woolhouse's narratives of Locke's intellectual engagements and controversies, Locke's good sense and level-headedness shines through, as does his humour, good and ill; his wit and passion. This is probably just enough for a biography, and it surely sets the stage for a more searching commentary of Locke's main works.

One of the advantages of reading this book through is that it leaves one with a sense of the sort of person Locke was, of his character. In developing this theme, Woolhouse draws from characters drawn by three contemporaries: Damaris, Lady Masham, nee Cudworth, with whom Locke enjoyed a Platonic love affair that lasted a quarter of a century (detailed by Woolhouse); Jean Le Clerc, the distinguished scholar and theologian, and Peter Coste, who was a retainer in Locke's household. Woolhouse does not provide a critical assessment of these sources, but he has surely used them critically, aided by Locke's letters and journals, to depict a man of endless curiosity, caution, fidelity to friends, affectionate to those with whom he chose to be intimate, although not above resentment when they failed him, a competent manager of all of his personal affairs and of those, like Peter King, who were close to him.

Although Woolhouse deserves nothing but praise for the care and industry that went into the writing of this book, the publisher and perhaps also the author deserve blame for the inconvenient manner in which the

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Aristotle's Syllogistic, Modern Deductive Logic, and Scientific Demonstration, EDWARD M. ENGELMANN

This article investigates the nature of Aristotelian syllogistics and shows that the categorical syllogism is fundamentally about showing the connection, in the premises of the syllogism, between the major and minor terms as stated in the conclusion. It discusses how this is important for the use of the syllogism in scientific demonstration. The article then examines modern deductive logic with an eye to the way in which it contrasts with Aristotelian syllogistics. It shows how modern logic is about making necessary connections between each proposition by means of external or second order rules. In the syllogism, on the other hand, the necessity between the premises as a whole unit and the conclusion is based on the internal middle term. The article concludes with a discussion of Günther Patzig's claim that Aristotelian syllogisms are best thought of as tautological propositions. If this were the case, then the differences asserted to exist between syllogistic and modern logic would not hold. However, it is shown that Patzig's assimilation of syllogistics to modern deductive logic is illegitimate.

The Primacy of Relation over Substance and the Recovery of a Theological Metaphysics, ADRIAN PABST

This essay concerns the problem of individuation in metaphysics in relation to the question of individuality in politics. It rejects the assumption in much of ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy and theology that unity and diversity are opposed and that this opposition produces conflict and violence. The proposed alternative is a metaphysics and politics of relationality. This alternative is not so much indebted to Aristotle, but instead goes back to Platonist metaphysics and its transformation by Augustine and Boethius. By privileging substance over all other categories, Aristotle not only relegated the transcendent immaterial actuality from the immanence of

*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

the material world but also divorced particular beings from the universal Prime Mover or God. By contrast, for Plato, the transcendent universal Good individuates all immanent particulars relationally at the level of the *oikos*, the *polis*, and the *cosmos*. Crucially, by combining the concept of creation *ex nihilo* with the metaphysics of participation, Augustine and Boethius reconfigured Plato's Good in the direction of the Creator-God and Trinitarian relationality. Thus, each and every being is individuated because it is a particular reflection of the universal Good, a unique and singular expression of God's self-communicative actualization in the world.

Forgiveness and its Healing Effects in the Face of Suffering and Death, MARIANO CRESPO

To consider that the nature of forgiveness consists in its healing effects on the forgiver overlooks the distinction between the nature of forgiveness and the question about its desirable effects. What the author suggests is that the curing effect of forgiveness is an indirectly intended consequence of forgiveness. To forgive my wrongdoer only because this is the way to gain inner peace or to "heal my soul" shows a somewhat utilitarian view on forgiveness. By forgiving the wrongdoer, the victim extends an attitude of authentic goodwill toward the offender as a person. However, the one who forgives does not extend this attitude toward the action the offender performed. We can strongly oppose wrong behavior without opposing wrongdoers as persons.

In Defense of Praying with Images, PAUL MOYAERT

The paper argues for a notion of religion that is based on a strong human sense for symbols. Symbols are the natural milieu for religion. The author distinguishes symbols from signs through the fact that the symbol brings together the elements kept separate in the sign. A symbol does contain something of the force of the reality which it represents. With this approach we can look at *fides quaerens intellectum* in a new light. Moreover, religious images and icons can gain from understanding religion as a symbolic practice. The paper argues that the theological debate on the religious value of icons should not be focused on the tension between the visibility and the invisibility of the divine. Against Marion the author argues that touching, rather than seeing, is the core of religious images. People kiss and caress icons. Examples from ordinary life are adduced to illustrate this understanding.

On the Revival of Natural Law: Several Books from the Last Half-Decade, ANTHONY J. LISSKA

The last third of the twentieth century witnessed a burst of energy by philosophers sorting out the many-faceted claims of natural law theory. Natural law theory, rooted in the *Nicomachean Ethics* with some modifications by the Stoics, was studied in the twentieth century mainly through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, followed by those of the Salamanca school, which was central to the Second Scholasticism. The horrors of the Second World

War and the trials following it, with their charges of "crimes against humanity," prompted a renewed interest by English-speaking philosophers in natural law jurisprudence. Analytic philosophers followed Elizabeth Anscombe's urging to venture beyond the limits of early twentieth-century moral philosophy; Alasdair MacIntyre's writings buttressed the return to ethical naturalism; John Finnis's "new natural law" theory also contributed to this renaissance. These many avenues form the conceptual backdrop to the eight books reviewed in this essay.

*Thomas versus Tibbles: A Critical Study of Christopher Brown's
Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus*, PATRICK TONER

In his recent book, *Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus*, Christopher Brown has argued that the metaphysics of St. Thomas is preferable to contemporary analytic views because it can solve the "problem of material constitution" (PMC) without requiring us to relinquish any of the common-sense beliefs that generate that problem. In this critical study, the author shows that in the case of both substances and aggregates, Brown's Aquinas endorses views that are extremely implausible. Consequently, even if it is granted that the solutions to the PMC fall right out of his views, it is still not clear that this gives us reason to prefer his ontology to its competitors. The author also considers Brown's take on the status of the human being after death.

Souls, Ships, and Substances: A Response to Toner, CHRISTOPHER
M. BROWN

Brown does four things in responding to Patrick Toner's incisive critique of my *Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus* (AST). First, he further motivates Aquinas's position that Socrates exists in the post-mortem and ante-resurrection state by noting that Socrates' situation is at least analogous to other states of affairs that would certainly count as atypical (although not impossible). Secondly, he offers a revised Thomistic account of artefact identity through time in light of Toner's objections to Aquinas's restrictive view. Unlike the restrictive view, this revised account is compatible with common-sense intuitions. Thirdly, he shows how his defense of Aquinas's substance metaphysic in AST is useful for the purpose of constructing defeaters for certain kinds of arguments for reductionism. Fourthly, he defends Aquinas's views on the unity of substance against Toner's suggestion that they are implausible on the grounds that they are in conflict with certain so-called "scientifically informed," common-sense beliefs.

Public Goods and Fairness, GARRETT CULLITY

To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. The author argues that when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a very controversial claim. But spelling out why it is unfair allows us to see just which forms of free riding are wrong. Moreover, it supplies a basis from which some more controversial conclusions can be defended. Even if a public good is one that you have been given without asking for it or seeking it out, it can still be wrong not to be prepared to pay for it. It can be wrong not to be prepared to pay for public goods even when you do not receive them at all. And furthermore, it can be right to force you to do so.

In Defence of Causal Bases, JAN HAUSKA

C. B. Martin's finkish cases raise one of the most serious objections to conditional analyses of dispositions. David Lewis's reformed analysis is widely considered the most promising response to the objection. Despite its sophistication, however, the reformed analysis still provokes questions concerning its ability to handle finkish cases. They focus on the applicability of the analysis to 'baseless' dispositions. After sketching Martin's objection and the reformed analysis, Hauska argues that all dispositions have causal bases which the analysis can unproblematically invoke.

Counterfactuals vs. Conditional Probabilities: A Critical Analysis of the Counterfactual Theory of Information, HILMI DEMIR

Cohen and Meskin [2006] recently offered a counterfactual theory of information to replace the standard probabilistic theory of information. They claim that the counterfactual theory fares better than the standard account on three grounds: first, it provides a better framework for explaining information flow properties; second, it requires a less expensive ontology; and third, because it does not refer to doxastic states of the information-receiving organism, it provides an objective basis. In this paper, the author shows that none of these is really an advantage. Moreover, the counterfactual theory fails to satisfy one of the basic properties of information flow, namely the Conjunction Principle. Thus, Demir concludes, there is no reason to give up the standard probabilistic theory for the counterfactual theory of information.

Colour Constancy as Counterfactual, JONATHAN COHEN

In this paper, Cohen argues that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, he contends, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on

the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, Cohen provides a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, he shows why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature.

A Priori Entailment and Conceptual Analysis: Making Room for Type-C Physicalism, J. L. DOWELL

One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here, Dowell avoids this well-trodden ground and argues instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual analysis and a priori entailment by showing that the lack of the former does not imply the absence of the latter.

Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, the author will argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not.

Humean Dispositionalism, TOBY HANDFIELD

Humean metaphysics is characterized by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper Handfield presents a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and that manifestations of powers are identified with certain kinds of causal processes. From these assumptions, the modal features of powers are explained in terms of internal relations between powers themselves and the process-types in which powers are manifested.

Directions of Fit and the Humean Theory of Motivation, MARY CLAYTON COLEMAN

According to the Humean theory of motivation, a person can only be motivated to act by a desire together with a relevantly related belief. More specifically, a person can only be motivated to ϕ by a desire to ψ together with a belief that ϕ -ing is a means to or a way of ψ -ing. In recent writings, Michael Smith gives what has become a very influential argument in favour of the Humean claim that desire is a necessary part of motivation, and a great deal has been written about Smith's defence of this Humean claim. However,

no one has yet identified the fundamental weakness of his defence. The fundamental weakness is that there is no single conception of directions of fit that does all the work Smith needs it to do throughout the various stages of his defence.

Gradable Adjectives: A Defence of Pluralism, KEITH DeROSE

This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a 'pluralist' approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the groupindexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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McDowell on External Reasons, JOHN BRUNERO

The paper considers McDowell's reply to Williams's internalism about practical reason, specifically, McDowell's suggestion that externalists can appeal to conversion to explain how one comes to be motivated to do what one has reason to do. The author argues that McDowell's appeal to conversion does not take seriously the connection between reasons and explanations, which is central to Williams's argument. But he also shows how McDowell might have been easily misled by some of Williams's claims that would make the appeal to conversion be right on point. The paper also considers the plausibility of McDowell's suggestion that rational deliberation be understood as a "correct picturing" and argues that if McDowell intends this conception of rational deliberation to play the role that rational deliberation plays in Williams's account, McDowell's view would be subject to objections analogous to the standard objections in epistemology against externalism about epistemic justification.

A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism, PHILIP GOFF

Austere nominalism has often been taken to involve an outright denial of the existence of properties. It is generally supposed, quite reasonably, that one who denies the existence of properties is obliged to believe that all sentences which seem to make reference to properties are analysable into sentences which do not make reference to properties. It is not obvious that such an analysis is always available, and many see this as undermining of the plausibility of austere nominalism. The article argues that there is a form of austere nominalism which can avoid this difficulty by *reducing* (in a certain sense) rather than *eliminating* properties. If the austere nominalist allows that properties exist (in a certain sense), then she can be content to leave

sentences making reference to properties unanalysed. By defending such a non-eliminative form of austere nominalism, the view is made much more plausible.

Self-Consciousness and Self-Reference: Sartre and Wittgenstein,
BEATRICE LONGUENESSE

Sartre's distinction between 'non-thetic' and 'thetic' self-consciousness is interestingly related to Wittgenstein's distinction between the 'use of "I" as subject' and the 'use of "I" as object'. Similarly, Sartre's description of our consciousness of our own body is interestingly related to recent, neo-Wittgensteinian analyses according to which, in its use 'as subject', "I" refers to one's own living, sentient body, albeit in a way that is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. However, in both styles of investigation (Sartre's phenomenological description of self-consciousness, Wittgenstein's and neo-Wittgensteinian semantic analyses of uses of the word "I"), an important component is missing: investigating the role played by the concept "I" in ordering mental contents. Examining this role is the legacy of Kant's investigation into what he called the 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness' and its expression in the thought 'I think'.

Transcendental Philosophy and Atheism, WAYNE M. MARTIN

Engineers test materials by subjecting them to stress; much the same method can be used in philosophy. In the Autumn of 1798 and the Winter of 1799, Fichte's philosophical position was submitted to extraordinary stress in the extended episode known as the Atheism Controversy, culminating in his effective dismissal from his university post at Jena. The disputed issues explicitly concerned matters of religious faith and philosophical theology, but the stress of the controversy exposed fundamental tensions in Fichte's broader philosophical position and provoked him to formulate a novel, proto-phenomenological account of the scope and structure of transcendental investigation.

The Moral Development of First-Person Authority, VICTORIA
McGEER

A fully satisfying account of 1st person authority should satisfy two desiderata: (1) explain the privileged relation we bear to our own intentional states sufficient to justify a default presumption of authority; (2) explain why such authority matters for our ability to function well as rational agents. The traditional epistemological approach fails on the second desideratum, suggesting the more radical alternative of analyzing first-person authority in terms of a rational and self-regulative capacity we have to author our own intentional states. In comparing different versions of this "agency" model of authoritative self-knowledge, the author argues that Richard Moran's Kantian ideal of rational autonomy is neither necessary nor sufficient for well-functioning agency; worse, the ideal is unsuitable for human beings given our moral developmental liabilities. Using examples drawn from George Eliot's

Middlemarch, the author argues that we become better authoritative agents through embracing a less ambitious rational ideal.

On Hume's Appropriation of Malebranche: Causation and Self, P. J. E. KAIL

This paper examines Hume's appropriation of some aspects of the philosophy of Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows how the influence of this Christian Platonist philosophy upon sceptical empiricist philosophy in Hume's *Treatise* can be understood in terms of Hume's exploiting Malebranche's religiously informed science of man to serve a different secular agenda. This approach provides an overall perspective from which to understand the relation between these two very different thinkers in the key areas of causation and self. The author also reveals hitherto unnoticed lines of connection between the two thinkers.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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The Metaphysical Realism of Pope John Paul II, AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, S.J.

Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) found phenomenology very helpful for the analysis of concrete human experience and for overcoming the ethical formalism of Kant. Phenomenology, he believed, could also enrich classical Thomism by exploring the lived experience of freedom, interiority, and self-governance. But phenomenology, in his opinion, needed to be supplemented by metaphysics in order to ground experiences such as the sense of duty in the real order. He criticized much modern philosophy for abandoning metaphysics and thus neglecting the sapiential dimension. Since his career as a professor was very short, he did not have time to complete his project of a personalist Thomism in which phenomenology and metaphysics would be harmoniously combined.

Unselfishness, CHRISTOPHER G. FRAMARIN

In this paper Framarin argues that the prohibition on desire in the orthodox Indian systems is not simply a prohibition on selfish desires. The word "selfish" is ambiguous. It can mean either "self-interested" or "excessively self-interested." Since only excessively self-interested actions are prohibited, the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on all self-interested desires. But the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on excessively self-interested desires either, because this class of desires is too insignificant to explain the general preoccupation with the elimination of desire in the tradition. Finally, Framarin argues that selfish desires are indeed prohibited,

but only if by "selfish" one means "based on false beliefs about the self." Even then, however, selfish desires do not exhaust the class of prohibited desires because some prohibited desires are based on false beliefs about things other than the self.

Expendable Emotions, KRISTJÁN KRISTJÁNSSON

Are there any morally expendable emotions? That is, are there any emotions that could ideally, from a moral point of view, be eradicated from human life? Aristotle may have subscribed to the view that there are no such emotions, and for that reason—though not only for that reason—it merits investigation. Kristjánsson first suggests certain revisions of the specifics of Aristotle's non-expendability claim that render it less counter-intuitive. He then shows that the plausibility of Aristotle's claim turns largely on the question of how emotions are to be individuated. After probing that question in relation to contemporary theories of emotion, he explores how our emotions and moral virtues relate to distinct spheres of human experience, and how emotion concepts can best carve up the emotional landscape. He argues finally that there exist certain normative reasons for specifying emotion concepts such that Aristotle's view holds good.

Temporality and the Future of Philosophy in Hegel's Phenomenology, JOHN RUSSON

In "Sense-Certainty" Hegel establishes "the now that is many nows" as the form of experience. This has implications for the interpretation of later figures within the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: specifically, the thing (from Chapter 2), the living body (from Chapter 4), and the ethical community (from Chapter 6) are each significantly different forms of such a "now" in which the way that past and future are held within the present differs. Comparing these changing "temporalities" allows us to defend Hegel's distinction between nature and spirit, and his claim that only spirit has a history. This comparison also allows us to see how it is that phenomenological philosophy, and the "end of history" that it announces, is a stance of openness to the future.

An Analysis of the Philosophy of Universal Human Rights: Hobbes, Locke, and Ignatieff, ERIC D. SMAW

This project is, in part, motivated by my contention that one cannot adequately answer the question regarding the proper justification for human rights until one has answered the metaphysical question regarding the fundamental nature of human rights and the ontological question regarding the proper status of human rights. Smaw offers a sustained analysis of metaphysical, ontological, and justificatory questions regarding human rights with the purpose of illustrating the point that theories that fail to engage in such analyses are inadequate. In particular, this essay argues that Michael Ignatieff's theory of human rights, as articulated in *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, is philosophically inadequate because it fails to connect his

justificatory arguments for human rights with metaphysical and ontological conceptions of and arguments for human rights.

Kant's Postulate of the Immortality of the Soul, CHRIS W. SURPRENANT

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant grounds his postulate for the immortality of the soul on the presupposed practical necessity of the will's endless progress toward complete conformity with the moral law. Given the important role that this postulate plays in Kant's ethical and political philosophy, it is hard to understand why it has received relatively little attention. It is even more surprising considering the attention given to his other postulates of practical reason: the existence of God and freedom. The project of this paper is to examine Kant's postulate of the immortality of the soul, examine critiques of this argument, and show why the argument succeeds in showing that belief in the moral law also obligates one to believe in the soul's immortality.

Proof and Demonstration: Hume's Account of the Causal Relation, ANDREW WARD

On the standard reading of Hume, the belief that the necessity associated with the causal relation is "an entirely mind-independent phenomenon" in the world is unjustified. For example, Jonathan Bennett writes that necessary connections of the sort that Hume allows are not "relations which hold *objectively* between the 'objects' or events which we take to be causally related." Similarly, Barry Stroud writes that, according to Hume, we believe falsely "that necessity is something that 'resides' in the relation between objects or events in the objective world." In this paper Ward argues that this reading of Hume is mistaken and that there is a sense of justification (viz., justification *qua* "proof") according to which human beings are justified in holding the belief that the necessity associated with the causal relation is "an entirely mind-independent phenomenon" in the world.

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Inquiry Without Names in Plato's Cratylus, CHRISTINE J. THOMAS

The interlocutors of Plato's *Cratylus* agree that "it is far better to learn and to inquire from the things themselves than from their names" (439b6–8). Although surprisingly little attention has been paid to these remarks, at least some commentators view Plato as articulating a preference for direct, nonlinguistic cognitive access to the objects of inquiry. Another commentator takes Plato simply to recommend first-hand, yet linguistic, experience in

addition to instruction from experts. This paper defends, in contrast to both interpretations, the view that inquiry without names is dialectical, linguistic inquiry into metaphysical first principles. As such, inquiry without names is (logically) prior to inquiry from or through names. Inquiry without names is a form of transcendental metaphysics.

An Intensional Interpretation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition,
CATARINA DUTILH NOVAES

According to a widespread view in medieval scholarship, theories of supposition are the medieval counterparts of theories of reference, and are thus essentially extensional theories. The author proposes an alternative interpretation: theories of supposition are theories of properties of terms, but whose aim is to allow for the interpretation of sentences. This holds especially of Ockham's supposition theory, which is the main object of analysis in this paper. In particular, she argues for my intensional interpretation of his theory on the basis of two key-phrases in his *Summa Logicae*: '*denotatur*' and '*propositio est distinguenda*'. Finally, she offers a reconstruction of his theory as a set of instructions to be carried out in order to generate the possible readings of (certain) sentences.

The Young Marx and German Idealism: Revisiting the Doctoral Dissertation, MARTIN McIVOR

Recent discussions of "German Idealism" have laid new emphasis on its central concern with the self-determining or "unconditioned" status of self-consciousness, its critique of "reflective" or "foundationalist" epistemologies and metaphysics, and its account of "Reason" or conceptuality as immanent in all human experience and social life. This article contends that this revaluation throws new light upon Karl Marx's 1841 doctoral dissertation on ancient Greek atomism. It argues that Marx's interest in comparing the atomistic theories of Democritus and Epicurus lies in their being historical species of reflective or "essentialist" thinking that attempts to identify an underlying "principle" behind or "beyond" sensible "appearance." Epicurus is accorded (relative) praise by Marx on account of his clear awareness of the necessary contradiction at the heart of any such structure, and his oblique demonstration of its internal link with the individualism and alienation of the post-Hellenic world. Intimately related themes are then shown to animate the rhetorical declarations against religion, in the name of "Reason" and "Self-consciousness", that frame the dissertation. The precise manner in which Marx formulates this opposition, it is argued, indicate a closer and more conscious affinity with the original project of post-Kantian Idealism than has hitherto been appreciated. While Marx is sure to have intended more than a simple recycling of this tradition, it is suggested that a greater sensitivity to its role in shaping his outlook will prove suggestive—if not conclusive—for thinking about where he means to take it.

Hans Blumenberg's Philosophical Anthropology: After Heidegger and Cassirer, VIDA PAVESICH

In this paper, Pavesich situates Hans Blumenberg historically and conceptually in relation to a subtheme in the famous debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer at Davos, Switzerland in 1929. The sub-theme concerns Heidegger's and Cassirer's divergent attitudes toward philosophical anthropology as it relates to the starting points and goals of philosophy. Pavesich then reconstructs Blumenberg's anthropology, which involves reconceptualizing Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms in relation to Heidegger's objections to the philosophical anthropology of his day (for example, Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen) as unduly anthropocentric. Blumenberg builds on anthropologist Gehlen's assumption that human beings are biologically underdetermined and therefore world-open. With this starting point, symbolic forms, such as myth and language, make up a compensatory life-world that supports human existence. Action, or self-assertion, which is necessary given the lack of a seamless fit between human beings and the environment, is thus circumscribed and shaped by the historical, cultural constructs that constitute a life-world. Human beings can thus be characterized as a species that continually renegotiates the shape of its existence through its relation to biological limits on the one hand and cultural constants on the other. Because Blumenberg and philosophical anthropology are relatively unexplored by Anglophone philosophers, and because philosophical anthropology is central to Blumenberg's methodology generally, this study provides an introduction to both.

Effects of the Agrégation de Philosophie on Twentieth-Century French Philosophy, ALAN SCHRIFT

In this paper, Schrift discusses the *Agrégation de Philosophie*—the French national examination that certifies philosophy teachers for both lycée and university instruction—in terms of the role it has played in the intellectual formation of all French philosophers and, as a corollary, its impact on developments in 20th-century French philosophy. Following a recounting of the history and structure of the examination, he discusses how the examination reveals that a thorough grounding in the history of philosophy, especially pre-1800 philosophy, is a necessary condition for employment as an instructor of philosophy. After discussing the connections between the examination and the teaching activities of the Sorbonne's Department of Philosophy, he analyzes the content of the exam, showing how it offers important insights into the French philosophical tradition and how it differs from the English language and German philosophical traditions. He concludes by examining in detail the appearances of Comte, Plotinus, and Nietzsche on the examination, showing how their appearances correlate with publication trends as well as the careers of influential philosophers.

MIND

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Coherence as a Heuristic, STAFFAN ANGERE

The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, Angere defines a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. He uses the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different circumstances. It turns out that all of these, including the prior, are just about equally good in cases of very little knowledge. Nevertheless, there are differences in when they are applicable, and they also depart more from each other when more knowledge is added.

Partial Belief, Partial Intention, RICHARD HOLTON

Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential.

On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals, DAVID MANLEY and RYAN WASSERMAN

Analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of conditional statements famously confront the problems of finks and masks. The authors argue that conditional analyses of dispositions, even those tailored to avoid finks and masks, face five further problems. These are the problems of: (i) Achilles' heels, (ii) accidental closeness, (iii) comparatives, (iv) explaining context sensitivity, and (v) absent stimulus conditions. The authors conclude by offering a proposal that avoids all seven of these problems.

Kant's Formula of Humanity, WILLIAM NELSON

This paper is concerned with the normative content of Kant's formula of humanity (FH). More specifically, does FH, as some seem to think, imply the

specific and rigid prescriptions in 'standard' deontological theories? To this latter question, the author argues, the answer is 'no'. He proposes reading FH largely through the formula of autonomy and the formula of the kingdom of ends, where he understands FA to describe the nature of the capacity of humanity—a capacity for self-governance. The latter, he suggests, is akin to the capacity for planning and intentional action described in Michael Bratman's work. A significant part of what FH requires, Nelson then proposes, is that we exercise these capacities for planning in such a way that we accommodate and coordinate with the (permissible) plans and intentions of others. Kant himself, as do many commentators, emphasizes the idea that our human capacities give us a distinctive kind of value. On Nelson's interpretation, by contrast, what is fundamentally important is not the value of the capacities but rather what they make possible: distinctive ways of mistreating (using) persons, but also a distinctive kind of morally desirable relationship.

Russell's Last (and Best) Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment,
CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK

Russell's version of the multiple-relation theory from the Theory of Knowledge manuscript is presented and defended against some objections. A new problem, related to defining truth via correspondence, is reconstructed from Russell's remarks and what we know of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory. In the end, understanding this objection in terms of correspondence helps to link Russell's multiplerelation theory to his later views on propositions.

THE MONIST
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Against Consciousness Chauvinism, ITAY SHANI

Consciousness chauvinism is the view that only conscious psychological states are intrinsically mental and that the mentality of unconscious psychological states is derived from the authentic mentality that is immanent to consciousness. In this paper, the author urges caution against this view, as well as against the somewhat weaker thesis of intentional dualism, the thesis that the intentional profile of unconscious mental states is categorically distinct from that of conscious intentional states. Examining in some detail the consciousness-chauvinist, and intentional-dualist, claims of John Searle (1992) and Colin McGinn (1988), the author argues that the initial plausibility of their views quickly deteriorates once greater attention is paid to the embodiment of intentionality—conscious and unconscious.

Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended, URIAH KRIEGAL

Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, an orthodoxy of sorts had gelled in the philosophy of mind around a kind of psychological externalism, the idea that some mental states individuate sensitively to extra-cranial factors. More recently, two trends of thought have departed from this young orthodoxy in opposite directions. On the one hand, a cluster of ideas captured in such phrases as "extended mind," "embodied cognition," and "enactive consciousness" proclaim to go further in externalizing the mind; call this the extended mind outlook. On the other hand, a constellation of ideas surrounding the notion of "phenomenal intentionality" has ventured to roll back some of the most important aspects of psychological externalism; call this the phenomenal intentionality outlook. In this paper, we examine the relationship between these two opposing trends. The authors will argue that the phenomenal intentionality outlook can accommodate the letter of the so-called extended mind hypothesis, while renouncing the spirit with which it is often embraced, thus neutralizing the alleged philosophical significance of the extended mind hypothesis. The purpose of this exercise is to show that there is nothing in the letter of the extended mind hypothesis that undermines a more traditional, strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian picture of the mind.

The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality, ADAM PAUTZ

Some philosophers have recently argued for prioritism: phenomenology is explanatorily prior to intentionality. This view may seem in conflict with intentionalism, which explains phenomenology in terms of intentionality. This paper puts forward a view that combines elements of both views. The author develops an argument for intentionalism that depends on a claim that is in the same spirit of prioritism, namely that experiences play a role in grounding the intentionality of other mental states, especially perceptual beliefs. The best account of how experiences can play this explanatory role, the author argues, is that they are themselves intentional states of a kind more basic than belief. This intentionalist view rules out what he will call "global prioritism." However, it is consistent with "restricted prioritism."

Phenomenal Intentionality without Compromise, KATALIN FARKAS

In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events' phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, the author will argue that it isn't. She will suggest that if one is convinced that narrow

phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.

Intentionality, Consciousness, and the Mark of the Mental: Rorty's Challenge, JAMES TARTAGLIA

Intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are the main candidates to provide a mark of the mental. Rorty, who thinks the category mental lacks any underlying unity, suggests a challenge to these positions: to explain how intentionality or phenomenal consciousness alone could generate a mental-physical contrast. The author argues that a failure to meet Rorty's challenge would present a serious indictment of the concept of mind, even though Rorty's own position is untenable. He then argues that both intentionalism and proposals such as Searle's Connection Principle fail to satisfy this explanatory burden. He concludes with the suggestion that only introspectibility may be able to unite intentional and phenomenal states whilst meeting Rorty's challenge.

Secondary Qualities Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet, JOE LEVINE

Secondary qualities like color and sound present a range of problems concerning the nature of mental representation and experience. Are these qualities really in objects as they seem to be? On the other hand, does it really make sense to attribute them to objects in the absence of a conscious subject apprehending them? This paper explores a model of conscious experience of secondary qualities that differs from a standard representational model, yet also eschews the more recent turn toward strongly externalist relational theories.

Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World, AMIE THOMASSON

One-level theories of consciousness—of both phenomenological and reductive representationalist varieties—deny that consciousness requires any awareness of our mental states. Thus they must say how we can acquire knowledge of our conscious mental states, if this is not via being aware of them. While much has been done to account for how we can know the representational content of experiences, greater difficulties arise in accounting for knowledge of the relevant sensory qualia and modes (seeing, hearing, etc.), and knowledge of moods, emotions, and attitudes (of belief, desire, intention, etc.).

Amie Thomasson addresses these problems in turn, suggesting a way for one-level views to overcome both of these problems by showing how our awareness of features of the phenomenal world may be conceptually transformed to provide knowledge of these features of our experience. Nonetheless, it then seems that we cannot hope to reduce phenomenal consciousness unless we can also reduce the phenomenal world. The upshot is that one-level views cannot hope to both give an adequate account of self-knowledge

and achieve reductive ambitions, giving reason to prefer non-reductive one-level theories of consciousness.

PHILOSOPHY

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A Metaphysics of Ordinary Things and Why We Need It, LYNNE
RUDDER BAKER

Mainstream metaphysicians today take little ontological interest in the world as we interact with it. They interpret the variety of things in the world as variety only of concepts applied to things that are basically of the same sort—for example, sums of particles or temporal parts of particles. Baker challenges this approach by formulating and defending for a contrasting line of thought. Using what she calls 'the Constitution View,' she argues that ordinary things (like screwdrivers and walnuts) are as ontologically significant as particles. Baker further argues for why we need recourse to such ordinary things in our basic ontology.

Deconstructing the Laws of Logic, STEPHEN R. L. CLARK

Clark considers reasons for questioning 'the laws of logic' (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and negation), and suggests that these laws do not accord with everyday reality. Either they are rhetorical tools rather than absolute truths, or else Plato and his successors were right to think that they identify a reality distinct from the ordinary world of experience, and also from the ultimate source of reality.

An Aristotelian Critique of Situationism, KRISTJÁN
KRISTJÁNSSON

Aristotle says that no human achievement has the stability of activities that express virtue. Ethical situationists consider this claim to be refutable by empirical evidence. If that is true, not only Aristotelianism, but folk psychology, contemporary virtue ethics and character education have all been seriously infirmed. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to offer a systematic classification of the existing objections against situationism under four main headings: 'the methodological objection', 'the moral dilemma objection', 'the bullet-biting objection' and 'the anti-behaviouristic objection'; (2) to resuscitate a more powerful Aristotelian version of the 'anti-behaviouristic objection' than advanced by previous critics; and (3) to explore some of the implications of such resuscitation for our understanding of the salience of character and for future studies of its nature.

What Is an Attributive Adjective? MILES RIND and LAUREN TILLINGHAST

Peter Geach's distinction between logically predicative and logically attributive adjectives has become part of the technical apparatus of philosophers, but no satisfactory explanation of what an attributive adjective is has yet been provided. Geach's discussion suggests two different ways of understanding the notion. According to one, an adjective is attributive just in case predications of it in combination with a noun fail to behave in inferences like a logical conjunction of predications. According to the other, an adjective is attributive just in case it cannot be applied in a truth-value-yielding fashion unless combined with a noun. The latter way of understanding the notion yields both a more defensible version of Geach's arguments that 'good' and 'bad' are attributive and a more satisfactory explanation of attributivity.

The Linguistic View of a Priori Knowledge, M. GIAQUINTO

This paper presents considerations against the linguistic view of a priori knowledge. The paper has two parts. In the first part the author argues that problems about the individuation of lexical meanings provide evidence for a moderate indeterminacy, as distinct from the radical indeterminacy of meaning claimed by Quine, and that this undermines the idea of a priori knowledge based on knowledge of synonymies. In the second part of the paper Giacquinto argues against the idea that a priori knowledge not based on knowledge of synonymies can be explained in terms of implicit definitions.

Dawkins' Infinite Regress, ROGER MONTAGUE

In *The God Delusion*, Richard Dawkins gives, but runs together, two criticisms of the argument from design. One is evolutionary and scientific; the other is a philosophical infinite regress argument. Disentangling them makes Dawkins' views clearer. The regress relies on the premise that a designer must be more complex than the thing designed. Montague offers two comments about theists who might accept the regress, citing God's infinity. These comments defend Dawkins: but only by making him, when using his regress argument, an atheist who knows (if his "complexity" premise holds) that God cannot exist.

On the Reality of the Continuum Discussion Note: A Reply to Ormell, 'Russell's Moment of Candour', ANNE NEWSTEAD and JAMES FRANLIN

How We Trust One Another, OSWALD HANFLING

How is the possibility of promising to be explained without circularity? Appeal is made to the role of natural inclinations in linguistic behavior, which presupposes truth telling and promise keeping, and also to the social functions of human language which go beyond signaling and transmitting information and which are prior to any explicit conventions. Although promises are broken and lies told, we all have the right to feel resentment when these things happen.

Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism, STEPHEN K. McLEOD

By the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive.

Studying Perception, OLLI LAGERSPETZ

Empirical studies of perception must use the logic of everyday non-technical conceptions of perception as their unquestioned background. This is because the phenomena to be studied are defined and individuated on the basis of such basic understanding. Thus the methods of neurobiology exclude reductionist accounts from the outset, implicitly if not explicitly. It is further argued that the concepts of neural and mental representation, while not confused per se, presuppose a general picture where perception as a whole is viewed in the light of teleology. References are made to discussions by Bennett and Hacker, Paul Churchland, and Peter Winch.

False Emotions, TONY MILLIGAN

This article sets out an account of false emotions and focuses upon the example of false grief: Widespread but short-lived mourning for well known public figures involves false grief on the part of at least some mourners. What is false about such grief is not any straightforward pretence but rather the inappropriate antecedents of the state in question and/or the desires that the relevant state involves. False grief, for example, often involves a desire for the experience itself, and this can be satisfied. By contrast, real grief is utterly without hope. (We cannot have the deceased back again.) However, because false emotions involve some desire, they can be motivating and may lead us to engage in actions and efforts of discernment that can result in the emergence of the real emotion that they mimic. For this reason, they are not always unwelcome.

What's Wrong With Megalopsychia? ALEXANDER SARCH

This paper looks at two accounts of Aristotle's views on the virtue of megalopsychia. The first, defended by Christopher Cordner, commits Aristotle to two claims about the virtuous person that might seem unpalatable to modern readers. The second account, defended by Roger Crisp, does not commit Aristotle to these claims. Some might count this as an advantage of Crisp's account. However, Sarch argues that Cordner's account, not Crisp's, is actually the better interpretation of Aristotle. Nonetheless, this does not ultimately spell trouble for Aristotle, since, as Sarch argues, the claims that Cordner's account commits Aristotle to are, on closer inspection, not really problematic.

The Complexity of Wittgenstein's Methods, ROM HARRÉ

In claiming to draw out an inconsistency between Wittgenstein's declarations on method and his actual practice, John Cook argues that Wittgenstein retained a radical distinction between material things (bricks) and immaterial things (spooks). Harré argues that on the contrary Wittgenstein showed in detail how this dichotomy is to be rejected in favour of a spectrum of more or less 'minded' beings, at one pole of which are persons as animated bodies. Discussing the grammar of 'know', Cook claims that Wittgenstein depended on philosophers' distinctions rather than a survey of vernacular uses. Harré argues that it was the expression/description distinction that Wittgenstein used to make sense of the grammar of 'know'.

PHRONESIS
Vol. 53, No. 1

The Place of Aporia in Plato's Charmides, VASILIS POLITIS

The aim of the paper is twofold: to examine the argument in response to Socrates' question whether or not reflexive knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial; and by doing so, to examine the method of Plato's argument. What is distinctive of the method of argument, Politis wants to show, is that Socrates argues on both sides of these questions (the question of possibility and the question of benefit). This, he argues, is why he describes these questions as a source of aporia. Socrates can argue, without contradiction, on both sides of these questions because the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge are premised on the supposition, defended by Critias, that this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, whereas the arguments for its possibility and benefit are not committed to this supposition.

Aristotle on Ontological Dependence, PHIL CORKUM

Aristotle holds that individual substances are ontologically independent from non-substances and universal substances but that non-substances and universal substances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between individual substances and other kinds of beings with respect to ontological dependence. Under what could plausibly be called the standard interpretation, the ontological independence ascribed to individual substances and denied of non-substances and universal substances is a capacity for independent existence. There is, however, a tension between this interpretation and the asymmetry between individual substances and the other kinds of entities with respect to ontological independence. Corkum will propose an alternative interpretation: to weaken the relevant notion of ontological independence from a capacity for independent existence to the independent possession of a certain ontological status.

PHRONESIS
Vol. 53, No. 2, 2008

False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus 427d1-431c3, IMOGEN SMITH

This paper offers an interpretation of Plato's *Cratylus* 427d1-431c3 that supports a reading of the dialogue as a whole as concluding in favour of a conventionalist account of naming. While many previous interpretations note the value of this passage as evidence for Platonic investigations of false propositions, this paper argues that its demonstration that there can be false (or incorrect) naming in turn refutes the naturalist account of naming; that is, it shows that a natural relation between name and nominatum is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for reference. Socrates secures this outcome by using demonstratives and their concomitants to show how any putative natural imitative link between name and object may be overridden. Furthermore, Socrates' employment of demonstratives and context-dependent statements in his case-studies of false naming speaks in favour of a reading of this passage as primarily focussing on naming rather than on propositions in general.

Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories, MARKUS KOHL

Kohl attempts to answer the question of what Aristotle's criteria for 'being a substance' are in the *Categories*. On the basis of close textual analysis, he argues that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the

subjecthood of concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance universals can be understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on Aristotle's essentialism, Kohl argues that such an understanding is possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the *Categories*.

The Place of I 7 in the Argument of Physics I, SEAN KELSEY

Aristotle introduces *Physics I* as an inquiry into principles; in this paper Kelsey asks where he argues for the position he reaches in *I 7*. Many hold that his definitive argument is found in the first half of *I 7* itself; Kelsey argues that this view is mistaken: the considerations raised there do not form the basis of any self-standing argument for Aristotle's doctrine of principles, but rather play a subordinate role in a larger argument begun in earnest in *I 5*. This larger argument stalls in *I 6*, which ends in *aporia*; Kelsey argues that the problem lies in the fact that Aristotle's reasoning in *I 6* thoroughly undermines his reasoning in *I 5* (on which *I 6* is ostensibly supposed to build). He further argues that the materials necessary for resolving this problem, and thereby allowing the argument begun in *I 5* to reach its proper conclusion, are supplied by the thesis that organizes the first half of *I 7*. Along the way Kelsey offers some remarks about Aristotle's doctrine of principles, arguing that it is about the principles of natural substance (as opposed to coming to be or change). He also offers some remarks about the thesis which organizes the first half of *I 7*. Kelsey argues negatively that it is not anything like a preliminary statement of Aristotle's doctrine of principles. He argues positively that it reflects Aristotle's idea that there are two distinct kinds of effect change has upon things (one constructive, the other destructive). One of these effects lies behind Aristotle's reasoning in *I 5*, the other comes to the fore in *I 6*; the achievement of the first half of *I 7* is to reconcile these seemingly competing conceptions by finding a place for them both in a unified account of coming to be and its subjects.

RATIO

Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2007

Wittgenstein's Critique of Frazer, JACQUES BOUVERESSE

This paper provides a systematic exposition of what Wittgenstein took to be the fundamental error committed by James George Frazer, author of the classic anthropological work *The Golden Bough*, in his account of ritual practices. By construing those rituals in scientific or rationalistic terms, as aimed at the production of certain effects, Frazer ignores, according to Wittgenstein, their expressive and symbolic dimension. It is, moreover, an error

to try to explain the powerful emotions evoked even today by traditions such as fire festivals (which may once have involved human sacrifice) by searching for their causal origins in history or prehistory; the disquieting nature of such practices needs to be understood by attending to the inner meaning they already have in our human lives. Certain important general lessons are drawn about the necessarily limited power of scientific and causal explanations when it comes to alleviating many of our fundamental perplexities not just in the area of anthropology but in philosophy as well.

Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability, HANS-JOHANN GLOCK

This paper discusses conceptual relativism. The main focus is on the contrasting ideas of Wittgenstein and Davidson, with Quine, Kuhn, Feysabend and Hacker in supporting roles. Glock distinguishes conceptual from alethic and ontological relativism, defend a distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content, and reject the Davidsonian argument against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes: there can be conceptual diversity without failure of translation, and failure of translation is not necessarily incompatible with recognizing a practice as linguistic. Conceptual relativism may be untenable, but not for the hermeneutic reasons espoused by Davidson.

'Back to the Rough Ground!' Wittgensteinian Reflections on Rationality and Reason, JANE HEAL

Wittgenstein does not talk much explicitly about reason as a general concept, but this paper aims to sketch some thoughts which might fit his later outlook and which are suggested by his approach to language. The need for some notions in the area of 'reason' and 'rationality' are rooted in our ability to engage in discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges. But because such exchanges can (as Wittgenstein emphasises) be so various, we should expect the notions to come in many versions, shaped by history and culture. Awareness of this variety, and of the distinctive elements of our own Western European history, may provide some defence against the temptation of conceptions, such as that of 'perfect rationality', which operate in unhelpfully simplified and idealised terms.

Worlds or Words Apart? Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Language, GENIA SCHÖNBAUMSFELD

In this paper the author develops an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. She shows that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible—either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a 'doctrineless' form of life. She offers a defence of Wittgenstein's conception against Kai Nielsen's charges that Wittgenstein removes the 'content' from religious belief and renders the religious form of life

'incommensurable' with other domains of discourse, thus immunizing it against rational criticism.

The Tightrope Walker, SEVERIN SCHROEDER

Contrary to a widespread interpretation, Wittgenstein did not regard credal statements as merely metaphorical expressions of an attitude towards life. He accepted that Christian faith involves belief in God's existence. At the same time he held that although as a hypothesis, God's existence is extremely implausible, Christian faith is not unreasonable. Is that a consistent view?

According to Wittgenstein, religious faith should not be seen as a hypothesis, based on evidence, but as grounded in a proto-religious attitude, a way of experiencing the world or certain aspects of it. A belief in religious metaphysics is not the basis of one's faith, but a mere epiphenomenon. Given further that religious doctrine is both falsification-transcendent and that religious faith is likely to have beneficial psychological effects, religious doctrine can be exempt from ordinary standards of epistemic support. An unsupported religious belief need not be unreasonable.

However, it is hard to see how one could *knowingly* have such an unsupported belief, as Wittgenstein seems to envisage. How can one believe what, at the same time, one believes is not likely to be true? This, Schroeder argues, is the unresolved tension in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.

Rules and Reason, JOACHIM SCHULTE

Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations (PI §§185–242) have often been discussed in terms of the debate occasioned by Kripke's interpretation of the so-called 'paradox' of rule-following. In the present paper, some of the remarks that stood in the centre of that debate are looked at from a very different perspective. First, it is suggested that these remarks are, among other things, meant to bring out that, to the extent we can speak of 'reason' in the context of rule-following, it is a very restricted form of reason—one which is basically to be understood as a kind of conformity. Second, by telling part of the story of the genesis of the relevant remarks it is pointed out that there is a certain tension between the 'liberating' character of earlier remarks bearing on rule-following (PI §§81ff.) and the 'sinister' side of later remarks like §§198–202, which helps explain why it took Wittgenstein such a long time to arrive at the views expressed in his rule-following considerations.

Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein's Quietism and the Constitutive Question, CRISPIN WRIGHT

This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. Wright returns to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky, hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the

Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, 'the Rule-following Considerations'.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 58, No. 231, April 2008

Two Arguments Against Realism, TIMOTHY BAYS

Bays presents two generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. The first replaces Putnam's model theory with some new, and substantially simpler, model theory, while the second replaces Putnam's model theory with some more accessible results from astronomy. By design, both of these new arguments fail. But the similarities between these new arguments and Putnam's original arguments illuminate the latter's overall structure, and the flaws in these new arguments highlight the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments.

When is Circularity in Definitions Benign?, J. A. BURGESS

Burgess aims to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. He begins by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. He then shows that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The inferences we actually use to establish the applicability of, for example, color concepts are designed to establish warranted assertability and not truth. Understood thus, dispositional analyses are not inferentially circular.

The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World, ANNALISA COLIVA

Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. Coliva argues that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in the existence of an external world itself. Coliva shows how Wright's and Pryor's positions are of interest when taken in connection with Humean scepticism, but that it is only

linking it with Cartesian scepticism which can explain why the proof strikes us as an obvious failure.

Desiring the Bad Under the Guise of the Good, JENNIFER HAWKINS

Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. Hawkins offers a new defense of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. Hawkins develops an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on the idea of evaluative experience.

NaVve Truth-Conditions and Meaning, LIONEL SHAPIRO

Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. Shapiro shall argue that the 'naVve' version of the truth-conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a different connection) to assimilate the naVve truth-conditional theory to an idealized verificationism.

Some Problems for Proof-Theoretic Semantics, WILLIAM R. STIRTON

Proof-theoretic semantics is an approach to logical semantics based on two ideas, of which the first is that the meaning of a logical connective can be explained by stipulating that some mode of inference, for example, a natural deduction introduction or elimination rule, is permissible. The second idea is that the soundness of rules which are not stipulated outright may be deduced by some proof-theoretic argument from properties of the rules which are stipulated outright. Stirton examines the first idea. His main conclusion is that the idea is more problematic, and requires more discussion, than has been generally realized. He mentions five problems which will have to be overcome before the idea can be accepted as definitely viable.

Shame and Punishment in Kant's Doctrine of Right, DAVID SUSSMAN

In the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant claims that killings motivated by the fear of disgrace should be punished less severely than other murders. Sussman considers how Kant understands the mitigating force of such motives, and argue that Kant takes agents to have a moral right to defend their honor. Unlike other rights, however, this right of honor can only be defended personally, so that individuals remain in a 'state of nature' with regard to any such rights, regardless of their political situation. According to Kant, we should be lenient in these cases because the malefactors are caught between two kinds

of authentic normative demand, at a point where the proper authority of the state collides with a certain authority which individuals must claim for themselves.

Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam, MARTIJN BLAAUW

Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. Blauw argues that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. He argues, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. He concludes that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is.

Sea Battle Semantics, BERIT BROGAARD

The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. According to a commonly held intuition, today's occurrence of the sentence 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow', while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later 'become' true. Relativistic semantics has been claimed to do a better job of accommodating intuitions about future contingents than non-relativistic semantics does. However, intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves give good reasons for shifting to a new paradigm, for despite the initial appearances, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both intuitions about future contingents.

Defeasible a Priori Justification: A Reply to Thurow, ALBERT CASULLO

Joshua Thurow offers a defense of the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. He responds to an objection which he makes against this claim, and offers two arguments in support of his own position. He shows that Thurow's response misconstrues my objection, and that his supporting arguments fall short of their goal.

Variable versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism, BRAD HOOKER and GUY FLETCHER

Fixed-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social

acceptance. Brad Hooker has advocated a fixed-rate version. Michael Ridge has argued that the variable-rate version is better. The debate continues here. Of particular interest is the difference between the implications of Hooker's and Ridge's rules about doing good for others.

Actions, Motives and Causes, JAMES LENMAN

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
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
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
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